Every man
will go with thee
and be thy guide
In thy most need
to go by thy side

EVERYMAN
I WILL GO WITH
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& BE THY GVIDE
IN THY MOST NEED
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
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DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

(MRS. CARTER'S TRANSLATION)

EDITED BY W. H. D. ROUSE

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The MORAL DISCOURSES of EPICTETUS

Translated by ELIZABETH CARTER



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EDITOR'S NOTE

NOTHING need be added to Mrs. Carter's sketch of the Stoic philosophy and its most interesting expounder. It is strange indeed that English readers have been content to neglect Epictetus, who is superior to Marcus Aurelius intellectually as morally. Intellectually, indeed, there is no comparison between them; but Marcus Aurelius seems to have become a fashion, with Omar Khayyam, whereas the keen pungent wit of Epictetus is less to the taste of an age of sentimentalists. Epictetus has the philosopher's dry light. He is so human, too, and his life was so true to his faith, that the reader can both love and respect him. In this, as in literary qualities, he has the advantage over Seneca, who was too diffuse, and not free from the suspicion of temporising.

Mrs. Carter's own style is not the style of Epictetus; but it is a style, which is more than can be said of most writers at this time. At least she has represented the author's ideas faithfully and coherently.

W. H. D. ROUSE.

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

§ 1. The Stoic sect was founded by Zeno, about three hundred years before the Christian era, and flourished in great reputation till the declension of the Roman Empire. A complete history of this philosophy would be the work of a large volume; and nothing further is intended here than such a summary view of it as may be of use to give a clearer notion of those passages in Epictetus, a strict professor of it, which allude to some of its peculiar doctrines.

§ 2. That the end of man is to live conformably to nature was universally agreed on amongst all the philosophers; but in what that conformity to nature consists was the point in dispute. The Epicureans maintained that it consisted in pleasure, of which they constituted sense the judge.[1] The Stoics, on the contrary, placed it in an absolute perfection of the soul. Neither of them seem to have understood man in his mixed capacity; but while the first debased him to a mere animal, the last exalted him to a pure intelligence, and both considered him as independent, uncorrupted, and sufficient, either by height of virtue or by well-regulated indulgence, to his own happiness. The Stoical excess was more useful to the public, as it often produced great and noble efforts towards that perfection to which it was supposed possible for human nature to arrive. Yet, at the same time, by flattering man with false and presumptuous ideas of his own power and excellence, it tempted even the best to pride; a vice not only dreadfully mischievous in human society, but perhaps, of all others, the most insuperable bar to real inward improvement.

§ 3. Epictetus often mentions three topics, or classes, under which the whole of moral philosophy is comprehended. These are the Desires and Aversions, the Pursuits and Avoidances, or the exercise of the active powers, and the Assents of the understanding.

§ 4. The desires (ὀρέξεις) and Aversions (ἐκκλίσεις) were considered as simple affections of the mind, arising from the apprehension that anything was conducive to happiness, or the contrary. The first care of a proficient in philosophy

was, to regulate these in such a manner as never to be disappointed of the one, or incur the other; a point no otherwise attainable than by regarding all externals as absolutely indifferent. Good must always be the object of Desire, and Evil of Aversion. The person, then, who considers life, health, ease, friends, reputation, etc. as Good, and their contraries as Evil, must necessarily desire the one, and be averse to the other; and, consequently, must often find his Desire disappointed, and his Aversion incurred. The Stoics, therefore, restrained Good and Evil to Virtue and Vice alone; and excluded all externals from any share in human happiness, which they made entirely dependent on a right choice. From this regulation of the Desires and Aversions follows that freedom from perturbation, grief, anger, pity, etc.; and in short, that universal apathy which they everywhere strongly inculcate.

§ 5. The next step to Stoical perfection was, the class of Pursuits (ὁρμαί) and Avoidances (ἀφορμαί).[2] As the Desires and Aversions are simple affections, the Pursuits and Avoidances are exertions of the active powers towards the procuring or declining anything. Under this head was comprehended the whole system of moral duties, according to their incomplete ideas of them, and a due regard to it was supposed to ensure a proper behaviour in all the social relations. The constant performance of what these point out naturally followed from a regulation of the Desires and Aversions in the first topic; for where the inclinations are exerted and restrained as they ought, there will be nothing to mislead us in action.

§ 6. The last topic, and the completion of the Stoic character, was that of the Assents.[3] As the second was to produce a security from failure in practice, this was to secure an infallibility in judgment, and to guard the mind from ever either admitting a falsehood or dissenting from truth. A wise man in the Stoic scheme was never to be mistaken, or to form any opinion. Where evidence could not be obtained, he was to continue in suspense. His understanding was never to be misled even in sleep, or under the influence of wine, or in a delirium. In this last particular, however, there is not a perfect agreement, and some authors are so very reasonable as to admit it possible for a philosopher to be mistaken in his judgment after he hath lost his senses.[4]

§ 7. The subjects of these several classes of philosophic exercise are the Appearances of things (φαντασίαι).[5] By these Appearances the Stoics understood the impressions[6] made on

the soul by any objects, presented either to the senses or to the understanding. Thus a house, an estate, life, death, pain, reputation, etc. (considered in the view under which they are presented to the perceptive faculties) in the Stoical sense are Appearances. The use of Appearances is common to brutes and men, an intelligent use of them belongs only to the latter; a distinction which is carefully to be observed in reading these discourses.

§ 8. That judgment which is formed by the mind concerning the Appearances the Stoics termed Principles (δόγματα), and these principles give a determination to the Choice.

§ 9. The Choice (προαίρεσεις) among the Stoics signified either the faculty of willing, or a deliberate election made of some action or course of life.

§ 10. As the Appearances respect particular objects, the Pre-conceptions (προλήψεις) are general innate notions, such as they supposed to take original possession of the mind, before it forms any of its own.[7] To adapt these Pre-conceptions to particular cases is the office of reason, and is often insisted on by Epictetus as a point of the highest importance.

§ 11. By the word, which throughout this translation is rendered Prosperity (εὔροια) the Stoics understood the internal state of the mind, when the affections and active powers were so regulated that it considered all events as happy; and, consequently, must enjoy an uninterrupted flow of success, since nothing could fall out contrary to its wishes.[8]

These which have been mentioned are the technical terms of the greatest consequence in the Stoic philosophy, and which for that reason are, except in a very few places, always rendered by the same English word. There are other words used in a peculiar sense by this sect; but, as they are not of equal importance, they are neither so strictly translated, nor need any particular definition.

§ 12. The Stoics held logic in the highest esteem, and often carried it to such a trifling degree of subtlety as rendered their arguments very tedious and perplexed. The frequent references to logical questions, and the use of syllogistical terms, are the least agreeable part of the discourses of Epictetus; since, however well they might be understood by some of his hearers, they are now unintelligible to the greatest part of his readers. Indeed, with all his strength and clearness of understanding, he seems to have been hurt by this favourite science of his sect. One is sometimes surprised to find his reasoning incoherent and

perplexed; and his scholars rather silenced by interrogatories which they are unable to comprehend, than convinced by the force of truth; and then given up by him, as if they were hopeless and unteachable. Yet many a well-meaning understanding may be lost in a wood by the confusion of dialectical quibbles, which might have been led without difficulty to the point in view if it had been suffered to follow the track of common sense.

§ 13. The Stoic scheme of theology, as it is explained in Cicero and other ancient writers, appears, in many parts of it, strangely perplexed and absurd. Some, however, of this seeming absurdity may possibly arise from the use of strong figures, and the infinite difficulty of treating a subject, for which no human language can supply proper and adequate terms.[9] The writings of the first founders of the Stoic philosophy, who treated expressly on physiology and metaphysics, are now lost, and all that can be known of their doctrine is from fragments, and the accounts given of them by other authors. By what can be collected from these, and particularly by the account which Diogenes Laertius gives of the Stoics, they appear to have held, that there is one supreme God, incorruptible, unoriginated,[10] immortal, rational, and perfect in intelligence and happiness, unsusceptible of all evil, governing the world and everything in it, by his providence; not however of the human form, but the creator of the universe, the father likewise of all; [11] and that the several names of Apollo, Minerva, Ceres, etc., only denote different exertions of his power in the different parts of the universe.[12] It would be well if they had stopt here, but they plainly speak of the world as God, or of God as the soul of the world, which they call his substance,[13] and I do not recollect any proof that they believed him to exist in the extramundane space. Yet they held the world to be finite [14] and corruptible, and that at certain periods it was to undergo successive conflagrations, and then all beings were to be resorbed into God, and again reproduced by him.[15] What they intended by being resorbed into God, as I do not comprehend, I will not attempt to explain; but I fear they understood by it a loss of separate personal existence. Yet some of the later Stoics departed from this doctrine of the conflagration, and supposed the world to be immortal.[16] Indeed, there is often so much obscurity and appearance of contradiction in their expressions, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to form any precise idea of their meaning. They who with impartiality read what the ancient philosophers of all sects have written on the nature of God, will

often find cause to think, with the utmost veneration and gratitude, on the only book in which this important article is explained, so far as is necessary to be known, in a manner perfectly agreeable to the principles of simple, unperverted reason. For what it graciously teaches more than reason could, it confirms by such evidences of its authority as reason must admit, or contradict itself.

§ 14. The Stoics sometimes define God to be an intelligent, fiery spirit, without form, but passing into whatever things it pleases, and assimilating itself to all;[17] sometimes an active, operative fire.[18] It might be hoped that these were only metaphorical phrases, if they did not expressly speak of God as corporeal, which is objected to them by Plutarch.[19] Indeed, they defined all essence to be body.[20] An error of which, probably, they did not discover the ill tendency any more than Tertullian; who inconsiderately followed them in this very unphilosophical notion, that what is not body is nothing at all.[21] His Christian faith secures him from the imputation of impiety; and the just and becoming manner in which the Stoics, in many instances, speak of God, should incline one to form the same favourable judgment of them; and those authors seem guilty of great injustice who represent them as little better than atheists.

§ 15. They held the eternity of matter as a passive principle; but that it was reduced into form by God, and that the world was made and is continually governed by him.[22] They sometimes represent him as modelling the constitution of the world with supreme authority;[23] at others, as limited by the materials, which he had not the power to change.[24] Epictetus may be thought to incline to this latter opinion;[25] yet his words are capable of a different turn. And there are, perhaps, more arguments in the writings of the Stoics, to prove their belief of the uncontrollable power of the Deity in the formation of things, than those which some unguarded expressions appear to furnish against it.

§ 16. Of all the philosophers the Stoics were the clearest and most zealous assertors of a particular Providence;[26] a belief which was treated with the utmost contempt by the Epicureans.[27] As this principle is, of all others, the most conducive to the interests of virtue, and lays the foundation of all true piety, the Stoics are entitled to the highest honour for their steady defence of it, and their utter rejection of the idle and contemptible notion of chance.[28]

§ 17. By fate they seem to have understood a series of events appointed by the immutable counsels of God; or that law of his providence by which he governs the world. It is evident, by their writings, that they meant it in no sense which interferes with the liberty of human actions. Cicero allows that Chrysippus endeavoured to reconcile fate with free will; and that it was contrary to his intention that, by a perplexed way of arguing, he confirmed the doctrine of necessity.[29] Whenever they speak of God as subject to fate, which it must be owned they sometimes do in a very strong and unguarded manner, their meaning seems to be, that his own eternal will is his law; that he cannot change, because he always ordains what is best;[30] and that, as fate is no more than a connected series of causes, God is the first original cause, on which all the rest depend.[31]

§ 18. They imagined the whole universe to be peopled with gods, genii, and demons; and among other inferior divinities reckoned the sun, moon, and stars, which they conceived to be animated and intelligent, or inhabited by particular deities, as the body is by the soul, who presided over them and directed their notions.[32]

§ 19. The Stoics held both the above-mentioned intelligences and the souls of men to be portions of the essence of God,[33] or parts of the soul of the world,[34] and to be corporeal,[35] and perishable.[36] Some of them indeed maintained that human souls subsisted after death; but that they were, like all other beings, to be consumed at the conflagration. Cleanthes taught that all souls lasted till that time; Chrysippus, only those of the good.[37] Seneca is perpetually wavering, sometimes speaking of the soul as immortal; and, at others, as perishing with the body. And indeed there is nothing but confusion, and a melancholy uncertainty, to be met with among the Stoics on this subject.

§ 20. There is, I think, very little evidence to be found that they believed future rewards or punishments, compared with that which appears to the contrary;[38] at least the reader will observe that Epictetus never asserts either. He strongly insists that a bad man hath no other punishment than being such; and a good man no other reward;[39] and he tells his disciple that, when want of necessaries obliges him to go out of life, he returns to the four elements of which he was made; that there is no Hades nor Acheron nor Pyriphlegethon;[40] and he clearly affirms that personal existence is lost in death.[41] Had Epictetus believed future rewards, he must, of course, have made frequent mention of them.[42] M. Antoninus, upon a supposition that souls con-

tinue after death, makes them to remain for some time in the air, and then to be changed, diffused, kindled, and resumed into the productive intelligence of the universe.[43] In another place he vindicates the conduct of Providence, on the hypothesis that the souls of the good are extinguished by death.[44]

§ 21. The Stoics thought that every single person had a tutelary genius assigned him by God, as a guardian of his soul and a superintendent of his conduct,[45] and that all virtue and happiness consist in acting in concert with this genius, with reference to the will of the supreme director of the whole.[46] Sometimes, however, they make the genius to be only the ruling faculty of every one's own mind.[47]

§ 22. A very slight examination of their writings is sufficient to convince any impartial reader how little the doctrines of this sect were fitted to influence the generality of mankind. But indeed about the generality of mankind the Stoics do not appear to have given themselves any kind of trouble. They seemed to consider all (except the few who were students in the intricacies of a philosophic system) as very little superior to beasts; and, with great tranquillity, left them to follow the devices of their own ungoverned appetites and passions. How unlike was this to the diffusive benevolence of the divine author of the Christian religion, who adapted his discourses to the comprehension, and extended the means of happiness to the attainment, of all mankind!

§ 23. There seem to be only two methods by which the present appearances of things are capable of being reconciled to our ideas of the justice, wisdom, and goodness of God: the one is the doctrine of a future state; the other, the position that virtue alone is sufficient to human happiness in this.[48] The first, which was the method chosen by Socrates, solves every difficulty, without contradicting either sense or reason; the latter, which was unfortunately maintained by the Stoics, is repugnant to both.

§ 24. That there is an intrinsic beauty and excellency in moral goodness; that it is the ornament and perfection of all rational beings; and that, till conscience is stifled by repeated guilt, we feel an obligation to prefer and follow, so far as we perceive it, in all cases; and find an inward satisfaction, and generally receive outward advantages, from so doing,—are positions which no thinking person can contradict: but it doth not follow from hence, that in such a mixture as mankind it is its own sufficient reward. God alone, infinitely perfect, is happy in and from

himself. The virtue of finite beings must be defective: and the happiness of created beings must be dependent. It is undeniable fact that the natural consequences of virtue in some may be interrupted by the vices of others. How much are the best persons liable to suffer from the follies of the unthinking; from the ill-nature, the rage, the scorn of the malevolent; from the cold and penurious hardheartedness of the unfeeling; from persecutions, for the sake both of religion and honesty; from ill returns to conjugal, to parental, to friendly affection; and from an innumerable train of other evils, to which the most amiable dispositions are usually the most sensible! It is no less undeniable that the natural consequences of virtue are interrupted by the struggles of our own passions (which we may overcome rewardably, though very imperfectly, or, if we live to overcome more perfectly, we may not live to enjoy the victory); by sickness, pain, languor, want; and by what we feel from the death or the sufferings of those with whom we are most nearly connected. We are often, indeed, afflicted by many of these things more than we ought to be. But concern for some, at least our own failings, for instance, is directly a duty; for others, it is visibly the instrument of moral improvement; for more still, it is the unavoidable result of our frame; and they who carry it too far may, on the whole, be good characters; and even they who do not, in any considerable degree, may however be extremely wretched. How, then, can virtue be its own reward to mankind in general, or indeed a proportionable reward to almost any man? Or how, unless the view be extended beyond such a scene of things, the certain means of happiness? The originally appointed means of happiness it undoubtedly is; but that it should be an effectual and infallible means to creatures so imperfect, passing through such a disordered world, is impossible, without a state of future reward; and of this the gospel alone gives us full assurance.

§ 25. By rejecting the doctrine of recompenses in another life, the Stoics were reduced to the extravagance of supposing felicity to be enjoyed in circumstances which are incapable of it. That a good man stretched on a rack, or reposing on a bed of roses, should enjoy himself equally, was a notion which could gain but few proselytes; and a sad experience that pain was an evil, sometimes drove their own disciples from the thorny asperities of the portico to the flowery gardens of Epicurus.

§ 26. The absolute indifference of all externals, and the position, that things independent on choice are nothing to us, the

grand point on which their arguments turned, every one who feels knows to be false: and the practice of the wisest and best among them proved it in fact to be so. It is remarkable that no sect of philosophers ever so dogmatically prescribed, or so frequently committed, suicide as those very Stoics, who taught that the pains and sufferings, which they strove to end by this act of rebellion against the decrees of Providence, were no evils. How absolutely this horrid practice contradicted all their noble precepts of resignation and submission to the divine will is too evident to need any enlargement. They professed, indeed, in suicide to follow the divine will; but this was a lamentably weak pretence. Even supposing sufferings to be evils, they are no proof of a signal from God to abandon life; but to show an exemplary patience, which he will reward: but, supposing them, as the Stoics did, not to be evils, they afford not so much as the shadow of a proof.[49]

§ 27. As the Stoics, by the permission of suicide, plainly implied that external inconveniences were not indifferent in the extremity, it follows that they must proportionably be allowed not to be indifferent in the inferior degrees; of which Zeno seemed to be perfectly well convinced, by hanging himself when his finger ached. And where was the use of taking so much pains to say and believe what they knew to be false? It might, perhaps, be thought to be of some benefit, in the time of the later Stoics, to the great men of Rome, whom the emperors frequently butchered at their pleasure: and this is the use to which Epictetus is perpetually applying it. Yet, even in this case, the Stoic doctrine, where men could bring themselves to act upon it, made them absurdly rough, as appears by the history of Helvidius Priscus, and hindered the good they might otherwise have done. And if a man, taught thus to despise tortures and death, should happen at the same time to be wrong-headed, for which he had no small chance, he would in one respect be a more terrible wild beast than an enthusiast of any other sect, as he would not think his sufferings evils; though in another he would be less so, as he would not hope to be rewarded for them hereafter.

§ 28. The Stoics are frequently, and justly, charged with great arrogance in their discourses, and even in their addresses to God. They assert, however, the doctrine of grace, and the duty of praise and thanksgiving for the divine assistance in moral improvements.[50] But there doth not, I think, appear any instance of a Stoic, or perhaps any other heathen philosopher, addressing

his repentance to God, and begging pardon for his failings, or directing his disciples to do it. Indeed nothing can excuse their idolatry of human nature, which they proudly and inconsistently supposed perfect and self-sufficient. Seneca carried the matter so far as by an impious antithesis to give his wise man the superiority to God.[51] Epictetus indeed was attentive enough to the voice of conscience to own himself not perfect:[52] and he sometimes tells his hearers that they cannot be perfect yet.[53] But even he at other times informs them that they are not inferior to the gods.[54] The Stoical boasting will, however, imply less of personal arrogance, if we can suppose that those speeches, which so ill become human imperfection, were always uttered, as perhaps in part they often were, in the character of their idol, the perfectly wise and good man, which they owned to be merely an ideal being.[55] At least, it may be affirmed with truth that they frequently mention themselves with decency and humility, and with an express confession of their deviation from this faultless exemplar.

§ 29. But then, where was the use of their favourite doctrine, that a wise man must always be happy? Might not a person, determined to follow his own inclinations, very reasonably object, "What is that to me if I am not, or to anybody else if no one ever was, a wise man? But suppose I were one; which is the better grounded argument? You must always be happy, and therefore externals are no evils; or, These things are evils, and therefore I am not happy. But Epictetus will say, You have a remedy: the door is open; go, with great good humour and thankfulness, and hang yourself, and there will be an end of your pain and you together.—A fine scheme of happiness indeed! and much to be thankful for! Why, is it not the shorter and merrier way, instead of studying this crabbed philosophy, to indulge myself in whatever I like, as long as I can (it may chance to be a good while), and hang myself thankfully, when I feel inconveniences from that? The door is just as open in one case, as in the other; and nothing beyond it either pleasing or terrible in either."—Such, alas! is the conclusion too commonly drawn; and such must be the consequences of every doctrine not built upon solid foundations.

§ 30. Epictetus often lays it down as a maxim, that it is impossible for one person to be in fault, and another to be the sufferer. This, on the supposition of a future state, will certainly be made true at last; but in the Stoical sense and system is an absolute extravagance. Take any person of plain understanding,

with all the feelings of humanity about him, and see whether the subtlest Stoic will ever be able to convince him that while he is insulted, oppressed, and tortured, he doth not suffer. See what comfort it will afford him to be told that, if he supports his afflictions and ill-treatment with fortitude and patience, death will set him free, and then he and his persecutor will be equally rewarded, will equally lose all personal existence, and return to the elements. How different are the consolations proposed by Christianity, which not only assures its disciples that they shall rest from their labours in death, but that their works shall follow them; and, by allowing them to rejoice in hope, teaches them the most effectual way of becoming patient in tribulation!

§ 31. The Stoical doctrine, that human souls are literally parts of the deity, was equally shocking and hurtful; as it supposed portions of his being to be wicked and miserable; and, by debasing men's ideas of the divine dignity, and teaching them to think themselves essentially as good as he, nourished in their minds an irreligious and fatal presumption. Far differently the Christian system represents mankind, not as a part of the essence, but a work of the hand of God, as created in a state of improvable virtue and happiness; fallen, by an abuse of free will, into sin, misery, and weakness; [56] but redeemed from them by an almighty Saviour; furnished with additional knowledge and strength; commanded to use their best endeavours; made sensible, at the same time, how wretchedly defective they are; yet assured of endless felicity on a due exertion of them. The Stoic philosophy insults human nature, and discourages all our attempts, by enjoining and promising a perfection in this life of which we feel ourselves incapable. The Christian religion shows compassion to our weakness, by prescribing to us only the practicable task of aiming continually at further improvements; and animates our endeavours by the promise of a divine aid equal to every trial.

§ 32. Specifying thus the errors and defects of so celebrated a system is an unpleasing employment; but in an age fond of preferring the guesses of human sagacity before the unerring declarations of God, it seemed on this occasion necessary to observe that the Christian morality is agreeable to reason and nature; that of the Stoics, for the most part, founded on notions intelligible to few, and which none could admit without contradiction to their own hearts. They reasoned many times admirably well, but from false principles; and the noblest of

their practical precepts, being built on a sandy basis, lay at the mercy of every strong temptation.

§ 33. Stoicism is, indeed, in many points inferior to the doctrine of Socrates, which did not teach that all externals were indifferent; which did teach a future state of recompense; and, agreeably to that, forbade suicide. It doth not belong to the present subject to show how much even this best system is excelled by Christianity. It is sufficient just to observe that the author of it died in a profession, which he had always made, of his belief in the popular deities, whose superstitions and impure worship was the great source of corruption in the heathen world; and the last words he uttered were a direction to his friend for the performance of an idolatrous ceremony. This melancholy instance of ignorance and error, in the most illustrious character for wisdom and virtue in all heathen antiquity, is not mentioned as a reflection on his memory, but as a proof of human weakness in general. Whether reason could have discovered the great truths which in these days are ascribed to it, because now seen so clearly by the light of the gospel, may be a question; but that it never did is an undeniable fact; and that is enough to teach us thankfulness for the blessing of a better information. Socrates, who had, of all mankind, the fairest pretensions to set up for an instructor and reformer of the world, confessed that he knew nothing, referred to traditions, and acknowledged the want of a superior guide; and there is a remarkable passage in Epictetus, in which he represents it as the office of his supreme god, or of one deputed by him, to appear among mankind as a teacher and example.[57]

§ 34. Upon the whole, the several sects of heathen philosophy serve as so many striking instances of the imperfection of human wisdom, and of the extreme need of a divine assistance to rectify the mistakes of depraved reason, and to replace natural religion on its true foundation. The Stoics everywhere testify the noblest zeal for virtue, and the honour of God; but they attempted to establish them on principles inconsistent with the nature of man, and contradictory to truth and experience. By a direct consequence of these principles they were liable to be seduced, and in fact often were seduced, into pride, hard-heartedness, and the last dreadful extremity of human guilt, self-murder.

§ 35. But however indefensible the philosophy of the Stoics in several instances may be, it appears to have been of very important use in the heathen world; and they are, on many

accounts, to be considered in a very respectable light. Their doctrine of evidence and fixed principles was an excellent preservative from the mischiefs that might have arisen from the scepticism of the Academics and Pyrrhonists, if unopposed; and their zealous defence of a particular providence a valuable antidote to the atheistical scheme of Epicurus. To this may be added, that their strict notions of virtue in most points (for they sadly failed in some), and the lives of several among them, must contribute a good deal to preserve luxurious states from an absolutely universal dissoluteness, and the subjects of arbitrary government from a wretched and contemptible pusillanimity.

§ 36. Even now their compositions may be read with great advantage, as containing excellent rules of self-government and of social behaviour, of a noble reliance on the aid and protection of Heaven, and of a perfect resignation and submission to the divine will; points which are treated with great clearness, and with admirable spirit, in the lessons of the Stoics; and though their directions are seldom practicable on their principles, in trying cases, may be rendered highly useful in subordination to Christian reflections.

§ 37. If, among those who are so unhappy as to remain unconvinced of the truth of Christianity, any are prejudiced against it by the influence of unwarrantable inclinations, such persons will find very little advantage in rejecting the doctrines of the New Testament for those of the portico, unless they think it an advantage to be laid under moral restraints almost equal to those of the gospel, while they are deprived of its encouragements and supports. Deviations from the rules of sobriety, justice, and piety meet with small indulgence in the Stoic writings; and they who profess to admire Epictetus, unless they pursue that severely virtuous conduct which he everywhere prescribes, will find themselves treated by him with the utmost degree of scorn and contempt. An immoral character is indeed, more or less, the outcast of all sects of philosophy; and Seneca quotes even Epicurus to prove the universal obligation of a virtuous life.[58] Of this great truth, God never left himself without witness. Persons of distinguished talents and opportunities seem to have been raised, from time to time, by Providence to check the torrent of corruption, and to preserve the sense of moral obligations on the minds of the multitude, to whom the various occupations of life left but little leisure to form deductions of their own. But then, they wanted a proper commission to enforce their precepts; they intermixed with them, through

false reasoning, many gross mistakes; and their unavoidable ignorance, in several important points, entangled them with doubts, which easily degenerated into pernicious errors.

§ 38. If there are others who reject Christianity from motives of dislike to its peculiar doctrines, they will scarcely fail of entertaining more favourable impressions of it if they can be prevailed on, with impartiality, to compare the holy Scriptures, from whence alone the Christian religion is to be learned, with the Stoic writings; and then fairly to consider whether there is anything to be met with in the discourses of our blessed Saviour, in the writings of his Apostles, or even in the obscurest parts of the prophetic books, by which, equitably interpreted, either their senses or their reason are contradicted, as they are by the paradoxes of these philosophers; and if not, whether notices from above, of things in which, though we comprehend them but imperfectly, we are possibly much more interested than at present we discern, ought not to be received with implicit veneration, as useful exercises and trials of that duty which finite understandings owe to infinite wisdom.

§ 39. Antiquity furnishes but very few particulars of the life of Epictetus. He was born at Hierapolis, a city of Phrygia; but of what parents is unknown, as well as by what means he came to Rome, where he was the slave of Epaphroditus, one of Nero's courtiers.[59] It is reported that when his master once put his leg to the torture, Epictetus, with great composure, and even smiling, observed to him, "You will certainly break my leg;" which accordingly happened, and he continued, in the same tone of voice, "Did not I tell you that you would break it?"[60] This accident might perhaps be the occasion of his lameness, which, however, some authors say he had from his early years,[61] and others attribute to the rheumatism.[62] At what time he obtained his liberty doth not appear. When the philosophers, by a decree of Domitian, were banished from Rome, Epictetus retired to Nicopolis,[63] a city of Epirus, where he taught philosophy; from which he doth not seem to have derived any external advantages, as he is universally said to have been extremely poor. At least he was so when he lived at Rome, where his whole furniture consisted of a bed,[64] a pipkin, and an earthen lamp;[65] which last was purchased for about a hundred pounds, after his death, by a person whom Lucian ridicules for it, as hoping to acquire the wisdom of Epictetus by studying over it. His only attendant was a woman, whom he took in his advanced years to nurse a child whom, otherwise, one of his

friends would have exposed to perish;[66] an amiable proof of the poor old man's good-nature, and disapprobation, it is to be hoped, of that shocking, yet common, instance of heathen blindness and barbarity.

In this extreme poverty, a cripple, unattended, and destitute of almost every convenience of life, Epictetus was not only obliged by the rules of his philosophy to think himself happy, but actually did so, according to the distich of which Aulus Gellius affirms him to have been the author:[67]

> "A slave, in body maimed, as Irus poor;
> Yet to the gods was Epictetus dear."

He is said to have returned to Rome in the reign of Hadrian, and to have been treated by him with a high degree of familiarity.[68] If this be true, he lived to a great age. But that he should continue alive to the time of M. Antoninus, as Themistius[69] and Suidas[70] affirm, is utterly improbable,[71] as the learned Fabricius observes; to whose life of Epictetus[72] I am greatly indebted. When or where he died is, I think, nowhere mentioned. All authors agree in bearing testimony to the unblemished conduct of his life, and the usefulness of his instructions. The last-named emperor expresses much obligation to a friend who had communicated his works to him;[73] and in another place he ranks him, not only with Chrysippus, but with Socrates.[74] A. Gellius calls him the greatest of the Stoics.[75] Origen affirms that his writings had done more good than Plato's;[76] and Simplicius says, perhaps by way of indirect opposition to an infinitely better book, that he who is not influenced by them is reclaimable by nothing but the chastisements of another world.[77] In what manner he instructed his pupils will be seen in the following treatise.

§ 40. There are so many of the sentiments and expressions of Christianity in it, that one should be strongly tempted to think that Epictetus was acquainted with the New Testament, if such a supposition was not highly injurious to his character. To have known the contents of that book, and not to have been led by them into an inquiry which must have convinced him of their truth, would argue such an obstinacy of prejudice as one would not willingly impute to a mind which appears so well disposed. And, even passing over this consideration, to have borrowed so much from Christianity as he seems to have done, without making the least acknowledgment from whence he received it, would be an instance of disingenuity utterly un-

worthy of an honest man, and inconsistent with his practice in other respects; for he often quotes, with great applause, the sentences of many writers not of his own sect. Possibly indeed he might, like the other heathens in general, have a peculiar contempt of, and aversion to, Christian authors, as akin to the Jews, and opposers of the established worship; notwithstanding those parts of them which he must approve. But still, I hope, his conformity with the sacred writings may be accounted for without supposing him acquainted with Christianity as such. The great number of its professors, dispersed through the Roman empire, had probably introduced several of the New Testament phrases into the popular language; and the Christian religion might by that time have diffused some degree of general illumination, of which many might receive the benefit who were ignorant of the source from whence it proceeded; and Epictetus I apprehend to have been of this number. Several striking instances of this resemblance between him and the New Testament have been observed in the notes; and the attentive reader will find many which are not mentioned, and may perceive from them, either that the Stoics admired the Christian language, however they came to the knowledge of it, or that treating a subject practically, and with a feeling of its force, leads men to such strong expressions as we find in Scripture, and should find oftener in the philosophers if they had been more in earnest; but, however, they occur frequently enough to vindicate those, in which the Scriptures abound, from the contempt and ridicule of light minds.

§ 41. Arrian, the disciple of Epictetus, to whom we are obliged for these discourses, was a Greek by birth, but a senator and consul of Rome, and an able commander in war.[78] He imitated Xenophon, both in his life and writings; and particularly in delivering to posterity the conversations of his master. There were originally twenty books of them, besides the *Enchiridion*, which seems to be taken out of them, and an account of his life and death. Very little order or method is to be found in them, or was from the nature of them to be expected. The connection is often scarcely discoverable; a reference to particular incidents, long since forgotten, at the same time that it evidences their genuineness, often renders them obscure in some places, and the great corruption of the text in others. Yet, under all these disadvantages, this immethodical collection is perhaps one of the most valuable remains of antiquity; and they who consult it with any degree of attention can scarcely

fail of receiving improvement. Indeed, it is hardly possible to be inattentive to so awakening a speaker as Epictetus. There is such a warmth and spirit in his exhortations; and his good sense is enlivened by such a keenness of wit, and gaiety of humour, as render the study of him a most delightful as well as profitable entertainment.

§ 42. For this reason it was judged proper that a translation of him should be undertaken; there being none, I believe, but of the *Enchiridion* in any modern language, excepting a pretty good French one, published about a hundred and fifty years ago, and so extremely scarce that I was unable to procure it, till Mr. Harris obligingly lent it to me after I had published the proposals for printing this, which, notwithstanding the assistance given me in the prosecution of it, hath still, I am sensible, great faults. But they who will see them the most clearly will be the readiest to excuse, as they will know best the difficulty of avoiding them. There is one circumstance which, I am apprehensive, must be particularly striking, and possibly shocking to many, the frequent use of some words in an unpopular sense; an inconvenience which, however, I flatter myself, the introduction and notes will, in some degree, remove. In the translation of technical terms, if the same Greek word had not always been rendered in the same manner, at least when the propriety of our language will at all permit it, every new expression would have been apt to raise a new idea. The reader, I hope, will pardon, if not approve, the uncouthness, in many places, of a translation pretty strictly literal; as it seemed necessary, upon the whole, to preserve the original spirit, the peculiar turn and characteristic roughness of the author. For else, taking greater liberties would have spared me no small pains.

I have been much indebted to Mr. Upton's edition, by which many passages, unintelligible before, are cleared up. His emendations have often assisted me in the text, and his references furnished me with materials for the historical notes.

ELIZABETH CARTER.

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ARRIAN

TO

LUCIUS GELLIUS

WISHETH ALL HAPPINESS

I NEITHER composed the Discourses of Epictetus in such a manner as things of this nature are commonly composed, nor did I myself produce them to public view any more than I composed them. But whatever sentiments I heard from his own mouth, the very same I endeavoured to set down in the very same words, as far as possible, and preserve as memorials, for my own use, of his manner of thinking and freedom of speech.

These discourses are such as one person would naturally deliver from his own thoughts, *extempore*, to another; not such as he would prepare to be read by numbers afterwards. Yet, notwithstanding this, I cannot tell how, without either my consent or knowledge, they have fallen into the hands of the public. But it is of little consequence to me if I do not appear an able writer; and of none to Epictetus if any one treats his discourses [1] with contempt; since it was very evident, even when he uttered them, that he aimed at nothing more than to excite his hearers to virtue. If they produce that one effect, they have in them what, I think, philosophical discourses ought to have. And should they fail of it, let the readers, however, be assured, that when Epictetus himself pronounced them, his audience could not help being affected in the very manner he intended they should. If by themselves they have less efficacy, perhaps it is my fault, or perhaps it is unavoidable.—Farewell.

[1] He means the composition, not the subject matter of them.

THE
DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE, AND OF THOSE WHICH ARE NOT, IN OUR OWN POWER

§ 1. Of other faculties, you will find no one that contemplates, or consequently approves or disapproves, itself. How far does the contemplative power of grammar extend?

As far as the judging of language.

Of music?

As far as judging of melody.

Does either of them contemplate itself, then?

By no means.

Thus, for instance, when you are to write to your friend, grammar will tell you what to write: but whether you are to write to your friend at all, or no, grammar will not tell you. Thus music, with regard to tunes; but whether it be proper or improper at any particular time to sing or play, music will not tell you.

What will tell, then?

That which contemplates both itself and all other things.

And what is that?

The reasoning faculty; for that alone is found to consider both itself, its powers, its value, and likewise all the rest. For what is it else that says gold is beautiful? (for the gold itself does not speak). Evidently that faculty which judges of the appearances of things.[1] What else distinguishes music, grammar, the other faculties, proves their uses, and shows their proper occasions?

Nothing but this.

§ 2. As it was fit, then, this most excellent and superior faculty alone, a right use of the appearances of things, the gods have placed in our own power; but all other matters not in our power. Was it because they would not? I rather think, that if they could, they had granted us these too: but they certainly could not. For, placed upon Earth, and confined to such a body, and to such companions, how was it possible that in these respects we should not be hindered by things without us?

§ 3. But what says Jupiter? "O Epictetus, if it were possible, I had made this little body and property of thine free, and not liable to hindrance. But now do not mistake: it is not thine own, but only a finer mixture of clay.[2] Since, then, I could not[3] give thee this, I have given thee a certain portion of myself: this faculty of exerting the powers of pursuit and avoidance,[4] of desire and aversion; and, in a word, the use of the appearances of things. Taking care of this point, and making what is thy own to consist in this, thou wilt never be restrained, never be hindered; thou wilt not groan, wilt not complain, wilt not flatter any one. How then! Do all these advantages seem small to thee?" Heaven forbid! "Let them suffice thee then, and thank the gods."

§ 4. But now, when it is in our power to take care of one thing, and to apply to one, we choose rather to take care of many, and to encumber ourselves with many; body, property, brother, friend, child, and slave; and by this multiplicity of encumbrances we are burdened and weighed down. Thus, when the weather doth not happen to be fair for sailing, we sit screwing ourselves, and perpetually looking out.—Which way is the wind?—North. —What have we to do with that?—When will the west blow?—When itself, friend, or Æolus pleases; for Jupiter has not made you dispenser of the winds, but Æolus.

§ 5. What, then, is to be done?

To make the best of what is in our power, and take the rest as it naturally happens.

And how is that?

As it pleases God.

What, then, must I be the only one to lose my head?

Why, would you have all the world, then, lose their heads for your consolation? Why are not you willing to stretch out your neck, like Lateranus,[5] when he was commanded by Nero to be beheaded? For, shrinking a little after receiving a weak blow, he stretched it out again. And, before this, when Epaphroditus,[6] the freedman of Nero, interrogated him about the conspiracy;

"If I have a mind to say any thing," replied he, "I will tell it to your master."

§ 6. What then should we have at hand upon such occasions? Why what else but—what is mine, and what not mine; what is permitted me, and what not.—I must die: and must I die groaning too?—Be fettered. Must it be lamenting too?—Exiled. And what hinders me, then, but that I may go smiling, and cheerful, and serene?—"Betray a secret"—I will not betray it; for this is in my own power.—"Then I will fetter you."—What do you say, man? Fetter me? You will fetter my leg; but not Jupiter himself can get the better of my choice.[7] "I will throw you into prison: I will behead that paltry body of yours." Did I ever tell you, that I alone had a head not liable to be cut off?—These things ought philosophers to study; these ought they daily to write; and in these to exercise themselves.

§ 7. Thrasea[8] used to say, "I had rather be killed to-day than banished to-morrow." But how did Rufus[9] answer him? "If you prefer it as a heavier misfortune, how foolish a preference! If as a lighter, who has put it in your power? Why do not you study to be contented with what is allotted you?"

§ 8. Well, and what said Agrippinus[10] upon this account? "I will not be a hindrance to myself." Word was brought him, "Your cause is trying in the Senate."—"Good luck attend it.—But it is eleven o'clock" (the hour when he used to exercise before bathing): "Let us go to our exercise." When it was over a messenger tells him, "You are condemned." To banishment, says he, or death? "To banishment."—What of my estate?—"It is not taken away."—Well then, let us go as far as Aricia,[11] and dine there.

§ 9. This it is to have studied what ought to be studied; to have rendered our desires and aversions incapable of being restrained, or incurred. I must die: if instantly, I will die instantly; if in a short time, I will dine first; and when the hour comes, then I will die. How? As becomes one who restores what is not his own.

CHAPTER II

IN WHAT MANNER UPON EVERY OCCASION TO PRESERVE OUR CHARACTER

§ 1. To a reasonable creature, that alone is insupportable which is unreasonable: but everything reasonable may be supported. Stripes are not naturally insupportable.—"How so?"—See how the Spartans [1] bear whipping, after they have learned that it is a reasonable thing. Hanging is not insupportable: for, as soon as a man has taken it into his head that it is reasonable, he goes and hangs [2] himself. In short, we shall find by observation, that no creature is oppressed so much by anything as by what is unreasonable; nor, on the other hand, attracted to anything so strongly as to what is reasonable.

§ 2. But it happens that different things are reasonable and unreasonable, as well as good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, to different persons. On this account, chiefly, we stand in need of a liberal education, to teach us to adapt the preconceptions of reasonable and unreasonable to particular cases, conformably to nature. But to judge of reasonable and unreasonable, we make use not only of a due estimation of things without us, but of what relates to each person's particular character. Thus, it is reasonable for one man to submit to a dirty [3] disgraceful office, who considers this only, that if he does not submit to it, he shall be whipt, and lose his dinner; but if he does, that he has nothing hard or disagreeable to suffer: whereas to another it appears insupportable, not only to submit to such an office himself, but to bear with any one else who does. If you ask me, then, whether you shall do this dirty office or not, I will tell you, it is a more valuable thing to get a dinner, than not; and a greater disgrace to be whipt than not to be whipt: so that, if you measure yourself by these things, go and do your office.

"Ay, but this is not suitable to my character."

It is you who are to consider that, not I: for it is you who know yourself, what value you set upon yourself, and at what rate you sell yourself: for different people sell themselves at different prices.

§ 3. Hence Agrippinus,[4] when Florus was considering whether he should go to Nero's shows, so as to perform some part in

them himself, bid him go.—"But why do not you go then?" says Florus. "Because," replied Agrippinus, "I do not deliberate about it." For he who once sets himself about such considerations, and goes to calculating the worth of external things, approaches very near to those who forget their own character. For, why do you ask me whether death or life be the more eligible? I answer, life. Pain or pleasure? I answer, pleasure.—"But if I do not act a part, I shall lose my head." Go and act it then, but I will not.—"Why?"—Because you esteem yourself only as one thread of many that make up the piece.—"What then?"—You have nothing to care for, but how to be like the rest of mankind, as one thread desires not to be distinguished from the others. But I would be the purple,[5] that small and shining thing, which gives a lustre and beauty to the rest. Why do you bid me resemble the multitude then? At that rate, how shall I be the purple?

§ 4. This Priscus Helvidius [6] too saw, and acted accordingly: For when Vespasian had sent to forbid his going to the senate, he answered, "It is in your power to prevent my continuing a senator; but while I am one, I must go."—"Well then, at least be silent there."—"Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent."—"But I must ask it."—"And I must speak what appears to me to be right."—"But if you do, I will put you to death."—"Did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your part, and I mine: It is yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish me, mine to depart untroubled."

§ 5. What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single person? Why what good does the purple do to the garment? What but the being a shining character in himself,[7] and setting a good example to others? Another, perhaps, if in such circumstances Cæsar had forbidden his going to the senate, would have answered, "I am obliged to you for excusing me." But such a one he would not have forbidden to go, well knowing that he would either sit like a statue, or, if he spoke, he would say what he knew to be agreeable to Cæsar, and would overdo it by adding still more.

§ 6. Thus acted even a wrestler, who was in danger of death, unless he consented to an ignominious amputation. His brother, who was a philosopher, coming to him and saying, "Well, brother, what do you design to do? Let us cut away this morbid part, and return again to the field." He refused, and courageously died.

§ 7. When it was asked whether he acted thus as a wrestler, or

a philosopher? I answer, as a man, said Epictetus; but as a man who had been proclaimed a champion at the Olympic games; who had been used to such places, and not exercised merely in the school of Bato.[8] Another would have had his very head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that regard to character, so powerful with those who are accustomed to introduce it, from their own breasts, into their deliberations.

§ 8. "Come now, Epictetus, take off your beard." [9]—If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not take it off.—"Then I will take off your head."—If that will do you any good, take it off.

§ 9. It was asked, How shall each of us perceive what belongs to his character? Whence, replied Epictetus, does a bull, when the lion approaches, perceive his own qualifications,[10] and expose himself alone for the whole herd? It is evident, that with the qualifications, occurs at the same time the consciousness of being endued with them. And in the same manner, whoever of us had such qualifications will not be ignorant of them. But neither is a bull nor a gallant-spirited man formed all at once. We are to exercise and qualify ourselves, and not to run rashly upon what doth not concern us.

§ 10. Only consider at what price you sell your own will and choice, man: [11] if for nothing else, that you may not sell it for a trifle. Greatness indeed, and excellence, perhaps belong to others, to such as Socrates.

Why then, as we are born with a like nature, do not all, or the greater number, become such as he?

Why, are all horses swift? Are all dogs sagacious? What then, because nature hath not befriended me, shall I neglect all care of myself? Heaven forbid! Epictetus is inferior to Socrates; [12] but if superior to —— this is enough for me. I shall never be Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor Crœsus, and yet I do not neglect my property: nor, in general, do we omit the care of any thing belonging to us, from a despair of arriving at the highest degree of perfection.

CHAPTER III

HOW, FROM THE DOCTRINE THAT GOD IS THE FATHER OF MANKIND, WE MAY PROCEED TO ITS CONSEQUENCES

§ 1. If a person could be persuaded of this principle as he ought, that we are all originally descended from God, and that he is the Father of gods and men, I conceive he never would think meanly or degenerately concerning himself. Suppose Cæsar were to adopt you, there would be no bearing your haughty looks: and will you not be elated on knowing yourself to be the son of Jupiter? Yet, in fact, we are not elated; but having two things in our composition, intimately united, a body in common with the brutes, and reason and sentiment in common with the gods, many incline to this unhappy and mortal kindred, and only some few to the divine and happy one. And, as of necessity every one must treat each particular thing, according to the notions he forms about it; so those few, who think they are made for fidelity, decency, and a well-grounded use of the appearances of things, never think meanly or degenerately concerning themselves. But with the multitude the case is contrary: "For what am I? A poor contemptible man, with this miserable flesh of mine!" Miserable indeed. But you have likewise something better than this paltry flesh. Why then, overlooking that, do you pine away in attention to this?

§ 2. By means of this [animal] kindred, some of us, deviating towards it, become like wolves, faithless and insidious and mischievous: others, like lions, wild and savage and untamed: but most of us foxes, and wretches even among brutes. For what else is a slanderous and ill-natured man, than a fox, or something yet more wretched and mean? See then, and take heed, that you do not become such wretches.

CHAPTER IV

OF IMPROVEMENT

§ 1. He who is entering on a state of improvement, having learnt from the philosophers, that the object of desire is good, of aversion, evil; and having learnt too, that prosperity and ease are no otherwise attainable by man, than in not being disappointed of his desire, nor incurring his aversion: such as one removes totally from himself and postpones desire,[1] and applies aversion only to things dependent on choice. For if he should be averse to things independent on choice, he knows that he must sometimes incur his aversion, and be unhappy. Now if virtue promises happiness, prosperity, and ease, then an improvement in virtue is certainly an improvement in each of these. For to whatever point of perfection of anything absolutely brings us, improvement is always an approach towards it.

§ 2. How happens it then, that when we confess virtue to be such, yet we seek, and make an ostentatious show of improvement in other things? What is the business of virtue?

A prosperous life.

Who is in a state of improvement then? He who hath read the many treatises of Chrysippus?[2] Why, doth virtue consist in having read Chrysippus through? If it doth, improvement is confessedly nothing else than understanding a great deal of Chrysippus: otherwise we confess virtue to produce one thing; and declare improvement, which is an approach to it, to be quite another thing.

§ 3. This person, says one, is already able to read Chrysippus, by himself.—"Certainly, sir, you have made a vast improvement!" What improvement? Why do you ridicule him? Why do you withdraw him from a sense of his misfortunes? Why do not you show him the business of virtue, that he may know where to seek improvement?—Seek it there, wretch, where your business lies. And where doth your business lie? In desire and aversion; that you may neither be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other: in exerting the powers of pursuit and avoidance, that you may not be liable to fail; in assent and suspense, that you may not be liable to be deceived. The first and most necessary is the first topic.[3] But if you seek to

avoid incurring your aversion, trembling and lamenting all the while, at this rate how do you improve?

§ 4. Show me then your improvement in this point. As if I should say to a wrestler, Show me your shoulders; and he should answer me, "See my poisers."—Do you and your poisers look to that: I desire to see the effect of them.

"Take the treatise on the subject of the active powers, and see how thoroughly I have perused it."

I do not inquire into this, wretch: but how you exert those powers; how you manage your desires and aversions, how your intentions and purposes; how you are prepared for events, whether conformably or contrary to nature. If conformably, give me evidence of that, and I will say you improve: if contrary, go your way, and not only comment on these treatises, but write such yourself; and what service will it do you? Do not you know that the whole volume is sold for half-a-crown? Doth he who comments upon it, then, value himself at more than half-a-crown? Never look for your business in one thing, and for improvement in another.

Where is improvement, then?

If any of you, withdrawing himself from externals, turns to his own faculty of choice, to exercise, and finish, and render it conformable to nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, decent: if he hath learnt too, that whoever desires, or is averse to, things out of his own power, can neither be faithful nor free, but must necessarily be changed and tossed up and down with them; must necessarily too be subject to others, to such as can procure or prevent what he desires or is averse to: if, rising in the morning, he observes and keeps to these rules; bathes and eats as a man of fidelity and honour; and thus, on every subject of action, exercises himself in his principal duty; as a racer, in the business of racing; as a public speaker, in the business of exercising his voice: this is he who truly improves; this is he who hath not travelled in vain. But if he is wholly intent on reading books, and hath laboured that point only, and travelled [4] for that: I bid him go home immediately, and not neglect his domestic affairs; for what he travelled for is nothing. The only real thing is, studying how to rid his life of lamentation, and complaint, and "Alas!" and "I am undone," and misfortune, and disappointment; and to learn what death, what exile, what prison, what poison is: that he may be able to say in a prison, like Socrates, "My dear Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be"; and not—"Wretched old man, have I

kept my grey hairs for this!" Who speaks thus? Do you suppose I will name some mean and despicable person? Is it not Priam who says it? Is it not Œdipus? Nay, how many kings say it? For what else is tragedy, but the sufferings of men, struck by an admiration of externals, represented in that kind of poetry? If one was to be taught by fictions, that externals independent upon choice are nothing to us; I, for my part, should wish for such a fiction, as that, by which I might live prosperously and undisturbed. What you wish for, it is your business to consider.

§ 5. Of what service, then, is Chrysippus to us?

To teach you that those things are not false on which prosperity and ease depend. "Take my books, and you will see how true and conformable to nature those things are which render me easy." How great a happiness! And how great the benefactor who shows the way! To Triptolemus all men have raised temples and altars, because he gave us a milder kind of food; but to him who hath discovered, and brought to light, and communicated, the truth to all; the means not of living, but of living well; who among you ever raised an altar or a temple, or dedicated a statue, or who worships God on that account? We offer sacrifices on the account of those who have given us corn and the vine; and shall we not give thanks to God, for those who have produced that fruit in the human understanding, by which they proceed to discover to us the true doctrine of happiness?

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE ACADEMICS [1]

§ 1. If any one opposes very evident truths, it is not easy to find a reason which may persuade him to alter his opinion. This arises neither from his own strength, nor from the weakness of his teacher: but when, after being driven upon an absurdity, he becomes petrified, how shall we deal with him any longer by reason?

§ 2. Now there are two sorts of petrifaction: the one, a petrifaction of the understanding; the other, of the sense of shame, when a person hath obstinately set himself not to assent to evident truths, nor to quit the defence of contradictions. We all dread a bodily mortification; and would make use

of every contrivance to avoid it: but none of us is troubled about a mortification of the soul. And yet, indeed, even with regard to the soul, when a person is so affected as not to apprehend or understand anything, we think him in a sad condition: but where the sense of shame and modesty is under an absolute mortification, we go so far as even to call this, strength to mind.[2]

§ 3. Are you certain that you are awake?—"I am not" (replies such a person): "for neither am I certain, when, in dreaming, I appear to myself to be awake."—Is there no difference, then, between these appearances?—"None."—Shall I argue with this man any longer? for what steel or what caustic can I apply to make him sensible of his mortification? He is sensible of it, and pretends not to be so. He is even worse than dead. Doth not he see the repugnancy of contradictory propositions? He sees it, and is never the better. He is neither moved, nor improves. Nay, he is in a yet worse condition: his sense of shame and modesty is utterly extirpated. His reasoning faculty indeed is not extirpated, but turned wild and savage. Shall I call this strength of mind? By no means: unless we allow it be such in the vilest debauchees, publicly to speak and act whatever comes into their heads.

CHAPTER VI

OF PROVIDENCE

§ 1. From every event that happens in the world it is easy to celebrate providence, if a person hath but these two circumstances in himself; a faculty of considering what happens to each individual, and a grateful temper. Without the first he will not perceive the usefulness of things which happen, and without the other he will not be thankful for them. If God had made colours, and had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use?

None.

On the contrary, if he had made the faculty without such objects as fall under its observation, what would have been the use of that?

None.

Again: if he had formed both the faculty and the objects, but had not made light?

Neither in that case would they have been of any use.

§ 2 Who is it, then, that hath fitted each of these to the other? Who is it that hath fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword? Is it no one? From the very construction of a complete work, we are used to declare positively, that it must be the operation of some artificer, and not the effect of mere chance. Doth every such work, then, demonstrate an artificer; and do not visible objects, and the sense of seeing, and Light, demonstrate one? Doth not the difference of the sexes, and their inclination to each other, and the use of their several powers; do not these things, neither, demonstrate an artificer?

Most certainly they do.

§ 3. But farther: this constitution of understanding, by which we are not simply impressed by sensible objects; but take and subtract from them; and add and compose something out of them; and pass from some to others absolutely remote: [1] Is not all this, neither, sufficient to prevail on some men, and make them ashamed of leaving an artificer out of their scheme? If not, let them explain to us what it is that effects each of these; and how it is possible that things so wonderful, and which carry such marks of contrivance, should come to pass spontaneously and without design.

What, then, do these things come to pass for our service only?

Many for ours only; such as are peculiarly necessary for a reasonable creature; but you will find many common to us with mere animals.

Then do they too understand what is done?

Not at all; for use is one affair, and understanding another. But God had need of animals to make use of the appearances of things; [2] and of us to understand that use. It is sufficient, therefore, for them to eat and drink and sleep and continue their species, and perform other such offices as belong to each of them; but to us, to whom he hath given likewise a faculty of understanding, these offices are not sufficient. For if we do not act in a proper and orderly manner, and suitably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall no longer attain our end. For where the constitution of beings is different, their offices and ends are different likewise. Thus where the constitution is adapted only to use, there use is alone sufficient; but where understanding is added to use, unless that too be duly exercised, the end of such a being will never be attained.

§ 4. Well then: each of the animals is constituted either for food, or husbandry, or to produce milk, and the rest of them for some other like use; and for these purposes what need is there of understanding the appearances of things, and being able to make distinctions concerning them? But God hath introduced man as a spectator of himself and his works; and not only as a spectator, but an interpreter of them. It is therefore shameful that man should begin and end where irrational creatures do. He is indeed rather to begin there, but to end where nature itself hath fixed our end; and that is in contemplation and understanding, and in a scheme of life conformable to nature.

§ 5. Take care, then, not to die without being spectators of these things. You take a journey to Olympia to behold the work [3] of Phidias, and each of you thinks it a misfortune to die without a knowledge of such things; and will you have no inclination to understand and be spectators of those works for which there is no need to take a journey; but which are ready and at hand, even to those who bestow no pains? [4] Will you never perceive, then, either what you are or for what you were born; nor for what purpose you are admitted spectators of this sight?

But there are some things unpleasant and difficult in life.

And are there none at Olympia? Are not you heated? Are not you crowded? Are not you without good conveniences for bathing? [5] Are not you wet through when it happens to rain? Do not you bear uproar and noise and other disagreeable circumstances? But, I suppose, by comparing all these with the advantage of seeing so valuable a sight, you support and go through them. Well, and [in the present case] have not you received faculties by which you may support every event? Have not you received greatness of soul? Have not you received a manly spirit? Have not you received patience? What signifies to me any thing that happens, while I have a greatness of soul? What shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me? Shall I not make use of my faculties, to that purpose for which they were granted me, but lament and groan at what happens?

§ 6. Oh, but my nose [6] runs.

And what have you hands for, beast, but to wipe it?

But was there, then, any good reason that there should be such a dirty thing in the world?

And now much better is it that you should wipe your nose,

than complain? Pray, what figure do you think Hercules would have made if there had not been such a lion, and a hydra, and a stag, and unjust and brutal men; whom he expelled and cleared away? And what would he have done if none of these had existed? Is it not plain that he must have wrapt himself up and slept? In the first place, then, he would never have become a Hercules by slumbering away his whole life in such delicacy and ease; or if he had, what good would it have done? What would have been the use of his arm, and the rest of his strength; of his patience, and greatness of mind, if such circumstances and subjects of action had not roused and exercised him?

What then, must we provide these things for ourselves, and introduce a boar, and a lion, and a hydra, into our country?

This would be madness and folly. But as they were in being, and to be met with, they were proper subjects to set off and exercise Hercules. Do you therefore likewise, being sensible of this, inspect the faculties you have, and after taking a view of them, say, "Bring on me now, O Jupiter, what difficulty thou wilt, for I have faculties granted me by thee, and abilities by which I may acquire honour and ornament to myself."—No; but you sit trembling, for fear this or that should happen; and lamenting, and mourning, and groaning at what doth happen; and then you accuse the gods. For what is the consequence of such a meanspiritedness, but impiety? and yet God hath not only granted us these faculties, by which we may bear every event without being depressed or broken by it; but, like a good prince, and a true father, hath rendered them incapable of restraint, compulsion, or hindrance, and entirely dependent on our own pleasure: nor hath he reserved a power, even to himself, of hindering or restraining them. Having these things free, and your own, will you make no use of them, nor consider what you have received, nor from whom? but sit groaning and lamenting, some of you, blind to him who gave them, and not acknowledging your benefactor; and others, basely turning yourselves to complaints and accusations of God? yet I undertake to show you that you have qualifications and occasions for greatness of soul, and a manly spirit; but what occasions you have to find fault, and complain, do you show me.

CHAPTER VII

OF THE USE OF CONVERTIBLE AND HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITIONS, AND THE LIKE

§ 1. It [1] is a secret to the vulgar, that the practice of convertible and hypothetical and interrogatory arguments, and, in general, of all other logical forms, hath any relation to the duties of life. For in every subject of action, the question is, how a wise and good man may find a way of extricating himself, and a method of behaviour conformable to his duty upon the occasion. Let them say, therefore, either that the man of virtue will not engage in questions and answers; of that, if he doth, he will not think it worth his care whether he behaves rashly and at hazard in questioning and answering; or if they allow neither of these, it is necessary to confess that some examination ought to be made of those topics, in which the affair of question and answer is principally concerned. For what is the profession of reasoning? to lay down true positions; to reject false ones; and to suspend the judgment in doubtful ones. Is it enough, then, to have learned merely this?—It is enough, say you.—Is it enough, then, for him who would not commit any mistake in the use of money, merely to have heard, that we are to receive the good pieces, and reject the bad?—This is not enough.—What must be added besides?—That faculty which tries and distinguishes what pieces are good, what bad.—Therefore, in reasoning too, what hath been already said is not enough; but it is necessary that we should be able to prove and distinguish between the true and the false and the doubtful.—It is necessary.

§ 2. And what farther is professed in reasoning?—To admit the consequences of what you have properly granted.—Well; and here, too, is the mere knowing this enough?—It is not; but we must learn how such a thing is the consequence of such another; and when one thing follows from one thing, and when from many things in common. Is it not moreover necessary, that he who would behave skilfully in reasoning, should both himself demonstrate whatever he delivers, and be able to comprehend the demonstrations of others; and not be deceived by such as sophisticate, as if they were demonstrating? Hence

then the employment and exercise of concluding arguments and figures arises, and appears to be necessary.

§ 3. But it may possibly happen, that from the premises which we have properly granted, there arises some consequence, which, though false, is nevertheless a consequence. What, then, ought I to do? To admit a falsehood?—And how is that possible?—Well; or to say that my concessions were not properly made?—But neither is this allowed.—Or that the consequence doth not arise from the premises?—Nor is even this allowed.—What, then, is to be done in the case?—Is it not this? As the having once borrowed money is not enough to make a person a debtor, unless he still continues to owe money and hath not paid it: so the having granted the premises is not enough to make it necessary to grant the inference, unless we continue our concessions. If the premises continue to the end, such as they were when the concessions were made, it is absolutely necessary to continue the concessions, and to admit what follows from them. But if the premises do not continue such as they were when the concession was made, it is absolutely necessary to depart from the concession, and from admitting what doth not follow from the argument itself. For this inference is no consequence of ours, nor belongs to us, when we have departed from the concession of the premises. We ought then to examine these kinds of premises, and their changes and conversions, on which any one, by laying hold, either in the question itself, or in the answer, or in the syllogistical conclusion, or in any other thing of that sort, gives an occasion to the unthinking of being disconcerted, not foreseeing the consequences.—Why so?—That in this topic we may not behave contrary to our duty, nor with confusion.

§ 4. The same thing is to be observed in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments. For it is sometimes necessary to require some hypothesis to be granted, as a kind of step to the rest of the argument. Is every given hypothesis, then, to be granted, or not every one; and if not every one, which? And is he who has granted an hypothesis for ever to abide by it? Or is he sometimes to depart from it, and admit only consequences, but not to admit contradictions?—Ay; but a person may say, on your admitting the hypothesis of a possibility, I will drive you upon an impossibility. With such a one as this, shall the man of prudence not engage, but avoid all examination and conversation with him?—And yet who, besides the man of prudence, is capable of treating an argument, or who besides is

sagacious in questions and answers, and incapable of being deceived and imposed on by sophistry?—Or will he indeed engage, but without regarding whether he behaves rashly and at hazard, in the argument?—Yet how then can he be such a one as we are supposing him? But, without some such exercise and preparation, is it possible for him to preserve himself consistent? Let them show this: and all these theorems will be superfluous and absurd, and unconnected with our idea of the virtuous man. Why then are we still indolent, and slothful, and sluggish, seeking pretences of avoiding labour? Shall we not be watchful to render reason itself accurate?—"But suppose, after all, I should make a mistake in these points: have I killed a father?"—Wretch! why, in this case, where had you a father to kill? What is it, then, that you have done? The only fault that you could commit, in this instance, you have committed. This very thing I myself said to Rufus, when he reproved me for not finding something that was omitted in some syllogism. Why, said I, have I burnt the Capitol then? Wretch! answered he, was the thing here omitted the Capitol? Or are there no other faults, but burning the Capitol, or killing a father? And is it no fault to treat the appearances presented to our minds rashly and vainly and at hazard; not to comprehend a reason, nor a demonstration, nor a sophism; nor, in short, to see what is for or against one's self in a question or answer? Is nothing of all this any fault?

CHAPTER VIII

THAT FACULTIES ARE NOT SAFE TO THE UNINSTRUCTED

§ 1. In as many ways as equivalent syllogisms may be varied, in so many may the forms of arguments and enthymemas be varied likewise. As for instance: if you have borrowed, and not paid, you owe me money. But you have not borrowed, and not paid, therefore you do not owe me money. To perform this skilfully, belongs to no one more than to a philosopher. For if an enthymema be an imperfect syllogism, he who is exercised in a perfect syllogism must be equally ready at an imperfect one.

Why, then, do not we exercise ourselves and others after this manner? [1]

Because even now, though we are not exercised in these things, nor diverted by me, at least, from the study of morality: yet we make no advances in virtue. What is to be expected then if we should add this avocation too? Especially as it would not only be an avocation from more necessary studies, but likewise a capital occasion of conceit and insolence. For the faculty of arguing and of persuasive reasoning is great; and, particularly, if it be much laboured and receive an additional ornament from rhetoric. For in general every faculty is dangerous to weak and uninstructed persons; as being apt to render them arrogant and elated. For by what method can one persuade a young man who excels in these kinds of study that he ought not to be an appendix to them, but they to him? Will he not trample upon all such advice; and walk about elated and puffed up, not bearing any one should touch him, to put him in mind where he is wanting and in what he goes wrong.

What then, was not Plato a philosopher?

Well, and was not Hippocrates a physician? Yet you see how he expresses himself. But is it in quality of physician, then, that he expresses himself so? Why do you confound things, accidently united from different causes, in the same men? If Plato was handsome and well-made, must I too set myself to endeavour at becoming handsome and well-made; as if this was necessary to philosophy, because a certain person happened to be at once handsome and a philosopher? Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the things that make men philosophers, and what belong to them on other accounts? Pray, if I [2] were a philosopher, would it be necessary that you should be lame too?

§ 2. What then? Do I reject these faculties? By no means. For neither do I reject the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me, what is the good of man? I have nothing else to say to you but that it is a certain regulation of the choice with regard to the appearances of things.

CHAPTER IX

HOW FROM THE DOCTRINE OF OUR KINDRED TO GOD WE ARE TO PROCEED TO ITS CONSEQUENCES

§ 1. If what philosophers say of the kindred between God and man be true, what has any one to do, but, like Socrates, when he is asked what countryman he is, never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of Corinth, but of the world? For why do you say that you are of Athens: and not of that corner only where that paltry body of yours was laid at its birth? Is it not, evidently, from what is principal, and comprehends not only that corner, and your whole house; but the general extent of the country from which your pedigree is derived down to you, that you call yourself an Athenian, or a Corinthian? Why may not he, then, who understands the administration of the world; and has learned that the greatest and most principal and comprehensive of all things is this system, composed of men and God; and that from him the seeds of being are descended, not only to my father or grandfather, but to all things that are produced and born on earth; and especially to rational natures, as they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the deity, being connected with him by reason: why may not such a one call himself a citizen of the world? Why not a son of God? And why shall he fear anything that happens among men? Shall kindred to Cæsar, or any other of the great at Rome, enable a man to live secure, above contempt, and void of all fear whatever; and shall not the having God for our Maker, and Father, and Guardian free us from griefs and terrors?

§ 2. "But how shall I subsist? For I have nothing."

Why, how do slaves, how do fugitives? To what do they trust when they run away from their masters? Is it to their estates? their servants? their plate? to nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to get necessaries. And must a philosopher, think you, when he leaves his own abode, rest and rely upon others, and not take care of himself? Must he be more helpless and anxious than the brute beasts, each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper food, nor any suitable and natural provision? One would think there should be no need for an old fellow to sit here contriving that you may not think meanly, nor entertain low and abject notions of your-

selves; but that his business would be, to take care that there may not happen to be among you young men of such a spirit, that, knowing their affinity to the gods, and that we are as it were fettered by the body and its possessions, and by so many other things as are necessary, upon these accounts, for the economy and commerce of life; they should resolve to throw them off, as both troublesome and useless, and depart to their kindred.

§ 3. This is the work, if any, that ought to employ your master and preceptor, if you had one; that you should come to him, and say: "Epictetus, we can no longer bear being tied down to this paltry body, feeding and resting and cleaning it, and hurried about with so many low cares on its account. Are not these things indifferent, and nothing to us, and death no evil? Are not we relations of God, and did we not come from him? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we came; suffer us, at length, to be delivered from these fetters, that chain and weigh us down. Here thieves and robbers, and courts of judicature, and those who are called tyrants, seem to have some power over us, on account of the body and its possessions. Suffer us to show them, that they have no power."

§ 4. And in this case it would be my part to answer: "My friends, wait for God, till he shall give the signal, and dismiss you from this service; then return to him. For the present, be content to remain in this post where he has placed you. The time of your abode here is short, and easy to such as are disposed like you. For what tyrant, what robber, what thief, or what courts of judicature are formidable to those who thus account the body and its possessions as nothing? Stay. Depart not inconsiderately."

§ 5. Thus ought the case to stand between a preceptor and ingenuous young men. But how stands it now? The preceptor has no life in him: you have none neither. When you have had enough to-day, you sit weeping about to-morrow, how you shall get food. Why, if you have it, wretch, you will have it: if not, you will go out of life. The door is open: why do you lament? What room doth there remain for tears? What occasion for flattery? Why should any one person envy another? Why should he be struck with awful admiration of those who have great possessions, or are placed in high rank? Especially if they are powerful and passionate? For what will they do to us? The things which they can do we do not regard: the things which we are concerned about they cannot do. Who

hen, after all, shall command a person thus disposed? How was Socrates affected by these things? As it became one persuaded of his being a relation of the gods. "If you should tell me (says he to his judges), We will acquit you upon condition that you shall no longer discourse in the manner you have hitherto done, nor make any disturbance either among our young or our old people; I would answer: You are ridiculous in thinking that if your general had placed me in any post, I ought to maintain and defend it, and choose to die a thousand times rather than desert it; but if God hath assigned me any station or method of life, that I ought to desert that for you."[1]

§ 6. This it is for a man to be truly a relation of God. But we consider ourselves as a mere assemblage of stomach and entrails and bodily parts. Because we fear, because we desire, we flatter those who can help us in these matters; we dread the very same persons.

§ 7. A person desired me once to write for him to Rome. He was one vulgarly esteemed unfortunate, as he had been formerly illustrious and rich, and afterwards stript of all his possessions and reduced to live here. I wrote for him in a submissive style, but, after reading my letter, he returned it to me and said: "I wanted your assistance, not your pity; for no evil hath befallen me."

§ 8.[2] Thus Rufus to try me used to say, This or that you will have from your master. When I answered him, These are [uncertain] human affairs: Why then, says he, should I intercede with him[3] when you can receive these things from yourself? For what one hath of his own it is superfluous and vain to receive from another. Shall I, then, who can receive greatness of soul and a manly spirit from myself, receive an estate, or a sum of money, or a place from you? Heaven forbid! I will not be so insensible of my own possessions. But if a person is fearful and abject, what else is necessary but to write letters for him as if he was dead? "Pray oblige us with the corpse and blood of such a one." For, in fact, such a one is corpse and blood; and nothing more. For if he was anything more, he would be sensible that one man is not rendered unfortunate by another.

CHAPTER X

CONCERNING THOSE WHO STROVE FOR PREFERMENTS AT ROME

§ 1. If we all applied ourselves as heartily to our proper business as the old fellows at Rome do to their schemes; perhaps we too might make some proficiency. I know a man older than I am, and who is now superintendent of provisions at Rome. When he passed through this place on his return from exile, what an account did he give me of his former life! and how did he promise that for the future when he was got back, he would apply himself to nothing but how to spend the remainder of his days in repose and tranquillity. "For how few have I now remaining!"—You will not do it, said I. When you are once got within the smell of Rome, you will forget all this, and, if you can but once gain admittance to court, you will go in heartily rejoiced and thank God. "If you ever find me, Epictetus," said he, "putting one foot into the court, think of me whatever you please." Now, after all, how did he act? Before he entered the city he was met by a billet from Cæsar. On receiving it he forgot all his former resolutions, and has ever since been heaping up one encumbrance upon another. I should be glad now to have an opportunity of putting him in mind of his discourse upon the road, and of saying, How much more clever a prophet am I than you!

§ 2. What then do I say? that man is made for an inactive life? No, surely. "But why is not ours a life of activity?" For my own part, as soon as it is day, I recollect a little what things I am to read over again [with my pupils], and then say to myself quickly, What is it to me how such a one reads? My chief point is to get to sleep.

§ 3. But, indeed, what likeness is there between the actions of these [old fellows at Rome] and ours? If you consider what it is they do you will see. For about what are they employed the whole day but in calculating, contriving, consulting about provisions; about an estate or other emoluments like these? Is there any likeness, then, between reading such a petition from any one as—"I entreat you to give me a permission to export corn;" and—"I entreat you to learn from Chrysippus of what nature the administration of the world is, and what

place a reasonable creature holds in it. Learn, too, what you yourself are, and wherein your good and evil consists." Are these things at all alike? Do they require an equal degree of application? And is it as shameful to neglect the one as the other? [1]

§ 4. Well, then, are we preceptors the only idle dreamers? No; but you young men are so first, in a greater degree. And so even we old folks, when we see young ones trifling, are tempted to grow fond of trifling with them. Much more, then, if I was to see you active and diligent, I should be excited to join with you in serious industry.

CHAPTER XI

OF NATURAL AFFECTION

§ 1. When one of the great men came to visit him, Epictetus, having inquired into the particulars of his affairs, asked him whether he had a wife and children? The other replying that he had, Epictetus likewise inquired, In what manner do you live with them? Very miserably, says he. How so? for men do not marry and get children to be miserable; but rather to make themselves happy. But I am so very miserable about my children, that the other day, when my daughter was sick and appeared to be in danger, I could not bear even to be with her, but ran away, till it was told me that she was recovered. And pray do you think this was acting right? It was acting naturally, said he. Well: do but convince me that it was acting naturally, and I will convince you that everything natural is right. All or most of us fathers are affected in the same way. I do not deny the fact, but the question between us is whether it be right. For, by this way of reasoning, it must be said that tumours happen for the good of the body, because they do happen: and even that vices are natural, because all or the most part of us are guilty of them. Do you show me, then, how such a behaviour as yours appears to be natural.

I cannot undertake that. But do you rather show me how it appears to be neither natural nor right.

If we were disputing about black and white, what criterion must we call in to distinguish them?

The sight.

If about hot and cold, and hard and soft, what?

The touch.

Well then, when we are debating about natural and unnatural, and right and wrong, what criterion are we to take?

I cannot tell.

And yet, to be ignorant of a criterion of colours, or of smells, or tastes, might perhaps be no very great loss. But do you think that he suffers only a small loss who is ignorant of what is good and evil, and natural and unnatural, to man?

No. The very greatest.

Well, tell me: Are all things which are judged good and proper by some, rightly judged to be so? It is possible that the several opinions of Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans concerning food should all be right?

How can it be possible?

I suppose, then, it is absolutely necessary, if the opinions of the Egyptians be right, the others must be wrong: if those of the Jews be good, all the rest must be bad.

How can it be otherwise?

And where ignorance is, there likewise is want of learning and instruction in necessary points.

It is granted.

Then, as you are sensible of this, you will for the future apply to nothing, and think of nothing else, but how to acquaint yourself with the criterion of what is agreeable to nature, and to use that in judging of each particular case.

§ 2. At present the assistance I have to give you towards what you desire is this: Doth affection seem to you to be a right and a natural thing? [1]

How should it be otherwise?

Well; and is affection natural and right, and reason not so?

By no means.

Is there any opposition, then, between reason and affection?

I think not.

If there was, of two opposites if one be natural, the other must necessarily be unnatural, must it not?

It must.

What we find, then, at once affectionate and reasonable, that we may safely pronounce to be right and good.

Agreed.

Well, then, you will not dispute but that to run away and leave a sick child is contrary to reason. It remains for us to consider whether it be consistent with affection.

Let us consider it.

Did you, then, from an affection to your child, do right in running away and leaving her? Hath her mother no affection for the child?

Yes; surely she hath.

Would it have been right, then, that her mother too should leave her, or would it not?

It would not.

And doth not her nurse love her?

She doth.

Then ought not she likewise to leave her?

By no means.

And doth not her preceptor love her?

He doth.

Then ought not he also to have run away, and left her; and so the child to have been left alone, and unassisted, from the great affection of her parents, and her friends; or to die in the hands of people who neither loved her nor took care of her?

Heaven forbid!

But is it not unreasonable and unjust, that what you think right in yourself, on the account of your affection, should not be allowed to others, who have the very same affection as you?

It is absurd.

Pray, if you were sick yourself, should you be willing to have your family, and even your wife and children, so very affectionate as to leave you helpless and alone?

By no means.

Or would you wish to be so loved by your friends, as from their excessive affection always to be left alone when you were sick? Or would you not rather wish, if it were possible, to have such a kind of affection from your enemies as to make them always keep from you? If so, it remains that your behaviour was by no means affectionate. Well then: was it merely nothing that induced you to desert your child?

How is that possible?

No; but it was some such motive as induced a person at Rome to hide his face while a horse was running to which he earnestly wished success; and when, beyond his expectation, it won the race, he was obliged to have recourse to sponges to recover his senses.

And what was this motive?

At present perhaps it cannot be accurately explained. It is sufficient to be convinced (if what philosophers say be true)

that we are not to seek it from without; but that there is universally one and the same cause, which moves us to do or forbear any action; to speak or not to speak; to be elated or depressed; to avoid or pursue; that very cause which hath now moved us two; you, to come and sit and hear me; and me to speak as I do.

And what is that?

Is it anything else than that it seemed right to us to do so?

Nothing else.

And if it had seemed otherwise to us, what should we have done else than what we thought right? This, and not the death of Patroclus, was the cause of lamentation to Achilles (for every man is not thus affected by the death of a friend), that it seemed right to him. This too was the cause of your running away from your child, that it seemed right; and if hereafter you should stay with her it will be because that seemed right. You are now returning to Rome because it seems right to you; but if you should alter your opinion you will not return. In a word, neither death nor exile, nor pain, nor anything of this kind is the cause of our doing, or not doing, any action; but our opinions and principles. Do I convince you of this, or not?

You do.

§ 3. Well then; such as the cause is, such will be the effect. From this day forward, then, whenever we do anything wrong we will impute it only to the principle from which we act; and we will endeavour to remove that, and cut it up by the roots, with greater care than we would wens and tumours from the body. In like manner, we will ascribe what we do right to the same cause; and we will accuse neither servant, nor neighbour, nor wife, nor children as the causes of any evils to us; persuaded that if we had not such principles, such consequences would not follow. Of these principles we ourselves, and not externals, are the masters.

Agreed.

From this day, then, we will neither consider nor inquire of what sort, or in what condition, anything is; our estate, or slaves, or horses, or dogs, but only our principles.

I wish to do it.

You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become a scholar: that kind of animal which every one laughs at; if you really desire to make an examination of your principles. But this, as you are sensible, is not the work of an hour or a day.

CHAPTER XII

OF CONTENTMENT

§ 1. CONCERNING the gods, some affirm that there is no deity: others, that he indeed exists; but slothful, negligent, and without a providence: a third sort admits both his being and providence, but only in great and heavenly objects, and in nothing upon earth: a fourth, both in heaven and earth; but only in general, not individuals: a fifth, like Ulysses and Socrates:[1]

> "O thou, who, ever present in my way,
> Dost all my motions, all my toils survey."
> POPE'S *Homer*.

It is, before all things, necessary to examine each of these; which is, and which is not, rightly said. Now, if there are no gods, how is it our end to follow them? If there are, but they take no care of anything, how will it be right, in this case, to follow them? Or, if they both are, and take care; yet, if there is nothing communicated from them to men, nor indeed to myself in particular, how can it be right even in this case? A wise and good man, after examining these things, submits his mind to him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the laws of the commonwealth.

§ 2. He, then, who comes to be instructed, ought to come with this intention: "Now may I in everything follow the gods? How may I acquiesce in the divine administration? And how may I be free?" For he is free to whom all happens agreeably to his choice; and whom no one can restrain.

What! then is freedom distraction?

By no means; for madness and freedom are incompatible.

But I would have whatever appears to me to be right, happen, however it comes to appear so.

You are mad: you have lost your senses. Do not you know that freedom is a very beautiful and valuable thing? But for me to choose at random, and for things to happen agreeably to such a choice, may be so far from a beautiful thing as to be, of all others, the most shocking. For how do we proceed in writing? Do I choose to write the name of Dion (for instance) as I will? No; but I am taught to be willing to write it as it ought to be writ. And what is the case in music? The same.

And what in every other art or science? Otherwise, it would be to no purpose to learn anything, if it was to be adapted to each one's particular humour. Is it, then, only in the greatest and principal point, that of freedom, permitted me to will at random? By no means, but true instruction is this: learning to will that things should happen as they do. And how do they happen? As the appointer of them hath appointed. He hath appointed that there should be summer and winter, plenty and dearth, virtue and vice, and all such contrarieties, for the harmony of the whole.[2] To each of us he hath given a body and its parts, and our several properties and companions. Mindful of this appointment, we should enter upon a course of education and instruction not to change the constitutions of things, which is neither put within our reach nor for our good; but that, being as they are, and as their nature is with regard to us, we may have our mind accommodated to what exists. Can we, for instance, fly mankind? And how is that possible? Can we, by conversing with them, change them? Who hath given us such a power? What, then, remains, or what method is there to be found for such a commerce with them, that while they act agreeably to the appearances in their own minds, we may nevertheless be affected conformably to nature? But you are wretched and discontented. If you are alone, you term it a desert; and if with men, you call them cheats and robbers. You find fault, too, with you parents and children and brothers and neighbours. Whereas you ought, when you live alone, to call that a repose and freedom, and to esteem yourself as resembling the gods; and when you are in company, not to call it a crowd and a tumult and a trouble, but an assembly and a festival; and thus to take all things contentedly. What, then, is the punishment of those who do not? To be just as they are. Is any one discontented with being alone? Let him be in a desert.[3] Discontented with his parents? Let him be a bad son, and let him mourn. Discontented with his children? Let him be a bad father. Throw him into prison. What prison? Where he already is; for he is in a situation against his will, and wherever any one is against his will, that is to him a prison; just as Socrates was not in prison, for he was willingly there. "What, then, must my leg be lame?" And is it for one paltry leg, wretch, that you accuse the world? Why will you not give it up to the whole? Why will you not withdraw yourself from it? Why will you not gladly yield it to him who gave it? And will you be angry and discontented with

the decrees of Jupiter, which he, with the Fates who spun in his presence the thread of your birth, ordained and appointed? Do you not know how very small a part you are of the whole? That is, as to body; for as to reason you are neither worse, nor less, than the gods. For reason is not measured by length or height, but by principles. Will you not therefore place your good there, where you are equal to the gods?[4] "How wretched am I in such a father and mother!" What, then, was it granted you to come beforehand, and make your own terms, and say: "Let such and such persons, at this hour, be the authors of my birth?" It was not granted; for it was necessary that your parents should exist before you, and so you be born afterwards. Of whom? Of just such as they were. What, then, since they are such, is there no remedy afforded you? Now, surely, if you were ignorant to what purpose you possess the faculty of sight, you would be wretched and miserable in shutting your eyes at the approach of colours, and are not you more wretched and miserable in being ignorant that you have a greatness of soul and a manly spirit, answerable to each of the above-mentioned accidents? Occurrences proportioned to your faculty [of discernment] are brought before you; but you turn it away at the very time when you ought to have it the most open and quick-sighted. Why do not you rather thank the gods that they have made you superior to whatever they have not placed in your own power, and have rendered you accountable for that only which is in your own power? Of your parents they acquit you; as not accountable of your brothers they acquit you; of body, possessions, death, life, they acquit you. For what, then, have they made you accountable? For that which is alone in your own power, a right use of the appearances of objects. Why, then, should you draw those things upon yourself for which you are not accountable? This is giving one's self trouble without need.

CHAPTER XIII

HOW EVERYTHING MAY BE PERFORMED ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS

When a person inquired, how any one might eat acceptably to the gods: If he eats with justice, says Epictetus, and gratitude, and fairly and temperately and decently, must he not also eat acceptably to the gods? And when you call for hot water, and your servant doth not hear you, or, if he doth, brings it only warm; or perhaps is not to be found at home; then not to be angry, or burst with passion, is not this acceptable to the gods?

But how, then, can one bear such things?

Wretch, will you not bear with your own brother, who hath God for his father, as being a son from the same stock, and of the same high descent? But if you chance to be placed in some superior station, will you presently set yourself up for a tyrant? Will you not remember what you are, and over whom you bear rule? That they are by nature your relations, your brothers; that they are the offspring of God? [1]

But I have them by right of purchase, and not they me.

Do you see what it is you regard? That it is earth and mire, and these wretched laws of dead [2] men, and that you do not regard those of the gods.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT ALL THINGS ARE UNDER THE DIVINE INSPECTION

§ 1. When a person asked him, how any one might be convinced that each of his actions are under the inspection of God: Do not you think, says Epictetus, that all things are mutually bound together and united?

I do.

Well; and do not you think that things on earth feel the influence of the heavenly bodies?

Yes.

Else how could the trees so regularly, as if by God's express

command, bud,[1] blossom, bring forth fruit, and ripen it; then let it drop, and shed their leaves, and lie contracted within themselves in quiet and repose, all when he speaks the word? Whence, again, are there seen, on the increase and decrease of the moon, and the approach and departure of the sun, so great vicissitudes and changes to the direct contrary in earthly things? Have then the very leaves, and our own bodies, this connection and sympathy with the whole, and have not our souls much more? But our souls are thus connected and intimately joined to God, as being indeed members and distinct portions of his essence; and must not he be sensible of every movement of them as belonging, and connatural to himself? Can even you think of the divine administration, and every other divine subject, and, together with these, of human affairs also: can you at once receive impressions on your senses and your understanding from a thousand objects; at once assent to some things, deny or suspend your judgment concerning others, and preserve in your mind impressions from so many and various objects, and whenever you are moved by [the traces of] them, hit on ideas similar to those which first impressed you: can you retain a variety of arts, and the memorials of ten thousand things, and is not God capable of surveying all things, and being present with all, and receiving a certain communication from all? Is the sun capable of illuminating so great a portion of the universe, and of leaving only that small part of it unilluminated which is covered by the shadow of the earth; and cannot he who made and revolves the sun, a small part of himself if compared with the whole, cannot he perceive all things?

§ 2. "But I cannot" (say you) "attend to all things at once." Why, doth any one tell you that you have equal power with Jupiter? No! but nevertheless he has assigned to each man a director, his own good genius, and committed him to his guardianship; a director whose vigilance no slumbers interrupt, and whom no false reasonings can deceive. For to what better and more careful guardian could he have committed us? So that when you have shut your doors, and darkened your room, remember never to say that you are alone, for you are not; but God is within, and your genius is within, and what need have they of light to see what you are doing? To[2] this God you likewise ought to swear such an oath as the soldiers do to Cæsar. For do they, in order to receive their pay, swear to prefer before all things the safety of Cæsar, and will not you swear, who have received so many and so great favours, or if you have sworn,

will you not stand to it? And what must you swear? Never to disobey, nor accuse, nor murmur at any of the things appointed by him, nor unwillingly to do or suffer anything necessary. Is this oath like the former? In the first, persons swear not to honour any other beyond Cæsar; in the last, beyond all, to honour themselves.

CHAPTER XV

WHAT IT IS THAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES

§ 1. When one consulted him, how he might persuade his brother to forbear treating him ill: Philosophy, answered Epictetus, doth not promise to procure anything external to man, otherwise it would admit something beyond its proper subject-matter. For the subject-matter of a carpenter is wood; of a statuary, brass: and so of the art of living, the subject-matter is each person's own life.

What, then, is my brother's?

That, again, belongs to his own art [of living]; but to yours is external like an estate, like health, like reputation. Now, philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance I will preserve the governing part conformable to nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I exist.

But how, then, is my brother to lay aside his anger against me?

Bring him to me, and I will tell him; but I have nothing to say to you about his anger.

§ 2. Well, but I still farther ask, How am I to keep myself in a state of mind conformable to nature though he should not be reconciled to me?

No great thing is brought to perfection suddenly, when not so much as a bunch of grapes or a fig is. If you tell me that you would at this minute have a fig, I will answer you, that there must be time. Let it first [1] blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen. Is then the fruit of a fig-tree not brought to perfection suddenly, and in one hour; and would you possess the fruit of the human mind in so short a time, and without trouble? I tell you, expect no such thing.

CHAPTER XVI

OF PROVIDENCE

§ 1. Be not surprised, if other animals have all things necessary to the body ready provided for them, not only meat and drink but lodging: that they want neither shoes, nor bedding, nor clothes, while we stand in need of all these. For they not being made for themselves, but for service, it was not fit that they should be formed so as to need the help of others. For, consider what it would be for us to take care, not only for ourselves, but for sheep and asses too, how they should be clothed, how shod, and how they should eat and drink. But as soldiers are ready for their commander, shod, clothed, and armed (for it would be a grievous thing for a colonel to be obliged to go through his regiment to put on their shoes and clothes), so nature likewise has formed the animals made for service, ready provided, and standing in need of no further care. Thus one little boy, with only a crook, drives a flock.

§ 2. But now we, instead of being thankful for this, complain of God that there is not the same kind of care taken of us likewise. And yet, good heaven! any one thing in the creation is sufficient to demonstrate a providence to a modest and grateful mind. Not to instance at present in great things, but only in the very production of milk from grass, cheese from milk, and wool from skins: who formed and contrived these things? No one, say you. O surprising stupidity, and want of shame! But come, let us omit the works of nature. Let us contemplate what she hath done, as it were, by the bye. What is more useless than the hairs which grow on the chin? And yet, hath she not made use even of these in the most becoming manner possibly? Hath she not by these distinguished the sexes? Doth not nature in each of us call out, even at a distance, I am a man; approach and address me as such; inquire no farther; see the characteristic. On the other hand, with regard to women, as she hath mixed something softer in their voice, so she hath deprived them of a beard. But no, to be sure, the animal should have been left undistinguished, and each of us obliged to proclaim, I am a man! But why is not this characteristic beautiful and becoming and venerable? How much more beautiful than the comb of cocks; how much more noble

than the mane of lions! Therefore, we ought to have preserved the divine characteristics; we ought not to have rejected them, nor confounded, as much as in us lay, the distinct sexes.

§ 3. Are these the only works of providence, with regard to us . . .[1] And what words can proportionably express our applauses and praise? For, if we had any understanding, ought we not both, in public and in private, incessantly to sing hymns, and speak well of the Deity, and rehearse his benefits? Ought we not, whether we are digging, or ploughing, or eating, to sing the hymn to God? Great is God, who has supplied us with these instruments to till the ground: great is God, who has given us hands, a power of swallowing, a stomach: who has given us to grow insensibly, to breathe in sleep. Even these things we ought upon every occasion to celebrate; but to make it the subject of the greatest and most divine hymn, that he has given us the faculty of apprehending them, and using them in a proper way. Well then: because the most of you are blind and insensible, was it not necessary that there should be some one to fill this station, and give out, for all men, the hymn to God? For what else can I, a lame old man, do but sing hymns to God? If I was a nightingale, I would act the part of a nightingale: if a swan,[2] the part of a swan. But, since I am a reasonable creature, it is my duty to praise God. This is my business. I do it. Nor will I ever desert this post as long as it is vouchsafed me; and I exhort you to join in the same song.[3]

CHAPTER XVII

THAT THE ART OF REASONING IS NECESSARY

§ 1. SINCE it is reason which sets in order and finishes all other things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder. But by what shall it be set in order?

Evidently either by itself, or by something else.

Well: either that too is reason, or there is something else superior to reason (which is impossible): and if it be reason, what, again, shall set that in order? For, if reason can set itself in order in one case, it can in another; and, if we will still require anything further, it will be infinite and without end.

But the more urgent necessity is to cure [our opinions, passions] and the like.[1]

Would you hear about these, therefore? Well, hear. But then, if you should say to me, 'I cannot tell whether your arguments are true or false'; and if I should happen to express myself doubtfully, and you should say, "Distinguish," I will bear with you no longer; but will retort your own words upon you, "The more urgent necessity is," etc. Therefore, I suppose, the art of reasoning is first settled; just as, before the measuring of corn, we settle the measure. For, unless we first determine what a bushel and what a balance is, how shall we be able to measure or weigh? Thus, in the present case, unless we have first learnt and accurately examined that which is the criterion of other things, and by which other things are learnt, how shall we be able accurately to learn anything else? And how is it possible? Well, a bushel, however, is only wood, a thing of no value in itself; but it measures corn. And logic (you say) is of no value in itself. That we will consider hereafter. Let us, for the present, then, make the concession. It is enough that it distinguishes and examines, and, as one may say, measures and weighs all other things. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus and Zeno and Cleanthes? And doth not Antisthenes say it? And who is it, then, who has written that the beginning of a right education is the examination of words? Doth not Socrates say it? Of whom, then, doth Xenophon write, that he began by the examination of words, what each signified? [2]

§ 2. Is this, then, the great and admirable thing, to understand or interpret Chrysippus?

Who says that it is? But what, then, is the admirable thing?

To understand the will of nature.

Well, then, do you apprehend it of yourself? In that case, what need have you for any one else? For, if it be true, that men never err but involuntarily, and you have learnt the truth, you must necessarily act right.

But, indeed, I do not apprehend the will of nature.

Who, then, shall interpret that?

They say Chrysippus.[3] I go and inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand his meaning. I seek one to interpret that. Here explain how this is expressed, and as if it were put into Latin. How, then, doth a supercilious self-opinion belong to the interpreter?

Indeed, it doth not justly belong to Chrysippus himself, if he only interprets the will of nature, and doth not follow it; and much less to his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus

on his own account, but that by his means we may apprehend the will of nature; nor do we need a diviner on his own account, but that by his assistance we hope to understand future events, and what is signified by the gods; nor the entrails of the victims on their own account, but on the account of what is signified by them; neither is it the raven or the crow that we admire, but the god who delivers his significations by their means. I come, therefore, to the diviner and interpreter of these things, and say, "Inspect the entrails for me: what is signified to me?" Having taken and laid them open, he thus interprets them:—You have a choice, man, incapable of being restrained or compelled. This is written here in the entrails. I will show you this first in the faculty of assent. Can any one restrain you from assenting to truth?—"No one."—Can any one compel you to admit a falsehood?—"No one."—You see, then, that you have in this topic a choice incapable of being restrained or compelled or hindered. Well, is it any otherwise with regard to pursuit and desire? What can conquer one pursuit?—"Another pursuit."—What desire and aversion?—"Another desire and another aversion." If you set death before me (say you) you compel me. No; not what is set before you doth it, but your principle, that it is better to do such or such a thing than to die. Here, again, you see it is your own principle which compels you—that is, choice compels choice. For, if God had constituted that portion which he hath separated from his own offence and given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled, either by himself or by any other, he would not have been God, nor have taken care of us in a due manner.

§ 3. These things, says the diviner, I find in the victims. These things are signified to you. If you please, you are free. If you please, you will have no one to complain of, no one to accuse. All will be equally according to your own mind, and to the mind of God.

§ 4. For the sake of this oracle I go to the diviner and the philosopher, admiring not him merely on the account of his interpretation, but the things which he interprets.

CHAPTER XVIII

THAT WE ARE NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRORS OF OTHERS

§ 1.[1] If what the philosophers say be true, that all men's actions proceed from one source; that, as they assent, from a persuasion that a thing is so, and dissent, from a persuasion that it is not, and suspend their judgment, from a persuasion that it is uncertain; so, likewise, they exert their pursuits, from a persuasion that such a thing is for their advantage; and it is impossible to esteem one thing advantageous, and desire another; to esteem one thing a duty, and pursue another: why, after all, should we be angry at the multitude?

They are thieves and pilferers.

What do you mean by thieves and pilferers? They are in an error concerning good and evil. Ought you, then, to be angry, or to pity them? Do but show them their error, and you will see that they will amend their faults; but, if they do not see it, the principles they form are to them their supreme rule.

What, then, ought not this thief and this adulterer to be destroyed?

By no means [ask that]; but say rather,[2] "Ought not he to be destroyed who errs and is deceived in things of the greatest importance; blinded, not in the sight that distinguishes white from black, but in the judgment that distinguishes good from evil?" By stating your question thus you see how inhuman it is, and just as if you would say, "Ought not this blind, or that deaf, man to be destroyed?" For, if the greatest hurt be a deprivation of the most valuable things, and the most valuable thing to every one is a right judgment in choosing; when any one is deprived of this, why, after all, are you angry? You ought not to be affected, man, contrary to nature, by the ills of another. Pity[3] him rather. Do not be angry; nor say, as many do, What! shall these execrable and odious wretches dare to act thus? Whence have you so suddenly learnt wisdom? Because we admire those things which such people take from us. Do not admire your clothes, and you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with an adulterer. Know that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things that are properly your own;

but in those that belong to others, and which are not in your power. If you give up these things, and look upon them as nothing, with whom will you any longer be angry? But while you admire them, be angry with yourself rather than with others. Consider only: You have a fine suit of clothes, your neighbour has not. You have a window, you want to air them. He knows not in what the good of man consists, but imagines it is in a fine suit of clothes; the very thing which you imagine too. Must not he, then, of course, come and take them away? When you show a cake to greedy people, and are devouring it all yourself, would not you have them snatch it from you? Do not provoke them. Do not have a window. Do not air your clothes. I, too, the other day, had an iron lamp burning before my household deities. Hearing a noise at the window, I ran. I found my lamp was stolen. I considered, that he who took it away did nothing unaccountable. What then? To-morrow, says I, you shall find an earthen one; for a man loses only what he hath. I have lost my coat. Ay, because you had a coat. I have a pain in my head. Why, can you have a pain in your horns?[4] Why, then, are you out of humour? For loss and pain can be only of such things as are possessed.

§ 2. But the tyrant will chain—what?—A leg.—He will take away—what?—A head.—What is there, then, that he can neither chain nor take away?—The will and choice. Hence the advice of the ancients—Know thyself.

What ought to be done, then?

Exercise yourself, for heaven's sake, in little things; and thence proceed to greater. "I have a pain in my head."—Do not cry, Alas!—"I have a pain in my ear."—Do not cry, Alas! I do not say you may not groan, but do not groan inwardly; or, if your servant is a long while in bringing you something to bind your head, do not bawl and distort yourself, and say, "Everybody hates me." For who would not hate such a one?

§ 3. Relying for the future on these principles, walk upright and free; not trusting to bulk of body like a wrestler: for one should not be unconquerable in the sense that an ass is.

Who then is unconquerable? He whom nothing, independent on choice, disconcerts. Then I run over every circumstance and consider (say) of an athletic champion, He has been victorious in the first encounter: what will he do in the second? What if the heat should be excessive? What if he were to appear at Olympia? So I say in this case. What if you throw money

in his way? He will despise it. What, if a girl? What, if in the dark? What, if he be tried by popular fame, calumny, praise, death? He is able to overcome them all. What then, if he be placed in the heat, or in the rain? [5] What if he be hypochondriac, or asleep? [Just the same.] This is my unconquerable athletic champion.

CHAPTER XIX

OF THE BEHAVIOUR TO BE OBSERVED TOWARDS TYRANTS

§ 1. When a person is possessed of some either real or imagined superiority, unless he hath been well instructed, he will necessarily be puffed up with it. A tyrant, for instance, says: "I am supreme over all."—And what can you do for me? Can you exempt my desires from disappointment? How should you? For do you never incur your own aversions? Are your own pursuits infallible? Whence should you come by that privilege? Pray, on shipboard, do you trust to yourself, or to the pilot? In a chariot, to whom but the driver? And to whom in all other arts? Just the same. In what then, doth your power consist?—"All men pay regard to me."

So do I to my desk. I wash it and wipe it; and drive a nail for the service of my oil flask.—"What then, are these things to be valued beyond me?"—No: but they are of some use to me, and therefore I pay regard to them. Why, do not I pay regard to an ass? Do not I wash his feet? Do not I clean him? Do not you know that every one pays regard to himself, and to you, just as he doth to an ass? For who pays regard to you as a man? Show that. Who would wish to be like you? Who would desire to imitate you, as he would Socrates?—"But I can take off your head."—You say right. I had forgot that one is to pay regard to you as to a fever or the colic, and that there should be an altar erected to you, as there is to the goddess Fever at Rome.

§ 2. What is it, then, that disturbs and strikes terror into the multitude? The tyrant and his guards? By no means. What is by nature free, cannot be disturbed or restrained by anything but itself. But its own principles disturb it. Thus, when the tyrant says to any one: "I will chain your leg": he who values his leg, cries out for pity: while he who sets the

value on his own will and choice, says: "If you imagine it for your interest, chain it."—"What! do not you care?"—No; I do not care.—"I will show you that I am master."—You? How should you? Jupiter has set me free. What! do you think he would suffer his own son to be enslaved? You are master of my carcase. Take it.—"So that when you come into my presence, you pay no regard to me?"—No; but to myself; or, if you will have me say, to you also: I tell you; the same to you as to a pipkin. This is not selfish vanity; for every animal is so constituted as to do everything for its own sake. Even the sun doth all for his own sake: nay, and to name no more, even Jupiter himself. But when he would be styled the Dispenser of Rain and Plenty, and the Father of Gods and Men, you see that he cannot attain these offices and titles unless he contributes to the common utility. And he hath universally so constituted the nature of every reasonable creature, that no one can attain any of its own proper advantages without contributing something to the use of society. And thus it becomes not unsociable to do everything for one's own sake. For, do you expect that a man should desert himself and his own interest? How, then, can all beings have one and the same original instinct, attachment to themselves? What follows, then? That where those absurd principles concerning things dependent on choice, as if they were either good or evil, are at the bottom, there must necessarily be a regard paid to tyrants: and I wish it were to tyrants only, and not to the very officers of their bed-chamber too. And how wise doth a man grow on a sudden when Cæsar has made him Clerk of the Close-stool! How immediately we say, "Felicio talked very sensibly to me!" I wish he were turned out of the bed-chamber, that he might once more appear to you the fool he is.

§ 3. Epaphroditus had [a slave, that was] a shoemaker; whom, because he was good for nothing, he sold. This very fellow being, by some strange luck, bought by a courtier, became shoemaker to Cæsar. Then you might have seen how Epaphroditus honoured him. "How doth good Felicio do, pray?" And if any of us asked what the great man himself was about, it was answered: "He is consulting about affairs with Felicio." Did not he sell him as good for nothing? Who, then, hath all on a sudden made a wise man of him? This it is to honour anything besides what depends on choice.

§ 4. Is any one exalted to the office of tribune? All that meet him congratulate him. One kisses his eyes, another his

neck, and the slaves his hands. He goes to his house; finds it illuminated. He ascends the Capitol. Offers a sacrifice. Now, who ever offered a sacrifice for having good desires? For exerting pursuits conformable to nature? For we thank the gods for that wherein we place our good.

§ 5. A person was talking with me to-day about the priesthood [1] of Augustus. I say to him, Let the thing alone, friend: you will be at great expense for nothing. "But my name," says he, "will be written in the annals." Will you stand by, then, and tell those who read them, "I am the person whose name is written there"? But, if you could tell every one so now, what will you do when you are dead?—"My name will remain."—Write it upon a stone and it will remain just as well. But, pray, what remembrance will there be of you out of Nicopolis?—"But I shall wear a crown [2] of gold."—If your heart is quite set upon a crown, take and put on one of roses, for it will make the prettier appearance.

CHAPTER XX

IN WHAT MANNER REASON CONTEMPLATES ITSELF

Every art and every faculty contemplates some things as its principal objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the same nature with the objects of its contemplations, it necessarily contemplates itself too. But where it is of a different nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The art of shoemaking, for instance, is exercised upon leather, but is itself entirely distinct from the materials it works upon; therefore it doth not contemplate itself. Again, grammar is exercised on articulate speech. Is the art of grammar itself, then, articulate speech?

By no means.

Therefore it cannot contemplate itself. To what purpose, then, is reason appointed by nature?

To a proper use of the appearances of things.

And what is reason?

A composition of certain appearances to the mind: and, thus, by its nature, it becomes contemplative of itself too. Again, what subjects of contemplation belong to prudence?

Good, and evil, and indifferent.

What, then, is prudence itself?
Good.
What, imprudence?
Evil.

You see, then, that it necessarily contemplates both itself and its contrary. Therefore the first and greatest work of a philosopher is to try and distinguish the appearances, and to admit none untried. Even in money, where our interest seems to be concerned, you see what an art we have invented, and how many ways an assayer uses to try its value. By the sight, the touch, the smell, and lastly, the hearing. He throws the piece down, and attends to the jingle; and is not contented with its jingling only once; but, by frequent attention to it, becomes quite musical. In the same manner, whenever we think it of consequence whether we are deceived or not, we use the utmost attention to distinguish those things which may possibly deceive us. But, yawning and slumbering over the poor miserable ruling faculty, we admit every appearance that offers. For here the mischief doth not strike us. When you would know, then, how very languidly you are affected by good and evil, and how vehemently by things indifferent; consider how you are affected with regard to being blinded, and how with regard to being deceived, and you will find that you are far from being moved, as you ought, in relation to good and evil.

But much previous qualification, and much labour and learning, are wanted.

What then? Do you expect the greatest of arts is to be acquired by slight endeavours? And yet the principal doctrine of the philosophers, of itself, is short. If you have a mind to know it, read Zeno, and you will see.[1] For what prolixity is there in saying, Our end is to follow the gods; and, The essence of good consists in the proper use of the appearances of things? Indeed, if you say, What, then, is God? What is an appearance? What is particular, what universal nature?—here the affair becomes prolix. And so, if Epicurus should come and say, that good must be placed in body; here, too, it will be prolix: and it will be necessary to hear what is the principal, the substantial and essential part in us. It is unlikely that the good of a snail should be placed in the shell: and is it likely that the good of a man should? You yourself, Epicurus, have something superior to this. What is that in you which deliberates, which examines, which forms the judgment concerning body itself, that it is the principal part? And why

do you light your lamp, and labour for us, and write so many books? That we may not be ignorant of the truth? What are we? What are we to you? Thus the doctrine becomes prolix.

CHAPTER XXI

OF THE DESIRE OF ADMIRATION

When a person maintains his proper station in life, he doth not gape after externals. What would you have, man?

"I am contented if my desires and aversions are conformable to nature: if I manage my powers of pursuit and avoidance, my purposes and intentions and assent, in the manner I was formed to do."

Why, then, do you walk as if you had swallowed a spit?

"I could wish, moreover, to have all who meet me admire me, and all who follow me cry out, What a great philosopher!"

Who are those by whom you would be admired? Are they not the very people who you used to say were mad? What, then, would you be admired by madmen?

CHAPTER XXII

OF PRE-CONCEPTIONS

§ 1. Pre-conceptions[1] are common to all men; and one pre-conception doth not contradict another. For, who of us doth not lay it down as a maxim, that good is advantageous and eligible, and at all events to be pursued and followed; that justice is fair and becoming? Whence, then, arises the dispute? —In adapting these pre-conceptions to particular cases. As when one cries: "Such a person hath acted well, he is a gallant man"; and another: "No, he hath acted like a fool." Hence arises the dispute among men. This is the dispute between Jews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, not whether sanctity be preferable to all things, and in every instance to be pursued; but whether the eating swine's flesh be consistent with sanctity or not. This, too, you will find to have been the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon. For, call them forth. What say you,

Agamemnon? Ought not that to be done which is fit and right? —Yes, surely.—Achilles, what say you? Is it not agreeable to you, that what is right should be done?—Yes, beyond every other thing. Adapt your pre-conceptions, then. Here begins the dispute. One says: "It is not fit that I should restore Chryseis to her father." The other says: "Yes, but it is." One or the other of them certainly makes a wrong adaptation of the pre-conception of fitness. Again, one says: "If it be fit that I should give up Chryseis, it is fit, too, that I should take some one of your prizes." The other: "What, that you should take my mistress?" "Ay, yours." "What, mine only? Must I only, then, lose my prize?"

§ 2. What, then, is it to be properly educated? To learn how to adapt natural pre-conceptions to particular cases, conformably to nature; and, for the future, to distinguish that some things are in our own power, others not. In our own power are choice, and all actions dependent on choice; not in our power, the body, the parts of the body, property, parents, brothers, children, country, and, in short, all with whom we are engaged in society. Where, then, shall we place good? To what kind of things shall we adapt the pre-conception of it? To that in our own power.

§ 3. What, then, is not health, and strength, and life good? And are not children, nor parents, nor country? Who will have patience with you?

Let us transfer it, then, to the other sort of things. Can he who suffers harm and is disappointed of good things be happy?

He cannot.

And can he preserve a right behaviour with regard to society? How is it possible he should? For I am naturally led to my own interest. If, therefore, it is for my interest to have an estate, it is for my interest likewise to take it away from my neighbour. If it is for my interest to have a suit of clothes, it is for my interest likewise to steal it wherever I find it.[2] Hence wars, seditions, tyranny, unjust invasions. How shall I, if this be the case, be able any longer to preserve my duty towards Jupiter? If I suffer harm and am disappointed, he takes no care of me. And what is Jupiter to me if he cannot help me, or again, what is he to me if he chooses I should be in the condition I am? Henceforward I begin to hate him. What, then, do we build temples, do we raise statues to Jupiter, as to evil demons, as to the goddess Fever? How, at this rate, is he the preserver, and how the

dispenser of rain and plenty? If we place the essence of good anywhere here, all this will follow.—What, then, shall we do?

§ 4. This is the inquiry of him who philosophises in reality and labours to bring forth [truth]. "Do not I now see what is good and what is evil?" Surely I am in my senses. Ay, but shall I place good anywhere on this other side; in things dependent [only] on my own choice? Why, every one will laugh at me. Some grey-headed old fellow will come with his fingers covered with gold rings, and shake his head, and say: "Hark ye, child, it is fit you should learn philosophy, but it is fit too you should have brains. This is nonsense. You learn syllogisms from philosophers; but how are you to act, you know better than they." "Then, why do you chide me, sir, if I do know?" What can I say to this wretch? If I make no answer, he will burst. I must e'en answer thus: "Forgive me, as they do people in love. I am not myself. I have lost my senses."

CHAPTER XXIII

AGAINST EPICURUS

§ 1. Even Epicurus is sensible that we are by nature sociable; but having once placed our good in the mere shell, he can say nothing afterwards different from that. For, again, he strenuously maintains, that we ought not to admire or receive anything separated from the nature of good. And he is in the right to maintain it. But how, then, came[1] any such suspicions [as your doctrines imply to arise], if we have no natural affection towards an offspring? Why do you, Epicurus, dissuade a wise man from bringing up children? Why are you afraid that upon their account he may fall into uneasiness? Doth he fall into any for a mouse, that feeds within his house? What is it to him if a little mouse bewails itself there? But Epicurus knew that, if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love and be solicitous for it. For the same reason, he says, a wise man will not engage himself in public business, for he knew very well what such an engagement would oblige him to do; for what should restrain any one from affairs if we may behave among men as we would among a swarm of flies?

§ 2. And doth he who knows all this dare to bid us not bring up children? Not even a sheep or a wolf deserts its offspring,

and shall man? What would you have? That we should be as silly as sheep? Yet even these do not desert their offspring. Or as savage as wolves? Neither do these desert them. Pray, who would mind you if he saw his child fallen upon the ground, and crying? For my part, I am of opinion that your father and mother, even if they could have foreseen that you would have been the author of such doctrines, would not, however, have thrown you away.

CHAPTER XXIV

HOW WE ARE TO STRUGGLE WITH DIFFICULTIES

§ 1. DIFFICULTIES are the things that show what men are. For the future, on any difficulty, remember that God, like a master of exercise,[1] has engaged you with a rough antagonist.

For what end?

That you may be a conqueror like one in the Olympic games, and it cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion, has a more advantageous difficulty on his hands than you have; provided you will but use it as an athletic champion doth his antagonist. We are now sending [2] a spy to Rome; but no one ever sends a timorous spy, who, when he only hears a noise or sees a shadow, runs back, frighted out of his wits, and says: "The enemy is just at hand." So now, if you should come and tell us: "Things are in a fearful way at Rome, death is terrible; banishment, terrible; calumny, terrible; poverty, terrible; run, good people, the enemy is at hand"; we will answer: Get you gone, and prophesy for yourself; our only fault is that we have sent such a spy. Diogenes [3] was sent a spy before you; but he told us other tidings. He says that death is no evil, for it is nothing base; that defamation is only the noise of madmen. And what account did this spy give us of pain? Of pleasure? Of poverty? He says that to be naked is better than a purple robe, to sleep upon the bare ground the softest bed, and gives a proof of all he says by his own courage, tranquillity, and freedom; and, moreover, by a healthy and robust body. There is no enemy near, says he. All is profound peace.—How so, Diogenes? Look upon me, says he. Am I hurt? Am I wounded? Have I run away from any one? This is such a spy as he ought to be. But you come and tell us one thing

after another. Go back again and examine things more exactly and without fear.

§ 2. What shall I do, then?

What do you do when you come out of a ship? Do you take away the rudder or the oars along with you? What do you take, then? Your own, your bottle, and your bundle. So, in the present case, if you will but remember what is your own, you will not claim what belongs to others. Are you bid to put off your consular robe?—Well, I am in my equestrian. Put off that too.—I have only my coat. Put off that too.—Well, I am naked. Still you raise my envy.—Then e'en take my whole body. If I can throw off a paltry body, am I any longer afraid of a tyrant? [4]

§ 3. But such a one will not leave me his heir. What, then, have I forgot that none of these things is mine? How, then, do we call them mine? As a bed in an inn. If the landlord when he dies leaves you the beds, well and good; but, if to another, they will be his, and you will seek one elsewhere; and consequently, if you do not find one, you will sleep upon the ground; only keep quiet and snore soundly, and remember that tragedies have no other subjects but the rich, and kings, and tyrants. No poor man fills any other place in one than as part of the chorus: whereas kings begin, indeed, with prosperity. "Crown the palace with festive garlands." [5]—But, then, about the third or fourth act: "Alas, Cithæron! why didst thou receive me?" Where are thy crowns, wretch: where is thy diadem? Cannot thy guards help thee?

Whenever you approach any of these, then, remember that you meet a tragic player; or, rather, not an actor, but Œdipus himself.—But such a one is happy. He walks with a numerous train. Well: I join myself with the crowd, and I too walk with a numerous train.

§ 4. But remember the principal thing: that the door is open. Do not be more fearful than children; but as they, when the play doth not please them, say, "I will play no longer": so do you, in the same case, say, "I will play no longer," and go; but, if you stay, do not complain.

CHAPTER XXV

ON THE SAME SUBJECT

§ 1. If these things are true, and we are not stupid or acting a part when we say that the good or ill of man consists in choice, and that all besides is nothing to us, why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What hath been our concern is in no one's power; what is in the power of others we do not regard. What embarrassment have we left?

But direct me.

Why should I direct you? Hath not Jupiter directed you? Hath he not given you what is your own, incapable of restraint or hindrance; and what is not your own, liable to both? What directions, then, what orders have you brought from him? "By all methods keep what is your own: what belongs to others do not covet. Honesty is your own; a sense of virtuous shame is your own. Who, then, can deprive you of these? Who can restrain you from making use of them but yourself? And how do you do it? When you make that your concern which is not your own, you lose what is." Having such precepts and directions from Jupiter, what sort do you still want from me? Am I better than he? More worthy of credit? If you observe these, what others do you need? Or are not these directions his? Produce your natural pre-conceptions: produce the demonstrations of philosophers: produce what you have often heard, and what you have said yourself; what you have read, and what you have studied.

How long is it right to observe these things, and not break up the game?

As long as it goes on agreeably. A king is chosen at the Saturnalian festival (for it was agreed to play at that game): he orders, "Do you drink: you mix the wine: you sing: you go: you come." I obey; that the game may not be broken up by my fault.—"Well: but I bid you think yourself to be unhappy." I do not think so, and who shall compel me to think so? Again: we agree to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed for Agamemnon, says to me: "Go to Achilles, and force away Briseis." I go. "Come." I come.

§ 2. We should converse in life as we do in hypothetical argu-

ments. "Suppose it to be night."—Well: suppose it. "Is it day, then?"—No: for I admitted the hypothesis that it is night. "Suppose that you think it to be night."—Well: suppose it. "But think also, in reality, that it is night."—That doth not follow from the hypothesis. Thus, too, in the other case. Suppose you have ill luck.—Suppose it. "Are you, then, unlucky?"—Yes. "Have you some cross dæmon?"—Yes. "Well: but think too [in earnest] that you are unhappy."—This doth not follow from the hypothesis: and there is one who forbids me to think so.

How long, then, are we to obey such orders?

As long as it is worth while: that is, as long as I preserve what is becoming and fit.

§ 3. Further, some are peevish and fastidious, and say, I cannot dine with such a fellow, to be obliged to hear him all day recounting how he fought in Mysia. "I told you, my friend, how I gained the eminence. There I am besieged again." But another says, "I had rather get a dinner, and hear him prate as much as he pleases."

Do you compare the value of these things, and judge for yourself; but do not let it be with depression and anxiety, and with a supposition that you are unhappy, for no one compels you to that. Is the house in a smoke? If it be a moderate one I will stay, if a very great one I will go out. For you must always remember and hold to this, that the door is open. "Well, do not live at Nicopolis."—I will not live there. "Nor at Athens."—Well, nor at Athens. "Nor at Rome."—Nor at Rome neither. "But you shall live at Gyaros."[1]—I will live there. But living at Gyaros seems to me like living in a great smoke. I will retire where no one can forbid me to live (for that abode is open to all), and put off my last garment,[2] this paltry body of mine: beyond this no one hath any power over me. Thus Demetrius said to Nero: "You sentence me to death; and nature, you!"[3] If I place my admiration on body, I give myself up for a slave; if on an estate, the same; for I immediately betray myself how I may be taken. Just as when a snake pulls in his head, I say, strike that part of him which he guards: and be you assured, that whatever you show a desire to guard, there your master will attack you. Remember but this, whom will you any longer flatter or fear?

But I want to sit where the senators do.

Do not you see that by this you straiten yourself? You squeeze yourself?

Why, how else shall I see the show in the amphitheatre cleverly?

Do not see it at all, man, and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself trouble? Or wait a little while, and when the show is over, go sit in the senators' places and sun yourself. For remember that this holds universally; we squeeze ourselves; we straiten ourselves: that is, our own principles squeeze and straiten us. What is it to be reviled, for instance? Stand by a stone and revile it; and what will you get? If you, therefore, would hear like a stone, what would your reviler be the better? But if the reviler hath the weakness of the reviled for an advantage ground, then he carries his point. "Strip him." —"What do you mean by him?" "Take my clothes; strip off them [if you will]." "I have put an affront upon you."— "Much good may it do you."

§ 4. These things were the study of Socrates; and, by this means, he always preserved the same countenance. But we had rather exercise and study anything than how to become unrestrained and free.

The philosophers talk paradoxes.

And are there not paradoxes in other arts? What is more paradoxical than the pricking any one's eye to make him see? If a person was to tell this to one ignorant of surgery, would not he laugh at him? Where is the wonder, then, if, in philosophy too, many truths appear paradoxes to the ignorant?

CHAPTER XXVI

WHAT THE LAW OF LIFE IS

§ 1. As one was reading hypothetical syllogisms; It is likewise a law in these, says Epictetus, to admit what follows from the hypothesis: but much more is it a law in life to do what follows from nature. For, if we desire in every subject of action, and in every circumstance, to keep up to nature; we must, on every occasion, evidently make it our aim neither to let consequences escape our observation, nor to admit contradictions. Philosophers, therefore, first exercise us in theory, which is the more easy task, and then lead us to the more difficult: for in theory there is nothing to oppose our following what we are taught; but in life there are many things to draw us aside. It is ridi-

culous, then, to say we must begin from these, for it is not easy to begin from the most difficult; and this excuse must be made to those parents who dislike that their children should learn philosophical speculations.—"Am I to blame, then, sir, and ignorant of my duty and of what is incumbent on me? If this is neither to be learnt nor taught, why do you find fault with me? If it is to be taught, pray teach me yourself; or, if you cannot, give me leave to learn it from those who profess to understand it. Besides: do you think that I voluntarily fall into evil, and miss of good? Heaven forbid! What, then, is the cause of my faults?"—Ignorance. "Are you not willing, then, that I should get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught the art of music or navigation by anger? Do you expect, then, that your anger should teach me the art of living?"—This, however, is allowed to be said only by one who really hath that intention. But he who reads these things, and applies to the philosophers, merely for the sake of showing at an entertainment that he understands hypothetical syllogisms; what doth he do it for but to be admired by some senator who happens to sit near him?[1] . . .

§ 2. . . . I once saw a person weeping and embracing the knees of Epaphroditus; and deploring his hard fortune that he had not £50,000 left. What said Epaphroditus, then? Did he laugh at him, as we should do? No; but cried out with astonishment, Poor man! How could you be silent? How could you bear it?

§ 3. . . . The first step, therefore, towards becoming a philosopher is being sensible in what state the ruling faculty of the mind is; for, when a person knows it to be in a weak one, he will not immediately employ it in great attempts. But for want of this, some, who can scarce get down a morsel, buy, and set themselves to swallow, whole treatises; and so they throw them up again, or cannot digest them; and then come colics, fluxes, and fevers. Such persons ought to consider what they can bear. Indeed, it is easy to convince an ignorant person in theory; but in matters relating to life no one offers himself to conviction; and we hate those who have convinced us. Socrates used to say that we ought not to live a life unexamined.

CHAPTER XXVII

OF THE SEVERAL APPEARANCES OF THINGS TO THE MIND: AND WHAT REMEDIES ARE TO BE PROVIDED FOR THEM

§ 1. APPEARANCES to the mind are of four kinds. Things are either what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be: or they are, and do not appear to be: or they are not, and yet appear to be. To form a right judgment in all these cases belongs only to the completely instructed. But whatever presses, to that a remedy must be applied. If the sophistries of Pyrrhonism [1] or the Academy press us, the remedy must be applied there: if specious appearances, by which things seem to be good which are not so, let us seek for a remedy there. If it be custom which presses us, we must endeavour to find a remedy against that.

What remedy is to be found against custom?

A contrary custom. You hear the vulgar say, "Such a one, poor soul! is dead."—Why, his father died; his mother died. "Ay; but he was cut off in the flower of his age, and in a foreign land."—Hear the contrary ways of speaking: withdraw yourself from these expressions. Oppose to one custom a contrary custom; to sophistry the art of reasoning, and the frequent use and exercise of it. Against specious appearances we must have clear pre-conceptions brightened up and ready. When death appears as an evil, we ought immediately to remember that evils may be avoided, but death is necessity. For what can I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me suppose myself to be Sarpedon, the son of Jove, that I may speak in the same gallant way.

> "Brave though we die, and honoured if we live;
> Or let us glory gain, or glory give."—POPE.

If I can achieve nothing myself, I will not envy another the honour of doing some gallant action. But suppose this to be a strain too high for us; are not we capable at least of arguing thus?—Where shall I fly from death? Show me the place; show me the people to whom I may have recourse, whom death doth not overtake. Show me the charm to avoid it. If there be none, what would you have me do? I cannot escape death; but [2] cannot I escape the dread of it? Must I die trembling and

lamenting? For the origin of the disease is wishing for something that is not obtained. In consequence of this, if I can bring over externals to my own inclination, I do it; if not, I want to tear out the eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the nature of man not to bear the being deprived of good; not to bear the falling into evil. And so, at last, when I can neither bring over things to my own inclination, nor tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and revile him whom I can; Jupiter, and the rest of the gods. For what are they to me if they take no care of me?

Oh! but you will be guilty of impiety.

What then? Can I be in a worse condition than I am now? In general, remember this, that, unless piety and interest be placed in the same thing, piety cannot be preserved in any mortal breast.

§ 2. Do not these things seem to have force?[3] Let a Pyrrhonist or an Academic come and oppose them. For my part, I am not at leisure, nor able to stand up as an advocate for general consent. Even if the business were concerning an estate, I should call in another advocate. With what advocate, then, am I contented? With any that may be upon the spot. I may be at a loss, perhaps, to give a reason how sensation is performed; whether it be diffused universally, or reside in a particular part; for I find difficulties that shock me in each case; but, that you and I are not the same person, I very exactly know.

How so?

Why, I never, when I have a mind to swallow anything, carry it to your mouth, but my own. I never, when I wanted to take a loaf, took a brush; but went directly to the loaf, as fit to answer my purpose. And do you yourselves, who deny all evidence of the senses, act any otherwise? Who of you, when he intended to go into a bath, ever went into a mill?

What, then, must not we to the utmost defend these points? support the general consent [of mankind]? be fortified against everything that opposes it?[4]

Who denies that? But it must be done by him who hath abilities, who hath leisure; but he who is full of trembling and perturbation and inward disorders of heart, must employ his time about something else.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THAT WE ARE NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MANKIND. WHAT THINGS ARE LITTLE, WHAT GREAT AMONG MEN

§ 1. WHAT is the cause of assent to anything?

Its appearing to be true.

It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true.

Why?

Because it is the very nature of the understanding to agree to truth, to be dissatisfied with falsehood, and to suspend its belief in doubtful cases.

What is the proof of this?

Persuade yourself, if you can, that it is now night.

Impossible.

Unpersuade yourself that it is day.

Impossible.

Persuade yourself that the stars are, or are not, even.

Impossible.

§ 2. When any one, then, assents to what is false, be assured that he doth not wilfully assent to it as false (for, as Plato affirms, the soul is never voluntarily deprived of truth); but what is false appears to him to be true. Well, then, have we, in actions, anything correspondent to true and false in propositions?

Duty, and contrary to duty: advantageous, and disadvantageous: suitable, and unsuitable; and the like.

A person, then, cannot think a thing advantageous to him, and not choose it.

He cannot. But how says Medea?

> "I know what evils wait my dreadful purpose;
> But vanquished reason yields to powerful rage."

Because she thought that very indulgence of her rage, and the punishing her husband, more advantageous than the preservation of her children.

Yes; but she is deceived.

Show clearly to her that she is deceived, and she will forbear; but, till you have shown it, what is she to follow but what appears to herself?

Nothing.

Why, then, are you angry[1] with her, that the unhappy woman is deceived in the most important points, and, instead of a human creature, becomes a viper? Why do not you rather, as we pity the blind and lame, so likewise pity those who are blinded and lamed in their superior faculties? Whoever, therefore, duly remembers that the appearance of things to the mind is the standard of every action to man: that this is either right or wrong: and, if right, he is without fault, if wrong, he himself bears the punishment; for that one man cannot be the person deceived, and another the sufferer: will not be outrageous and angry at any one; will not revile, or reproach, or hate, or quarrel with any one.

§ 3. So, then, have all the great and dreadful deeds that have been done in the world no other original than appearance?

Absolutely no other. The *Iliad* consists of nothing but the appearances [of things to the mind], and the use of those appearances. It appeared to Paris to carry off the wife of Menelaus. It appeared to Helen to follow him. If, then, it had appeared to Menelaus to persuade himself that it was an advantage to be robbed of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only the *Iliad* had been lost, but the *Odyssey* too.

Do these great events, then, depend on so small a cause?

What are these events which you call great?

Wars and seditions, the destruction of numbers of men, and the overthrow of cities.

And what great matter is there in all this? Nothing. What great matter is there in the death of numbers of oxen, numbers of sheep, or in the burning or pulling down numbers of nests of storks or swallows?

Are these like cases, then?

Perfectly like. The bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of sheep and oxen. The houses of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there great or dreadful in all this? Pray, show me what difference there is between the house of a man, and the nest of a stork, so far as it is a habitation,[2] excepting that houses are built with beams and tiles and bricks; and nests with sticks and clay?

What, then, is a stork and a man a like thing? What do you mean?

With regard to body, extremely like.

Is there no difference, then, between a man and a stork?

Yes, surely; but not in these things.

In what, then?

Inquire, and you will find that the difference consists in something else. See whether it be not in acting with discernment; whether it be not in a social disposition; in fidelity, honour, steadiness, judgment.

§ 4. Where, then, is the great good or evil of man?

Where his difference is. If this is preserved and remains well fortified, and neither honour, fidelity, or judgment is destroyed, then he himself is preserved likewise; but when any of these is lost and demolished, he himself is lost also. In this do all great events consist. Paris, they say, was undone, because the Greeks invaded Troy and laid it waste, and his family were slain in battle. By no means; for no one is undone by an action not his own. All that was only laying waste the nests of storks. But his true undoing was when he lost the modest, the faithful, the hospitable, and the decent character. When was Achilles undone? When Patroclus died? By no means. But when he gave himself up to rage; when he wept over a girl; when he forgot that he came there not to get mistresses, but to fight. This is human undoing; this is the siege; this the overthrow; when right principles are ruined; when these are destroyed.

But when wives and children are led away captives, and the men themselves killed, are not these evils?

Whence do you conclude them such? Pray, inform me in my turn.

Nay; but whence do you affirm that they are not evils?

§ 5. Let us recur to the rules. Produce the pre-conceptions. One cannot sufficiently wonder at what happens in this respect. When we would judge of light and heavy, we do not judge by guess; when of straight and crooked, not by guess: and, in general, when it concerns us to know the truth of any particular, no one of us will do anything by guess. But, where the first and principal cause is concerned of acting either right or wrong; of being prosperous or unprosperous, happy or unhappy; there only do we act rashly and by guess. Nowhere anything like a balance; nowhere anything like a rule; but some fancy strikes me, and I instantly act conformably to it. For am I better than Agamemnon or Achilles; that they, by following their fancies, should do and suffer so many things, and fancy not suffice me? And what tragedy hath any other original? The *Atreus* of Euripides, what is it? Fancy. The *Œdipus* of Sophocles? Fancy. The *Phœnix?* The *Hippolytus?* All fancy. To what character, then, doth it belong, think you, to

take no care of this point? What are they called who follow every fancy?

Madmen.

Do we, then, behave any otherwise?

CHAPTER XXIX

OF INTREPIDITY

§ 1. THE essence of good and evil is a certain disposition of the choice.

What are externals, then?

Materials to the faculty of choice: in the management of which it will attain its own good or evil.

How, then, will it attain good?

If it doth not admire the materials themselves: for right principles concerning these materials constitute a good choice; but perverse and distorted principles, a bad one. This law hath God ordained, who says, "If you wish for good, receive it from yourself." You say, No; but from another.—"Nay; but from yourself." In consequence of this, when a tyrant threatens and sends for me; I say, Against what is your threatening pointed? If he says, "I will chain you"; I answer, It is my hands and feet that you threaten. If he says, "I will cut off your head"; I answer, It is my head that you threaten. If he says, "I will throw you into prison"; I answer, It is the whole of this paltry body that you threaten: and, if he threatens banishment, just the same.

Doth not he threaten you, then?

If I am persuaded that these things are nothing to me, he doth not; but, if I fear any of them, it is me that he threatens. Whom, after all, is it that I fear? The master of what? Of things in my own power? Of these no one is the master. Of things not in my power? And what are these to me?

§ 2. What, then! do you philosophers teach us a contempt of kings?

By no means. Who of us teaches any one to contend with them about things of which they have the command? Take my body, take my possessions, take my reputation, take those who are about me. If I persuade any one to contend for these things as his own, accuse me with justice.—"Ay, but I would

command your principles too."—And who hath given you that power? How can you conquer the principle of another?—By applying terror I will conquer it.—Do not you see that[1] what conquers itself is not conquered by another? And nothing but itself can conquer the choice. Hence, too, the most excellent and equitable law of God, that the better should always prove superior to the worse. Ten are better than one.

To what purpose?

For chaining, killing, dragging where they please; for taking away an estate. Thus ten conquer one in the instance wherein they are better.

In what, then, are they worse?

When the one hath right principles and the others have not. For can they conquer in this point? How should they? If we were weighed in a scale, must not the heavier outweigh?

§ 3. That ever Socrates should suffer such things from the Athenians!

Wretch! what do you mean by Socrates?[2] Express the fact as it is. That ever the poor paltry body of Socrates should be carried away and dragged to prison by such as were stronger: that ever any one should give hemlock to the body of Socrates; and that it should expire! Do these things appear wonderful to you? These things unjust? Is it for such things as these that you accuse God? Had Socrates, then, no equivalent for them? In what, then, to him did the essence of good consist? Whom shall we mind, you or him? And what doth he say? "Anytus and Melitus[3] may indeed kill; but hurt me they cannot." And again: "If it so pleases God, so let it be."

§ 4. But show me that he who hath the worst principles gets the advantage over him who hath the better. You never will show it, nor anything like it: for the law of nature and of God is this: Let the better be always superior to the worse.

In what?

In that wherein it is better. One body is stronger than another: many than one; and a thief than one who is not a thief. Thus I, too, lost my lamp because the thief was better at keeping awake than I. But he bought a lamp at the price of being a thief, a rogue, and a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain, and much good may it do him!

§ 5. Well; but one takes me by the coat and draws me to the Forum; and then all the rest bawl out—"Philosopher, what good do your principles do you? See, you are dragging to prison: see, you are going to lose your head!"—And pray

what rule of philosophy could I contrive, that when a stronger than myself lays hold on my coat, I should not be dragged? Or that when ten men pull me at once and throw me into prison, I should not be thrown there? But have I learned nothing, then? I have learned to know, whatever happens, that if it is not a matter of choice it is nothing to me. Have my principles, then, done me no good? [4] What, then! do I seek for anything else to do me good but what I have learned? Afterwards, as I sit in prison, I say: He who makes this outcry neither hears what signal is given nor understands what is said; nor is it any concern to him to know what philosophers say or do. Let him alone. Well; but I am bid to come out of prison again. If you have no further need for me in prison, I will come out; if you want me again, I will return. "For how long will you go on thus?"—Just as long as [5] reason requires I should continue in this paltry body: when that is over, take it and fare ye well. Only let not this be done inconsiderately, nor from cowardice, nor upon every slight pretence; for that, again, would be contrary to the will of God: for he hath need of such a world and such creatures to live on earth. But if he sounds a retreat as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him when he sounds it as our general.

§ 6. Well, but are these things to be said to the world?

For what purpose? Is it not sufficient to be convinced one's self? When children come to us clapping their hands and saying: "To-morrow is the good feast of Saturn," do we tell them that good doth not consist in such things? By no means: but we clap our hands along with them. Thus, when you are unable to convince any one, consider him as a child, and clap your hands with him; or if you will not do that, at least hold your tongue. These things we ought to remember; and when we are called to any difficulty, know that an opportunity is come of showing whether we have been well taught. For he who goes from a philosophical lecture to a difficult point of practice, is like a young man who has been studying to solve syllogisms. If you propose an easy one, he says: Give me rather a fine intricate one, that I may try my strength. Even athletic champions are displaced with a slight antagonist. He cannot lift me, says one. This is a youth of spirit. No; but I warrant you when the occasion calls upon him, he must fall a-crying and say: "I wanted to learn a little longer first."—Learn what? If you did not learn these things to show them in practice, why did you learn them at all? I am persuaded there must be some one

among you who sit here that feels secret pangs of impatience and says: "When will such a difficulty come to my share as hath now fallen to his? Must I sit wasting my life in a corner when I might be crowned at Olympia? When will any one bring the news of such a combat for me?" Such should be the disposition of you all. Even among the gladiators of Cæsar there are some who bear it very ill, that they are not brought upon the stage and matched; and who offer vows to God, and address the officers, begging to fight. And will none among you appear such? I would willingly take a voyage on purpose to see how a champion of mine acts; how he treats his subject. "I do not choose such a subject," say you. Is it in your power, then, to take what subject you choose? Such a body is given you; such parents, such brothers, such a country, and such a rank in it; and then you come to me and say: "Change my subject." Besides, have not you abilities to manage that which is given you? It is your business [we should say] to propose; mine to treat the subject well.—"No. But do not propose such an argument to me; but such a one: do not offer such an objection to me; but such a one."—There will be a time, I suppose, when tragedians will fancy themselves to be mere masks, and buskins, and long trains. These things are your materials, man, and your subject. Speak something, that we may know whether you are a tragedian or a buffoon: for both have all the rest in common. If any one, therefore, should take away his buskins and his mask, and bring him upon the stage in his common dress,[6] is the tragedian lost or doth he remain? If he hath a voice he remains. "Here, this instant take upon you the command." I take it; and, taking it, I show how a person who hath been properly instructed behaves. "Lay aside your robe, put on rags, and come upon the stage in that character."—What then? is it not in my power to bring a good voice [and manner] along with me? "In what character do you now appear?"—As a witness cited by God. "Come you, then, and bear witness for me, for you are a witness worthy of being produced by me. Is anything external to the choice either good or evil? Do I hurt any one? Have I placed the good of each individual in any one but in himself? What evidence do you give for God?"—I am in a miserable condition, O Lord;[7] I am undone; no mortal cares for me; no mortal gives me anything; all blame me, all speak ill of me.—Is this the evidence you are to give? And will you bring disgrace upon his citation who hath conferred such an honour upon you

and thought you worthy of being produced as a witness in such a cause?

§ 7. But he who hath the power hath given sentence. "I judge you to be impious and profane." What hath befallen you?—I have been judged to be impious and profane. Anything else?—Nothing. Suppose he had passed his judgment upon an hypothetical proposition, and pronounced it to be a false conclusion, that if it be day it is light; what would have befallen the proposition? In this case who is judged; who condemned; the proposition, or he who is deceived concerning it? Doth he, who hath the power of pronouncing anything concerning you, know what pious or impious mean? Hath he made it his study, or learned it? Where? From whom? A musician would not regard him if he pronounced bass to be treble: nor a mathematician, if he passed sentence that lines drawn from the centre to the circle are not equal. And shall he, who is truly learned, regard an unlearned man, when he pronounces upon pious and impious, just and unjust?

§ 8. "Oh, the injuries to which the learned are exposed!" Is it here that you have learned this? Why do not you leave such pitiful reasonings to idle pitiful fellows;[8] and let them sit in a corner, and receive some little sorry pay, or grumble that nobody gives them anything? But do you appear, and make use of what you have learned. It is not reasonings that are wanted now. On the contrary, books are stuffed full of Stoical reasonings.

What is wanted, then?

One to apply them, whose actions may bear testimony to his doctrines. Assume me this character, that we may no longer make use of the examples of the ancients in the schools; but may have some example of our own.

§ 9. To whom, then, doth the contemplation of these [speculative reasonings] belong?

To him that hath leisure. For man is an animal fond of contemplation. But it is shameful to take a view of these things as runaway slaves do of a play. We are to sit quietly and listen, sometimes to the actor, and sometimes to the musician: and not do like those, who come in and praise the actor, and at the same time look round them every way: then, if any one happens to name their master, are frighted out of their wits and run off. It is shameful for a philosopher thus to contemplate the works of nature. Now, what, in this case, is the master? Man is not the master of man; but death, and life,

and pleasure, and pain: for without these, bring Cæsar to me, and you will see how intrepid I shall be. But, if he comes thundering and lightning with these; and these are the objects of my terror; what do I else but, like the runaway slave, acknowledge my master? While I have any respite from these, as the fugitive comes into the theatre, so I bathe, drink, sing; but all, with terror and anxiety. But, if I free myself from my masters, that is, from such things as render a master terrible, what trouble, what master have I remaining?

§ 10. What, then, are we to publish these things to all men?

No. But humour the vulgar, and say: This poor man advises me to what he thinks good for himself. I excuse him; for Socrates, too, excused the jailor who wept when he was to drink the poison, and said, "How heartily he sheds tears for us." Was it to him that Socrates said, "For this reason we send the women out of the way"? No; but to his friends: to such as were capable of hearing it, while he humoured the other as a child.

CHAPTER XXX

WHAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE READY IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES

When you are going to any one of the great, remember, that there is Another, who sees from above what passes; and whom you ought to please rather than man. He, therefore, asks you:

In the schools, what did you use to call exile, and prison, and chains, and death, and defamation?

I? Indifferent things.

What, then, do you call them now? Are they at all changed?

No.

Are you changed, then?

No.

Tell me, then, what things are indifferent.

Things independent on choice.

Tell me the consequence too.

Things independent on choice, are nothing to me.

Tell me, likewise, what appeared to us to be the good of man.

A right choice and a right use of the appearances of things.

What his end?

To follow thee.

Do you say the same things now, too?

Yes. I do say the same things, even now.

Well, go in, then, boldly, and mindful of these things: and you will see what a youth, who hath studied what he ought, is among men who have not. I protest, I imagine you will have such thoughts as these: "Why do we provide so many and great qualifications for nothing? Is the power, the antechamber, the attendants, the guards, no more than this? Is it for these that I have listened to so many dissertations? These are nothing: and I had qualified myself as for some great encounter."

END OF THE FIRST BOOK

BOOK II

CHAPTER I

THAT COURAGE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION

§ 1. WHAT is asserted by the philosophers may, perhaps, appear a paradox to some: let us, however, examine, as well as we can, whether this be true: That it is possible in all things to act at once with caution and courage. For caution seems, in some measure, contrary to courage; and contraries are by no means consistent. The appearance of a paradox to many, in the present case, seems to me to arise from something like this. If, indeed, we assert that courage and caution are to be used in the same instances, we should justly be accused of uniting contradictions: but, in the way that we affirm it, where is the absurdity? For, if what hath been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the essence of good and evil consists in the use of the appearances; and that things independent on choice are not of the nature either of good or evil: what paradox do the philosophers assert, if they say: "Where things are not dependent on choice, be courageous; where they are, be cautious"? For in these only, if evil consists in a bad choice, is caution to be used. And if things independent on choice, and not in our power, are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous: and, indeed, courageous on the account of this very caution; for, by using caution with regard to things really evil, we shall gain courage with regard to what are not so.

§ 2. But we are in the same condition as deer: when these in a fright fly from the feathers,[1] where do they turn, and to what do they retire for safety? To the toils. And thus they are undone, by inverting the objects of fear and confidence. Thus we, too. In what instances do we make use of fear? In things independent on choice. In what, on the other hand, do we behave with courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded? In things dependent on choice. To be deceived, then, or to act rashly or imprudently, or to indulge an ignominious desire, is of

no importance to us, if we do but take a good aim in things independent on choice. But where death, or exile, or pain, or ignominy are concerned, there is the retreat, there the flutter and fright. Hence, as it must be with those who err in matters of the greatest importance, what is naturally courage we render bold, desperate, rash, and impudent; and what is naturally caution, timid and base, and full of fears and perturbations. For if a person was to transfer caution to choice, and the actions of choice, by a willingness to be cautious, he will at the same time have it in his power to avoid [what he guards against]; but if he transfers it to things not in our power, or choice, by fixing his aversion on what is not in our own power but dependent on others, he will necessarily fear; he will be hurried; will be disturbed. For it is not death or pain that is to be feared; but the fear of pain or death. Hence we commend him who says:

"Death is no ill, but shamefully to die."

Courage, then, ought to be opposed to death, and caution to the fear of death: whereas we, on the contrary, oppose to death, flight; and to our principle concerning it, carelessness and desperateness and indifference.

§ 3. Socrates used very properly to call these things vizards: for, as masks appear shocking and formidable to children, from their inexperience, we are affected in like manner, with regard to things, for no other reason than as children are with regard to vizards. For what is a child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of learning; for, so far as the knowledge of children extends, they are not inferior to us. What is death? A vizard. Turn it, and be convinced. See, it doth not bite. This little body and spirit must be separated (as they formerly were) either now, or hereafter: why, then, are you displeased if it be now? For if not now, it will be hereafter. Why? To complete the revolutions of the world: for that hath need of some things present, others to come, and others already completed. What is pain? A vizard. Turn it, and be convinced.

This paltry flesh is sometimes affected by harsh, sometimes by smooth impressions. If suffering be not worth your while, the door is open; if it be, bear it: for it was fit the door should be open against all accidents. And thus we have no trouble.

§ 4. What, then, is the fruit of these principles? What it ought to be; the most noble, and the most becoming, the truly educated,[2] tranquillity, security, freedom. For in this case we

are not to give credit to the many, who say that none ought to be educated but the free; but rather to the philosophers, who say that the well-educated alone are free.

How so?

Thus, is freedom anything else than the power of living as we like?

Nothing else.

Well, tell me, then, do you like to live in error?

We do not. No one, sure, that lives in error [3] is free.

Do you like to live in fear? Do you like to live in sorrow? Do you like to live in perturbation?

By no means.

No one, therefore, in a state of fear, or sorrow, or perturbation, is free; but whoever is delivered from sorrow, fear, and perturbation, by the same means is delivered likewise from slavery. How shall we believe you, then, good legislators, when you say, "We allow none to be educated, but the free"? for the philosophers say, "We allow none to be free, but the liberally-educated": that is, God doth not allow it.

What, then, when any person had turned his slave about before the consul,[4] hath he done nothing?

Yes, he hath.

What?

He hath turned his slave about before the consul.

Nothing more?

Yes. He pays a fine for him.

Well, then, is not the man who hath gone through this ceremony rendered free?

No more than he is rendered exempt from perturbation. Pray, have you, who are able to give this freedom to others, no master of your own? Are not you a slave to money? to a girl? to a boy? to a tyrant? to some friend of a tyrant? else, why do you tremble when any of these is in question? Therefore I so often repeat to you, Let this be your study; have this always at hand; in what it is necessary to be courageous, and in what cautious: courageous in what doth not depend on choice; cautious in what doth.

§ 5. [5] But have not I read my papers to you? Do not you know what I am doing?

In what?

In my essays.

Show me in what state you are as to desire and aversion. Whether you do not fail of what you wish, and incur what you

would avoid: but, as to these commonplace essays, if you are wise, you will take them and obliterate them.

Why, did not Socrates write?

Yes, who [6] so much? But how? As he had not always one at hand to argue against his principles, or be argued against in his turn, he argued with, and examined himself; and always treated, at least, some one natural notion, in a manner fitted for the use of life. These are the things which a philosopher writes, but for such [7] commonplace essays as those I am speaking of, he leaves to the insensible, or to the happy creatures whom idleness [8] furnishes with leisure; or to such as are too weak to regard consequences. And will you, when you are gone from hence,[9] which the time now calls for, be fond of showing, and reading, and be ridiculously conceited, of these things?

Pray, see how I compose dialogues.

Talk not of that, man; but rather be able to say: See how I avoid being disappointed of my desire; see how I secure myself against incurring my aversion. Set death before me, set pain, set a prison, set ignominy, set condemnation before me, and you will know me. This is the [proper] ostentation of a young man come out from the schools. Leave the rest to others. Let no one ever hear you utter a word about them, nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them: but think that you are nobody, and that you know nothing. Appear to know only this, how you may never be disappointed of your desire; never incur your aversion. Let others study causes, problems, and syllogisms. Do you study death, chains, torture, exile: [10] and all these with courage, and reliance upon him who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy a post in which you may show what the rational governing faculty can do when set in array against powers independent on the choice. And thus, this paradox becomes neither impossible nor a paradox, that we must be at once cautious and courageous: courageous in what doth not depend upon choice, and cautious in what doth.

CHAPTER II

OF TRANQUILLITY

§ 1. CONSIDER, you who are going to take your trial, what you wish to preserve, and in what to succeed. For if you wish to preserve a choice conformable to nature, you are entirely safe; everything goes well; you have no trouble on your hands. While you wish to preserve what is in your own power, and which is naturally free, and are contented with that, whom have you longer to care for? For who is the master of things like these? Who can take them away? If you wish to be a man of honour and fidelity, who shall prevent you? If you wish not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desires contrary to your principles; to aversions contrary to your opinion? The judge, perhaps, will pass a sentence against you which he thinks formidable: but how can he likewise make you receive it with aversion? Since, then, desire and aversion are in your own power, what have you else to care for? Let this be your introduction,[1] this your narration, this your proof, this your victory, this your conclusion, and this your applause. Thus Socrates, to one who put him in mind to prepare himself for his trial: "Do not you think," says he, "that I have been preparing myself for this very thing my whole life?" By what kind of preparation? "I have preserved what was in my own power." What do you mean? "I have done nothing unjust, either in public or in private life."

§ 2. But if you wish to preserve externals too; your paltry body, your estate or dignity; I advise you immediately to prepare yourself by every possible preparation, and besides, consider the disposition of your judge, and of your adversary. If it be necessary to fall down at his feet, fall down at his feet: if to weep, weep: if to groan, groan. For when you have subjected what is in your own power to externals, submit to slavery at once, and do not struggle, and at one time be willing to be a slave, and at another not willing: but simply, and with your whole intention, be one or the other; free or a slave, well-educated or not; a game-cock or a craven: either bear to be beat till you die, or give out at once; and do not be soundly beat first, and then give out at last. If both these be shameful, make the distinction immediately.

§ 3. Where is the nature of good and evil?

Where truth likewise is. Where truth and where nature are,[2] here is caution: where truth and where nature are not, there is courage. Why, do you think that if Socrates had wished to preserve externals, that he would have said, when he appeared at his trial, "Anytus and Melitus may indeed kill, but hurt me they cannot"? Was he so foolish as not to see that this way doth not lead to that end, but the contrary? What, then, is the reason that he not only disregards, but provokes his judges? Thus my friend Heraclitus, in a trifling suit about a little estate at Rhodes, after having proved to the judges that his cause was good, when he came to the conclusion of his speech, "I will not entreat you," says he, "nor care what judgment you give: for it is rather you who are to be judged than I." And thus he lost his suit. What need was there of this? Be content not to entreat: do not tell them, too, that you will not entreat, unless it be a proper time to provoke the judges designedly, as in the case of Socrates. But if you too are preparing such a speech, what do you wait for? Why do you submit to be tried? For if you wish to be hanged, have patience, and the gibbet will come. But if you choose rather to submit, and make your defence as well as you can, all the rest is to be ordered accordingly: with a due regard, however, to the preservation of your own character.

§ 4. For this reason it is ridiculous too to say, "Suggest to me what is to be done." How should I know what to suggest to you? You should rather say, Inform my understanding to accommodate itself to whatever may be the event. The former is just as if an illiterate person should say: "Tell me what to write when any name is proposed to me"; and I direct him to write Dion; and then another comes, and proposes to him the name, not of Dion, but of Theon; what will be the consequence? What will he write? Whereas, if you had made writing your study, you would be ready prepared for whatever word might occur: if not, how can I suggest to you? For, if the circumstances of the affair should suggest something else, what will you say, or how will you act? Remember, then, the general rule, and you will need no suggestion: but if you gape after externals you must necessarily be tossed up and down, according to the inclination of your master.

And who is my master?

He in whose power is placed whatever you strive to acquire, or would avoid.

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING SUCH AS RECOMMEND PERSONS TO THE PHILOSOPHERS

§ 1. Diogenes rightly answered one who desired letters of recommendation from him, "At first sight he will know you to be a man: and whether you are a good or a bad man, if he hath any skill in distinguishing, he will know likewise: and, if he hath not, he will never know it, though I should write a thousand times." Just as if you were a piece of coin, and should desire to be recommended to any person as good, in order to be tried: if it be to an assayer, he will know your value, for you will recommend yourself.

§ 2. We ought, therefore, in life also, to have something analogous to this skill in gold; that one may be able to say, like the assayer, Bring me whatever piece you will, and I will find out its value: or as I would say with regard to syllogisms, Bring me whomever you will, and I will distinguish for you, whether he knows how to solve syllogisms or not. Why? Because I can solve syllogisms myself, and have that faculty, which is necessary for one who knows how to find out persons skilled in the solution of syllogisms. But how do I act in life? I at some times call a thing good; at others, bad. What is the cause of this? The contrary to what happens in syllogisms: ignorance and inexperience.

CHAPTER IV

CONCERNING A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN GUILTY OF ADULTERY

§ 1. As he was saying, that man is made for fidelity; and that whoever subverts this subverts the peculiar property of man; one of those who pass for men of literature happened to come in, who had been found guilty of adultery in that city. But, continues Epictetus, if, laying aside that fidelity for which we were born, we form designs against the wife of our neighbour,

what do we do? What else but destroy and ruin—what? Fidelity, honour, and sanctity of manners.—Only these? And do not we ruin neighbourhood? Friendship? Our country? In what rank do we place ourselves? How am I to consider you, sir? As a neighbour? A friend? What sort of one? As a citizen? How shall I trust you? Indeed, if you were some sorry vessel, so noisome that no use could be made of you, you might be thrown on a dunghill and no mortal would take the trouble to pick you up; but if, being a man, you cannot fill any one place in human society, what shall we do with you? For, suppose you cannot hold the place of a friend, can you hold even that of a slave? And who will trust you? Why, then, should not you also be contented to be thrown upon some dunghill as a useless vessel, and indeed as mere dung? Will you say, after this, Hath no one any regard for me, a man of letters? Why, you are wicked, and fit for no use. Just as if wasps should take it ill that no one hath any regard for them, but all shun, and whoever can beats them down. You have such a sting that whoever you strike with it is thrown into troubles and pangs. What would you have us do with you? There is nowhere to place you.

§ 2. What, then, are not women by nature common?

I admit it; and so is a pig at table common to those who are invited. But, after it is distributed, go, if you think proper, and snatch away the share of him who sits next you, or slyly steal it, or stretch out your hand and taste; and, if you cannot tear away any of the meat, dip your fingers and lick them. A fine companion! A Socratic guest indeed! Again: is not the theatre common to all the citizens? Therefore come, when all are seated, if you think proper, and turn any one of them out of his place. Thus, women are common by nature; but when the legislator, like the master of an entertainment, distributes them, will not you, like the rest of the company, be contented with desiring a share for yourself, but must you pilfer, and taste what belongs to another?

But I am a man of letters, and understand Archedemus.[1]

With all your understanding of Archedemus, then, be an adulterer and a rogue; and, instead of a man, a wolf or an ape. For where is the difference?

CHAPTER V

HOW MAGNANIMITY MAY BE CONSISTENT WITH CARE

§ 1. THE materials of action are indifferent; but the use of them is not indifferent.

How, then, shall one preserve intrepidity and tranquillity; and at the same time be careful, and neither rash nor indolent?

By imitating those who play at tables. The dice are indifferent; the pieces are indifferent. How do I know what will fall out? But it is my business to manage carefully and dexterously whatever doth fall out. Thus in life, too, this is the chief business; distinguish and separate things, and say, "Externals are not in my power, choice is. Where shall I seek good and evil? Within; in what is my own." But in what belongs to others, call nothing good, or evil, or profit, or hurt, or anything of that sort.

§ 2. What, then, are we to treat these in a careless way?

By no means; for this, on the other hand, is an evil exercise of the faculty of choice; and, on that [1] account, against nature. But we are to act with care, because the use of the materials is not indifferent; and at the same time with intrepidity and tranquillity, because the materials themselves are indifferent. For where a thing is not indifferent, there no one can restrain or compel me. Where I am capable of being restrained or compelled, the acquisition doth not depend upon me; nor is either good or evil. The use of it, indeed, is either good or evil; but that doth depend upon me. It is difficult, I own, to blend and unite the carefulness of one who is affected by the materials of action, and the intrepidity of one who disregards them; but it is not impossible: if it be, it is impossible to be happy. How do we act in a voyage? What is in my power? To choose the pilot, the sailors, the day, the time of day. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for? My part is performed. The subject belongs to another, to the pilot. But the ship is sinking: what then have I to do? That which alone I can do; I am drowned, without fear, without clamour, or accusing God; but as one who knows that what is born must likewise die. For I am not eternity, but a man; a part of the whole, as an hour is of the day. I must come like an hour, and like an hour

must pass away. What signifies it whether by drowning or by a fever? For, in some way or other, pass I must.

§ 3. This you may see to be the practice of those who play skilfully at ball. No one contends for the ball, as either a good or an evil; but how he may throw and catch it again. Here lies the address, here the art, the nimbleness, the sagacity; that I may not be able to catch it, even if I hold up my lap for it; another may catch it whenever I throw it. But if we catch or throw it with fear or perturbation, what kind of play will this be? How shall we keep ourselves steady; or how see the order of the game? One will say, Throw; another, Do not throw; a third, You have thrown once already. This is a mere quarrel, not a play. Therefore Socrates well understood playing at ball.

What do you mean?

Using pleasantry at his trial. "Tell me," says he, "Anytus, how can you say that I do not believe a God? What do you think dæmons are?[2] Are they not either the offspring of the gods, or compounded of gods and men?"—"Yes." "Do you think, then, that one can believe there are mules, and not believe that there are asses?" This was just as if he had been playing at ball. And what was the ball he had to play with? Life, chains, exile, a draught of poison, separation from a wife, and the desertion of orphan children. These were what he had to play with; and yet, nevertheless, he did play, and threw the ball with address. Thus we should be careful how we play, but indifferent as to the ball itself. We are by all means to manage external materials with art; not taking them for ourselves, but showing our art about them, whatever they may happen to be. Thus a weaver doth not shake the wool, but employs his art upon what is given him. It is another who gives you food, and a property; and may take them away, and your paltry body too. Do you, however, work upon the materials you have received; and then, if you come off unhurt, others, no doubt, who meet you, will congratulate you on your escape. But he who hath a clearer insight into such things, if he sees you have behaved in a becoming manner, will praise and congratulate you; but, if you owe your escape to any unbecoming action, the contrary. For where there is a reasonable cause of rejoicing, there is likewise a reasonable cause of congratulation.

§ 4. How, then, are some external things said to be according to nature; others contrary to it?

When we are considered as unconnected individuals. I will allow it is natural for the foot, for instance, to be clean. But if you take it as a foot, and not as an unconnected individual thing, it will be fit that it should walk in the dirt, and tread upon thorns; and sometimes that it should even be cut off for the good of the whole: otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should reason in some such manner concerning ourselves. What are you? A man. If then, indeed, you consider yourself as an unconnected individual, it is natural that you should live to old age, be rich and healthy; but if you consider yourself as a man, and as a part of the whole, it will be fit, on the account of that whole, that you should at one time be sick; at another, take a voyage, and be exposed to danger; sometimes be in want; and possibly it may happen, die before your time. Why, then, are you displeased? Do not you know that else, as the other is no longer a foot, so you are no longer a man? For what is a man? A part of a commonwealth, principally of that which consists of gods and men; and next, of that to which you immediately belong, which is a miniature of the universal city.

§ 5. What, then, must I at one time be called to a trial; must another at another time be scorched by a fever; another be exposed to the sea; another die; and another be condemned?

Yes; for it is impossible, in such a body, in such a world, and among such companions, but that some or other of us must fall into such circumstances.[3] Your business, when you come into them, is to say what you ought, to order things as you can. Then, says one, "I decide that you have acted unjustly." Much good may it do you; I have done my part. You are to look to it, whether you have done yours; for there is some danger of that too, let me tell you.

CHAPTER VI

OF INDIFFERENCE

§ 1. A HYPOTHETICAL proposition is an indifferent thing; but the judgment concerning it is not indifferent, but is either knowledge, or opinion, or mistake. Thus life is indifferent; the use of it not indifferent. When you are told, therefore, that these things are indifferent, do not, upon that account, ever be careless; nor, when you are excited to carelessness, be abject, and struck by the admiration of the materials of action. It is good to know your own qualifications and powers; that, where you are not qualified, you may be quiet, and not angry that others have the advantage of you in such things. For you too will think it reasonable that you should have the advantage in the art of syllogisms; and, if others should be angry at it, you will tell them, by way of consolation, "I have learned it, and you have not." Thus, too, wherever practice is necessary, do not pretend to what can be obtained no other way; but leave the matter to those who are practised in it, and do you be contented with a composed firmness of mind. "Go, for instance, and pay your compliments to such a person."—"How?" "Not meanly."—"But I have been shut out; for I have not learned to get in at the window; and, finding the door shut, I must necessarily either go back, or get in at the window." "But speak to him too."—"I will speak to him." "In what manner?"—"Not meanly." But you have not succeeded; for this was not your business, but his. Why do you claim what belongs to another? Always remember what is your own, and what is another's; and you will never be disturbed.

§ 2. Hence Chrysippus rightly says: While consequences are uncertain, I will keep to those things which are best adapted to the attainment of what is conformable to nature: for God himself hath formed me to choose this. If I knew that it was now destined for me to be sick, I would even exert my pursuits towards it: for even the foot, if it had understanding, would exert itself to get into the dirt. For why are ears of corn produced, if it be not to ripen? and why do they ripen, if not to be reaped? For they are not separate individuals. If they were capable of sense, do you think they would wish never to

be reaped? It would be a curse upon ears of corn not to be reaped: and we ought to know, that it would be a curse upon man not to die; like that of not ripening, and not being reaped. Since, then, it is necessary for us to be reaped, and we have, at the same time, understanding to know it, are we angry at it? This is only because we neither know what we are, nor have studied what belongs to man, as jockeys do what belongs to horses. Yet Chrysantas, when he was about to strike an enemy, on hearing the trumpet sound a retreat, drew back his hand: for he thought it more eligible to obey the command of his general than his own inclination.[1] But not one of us, even when necessity calls, is ready and willing to obey it: but we suffer, whatever things we do suffer, weeping and groaning, and calling them our circumstances.[2] What circumstances, man? For if you call what surrounds you circumstances, everything is a circumstance: but, if you apply this name to hardships, where is the hardship that whatever is born must die? The instrument is either a sword, or a wheel, or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. And what doth it signify to you by what way you descend to Hades? All are equal: but, if you would hear the truth, the shortest is that by which a tyrant sends you. No tyrant was ever six months in cutting any man's throat: but a fever is often a year in killing. All these things are mere sound, and the pomp of empty names.

My life is in danger from Cæsar.

And am not I in danger, who dwell at Nicopolis, where there are so many earthquakes? And when you yourself cross the Adriatic,[3] what is then in danger? Is not your life?

Ay; but I am in danger with respect to opinion.

What, your own? How so? Can any one compel you to have any opinion contrary to your own inclination?

But the opinions of others too.

And what danger is it of yours if others have false opinions?

But I am in danger of being banished.

What is it to be banished? To be somewhere else than at Rome.

Yes; but what if I should be sent to Gyaros?

If it be worth your while, you will go: if not, you have another place to go to; where he who now sends you to Gyaros must go likewise, whether he will or not. Why, then, do you come to these as to great trials? They are not equal to your qualifications. So that an ingenuous young man would say, It was not worth while for this, to have read and writ so much

and to have sat so long listening to a good-for-nothing old fellow. Only remember that division by which your own, and not your own, is distinguished, and you will never claim what belongs to others. A tribunal and a prison is, each of them, a place; one high, the other low: but choice is equal, and if you have a mind to keep it equal for both places, it may be kept. We shall then become imitators of Socrates, when, even in a prison, we are able to write hymns [4] of praise: but, as we now are, consider, whether we could bear that even another should say to us in a prison, "Shall I read you a hymn of praise?"—"Why do you trouble me: do you know in what a sad situation I am? In such circumstances, am I able to hear hymns?" "What circumstances?"—"I am going to die." "And are all other men to be immortal?"

CHAPTER VII

OF DIVINATION

§ 1. From an unseasonable regard to divination, we omit many duties.[1] For what can the diviner see, besides death, or danger, or sickness, or, in short, things of this kind? When it is necessary, then, to expose one's self to danger for a friend, or even a duty to die for him, what occasion have I for divination? Have not I a diviner within, who hath told me the essence of good and evil, and who explains to me the indications of both? What further need, then, have I of the entrails of victims, or the flight of birds? Can I bear with the other diviner, when he says, "This is for your interest?" For doth he know what is for my interest? Doth he know what good is? Hath he learned the indications of good and evil as he hath those of the victims? If so, he knows the indications likewise of fair and base, just and unjust. Do you tell me, sir, what is indicated to me; life or death, riches or poverty. But whether these things are for my interest or not, I shall not inquire of you. "Why?" Because you do not give your opinion about grammar; and do you give it here, in things about which we all take different ways and dispute with one another? Therefore, the lady who was going to send a month's provision to Gratilla,[2] in her banishment, made a right answer to one who told her Domitian would

seize it; I had rather, says she, that he should seize it than I not send it.

§ 2. What, then, is it that leads us so often to divination? Cowardice, the dread of events. Hence we flatter the diviners. "Pray, sir, shall I inherit my father's estate?"—"Let us see, let us sacrifice upon the occasion." "Nay, sir, just as fortune pleases." Then, if he says, "You shall inherit it," we give him thanks, as if we received the inheritance from him. The consequence of this is that they play upon us.

§ 3. What, then, is to be done?

We should come without previous desire or aversion. As a traveller inquires the road of the person he meets, without any desire for that which turns to the right hand, more than to the left; for he wishes for neither of these, but that only which leads him properly. Thus we should come to God as to a guide. Just as we make use of our eyes, not persuading them to show us one object rather than another, but receiving such as they present to us. But now we hold the bird with fear and trembling, and, in our invocations to God, entreat him, "Lord have mercy upon me: suffer me to come off safe." You wretch! would you have anything, then, but what is best? And what is best, but what pleases God? Why do you, as far as in you lies, corrupt your judge and seduce your adviser?

CHAPTER VIII

WHEREIN CONSISTS THE ESSENCE OF GOOD

§ 1. God is beneficial. Good is also beneficial. It should seem, then, that where the essence of God is, there too is the essence of good. What, then, is the essence of God? Flesh?—By no means. An estate? Fame?—By no means. Intelligence? Knowledge? Right reason?—Certainly. Here then, without more ado, seek the essence of good. For, do you seek it in a plant?—No. Or in a brute?—No. If, then, you seek it only in a rational subject, why do you seek it anywhere but in what is distinct from irrationals? Plants have not the use of the appearances of things, and therefore you do not apply the term good to them. Good, then, requires the use of these appearances. And nothing else? If so, you may say that

good, and happiness, and unhappiness belong to mere animals. But this you do not say; and you are right; for how much soever they have the use of the appearances of things, they have not the faculty of understanding that use, and with good reason, for they are made to be subservient to others, and not principals themselves. Why was an ass made? Was it as a principal? No, but because we had need of a back able to carry burthens. We had need too that he should walk; therefore he had the use of the appearances of things added, otherwise he could not have walked. But here his endowments end; for if an understanding of that use had been likewise added, he would not in reason have been subject to us, nor have done us these services, but would have been like and equal to ourselves. Why will you not, therefore, seek the essence of good in that, without which you will not say there can be good in anything?

§ 2. What then? Are not these likewise the works of the gods? They are, but not principals nor parts of the gods. But you are a principal. You are a distinct portion of the essence of God, and contain a certain part of him in yourself.[1] Why, then, are you so ignorant of your noble birth? Why do not you consider whence you came? Why do not you remember, when you are eating, who you are who eat, and whom you feed? When you are in the company of women, when you are conversing, when you are exercising, when you are disputing, do not you know that it is a god you feed, a god you exercise? You carry a god about with you, wretch, and know nothing of it. Do you suppose I mean some god without you, of gold or silver? It is within yourself you carry him, and profane him, without being sensible of it, by impure thoughts and unclean actions. If even the image of God were present, you would not dare to act as you do; and when God himself is within you, and hears and sees all, are not you ashamed to think and act thus, insensible of your own nature and hateful to God?

§ 3. After all, why are we afraid, when we send a young man from the school into action, that he should behave indecently, eat indecently, converse indecently with women; that he should either debase himself by a shabby dress, or clothe himself too finely? Doth not he know the god within him? Doth not he know with whom he sets out? Have we patience to hear him say, "I wish to have you with me"?

Have you not God? Do you seek any other, while you have him? Or will he tell you any other than these things? If you

were a statue of Phidias, either Jupiter or Minerva, you would remember both yourself and the artist; and, if you had any sense, you would endeavour to do nothing unworthy of him who formed you, or of yourself: nor to appear in an unbecoming manner to spectators. And are you now careless how you appear, because you are the workmanship of Jupiter? And yet, what comparison is there, either between the artists or the things they have formed? What work of any artist contains in itself those faculties which are shown in forming it? Is it anything but marble, or brass, or gold, or ivory? And the Minerva of Phidias, when its hand is once extended and a Victory placed in it, remains in that attitude for ever. But the works of God are endued with motion, breath, the use of the appearances of things, judgment. Being, then, the formation of such an artist, will you dishonour him, especially when he hath not only formed, but intrusted and given the guardianship of you to yourself? Will you not only be forgetful of this, but, moreover, dishonour the trust? If God had committed some orphan to your charge, would you have been thus careless of him? He hath delivered yourself to your care, and says, "I had no one fitter to be trusted than you: preserve this person for me, such as he is by nature; modest, faithful, sublime, unterrified, dispassionate, tranquil." And will you not preserve him?

§ 4. But it will be said: "Whence this supercilious look, and gravity of face?" [in our young philosopher].—"I have not yet so much gravity as the case deserves. I do not yet trust to what I have learned, and assented to. I still fear my own weakness. Let me but take courage a little, and then you shall see such a look and such an appearance as I ought to have. Then I will show you the statue when it is finished, when it is polished. Do you think I will show you a supercilious countenance? Heaven forbid! For Olympian Jupiter doth not lift up his brow, but keeps a steady countenance, as becomes him who is about to say—

"Th' immutable decree
No force can shake: what is, that ought to be."—Pope.

"Such will I show myself to you: faithful, modest, noble, tranquil."—What, and immortal too, and exempt from age and sickness?—"No. But sickening and dying as becomes a god. This is in my power; this I can do. The other is not in my power, nor can I do it." Shall I show you the [2] nerves of a philosopher?

What nerves are those?

A desire undisappointed; an aversion unincurred; pursuits duly exerted; a careful resolution; an unerring assent. These you shall see.

CHAPTER IX

THAT WHEN WE ARE UNABLE TO FULFIL WHAT THE CHARACTER OF A MAN PROMISES, WE ASSUME THAT OF A PHILOSOPHER

§ 1. It is no common attainment merely to fulfil what the nature of man promises. For what is man?

A rational and mortal being.

Well: from what are we distinguished by reason?

From wild beasts.

From what else?

From sheep and the like.

Take care, then, to do nothing like a wild beast; otherwise you have destroyed the man; you have not fulfilled what your nature promises. Take care, too, to do nothing like cattle; for thus likewise the man is destroyed.

In what do we act like cattle?

When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, sordidly, inconsiderately, into what are we sunk?

Into cattle.

What have we destroyed?

The rational being.

When we behave contentiously, injuriously, passionately, and violently, into what are we sunk?

Into wild beasts.

§ 2. And further: some of us are wild beasts of a larger size; others, little mischievous vermin; whence there is room to say, Let me rather be eat by a lion. By all these means is destroyed what the nature of man promises. For when is a conjunctive proposition preserved?

When it fulfils what its nature promises.

So that the preservation of such a proposition consists in this, that its several parts are a conjunction of truths.

When is a disjunctive proposition preserved?

When it fulfils what its nature promises.

When is a flute, a harp, a horse, or a dog preserved?

When each fulfils what its nature promises.

Where is the wonder, then, that man should be preserved and destroyed in the same manner? All are preserved and improved by operations correspondent to their several faculties; as a carpenter, by building; a grammarian, by grammar; but if he accustom himself to write ungrammatically, his art will necessarily be spoiled and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest ones destroy him; faithful actions, the faithful man, and the contrary destroy him. On the other hand, contrary actions heighten contrary characters. Thus impudence, an impudent one; knavery, a knavish one; slander, a slanderous one; anger, an angry one; and unequitable dealings, a covetous one.

§ 3. For this reason philosophers advise us not to be contented with mere learning; but to add meditation likewise, and then practice. For we have been long accustomed to contrary actions, and have practised upon wrong opinions. If, therefore, we do not likewise habituate ourselves to practise upon right opinions, we shall be nothing more than expositors of the principles of others. For who among us is not already able to discourse, according to the rules of art, upon good and evil? That some things are good, some evil, and others indifferent: the good, virtue, and whatever partakes of virtue; the evil, the contrary; and the indifferent, riches, health, reputation: and then, if while we are saying all this there should happen some more than ordinary noise, or one of the bystanders should laugh at us, we are disconcerted. Philosopher, what is become of what you were saying? Whence did it proceed? Merely from your lips? Why, then, do you pollute the aids which others have provided? Why do you trifle on the most important subjects? It is one thing to hoard up provision in a store-house, and another to eat it. What is eaten is concocted, digested, and becomes nerves, flesh, bones, blood, colour, breath. Whatever is hoarded up is ready, indeed, whenever you have a mind to show it; but of no further use to you than the mere notion that you have it. For what difference is there, whether you explain these doctrines, or those of persons of opposite principles? Sit down now, and comment, according to the rules of art, upon the principles of Epicurus: and perhaps you may comment more practically than he could have done himself. Why, then, do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do you act a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do not you see on what terms each is called a Jew, a Syrian, an Egyptian? And, when we

see any one wavering, we are wont to say, This is not a Jew, but acts one. But, when he assumes the sentiments of one who hath been baptized and circumcised,[1] then he both really is, and is called, a Jew. Thus we, falsifying our profession, are Jews in name, but in reality something else. Our sentiments are inconsistent with our discourse; far from practising what we teach, and what we pride ourselves in the knowledge of. Thus, while we are unable to fulfil what the character of a man promises, we assume, besides, so vast a weight as that of a philosopher. As if a person incapable of lifting ten pounds should endeavour to heave the same stone with Ajax.

CHAPTER X

HOW WE MAY INVESTIGATE THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM THE NAMES WHICH WE BEAR

§ 1. EXAMINE who you are. In the first place, a man: that is, one who hath nothing superior to the faculty of choice; but all things subject to this; and this itself unenslaved, and unsubjected, to anything. Consider, then, from what you are distinguished by reason. You are distinguished from wild beasts: you are distinguished from cattle. Besides, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it; not a subservient, but a principal part. You are capable of conprehending the divine economy; and of considering the connections of things. What then doth the character of a citizen promise? To hold no private interest; to deliberate of nothing as a separate individual, but like the hand or the foot, which, if they had reason, and comprehended the constitution of nature, would never pursue, or desire, but with a reference to the whole. Hence the philosophers rightly say, that, if a wise and good man could foresee what was to happen, he would help forward sickness and death, and mutilation, to himself; being sensible that these things are appointed from the order of the universe, and that the whole is superior to a part, and the city to the citizen. But, since we do not foreknow what is to happen, it becomes our duty to adhere to what is more naturally adapted to our option: for, amongst other things, we were born for this.

§ 2. Remember, next, that you are a son; and what doth

this character promise? To esteem everything that is his, as belonging to his father: in every instance to obey him: not to revile him to another: not to say or do anything injurious to him: to give way and yield in everything; co-operating with him to the utmost of his power.

§ 3. After this, know likewise, that you are a brother; and that to this character it belongs, to make concessions; to be easily persuaded: to use gentle language; never to claim for yourself any of the things dependent on choice, but cheerfully to give these, that you may have the larger share of what is dependent on it. For consider what it is, instead of a lettuce, for instance, or a chair, to procure for yourself a good temper? How great an advantage gained!

§ 4. If, besides this, you are a senator of any city, consider yourself as a senator; if a youth, as a youth; if an old man, as an old man. For each of these names, if it comes to be considered, always points out the proper duties. But, if you go and revile your brother, I tell you you have forgot who you are, and what is your name. For even if you were a smith and made an ill use of the hammer, you would have forgot the smith: and, if you have forgot the brother, and are become, instead of a brother, an enemy, do you imagine you have made no change of one thing for another in that case? If, instead of a man, a gentle social creature, you are become a wild beast, mischievous, insidious, biting; have you lost nothing? But must you lose money, in order to suffer damage; and is there no other thing, the loss of which endamages a man? If you were to part with your skill in grammar, or in music, would you think the loss of these a damage? And, if you part with honour, decency, and gentleness, do you think that no matter? Yet the first are lost by some cause external, and independent on choice; but the last by our own fault. There is no shame either in [1] having, or losing the one; but either not to have, or to lose, the other, is equally shameful and reproachful and unhappy. What doth the pathic lose? The man. What doth the smooth, effeminate fellow lose! [3] Many other things; but, however, the man also. What doth an adulterer lose? The modest, the chaste character; the neighbour. What doth an angry person lose? Something else. A coward? Something else. No one is wicked without some loss or damage. Now, if, after all, you make the loss of money the only damage, all these are unhurt and undamaged. Nay, it may be, even gainers; as, by such practices, their money

may possibly be increased. But consider: if you refer everything to money, the man who loses his nose is not hurt. Yea, say you, he is maimed in his body. Well; but doth he, who loses his smell itself, lose nothing? Is there, then, no faculty of the soul which he who possesses it is the better for, and he who parts with it the worse?

What sort do you mean?

Have we not a natural sense of honour?

We have.

Doth he who loses this suffer no damage? Is he deprived of nothing? Doth he part with nothing that belongs to him? Have we no natural fidelity? No natural affection? No natural disposition to mutual usefulness, to mutual forbearance? Is he, then, who carelessly suffers himself to be damaged in these respects, unhurt and undamaged?

§ 5. What, then, shall not I hurt him who hath hurt me?

Consider first what hurt is; and remember what you have heard from the Philosophers. For, if both good and evil consist in choice, see whether what you say doth not amount to this: "Since he hath hurt himself by injuring me, shall not I hurt myself by injuring him?" Why do we not make some such representation to ourselves as this? Are we hurt when any detriment happens to our bodily possessions, and are we not at all hurt when any happens to our faculty of choice? He who is deceived, or hath done an injury, hath no pain in his head, nor loses an eye, a leg, or an estate, and we wish for nothing beyond these. Whether we have a modest and faithful, or a shameless and unfaithful, will and choice, we make not the smallest difference; except only in the schools, as far as a few words go. Therefore all the improvement we make reaches only to words, and beyond them is absolutely nothing.

CHAPTER XI

WHAT THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY IS

§ 1. The beginning of philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper way, and by the door, is a consciousness of our own weakness, and inability in necessary things. For we came into the world without any natural idea of a right-angled triangle, of a diesis or a hemitone in music; but we learn each of these things

by some instruction of art. Hence, they who do not understand them do not form any conceit of understanding them. But whoever came into the world without an innate idea of good and evil, fair and base, becoming and unbecoming, happiness and misery, proper and improper, what ought to be done and what not to be done? Hence we all make use of the names, and endeavour to apply our pre-conceptions to particular cases. "Such a one hath acted well, not well; right, not right; is unhappy, is happy; is just, is unjust." Who of us refrains from these names? Who defers the use of them till he hath learnt it, as those do who are ignorant of lines and sounds? The reason of this is, that we [1] come instructed in some degree by nature upon these subjects, and from this beginning we go on to add self-conceit. "For why, say you, should not I know what fair and base is? Have not I the idea of it?"—You have. "Do not I apply this idea to particulars?"—You do. "Do not I apply it right, then?"—Here lies the whole question; and here arises the self-conceit. For, beginning from these acknowledged points, men proceed to what is in dispute by means of their unsuitable application. For, if they possess a right method of application, what would restrain them from being perfect? Now, since you think that you make a suitable application of your pre-conceptions to partcular cases, tell me whence you derive this.

From its seeming so to me.

But it doth not seem so to another, and doth not he too form a conceit that he makes a right application?

He doth.

Is it possible, then, that each of you should apply your pre-conceptions right, on the very subjects about which you have contradictory opinions?

It is not.

Have you anything to show us, then, for this application, preferable to its seeming so to you? And doth a madman act any otherwise than seems to him right? Is this, then, a sufficient criterion to him too?

It is not.

Come, therefore, to something preferable to what seems.

What is that?

§ 2. The beginning of philosophy is this: The being sensible of the disagreement of men with each other; an inquiry into the cause of this disagreement, and a disapprobation and distrust of what merely seems; a certain examination into what seems,

whether it seem rightly; and an invention of some rule, like a balance for the determination of weights, like a square for straight and crooked.

Is this the beginning of philosophy, that all things which seem right to all persons are so?

Why, is it possible that contradictions can be right?

Well, then, not all things; but all that seem so to us.

And why more to you than to the Syrians, or Egyptians? Than to me, or to any other man?

Not at all more.

§ 3. Therefore merely what seems to each man is not sufficient to determine the reality of a thing. For even in weights or measures we are not satisfied with the bare appearance; but for everything we find some rule. And is there in the present case, then, no rule preferable to what seems? Is it possible that what is of the greatest necessity in human life should be left incapable of determination and discovery?

There is, then, some rule.

And why do we not seek and discover it; and when we have discovered, make use of it, without fail, ever after, so as not even to move a finger without it? For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure those of their madness who make use of no other measure but their own preverted way of thinking. That afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate points, we may make use of pre-conceptions properly applied to particulars. What is the subject that falls under our inquiry?

Pleasure.

Bring it to the rule. Throw it into the scale. Must good be something in which it is fit to confide, and to which we may trust?

Yes.

Is it fit to trust to anything unsteady?

No.

Is pleasure, then, a steady thing?

No.

Take it, then, and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far distant from the place of good things. But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by good?

Yes.

Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present pleasure? See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a scale. Thus are things judged, and weighed,

when we have the rules ready. This is the part of philosophy, to examine and fix the rules; and to make use of them when they are known is the business of a wise and good man.

CHAPTER XII

OF DISPUTATION

§ 1. WHAT things are to be learned in order to the right use of reason, the philosophers of our sect have accurately taught, but we are altogether unpractised in the due application of them. Only give any of us that you please some illiterate person for an antagonist, and he will not find out how to treat him. But when he hath a little moved the man, if he happens to answer beside the purpose, he knows not how to deal with him any further; but either reviles or laughs at him, and says, "He is an illiterate fellow: there is no making anything of him." Yet a guide, when he perceives his charge going out of the way, doth not revile and ridicule and then leave him; but leads him into the right path. Do you also show your antagonist the truth, and you will see that he will follow. But till you do show it, do not ridicule him; but rather be sensible of your own incapacity.

§ 2. How, then, did Socrates use to act? He obliged his antagonist himself to bear testimony to him, and wanted no other witness. Hence he might well say, "I give up all the rest, and am always satisfied with the testimony of my opponent; and I call in no one to vote, but my antagonist alone." For he rendered the arguments drawn from natural notions so clear, that every one saw, and avoided the contradiction. "Doth an envious man rejoice?"—"By no means. He rather grieves." (This he moved him to say, by proposing the contrary.) "Well, and do you think envy to be a grief for misery?"—"And who ever envied misery?" (Therefore he makes the other say, that envy is a grief for happiness.) "Doth any one envy those who are nothing to him?"—"No, surely." Having thus drawn [from his opponent] a full and distinct idea, he then left that point; and doth not say, "Define to me what envy is"; and after he had defined it, "You have defined it wrong; for the definition doth not reciprocate to the thing defined." Technical terms, and therefore grievous, and scarcely to be made intelligible to the illiterate, which yet we, it seems, cannot

part with. But we have no capacity at all to move them by such arguments as might induce them, in following the track of the appearances in their own minds, to allow or disprove any point. And from a consciousness of this incapacity, those among us, who have any modesty, give the matter entirely up; but the greater part, rashly entering upon these debates, mutually confound and are confounded; and at last, reviling and reviled, walk off. Whereas it was the principal and most peculiar characteristic of Socrates never to be provoked in a dispute, nor to throw out any reviling or injurious expressions, but to bear patiently with those who reviled him, and to put an end to the controversy. If you would know how great abilities he had in this particular, read Xenophon's *Banquet*, and you will see how many controversies he ended. Hence, even among the poets, that person is justly mentioned with the highest commendation,

> "Whose lenient art attentive crowds await,
> To still the furious clamours of debate."—Hesiod.

But what then? This is no very safe affair now, and especially at Rome. For he who doth it must not do it in a corner, but go to some rich consular senator, for instance, and question him. "Pray, sir, can you tell me to whom you intrust your horses?"—"Yes, certainly." "Is it, then, to any one indifferently, though he be ignorant of horsemanship?"—"By no means." "To whom do you intrust your gold, or your silver, or your clothes?"—"Not to any one indifferently." "And did you ever consider to whom you committed the care of your body?"—"Yes, surely." "To one skilled in exercise, or medicine, I suppose?"—"Without doubt." "Are these things your chief good; or are you possessed of something better than all of them?"—"What do you mean?" "Something which makes use of these, and proves and deliberates about each of them?"—"What then, do you mean the soul?" "You have guessed right; for indeed I do mean that."—"I do really think it a much better possession than all the rest." "Can you show us, then, in what manner you have taken care of this soul? For it is not probable that a person of your wisdom, and approved character in the State, should carelessly suffer the most excellent thing that belongs to you to be neglected and lost."—"No, certainly." "But do you take care of it yourself? And is it by the instructions of another, or by your own discovery [how it ought to be done]?" Here now comes the

danger, that he may first say, Pray, good sir, what business is that of yours? What are you to me? Then, if you persist to trouble him, he may lift up his hand and give you a box on the ear. I myself was once a great admirer of this method of instruction, till I fell into such kind of adventures.

CHAPTER XIII

OF SOLICITUDE

§ 1. When I see any one solicitous, I say, What doth this man mean? Unless he wanted something or other not in his own power, how could he still be solicitous? A musician, for instance, feels no solicitude while he is singing by himself: but when he appears upon the stage he doth; even if his voice be ever so good, or he plays ever so well. For what he wants is, not only to sing well, but likewise to gain applause. But this is not in his own power. In short, where his skill lies, there is his courage. (Bring any ignorant person, and he doth not mind him.) But in the point which he neither understands, nor hath studied, there he is solicitous.

What point is that?

He doth not understand what a multitude is, nor what the applause of a multitude. He hath learnt, indeed, how to strike bass and treble; but what the applause of the many is, and what force it hath in life, he neither understands, nor hath studied. Hence he must necessarily tremble and turn pale. I cannot, indeed, say that a man is no musician when I see him afraid; but I can say something else, and that not one, but many things. And, first of all, I call him a stranger, and say, This man doth not know in what country he is; and, though he hath lived here so long, he is ignorant of the laws and customs of the State, and what is permitted and what not; nor hath he ever consulted any lawyer who might tell and explain to him the laws. Yet no man writes a will without knowing how it ought to be written, or consulting some one who doth know; nor doth he rashly sign a bond or give security. But he uses his desire and aversion, exerts his pursuits, intentions, and resolutions, without consulting any lawyer about the matter.

How do you mean without a lawyer?

He knows not that he chooses what is not allowed him, and doth not choose what is necessary; and he knows not what is his own and what belongs to others; for if he did know, he would never be hindered, would never be restrained, would never be solicitous.

How so?

Why, doth any one fear things that are not evils?

No.

Doth any one fear things that are evils indeed, but which it is in his own power to prevent?

No, surely.

§ 2. If, then, the things independent on choice are neither good nor evil; and all that do depend on choice are in our own power, and can neither be taken away from us, or given to us, unless we please; what room is there left for solicitude? But we are solicitous about this paltry body or estate of ours, or about the determination of Cæsar, and not at all about anything internal. Are we ever solicitous not to take up a false opinion? No, for this is in our own power. Or not to exert our pursuits contrary to nature? No, nor this neither. When, therefore, you see any one pale with solicitude, as the physician pronounces from the conplexion that such a patient is disordered in the spleen, another in the liver, so do you likewise say, this man is disordered in his desires and aversions, he cannot walk steady, he is in a fermentation. For nothing else changes the complexion or causes a trembling or sets the teeth a-chattering.

> "No force, no firmness, the pale coward shows;
> He shifts his place, his colour comes and goes.
> Terror and death in his wild eye-balls stare;
> With chattering teeth he stands, and stiffened hair."
>
> POPE'S *Homer*.

Therefore Zeno, when he was to meet Antigonus,[1] felt no solicitude. For over what he admired Antigonus had no power, and those things of which he had the power Zeno did not regard. But Antigonus felt a solicitude when he was to meet Zeno, and with reason, for he was desirous to please him, and this was external. But Zeno was not desirous to please Antigonus; for no one skilful in any art is desirous to please a person unskilful.

I am desirous [says one of his scholars] to please you.

For what? Do you know the rules by which one man judges of another? Have you studied to understand what a good, and what a bad man is; and how each becomes such? Why, then, are not you yourself a good man?

On what account am I not?

Because no good man laments, nor sighs, nor groans; no good man turns pale and trembles and says, "How will such a one receive me, how will he hear me?" As he thinks fit, wretch. Why do you trouble yourself about what belongs to others? Is it not his fault if he receives you ill?

Yes, surely.

And can one person be in fault, and another the sufferer? [2]

No.

Why, then, are you solicitous about what belongs to others?

Well, but I am solicitous how I shall speak to him.

What, then, cannot you speak to him as you will?

But I am afraid I shall be disconcerted.

If you were going to write the name of Dion, should you be afraid of being disconcerted?

By no means.

What is the reason? is it not because you have studied how to write?

Yes.

And if you were going to read, would it not be exactly the same?

Exactly.

What is the reason?

Because every art hath a certain assurance and confidence in the subjects that belong to it.

Have you not studied, then, how to speak? And what else did you study at school?

Syllogisms and convertible propositions.

For what purpose? Was it not in order to talk properly? And what is that but to talk seasonably and cautiously and intelligibly and without flutter and hesitation, and in consequence of all this with courage?

Very true.

When, therefore, you go into the field on horseback, are you solicitous about one who is here now on foot? Solicitous in a point which you have studied, and another hath not?

Ay, but the person [with whom I am to talk] hath power to kill me.

Then speak the truth, pitiful wretch, and do not be arrogant; nor take the philosopher upon you; nor conceal from yourself who are your masters: but while you may thus be laid hold on by the body, follow every one who is stronger than you. Socrates, indeed, had studied how to speak, who talked in such

a manner to tyrants and judges, and in a prison. Diogenes[3] had studied how to speak, who talked in such a manner to Alexander, to Philip, to the pirates, to the person who bought him. This belonged to them who had studied the point, who had courage. But do you walk off about your own affairs, and never stir from them. Retire into some corner, and there sit and weave syllogisms, and propose them to others. For there is not, in you, one able

To rule the sacred citadel within.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCERNING NASO

§ 1. When a certain Roman came to him with his son and had heard one lesson, This, said Epictetus, is the method of teaching, and stopped. When the other desired him to go on, Every art, answered he, is tedious when it is delivered to a person ignorant and unskilful in it. Indeed, the things performed by the common arts quickly discover the use for which they were made, and most of them have something engaging and agreeable. Thus the trade of a shoemaker, if one would stand by and endeavour to comprehend it, is an unpleasant thing; but the shoe is useful, and, besides, not disagreeable to see. The trade of a smith is extremely uneasy to an ignorant person that chances to be present,[1] but the work shows the usefulness of the art. You will see this much more strongly in music; for if you stand by, while a person is learning, it will appear to you of all sciences the most unpleasant; but the effects are agreeable and delightful, even to those who do not understand it.

§ 2. Now here, we imagine it to be the work of one who studies philosophy to adapt his will to whatever happens; so that none of the things which happen may happen against our inclination, nor those which do not happen be wished for by us. Hence, they who have settled this point have it in their power never to be disappointed of their desire, or incur their aversion; but to lead a life exempt from sorrow, fear, and perturbation in themselves; and in society preserving all the natural and adventitious relations of a son, a father, a brother, a citizen, a husband, a wife, a neighbour, a fellow-traveller, a ruler, or a

subject. Something like this is what we imagine to be the work of a philosopher. It remains to inquire how it is to be effected. Now we see that a carpenter by learning certain things becomes a carpenter; and a pilot by learning certain things becomes a pilot. Probably, then, it is not sufficient, in the present case, merely to be willing to be wise and good; but it is moreover necessary that certain things should be learned. What these things are is the question. The philosophers say that we are first to learn that there is a God, and that his providence directs the whole; and that it is impossible to conceal from him, not only our actions, but even our thoughts and emotions. We are next to learn what the Gods are: for such as they are found to be, such must he, who would please and obey them to the utmost of his power, endeavour to be. If the deity is faithful, he too must be faithful; if free, beneficient, and exalted, he must be free, beneficient, and exalted likewise; and, in all his words and actions, behave as an imitator of God.

§ 3. Whence, then, are we to begin?

If you will give me leave, I will tell you. It is necessary, in the first place, that you should understand words.

So, then, I do not understand them now?

No. You do not.

How is it, then, that I use them?

Just as the illiterate do written expressions, and brutes the appearances of things. For use is one thing, and understanding another. But if you think you understand them, bring whatever word you please, and let us see whether we understand it or not.

Well, but it is a grievous thing for a man to be confuted who is grown old, and perhaps arrived through a regular course of military service to the dignity of a senator.

I know it very well, for you now come to me as if you wanted nothing. And how can it enter into your imagination that there should be anything in which you are defective? You are rich, and perhaps have a wife and children, and a great number of domestics. Cæsar takes notice of you; you have many friends at Rome; you render to all their dues; you know how to requite a favour and revenge an injury. In what are you deficient? Suppose, then, I should prove to you that you are deficient in what is most necessary and important to happiness, and that hitherto you have taken care of everything, rather than your duty; and, to complete all, that you understand neither what God or man or good or evil means? That you are ignorant of

all the rest, perhaps, you may bear to be told; but if I prove to you that you are ignorant even of yourself, how will you bear with me, and how will you have patience to stay and be convinced? Not at all. You will immediately be offended and go away. And yet what injury have I done you? unless a looking-glass injures a person not handsome, when it shows him to himself such as he is. Or unless a physician can be thought to affront his patient when he says to him, "Do you think, sir, that you ail nothing? You have a fever. Eat no meat to-day, and drink water." Nobody cries out here, "What an intolerable affront!" But if you say to any one, Your desires are in a fermentation; your aversions are low; your intentions contradictory; your pursuits not conformable to nature; your opinions rash and mistaken; he presently goes away, and complains he is affronted.

§ 4. This is the nature of our proceedings. As in a crowded fair the horses and cattle are brought to be sold, and the greatest part of men come either to buy or sell; but there are a few who come only to look at the fair, and inquire how it is carried on; and why in that manner; and who appointed it; and for what purpose: thus, in the fair of the world, some, like cattle, trouble themselves about nothing but fodder. For as to all you who busy yourselves about possessions and farms and domestics and public posts, these things are nothing else but mere fodder. But there are some few men among the crowd who are fond of looking on and considering, "What then, after all, is the world? Who governs it? Hath it no governor? How is it possible, when neither a city nor a house can remain ever so short a time without some one to govern and take care of it, that this vast and beautiful system should be administered in a fortuitous and disorderly manner? Is there then a governor? What sort of one is he? And how doth he govern; and what are we who are under him? And for what designed? Have we some connection and relation to him; or none?" In this manner are the few affected; and apply themselves only to view the fair and then depart. Well: and are they laughed at by the multitude? Why, so are the lookers-on by the buyers and sellers; and, if the cattle had any apprehension, they too would laugh at such as admired anything but fodder.

CHAPTER XV

CONCERNING THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSEVERE IN WHATEVER THEY HAVE DETERMINED

§ 1. Some, when they hear such discourses as these, That we ought to be steady; that choice is by nature free and uncompelled; and that all else is liable to restraint, compulsion, slavery, and belongs to others; imagine that they must remain immutably fixed to everything which they have determined. But it is first necessary that the determination should be a sound one. I agree that there should be a tension of the nerves in the body; but such as appears in a healthy, an athletic body: for, if you show me that you have the tension of a lunatic, and value yourself upon that, I will say to you, Get yourself to a physician, man: this is not a tension of the nerves, but a relaxation of another kind. Such is the distemper of mind in those who hear these discourses in a wrong manner: like an acquaintance of mine, who, for no reason, had determined to starve himself to death. I went the third day, and inquired what was the matter. He answered, "I am determined." Well: but what is your motive? for, if your determination be right, we will stay and assist your departure; but, if unreasonable, change it.—"We ought to keep our determinations." What do you mean, sir? not all; but such as are right. Else, if you should just now take it into your head that it is night, if you think fit, do not change; but persist, and say, We ought to keep our determinations. What do you mean, sir? Not all. Why do not you begin by first laying the foundation in an inquiry whether your determination be a sound one or not, and then build your firmness and constancy upon it? For if you lay a rotten and crazy foundation, you must not build:[1] and the greater and more weighty the superstructure is, the sooner will it fall. Without any reason you are withdrawing from us, out of life, a friend, a companion, a fellow-citizen, both of the same greater[2] and lesser city: and while you are committing murder and destroying an innocent person, you say, We must keep our determinations. Suppose, by any means, it should ever come into your head to kill me, must you keep such a determination?

§ 2. With difficulty this person was, however, at last con-

vinced; but there are some at present whom there is no convincing. So that now I think I understand what before I did not, the meaning of that common saying, that a fool will neither bend nor break. May it never fall to my lot to have a wise, that is an intractable, fool for my friend.[3] "It is all to no purpose: I am determined." So are madmen too; but the more strongly they are determined upon absurdities, the more need have they of hellebore. Why will you not act like a sick person, and apply yourself to a physician? "Sir, I am sick. Give me your assistance: consider what I am to do. It is my part to follow your directions." So, in the present case, I know not what I ought to do; and I am come to learn. "No; but talk to me about other things; for upon this I am determined." What other things? What is of greater consequence than to convince you that it is not sufficient to be determined, and to persist? This is the tension of a madman, not of one in health. "I will die if you compel me to this." Why so, man: what is the matter?—"I am determined." I have a lucky escape that you are not determined to kill me. "I take no money."[4] Why so? "I am determined." Be assured that with that very tension which you now make use of to refuse it, you may very possibly, hereafter, have as unreasonable a propensity to take it; and again to say, "I am determined." As in a distempered and rheumatic body the humour tends sometimes to one part, sometimes to another; thus it is uncertain which way a sickly mind will incline. But if to its inclination and bent an obstinate tension be likewise added, the evil then becomes desperate and incurable.

CHAPTER XVI

THAT WE DO NOT STUDY TO MAKE USE OF THE PRINCIPLES CONCERNING GOOD AND EVIL

§ 1. WHERE lies good? In choice. Where evil? In choice. Where neither good nor evil? In things independent on choice. What then? Doth any of us remember these lessons out of the schools? Doth any of us study how to answer for himself in things as in questions? "Is it day?"—"Yes." "Is it night, then?"—"No." "Is the number of stars even?"—"I cannot tell." When money is offered you,[1] have you studied

to make the proper answer that it is not a good? Have you exercised yourself in such answers as these; or only in sophistries? Why do you wonder, then, that you improve in points which you have studied; and in those which you have not studied, there you remain the same? When an orator knows that he hath written well; that he hath committed to memory what he hath written; and that he brings an agreeable voice with him; why is he still solicitous? Because he is not contented with what he hath studied. What doth he want, then? To be applauded by the audience. He hath studied the power of speaking, then; but he hath not studied censure and applause. For when did he hear from any one what applause, what censure is? What is the nature of each? What kind of applause is to be sought, and what kind of censure to be shunned? And when did he ever apply himself to study what follows from these lessons? Why do you wonder, then, if in what he hath learned he excels others; but where he hath not studied, he is the same with the rest of the world? Just as a musician knows how to play, sings well, and hath the proper dress of his profession, yet trembles when he comes upon the stage. For the first he understands; but what the multitude is or what the clamour and laughter of the multitude is he doth not understand. Nor doth he even know what solicitude itself is: whether it be our own affair or that of others, or whether it be possible to suppress it or not. Hence, if he is applauded, he is puffed up when he makes his exit: but if he is laughed at, the tumour is pricked and subsides.

§ 2. Thus are we too affected. What do we admire? Externals. For what do we strive? Externals. And are we, then, in any doubt how we come to fear and be solicitous? What is the consequence, then, when we esteem the things that are brought upon us to be evils? We cannot but fear; we cannot but be solicitous. And then we say, "O Lord God, how shall I avoid solicitude!" Have you not hands, fool?[2] Hath not God made them for you?[3] Sit down now and pray that your nose may not run! Wipe it rather, and do not murmur. Well: and hath he given you nothing in the present case? Hath not he given you patience? Hath not he given you magnanimity? Hath not he given you fortitude? When you have such hands as these, do you still seek for somebody to wipe your nose?[4] But we neither study nor regard these things. For give me but one who cares how he doth anything, who doth not regard the success of anything but his own manner of acting. Who,

when he is walking, regards his own action? Who, when he is deliberating, the deliberation itself, and not the success that is to follow it? If it happens to succeed, he is elated, and cries, "How prudently have we deliberated! Did not I tell you, my dear friend, that it was impossible, when we considered about anything, that it should not happen right?" But if it miscarries, the poor wretch is dejected, and knows not what to say about the matter. Who among us ever upon this account consulted a diviner? Who of us ever slept in a temple to be informed concerning his manner of acting? [5] I say, who? Show me one (that I may see what I have long sought) who is truly noble and ingenuous. Show me either a young or an old man.

§ 3. Why then are we still surprised, if, when we waste all our attention on the materials of action, we are, in the manner of action itself, low, sordid, worthless, fearful, wretched, and a mere heap of disappointment and misery? For we do not care about these things nor make them our study. If we had feared not death or exile, but fear itself, we should have studied not to fall into what appears to us to be evil. But, as the case now stands, we are eager and loquacious in the schools; and when any little question arises about any of these things, we are prepared to trace its consequences: but drag us into practice, and you will find us miserably shipwrecked. Let some alarming appearance attack us, and you will perceive what we have been studying, and in what we are exercised. Besides this negligence, we always accumulate somewhat else, and represent things greater than the reality. In a voyage, for instance, casting my eyes down upon the ocean below, and looking round me and seeing no land, I am out of my wits, and imagine that if I should be shipwrecked I must swallow all that ocean; nor doth it once enter my head, that three pints are enough to do my business. What is it then that alarms me? The ocean? No, but my own principle. Again, in an earthquake, I imagine the city is going to fall upon me; but is not one little stone enough to knock my brains out? What is it then that oppresses and puts us out of our wits? Why, what else but our principles? For what is it but mere principle that oppresses him who leaves his country, and is separated from his acquaintance, and friends, and place, and usual manner of life? When children cry if their nurse happens to be absent for a little while, give them a cake, and they forget their grief. Shall we compare you to these children, then?

No, indeed. For I do not desire to be pacified by a cake, but by right principles. And what are they?

Such as a man ought to study all day long, so as not to be attached to what doth not belong to him; neither to a friend, to a place, an academy, nor even to his own body, but to remember the law and to have that constantly before his eyes. And what is the divine law? To preserve inviolate what is properly our own, not to claim what belongs to others; to use what is given us, and not desire what is not given us; and, when anything is taken away, to restore it readily, and to be thankful for the time you have been permitted the use of it, and not cry after it, like a child for its nurse and its mamma. For what doth it signify what gets the better of you, or on what you depend? And in what are you superior to him who cries for a puppet, if you lament for a paltry academy and a portico and an assembly of young people, and suchlike amusements? Another comes, lamenting that he must no longer drink the water of Dircè. Why, is not the Marcian water as good? "But I was used to that." And in time you will be used to the other. And when you are attached to this too, you may cry again and set yourself, in imitation of Euripides, to celebrate in verse

"The baths of Nero, and the Marcian water."

Hence see the origin of tragedy when trifling accidents befall foolish men. "Ah, when shall I see Athens and the citadel again!" Wretch, are not you contented with what you see every day? Can you see anything better than the sun, the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea? But if, besides, you comprehend him who administers the whole, and carry him about in yourself, do you still long after pebbles and a fine rock?[6] What will you do, then, when you are to leave even the sun and moon? Will you sit crying like an infant? What then have you been doing in the school? What did you hear? What did you learn? Why have you written yourself a philosopher, instead of writing the real fact? I have made some introductions,[7] you may say, and read over Chrysippus; but I have not so much as gone near the door of a philosopher.[8] For what pretensions have I to anything of the same kind with Socrates, who died and who lived in such a manner? Or with Diogenes? Do you observe either of these crying, or out of humour, that he is not to see such a man or such a woman; nor to live any longer at Athens, or at Corinth, but at Susa, for instance, or at Ecbatana? For doth he stay and repine who is

at his liberty, whenever he pleases, to quit the entertainment and play no longer? Why doth he not stay as children do, as long as he is amused? Such a one, no doubt, will bear perpetual banishment and a sentence of death wonderful well! Why will you not be weaned, as children are, and take more solid food? Will you never cease to cry after your mammas and nurses, whom the old women about you have taught you to bewail? "But if I go away I shall trouble them." You trouble them! No, it will not be you, but that which troubles you too, principle. What have you to do, then? Pluck out your principle, and, if they are wise, they will pluck out theirs too; or, if not, they will groan for themselves.

§ 4. Boldly make a desperate push, man, as the saying is, for prosperity, for freedom, for magnanimity. Lift up your head at last, as free from slavery. Dare to look up to God and say, "Make use of me for the future as thou wilt. I am of the same mind; I am equal with thee. I refuse nothing which seems good to thee. Lead me whither thou wilt. Clothe me in whatever dress thou wilt. Is it thy will, that I should be in a public or a private condition, dwell here or be banished, be poor or rich? Under all these circumstances I will make thy defence to men. I will show what the nature of everything is." No. Rather sit alone in a warm [9] place, and wait till your mamma comes to feed you. If Hercules had sat loitering at home, what would he have been? Eurystheus, and not Hercules. Besides, by travelling through the world, how many acquaintance and how many friends had he? But none more his friend than God, for which reason he was believed to be the son of God, and was so. In obedience to him, he went about extirpating injustice and lawless force. But you are not Hercules, nor able to extirpate the evils of others; nor even Theseus to extirpate the evils of Attica. Extirpate your own, then. Expel, instead of Procrustes and Sciron,[10] grief, fear, desire, envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance, from your mind. But these can be no otherwise expelled than by looking up to God alone as your pattern; by attaching yourself to him alone, and being consecrated to his commands. If you wish for anything else, you will, with sighs and groans, follow what is stronger than you, always seeking prosperity without, and never able to find it. For you seek it where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is.

CHAPTER XVII

HOW TO ADAPT PRE-CONCEPTIONS TO PARTICULAR CASES

§ 1. WHAT is the first business of one who studies philosophy?[1] To part with self-conceit. For it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he hath a conceit that he already knows. We all go to the philosophers, talking at all adventures upon negative and positive duties, good and evil, fair and base. We praise, censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and base enterprises. And for what do we go to the philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves not to know. And what is this? Theorems. We are desirous to hear what the philosophers say, for its elegance and acuteness, and some with a view only to gain. Now it is ridiculous to suppose that a person will learn anything but what he desires to learn, or make an improvement in what he doth not learn. But most are deceived in the same manner as Theopompus the orator, when he blames Plato for defining everything. "For what," says he, "did none of us, before you, use the words *good* and *just*, or did we utter them as empty sounds, without understanding what each of them meant?" Why, who tells you, Theopompus, that we had not natural ideas and pre-conceptions of each of these? But it is not possible to adapt pre-conceptions to their correspondent subjects, without having minutely distinguished them, and examined what is the proper subject to each. You may make the same objection to the physicians. For who of us did not use the words *wholesome* and *unwholesome* before Hippocrates was born? or did we utter them as empty sounds? For we have some pre-conception of wholesome too, but we cannot adapt it. Hence, one says, Let the patient abstain from meat; another, Give it him; one says, Let him be bled; another, Cup him. And what is the reason, but not being able to adapt the pre-conception of wholesome to particular cases? Thus, too, in life; who of us doth not talk of good and evil, advantageous and disadvantageous: for who of us hath not a pre-conception of each of these? But is it then a distinct and perfect one? Show me this.

How shall I show it?

§ 2. Adapt it properly to particular subjects. Plato, to go no

further, puts definitions under the pre-conceptions of useful; but you, under that of useless. Can both of you be right? How is it possible? Again, doth not one man adapt the pre-conception of good to riches? Another, not to riches, but to pleasure or health? Upon the whole, if none of us who use words, either utter them without meaning, or need to take any manner of care in distinguishing our pre-conceptions, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why do we censure each other? But what occasion have I to mention this mutual contradiction? If you yourself adapt your pre-conceptions properly, how comes it to pass that you do not prosper? Why do you meet with any hindrance? Let us for the present omit the second topic, concerning the pursuits, and the duties relative to them; let us omit the third too, concerning assent. I make you a present of all these. Let us insist only on the first,[2] which affords almost a sensible proof that you do not adapt your pre-conceptions right. You desire what is possible in itself, and possible for you. Why then are you hindered? Why are not you in a prosperous way? You do not decline what is necessary. Why then do you incur anything which is your aversion? Why are you unfortunate? When you desire anything, why doth it not happen? When you do not desire it, why doth it happen? For this is the greatest demonstration of ill success and misery. I desire something, and it doth not happen: and what is more wretched than I? From an impatience of this, Medea came to murder her own children, an action of a noble spirit in this view; for she had a proper impression of what it was to be disappointed of one's desire. "Thus, I shall punish him who hath injured and dishonoured me; and what is so wicked a wretch good for? But how is this to be effected? I will murder the children. But that will be punishing myself. And what do I care?" This is the error of a soul endued with great powers. For she knew not where the completion of our desires is to be found; that it is not to be had from without, nor by altering the appointment of things. Do not desire the man for your husband, and nothing which you do desire will fail to happen. Do not desire to keep him to yourself. Do not desire to stay at Corinth, and, in a word, have no will but the will of God; and who shall restrain you, who shall compel you any more than Jupiter? When you have such a guide, and conform your will and inclinations to his, what need you fear being disappointed? Yield up your desire and aversion to riches, or poverty; the one will be disappointed,

the other incurred. Yield them up to health, power, honours, your country, friends, children, in short, to anything independent on choice, you will be unfortunate. But yield them up to Jupiter and the other gods. Give yourself up to these; let these govern, let both be ranged on the same side with these; and how can you be any longer unprosperous? But if, poor wretch, you envy, and pity, and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease a single day from complaining of yourself and the Gods, why do you boast of your education? What education, man? That you have learned convertible syllogisms? Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these and begin again, convinced that hitherto you have not even touched upon the point? And, for the future, beginning from this foundation, proceed in order, to the superstructure, that nothing may happen which you do not wish, and that everything may happen which you do. Give me but one young man who brings this intention with him to the school, who is a champion for this point, and says, "I yield up all the rest: it suffices me, if once I become able to pass my life, free from hindrance and grief; to stretch out my neck to all events, as free; and to look up to heaven, as the friend of God, fearing nothing that can happen." Let any one of you show himself of such a disposition, that I may say, "Come into the place, young man, that is of right your own; for you are destined to be an ornament to philosophy. Yours are these possessions; yours these books; yours these discourses." Then, when he hath mastered and got the better of this first class, let him come to me again, and say, "I desire indeed to be free from passion and perturbation; but I desire too, as a pious, a philosophic, and a carefully attentive man, to know what is my duty to God, to my parents, to my relations, to my country, and to strangers." "Come into the second class too; for this likewise is yours." "But I have now sufficiently studied the second class too; and I would willingly be secure, and unshaken [3] by error and delusion, not only awake, but even when asleep; when warmed with wine; when diseased with the spleen." "You are a god, man; your intentions are great."

§ 3. "No. But I, for my part, desire to understand what Chrysippus says, in his logical treatise of the Pseudomenos." [4] Go hang yourself, pitiful wretch, with such an intention as this. What good will it do you? You will read the whole, lamenting all the while, and say to others, trembling, "Do as I do."—"Shall I read to you, my friend, and you to me?—You write [5] surprisingly, sir, and you very finely imitate the style of Plato;

and you, of Xenophon; and you, of Antisthenes." And thus, having related your dreams to each other, you return again to the same state. Your desires and aversions, your pursuits, your intentions, your resolutions, your wishes and endeavours, are just what they were. You do not so much as seek for one to advise you; but are offended, when you hear such things as these, and cry: "An ill-natured old fellow! He never wept over me, when I was setting out, nor said, To what a danger are you going to be exposed! If you come off safe, child, I will illuminate my house.—This would have been the part of a good-natured man." Truly, it will be a mighty happiness, if you do come off safe; it will be worth while to make an illumination. For you ought[6] to be immortal and exempt from sickness, to be sure.

§ 4. Throwing away then, I say, this self-conceit, by which we fancy we have gained some knowledge of what is useful, we should come to philosophic reasoning, as we do to mathematics and music; otherwise we shall be far from making any improvement, even if we have read over all the collections and compositions, not only of Chrysippus, but of Antipater and Archedemus too.

CHAPTER XVIII

HOW THE APPEARANCES OF THINGS ARE TO BE COMBATED

§ 1. Every habit and faculty is preserved and increased by correspondent actions: as the habit of walking, by walking; of running, by running. If you would be a reader, read; if a writer, write. But if you do not read for a month together, but do somewhat else, you will see what will be the consequence. So, after sitting still for ten days, get up and attempt to take a long walk, and you will find how your legs are weakened. Upon the whole, then, whatever you would make habitual, practise it; and, if you would not make a thing habitual, do not practise it, but habituate yourself to something else.

§ 2. It is the same with regard to the operations of the soul. Whenever you are angry, be assured that it is not only a present evil, but that you have increased a habit, and added fuel to a fire. When you are overcome by the company of women, do not esteem it as a single defeat; but that you have fed, that you

have increased, your dissoluteness. For it is impossible but that habits and faculties must either be first produced, or strengthened and increased, by correspondent actions. Hence the philosophers derive the growth of all infirmities. When you once desire money, for example, if a degree of reasoning sufficient to produce a sense of the evil be applied, the desire ceases, and the governing faculty of the mind regains its authority: whereas, if you apply no remedy, it returns no more to its former state; but, being again excited by a correspondent appearance, it kindles at the desire more quickly than before, and, by frequent repetitions, at last becomes callous:[1] and by this infirmity is the love of money fixed. For he who hath had a fever, even after it hath left him, is not in the same state of health as before, unless he was perfectly cured: and the same thing happens in distempers of the soul likewise. There are certain traces and blisters left in it, which, unless they are well effaced, whenever a new hurt is received in the same part, instead of blisters become sores.

§ 3. If you would not be of an angry temper, then, do not feed the habit. Give it nothing to help its increase. Be quiet at first, and reckon the days in which you have not been angry. I used to be angry every day; now every other day; then every third and fourth day: and, if you miss it so long as thirty days, offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving to God. For habit is first weakened, and then entirely destroyed. "I was not vexed to-day;[2] nor the next day; nor for three or four months after; but took heed to myself when some provoking things happened." Be assured that you are in a fine way. "To-day, when I saw a handsome person, I did not say to myself, O that I could possess her! And, How happy is her husband! (for he who says this, says too, How happy is her gallant!): nor do I go on to represent her as present, as undressed, as lying down beside me." On this I stroke my head, and say, Well done, Epictetus: thou hast solved a pretty sophism; a much prettier than one very celebrated in the schools.[3] But if even the lady should happen to be willing, and give me intimations of it, and send for me, and press my hand, and place herself next to me, and I should then forbear and get the victory, that would be a sophism beyond all the subtleties of logic. This, and not disputing artfully, is the proper subject for exultation.

§ 4. How, then, is this to be effected? Be willing to approve yourself to yourself. Be willing to appear beautiful in the sight of God: be desirous to converse in purity with your own

pure mind, and with God; and then, if any such appearance strikes you, Plato directs you: "Have recourse to expiations: go a suppliant to the temples of the averting deities." It is sufficient, however, if you propose to yourself the example of wise and good men, whether alive or dead; and compare your conduct with theirs. Go to Socrates, and see him lying by Alcibiades, yet slighting his youth and beauty. Consider what a victory he was conscious of obtaining! What an Olympic prize! In what number did he stand from Hercules?[4] So that, by Heaven, one might justly salute him,[5] Hail! incredibly great, universal victor![6] not those sorry boxers and wrestlers; nor the gladiators, who resemble them.

§ 5. By placing such an object over against you, you will conquer any appearance, and not be drawn away by it. But, in the first place, be not hurried along with it, by its hasty vehemence: but say, Appearance, wait for me a little. Let me see what you are, and what you represent. Let me try you. Then, afterwards, do not suffer it to go on drawing gay pictures of what will follow: if you do, it will lead you wherever it pleases. But rather oppose to it some good and noble appearance, and banish this base and sordid one. If you are habituated to this kind of exercise, you will see what shoulders, what nerves, what sinews, you will have. But now it is mere trifling talk, and nothing more. He is the true practitioner who exercises himself against such appearances as these. Stay, wretch, do not be hurried away. The combat is great, the achievement divine; for empire, for freedom, for prosperity, for tranquillity. Remember God. Invoke him for your aid and protector, as sailors do Castor and Pollux in a storm. For what storm is greater than that which arises from violent appearances, contending to overset our reason? Indeed, what is the storm itself, but appearance? For, do but take away the fear of death, and let there be as many thunders and lightnings as you please, you will find that, in the ruling faculty, all is serenity and calm: but if you are once defeated, and say you will get the victory another time, and then the same thing over again; assure yourself, you will at last be reduced to so weak and wretched a condition, that you will not so much as know when you do amiss; but you will even begin to make defences for your behaviour, and thus verify the saying of Hesiod:

"With constant ills the dilatory strive."

CHAPTER XIX

CONCERNING THOSE WHO EMBRACE PHILOSOPHY ONLY IN WORD

§ 1. The argument, called the ruling one, concerning which disputants questioned each other, appears to have its rise from hence.[1] Of the following propositions, any two imply a contradiction to the third. They are these. That everything past is necessarily true; that an impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility; and that something is a possibility which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus, perceiving this contradiction, made use of the probability of the two first to prove that nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold the second and third: that something is possible which neither is nor will be true; and that an impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility: and, consequently, assert that not everything past is necessarily true. This way Cleanthes and his followers took; whom Antipater copiously defends. Others, lastly, maintain the first and third: that something is possible which neither is nor will be true; and that every thing past is necessarily true; but then, that an impossibility may be the consequence of a possibility. But all these three propositions cannot be at once maintained, because of their mutual contradiction. If any one should ask me, then, which of them I maintain: I answer him, that I cannot tell. But I have heard it related that Diodorus held one opinion about them, the followers of Panthoides, I think, and Cleanthes, another; and Chrysippus a third.

What, then, is yours?[2]

None.[3] Nor was I born to examine the appearances of things to my mind; to compare what is said by others, and thence to form some principle of my own, as to the topic [which you mention]. Therefore, [in respect to it,] I am no better than a grammarian [who repeats what he hath read]. Who was the father of Hector? Priam. Who were his brothers? Paris and Deiphobus. Who was his mother? Hecuba. This I have heard related. From whom? From Homer. But I believe Hellanicus and other authors have written on the same subject. And what better account have I of the ruling argu-

ment? But, if I was vain enough, I might, especially at an entertainment,[4] astonish all the company by an enumeration of authors relating to it. Chrysippus hath written wonderfully, in his first Book, of possibilities. Cleanthes and Archedemus have each written separately on this subject. Antipater too hath written, not only in his treatise of possibilities, but purposely in a discourse on the ruling argument. Have not you read the work? "No." Read it, then.—And what good will it do him? He will be more trifling and impertinent than he is already. For what else have you gained by reading it? What principle have you formed upon this subject? But you tell us of Helen and Priam and the Isle Calypso, which never was, nor ever will be. And here, indeed, it is of no great consequence if you retain the story, without forming any principle of your own. But it is our misfortune to do so, much more in morality than upon such subjects as these.

§ 2. Talk to me concerning good and evil.[5]

Hear.

> "The wind from Ilium to the Cicon's shore
> Hath driven me—"

Of things, some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good are the virtues, and whatever partakes of them, and the evil vices, and what partakes of vice; the indifferent lie between these, as riches, health, life, death, pleasure, pain.

Whence do you know this?

Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian history.[6] For what doth it signify, whether one names the history of Hellanicus, or the ethics of Diogenes, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes? Have you, then, examined any of these things, and formed a principle of your own? But show me how you are used to exercise yourself on shipboard. Remember this division,[7] when the mast rattles, and some idle fellow stands by you while you are screaming, and says, "For heaven's sake, talk as you did a little while ago. Is it vice to suffer shipwreck? Or doth it partake of vice?" Would not you take up a log, and throw it at his head? "What have we to do with you, sir? We are perishing, and you come and jest." Again, if Cæsar should summon you to answer an accusation, remember the division. If, when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one should meet you, and say, "Why do you tremble, sir? What is this affair you are engaged in? Doth Cæsar within give virtue and vice to those who approach him?"—"What, do you too insult me, and

add to my evils?" "Nay, but tell me, philosopher, why you tremble? Is there any other danger but death, or a prison, or bodily pain, or exile, or defamation?"—"Why, what should there be else?" "Are any of these vice? or do they partake of vice? What, then, did you yourself use to say of these things?"—"What have you to do with me, sir? My own evils are enough for me." "You say right. You own evils are indeed enough for you; your baseness, your cowardice, and that arrogance by which you were elated as you sat in the schools. Why did you plume yourself with what is not your own? Why did you call yourself a Stoic?"

§ 3. Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find of what sect you are. You will find that most of you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics, and those but loose ones.[8] For, by what action will you prove that you think virtue equal, and even superior, to all other things? Show me a Stoic if you have one.[9] Where? Or how should you? You can show, indeed, a thousand who repeat the Stoic reasonings. But do they repeat the Epicurean worse! Are they not just as perfect in the Peripatetic? Who, then, is a Stoic? As we call that a Phidian statue, which is formed according to the art of Phidias, so show me some one person, formed according to the principles which he professes. Show me one who is sick, and happy; in danger, and happy; dying, and happy; exiled, and happy; disgraced, and happy. Show him me, for, by heaven, I long to see a Stoic. But (you will say) you have not one perfectly formed. Show me, then, one who is forming, one who is approaching towards this character. Do me this favour. Do not refuse an old man a sight which he hath never yet seen. Do you suppose that you are to show the Jupiter or Minerva of Phidias, a work of ivory or gold? Let any of you show me a human soul, willing to have the same sentiments with those of God, not to accuse either God or man, not to be disappointed of its desire, or incur its aversion, not to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous, in a word, willing from a man to become a God, and, in this poor mortal body, aiming to have fellowship with Jupiter. Show him to me. But you cannot. Why, then, do you impose upon yourselves, and play tricks with others? Why do you put on a dress not your own; and walk about in it, mere thieves and pilferers of names and things which do not belong to you? Here, I am your preceptor, and you come to be instructed by me. And indeed my intention is to secure you from being restrained, compelled, hindered; to make you free, prosperous,

happy; looking to God upon every occasion, great or small. And you come to learn and study these things. Why then do not you finish your work, if you have the proper intention, and I, besides the intention, the proper qualifications? What is wanting? When I see an artificer, and the materials lying ready, I expect the work. Now here is the artificer; here are the materials; what is it we want? Is not the thing capable of being taught? It is. Is it not in our own power, then? The only thing of all others that is so. Neither riches, nor health, nor fame, nor, in short, anything else, is in our power, except the right use of the appearances of things. This alone is, by nature, not subject to restraint, not subject to hindrance. Why, then, do not you finish it? Tell me the cause. It must be by my fault, or yours, or from the nature of the thing. The thing itself is practicable, and the only one in our power. The fault then must be either in me, or in you, or, more truly, in both. Well, then, shall we now, at last, bring this intention along with us? Let us lay aside all that is past. Let us begin. Only believe me, and you will see the consequence.

CHAPTER XX

CONCERNING THE EPICUREANS AND ACADEMICS

§ 1. True and evident propositions must, of necessity, be used even by those who contradict them. And, perhaps, one of the strongest proofs that there is such a thing as evidence, is the necessity which those who contradict it are under to make use of it. If a person, for instance, should deny that anything is universally true, he will be obliged to assert the contrary, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, not even this itself? For what is this but to say, that everything universal is false? Again, if any one should come and say, "Know that there is nothing to be known, but all things are uncertain"; or another, "Believe me, and it will be the better for you, no man ought to be believed in anything"; or a third, "Learn from me, that nothing is to be learned; I tell you this, and will teach the proof of it, if you please." Now what difference is there between such as these, and those who call themselves Academics? Who say to us, "Be convinced, that no one ever is convinced. Believe us, that nobody believes anybody."

§ 2. Thus also, when Epicurus would destroy the natural relation of mankind to each other, he makes use of the very thing he is destroying. For what doth he say? "Be not deceived, be not seduced and mistaken. There is no natural relation between reasonable beings. Believe me. Those who say otherwise mislead and impose upon you." Why are you concerned for us, then? Let us be deceived. You will fare never the worse if all the rest of us are persuaded that there is a natural relation between mankind, and that it is by all means to be preserved. Nay, it will be much safer and better. Why do you give yourself any trouble about us, sir? Why do you break your rest for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you compose so many volumes? Is it that none of us should be deceived concerning the gods; as if they took any care of men? Or that we may not suppose the essence of good consists in anything but pleasure? For, if these things be so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of which you judge yourself worthy—that of a mere reptile. Eat and drink, and satisfy your passion for women, and ease yourself, and snore. What is it to you whether others think right or wrong about these things? For what have you to do with us? You take care of sheep, because they afford us their milk, their wool, and at last their flesh. And would it not be a desirable thing, that men might be so lulled and enchanted by the Stoics, as to give themselves up to be milked and fleeced by you, and such as you? Should not these doctrines be taught to your brother Epicureans only, and concealed from the rest of the world; who should by all means above all things be persuaded that we have a natural relation to each other, and that temperance is a good thing, in order that all may be kept safe for you? Or is this relation to be preserved towards some, and not towards others? Towards whom, then, is it to be preserved? Towards such as mutually preserve, or such as violate it? And who violate it more than you, who teach such doctrines?

§ 3. What was it, then, that waked Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write what he did? What else but that which is of all others the most powerful in mankind, nature; which draws every one, however unwilling and reluctant, to its own purposes? For since, says she, you think that there is no relation between mankind, write this doctrine, and leave it for the use of others, and break your sleep upon that account; and, by your own practice, confute your own principles. Do we say that Orestes was roused from sleep by the agitation of

the Furies; and was not Epicurus waked by Furies more cruel and avenging, which would not suffer him to rest, but compelled him to divulge his own evils, as wine and madness do the priests of Cybele? So strong and unconquerable a thing is human nature! For how can a vine have the properties not of a vine, but of an olive tree? Or an olive tree not those of an olive tree, but of a vine? It is impossible. It is inconceivable. Neither, therefore, is it possible for a human creature entirely to lose human affections. But even those who have undergone a mutilation cannot have their inclinations also mutilated: and so Epicurus, when he had mutilated all the offices of a man, of a master of a family, of a citizen, and of a friend, did not mutilate the inclinations of humanity, for he could not, any more than the idle Academics can throw away, or blind their own senses, though this be, of all others, the point they labour most. What a misfortune is it when any one, after having received from nature standards and rules for the knowledge of truth, doth not strive to add to these, and make up their deficiencies; but, on the contrary, endeavours to take away and destroy whatever truth may be known even by them!

§ 4. What say you, philosopher? What do you think of piety and sanctity?—If you please, I will prove that they are good.—Pray, do prove it, that our citizens may be converted [1] and honour the deity, and may no longer neglect what is of the highest importance.—Have you the proofs, then?—I have, and I thank you. Since you are so well pleased with this, then, learn the contrary: that there are no gods, or, if there are, that they take no care of mankind, neither have any concern with them; that this piety and sanctity, which is so much talked of by many, is only an imposition of boasting and sophistical men; or, perhaps, of legislators, for a terror and restraint to injustice. —Well done, philosopher. Our citizens are much the better for you. You have already brought back all the youth to a contempt of the deity.—What! doth not this please you, then? Learn next, that justice is nothing; that shame is folly; that the paternal relation is nothing, the filial nothing.—Well said, philosopher; persist, convince the youth, that we may have many more to think and talk like you. By such doctrines as these have our well-governed states flourished! Upon these was Sparta founded! Lycurgus, by his laws and method of education, introduced such persuasions as these: that it is just as honourable, as it is dishonourable, to be slaves; and just as dishonourable, as honourable, to be free! They who died at

Thermopylæ, died from such principles as these! And from what other doctrines did the Athenians leave their city? [2]

§ 5. And yet, they who talk thus marry, and produce children; and engage in public affairs, and get themselves made priests and prophets (of whom? Of gods that have no existence); and consult the Pythian priestess, only to hear falsehoods, and interpret the oracles to others. What monstrous impudence and imposture!

§ 6.[3] What are you doing, man? You contradict yourself every day, and yet you will not give up these paltry cavils. When you eat, where do you carry your hand? To your mouth, or to your eye? When you bathe, where do you go? Do you ever call a kettle a dish; or a spoon, a spit? If I were a servant to one of these gentlemen, were it at the hazard of being flayed every day, I would plague him. "Throw some oil into the bath, boy." I would take pickle and pour upon his head. "What is this?" Really, sir, an appearance struck me so perfectly alike, as not to be distinguished from oil. "Give me the soup." I would carry him a dish full of vinegar. "Did not I ask for the soup?" Yes, sir, this is the soup. "Is not this vinegar?" Why so, more than soup? "Take it and smell to it; take it and taste it." "How do you know, then, but our senses deceive us?" If I had three or four fellow-servants to join with me, I would make him either choke with passion and burst, or change his opinions. But now they insult us by making use of the gifts of nature, while in words they destroy them. Grateful and modest men, truly! who, if there were nothing else in the case, while they are eating their daily bread dare to say, "We do not know whether there be any Ceres, or Proserpine, or Pluto." [4] Not to mention that while they enjoy the night and day, the seasons of the year, the stars, the earth and sea, they are not the least affected by any of these things, but only study to throw out some idle problem; and, when they have cleared their stomachs, go and bathe: but take not the least care what they say; nor on what subjects; nor to whom; nor what may be the consequence of their talk; whether any well-disposed young man by hearing such doctrines may not be affected by them, and so affected as entirely to lose the seeds of his good disposition; whether they may not furnish an adulterer with occasions of growing shameless in his guilt; whether a public plunderer may not find excuses from these doctrines; whether he who neglects his parents may not gain an additional confidence from them.[5]

"What, then, in your opinion, is good and evil, fair and base;[6] such things, or such things?" Why should one say any more against such creatures as these, or give them any account, or receive any from them, or endeavour to convince them? By Jupiter, one might sooner hope to convince the most unnatural debauchees, than those who are thus deaf and blind to their own evils.[7]

CHAPTER XXI

OF INCONSISTENCY

§ 1. THERE are some things which men confess with ease; others, with difficulty. No one, for instance, will confess himself a fool, or a blockhead; but, on the contrary, you will hear every one say, "I wish my fortune was equal to my mind." But they easily confess themselves fearful, and say, "I am somewhat timorous, I confess; but in other respects you will not find me a fool." No one will easily confess himself intemperate in his desires; upon no account dishonest, nor absolutely very envious, or meddling; but many confess themselves to have the weakness of being compassionate. What is the reason of all this? The principal is, an inconsistency and confusion in what relates to good and evil. But different people have different inducements. In general, whatever they imagine to be base they do not absolutely confess. Fear and compassion they imagine to belong to a well-meaning disposition; but stupidity to a slave. Offences against society they do not own; but, in most faults, they are brought to a confusion chiefly from imagining that there is something involuntary in them, as in fear and compassion. And, though a person[1] should in some measure confess himself intemperate in his desires, he accuses his passion, and expects forgiveness as for an involuntary fault. But dishonesty is not imagined to be, by any means, involuntary. In jealousy, too, there is something, they suppose, of involuntary; and this likewise, in some degree, they confess.

§ 2. Conversing among such men, therefore, thus confused, thus ignorant what they say, what are or are not their evils, whence they have them, and how they may be delivered of them, it is worth while, I think, to ask one's self continually, "Am I, too, one of these? What do I imagine myself to be? How

do I conduct myself? As a prudent, as a temperate man? Do I, too, ever talk at this rate, that I am sufficiently instructed for what may happen? Have I that persuasion, that I know nothing, which becomes one who knows nothing? Do I go to a master, as to an oracle, prepared to obey; or do I, as well as others, like a stupid driveller,[2] enter the school only to learn the history [of philosophy], and understand books which I did not understand before; or, perhaps, to explain them to others?"[3] You have been fighting at home with your servant, sir; you have turned the house upside-down, and alarmed the neighbourhood; and do you come to me with a pompous show of wisdom, and sit and pass judgment how I explain a sentence? How I prate whatever comes into my head? Do you come, envious and dejected that nothing is brought you from home? And, in the midst of the disputations, sit thinking on nothing but how your father or your brother may behave to you? "What are they saying about me at home? Now they think I am improving; and say, He will come back with universal knowledge. I wish I could learn everything before my return; but this requires much labour; and nobody sends me anything. The baths are very bad at Nicopolis; and things go very ill both at home and here."

§ 3. After all this it is said nobody is the better for the philosophic school. Why, who comes to the school? I mean, who comes to be reformed? Who to submit his principles to correction? Who with a sense of his wants? Why do you wonder, then, that you bring back from the school the very thing you carried there? For you do not come to lay aside, or correct, or change your principles. How should you? Far from it. Rather consider this, therefore, whether you have not what you come for. You come to talk about theorems. Well; and are not you more impertinently talkative than you were? Do not these paltry theorems furnish you with matter for ostentation? Do not you solve convertible and hypothetical syllogisms? Why, then, are you still displeased if you have the very thing for which you came?—"Very true; but if my child or my brother should die, or if I must die or be tortured myself, what good will these things do me?" Why, did you come for this? Did you attend upon me for this? Was it upon any such account that you ever lighted your lamp, or sat up at night? Or did you, when you went into the walk, propose any appearance to your own mind to be discussed instead of a syllogism? Did any of you ever

go through such a subject jointly? And, after all, you say theorems are useless. To whom? To such as apply them ill. For medicines for the eyes are not useless to those who apply them when and as they ought. Fomentations are not useless; poisers are not useless; but they are useless to some, and, on the contrary, useful to others. If you should ask me now, Are syllogisms useful? I answer, that they are useful; and, if you please, I will show you how.[4] "Will they be of service to me, then?"—Why, did you ask, man, whether they would be useful to you, or in general? If any one in a dysentery should ask me whether acids be useful, I answer, They are. "Are they useful for me, then?"—I say, No. First try to get the flux stopped, and the exulceration healed. Do you, too, first get your ulcers healed; your fluxes stopped. Quiet your mind, and bring it free from distraction to the school, and then you will know what is the force of reasoning.

CHAPTER XXII

OF FRIENDSHIP

§ 1. To whatever objects a person devotes his attention, these objects he probably loves. Do men ever devote their attention, then, to evils?—By no means. Or even to what doth not concern them?—No, nor this. It remains, then, that good must be the sole object of their attention; and, if of their attention, of their love too. Whoever, therefore, understands good is capable likewise of love; and he who cannot distinguish good from evil, and things indifferent from both, how is it possible that he can love? The prudent person alone, then, is capable of loving.

How so? I am not this prudent person, yet I love my child.

I protest it surprises me that you should, in the first place, confess yourself imprudent. For in what are you deficient? Have you not the use of your senses? Do not you distinguish the appearance of things? Do not you provide such food and clothing and habitation as are suitable to you? Why, then, do you confess that you want prudence? In truth, because you are often struck and disconcerted by appearances, and their speciousness gets the better of you; and hence you sometimes

suppose the very same things to be good, then evil, and lastly, neither; and, in a word, you grieve, you fear, you envy, you are disconcerted, you change. Is it from hence that you confess yourself imprudent? And are you not changeable too in love? Riches, pleasure, in short, the very same things, you at some times esteem good, and at others evil; and do not you esteem the same persons, too, alternately good and bad? And at one time treat them with kindness, at another with enmity? one time commend, and at another censure them?

Yes. This too is the case with me.

Well, then, can he who is deceived in another be his friend, think you?

No, surely.

Or doth he who loves him with a changeable affection bear him genuine goodwill?

Nor he, neither.

Or he, who now vilifies, then admires him?

Nor he.

Do you not often see little dogs caressing and playing with each other, that you would say nothing could be more friendly; but, to learn what this friendship is, throw a bit of meat between them, and you will see. Do you too throw a bit of an estate betwixt you and your son, and you will see that he will quickly wish you underground, and you him: and then you, no doubt, on the other hand, will exclaim, What a son have I brought up! He would bury me alive! Throw in a pretty girl, and the old fellow and the young one will both fall in love with her; or let fame or danger intervene, the words of the father of Admetus will be yours: [1]

"You hold life dear; doth not your father too?"

Do you suppose that he did not love his own child when he was a little one? That he was not in agonies when he had a fever, and often wished to undergo that fever in his stead? But, after all, when the trial comes home, you see what expressions he uses. Were not Eteocles and Polynices born of the same mother and of the same father? Were they not brought up, and did they not live and eat and sleep, together? Did not they kiss and fondle each other? So that any one who saw them would have laughed at all the paradoxes which philosophers utter about love. And yet, when a kingdom, like a bit of meat, was thrown betwixt them, see what they say, and how eagerly they wish to kill each other.[2] For universally,

be not deceived, no animal is attached to anything so strongly as to its own interest. Whatever therefore appears a hindrance to that—be it brother, or father, or child, or mistress, or friend—is hated, abhorred, execrated; for by nature it loves nothing like its own interest. This is father, and brother, and family, and country, and God.[3] Whenever, therefore, the gods seem to hinder this, we vilify even them, and throw down their statues and burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temple of Æsculapius to be burnt, because he had lost the man he loved.

§ 2. Whenever, therefore, any one makes his interest to consist in the same thing with sanctity, virtue, his country, parents, and friends, all these are secured; but wherever they are made to interfere, friends, and country, and family, and justice itself, all give way, borne down by the weight of self-interest. For wherever *I* and *mine* are placed, thither must every animal gravitate. If in body, that will sway us; if in choice, that; if in externals, these. If, therefore, I be placed in a right choice, then only I shall be a friend, a son, or a father, such as I ought. For in that case it will be for my interest to preserve the faithful, the modest, the patient, the abstinent, the beneficent character; to keep the relations of life inviolate. But, if I place myself in one thing, and virtue in another, the doctrine of Epicurus will stand its ground, That virtue is nothing, or mere opinion.[4]

§ 3. From this ignorance it was that the Athenians and Lacedemonians quarrelled with each other; and the Thebans with both: the Persian king with Greece; and the Macedonians with both: and now the Romans with the Getes. And in still remoter times, the Trojan war arose from the same cause. Paris was the guest of Menelaus; and whoever had seen the mutual proofs of goodwill that passed between them would never have believed that they were not friends. But a tempting bit, a pretty woman, was thrown in between them; and for this they went to war. At present, therefore, when you see dear brothers have, in appearance, but one soul, do not immediately pronounce upon their friendship; not though they should swear it, and affirm it was impossible to live asunder. (For the governing faculty of a bad man is faithless, unsettled, injudicious; successively vanquished by different appearances.) But inquire, not as others do, whether they were born of the same parents, and brought up together, and under the same preceptor; but this thing only, in what they place their interest

—in externals, or in choice. If in externals, no more call them friends, than faithful, or constant, or brave, or free; nay, nor even men, if you are wise. For it is no principle of humanity that makes them bite and vilify each other, and take possession of public assemblies as wild beasts do of solitudes and mountains; and convert courts of justice into dens of robbers; nor that prompts them to be intemperate, adulterers, seducers; or leads them into other offences that men commit against each other, from the one single principle by which they place themselves and their own concerns in things independent on choice.

§ 4. But if you hear that these men in reality suppose good to be placed only in choice, and in a right use of the appearances of things, no longer take the trouble of inquiring if they are father and son, or old companions and acquaintance; but as boldly pronounce that they are friends, as that they are faithful and just. For where else can friendship be met but with fidelity and modesty, and a communication[5] of virtue; and of no other thing?

Well; but such a one paid me the utmost regard for so long a time, and did not he love me?

How can you tell, wretch, if that regard be any other than he pays to his shoes, or his horse, when he cleans them? And how do you know but when you cease to be a necessary utensil, he may throw you away, like a broken stool?

Well; but it is my wife, and we have lived together many years.

And how many did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was the mother of children, and not a few? But a bracelet fell in between them. What was this bracelet? The principle [she had formed] concerning such things. This turned her into a savage animal; this cut asunder all love, and suffered neither the wife nor the mother to continue such.[6]

§ 5. Whoever, therefore, among you studies to be or to gain a friend, let him cut up all these principles by the root; hate them; drive them utterly out of his soul. Thus, in the first place, he will be secure from inward reproaches and contests; from change of mind and self-torment. Then, with respect to others: to every one like himself he will be unreserved. To such as are unlike he will be patient, mild, gentle, and ready to forgive them, as failing in points of the greatest importance: but severe to none; being fully convinced of Plato's doctrine, That the soul is never willingly deprived of truth. Without

all this you may, in many respects, live as friends do; and drink and lodge and travel together; and be born of the same parents; and so may [7] serpents too; but neither they nor you can ever be friends, while you have these brutal and execrable principles.

CHAPTER XXIII

OF THE FACULTY OF SPEAKING

§ 1. A BOOK will always be read with the greater pleasure, and ease too, if it be written in a fair character; therefore every one will the more easily attend to discourses, likewise ornamented with proper and beautiful expressions. It [1] ought not, then, to be said that there is no such thing as the faculty of elocution: for this would be at once the part of an impious and fearful person.[2] Impious, because he dishonours the gifts of God; just as if he should deny any use in the faculty of sight, hearing, and speech itself. Hath God, then, given you eyes in vain? Is it in vain that he hath infused into them such a strong and active spirit as to be able to represent the forms of distant objects? [3] What messenger is so quick and diligent? Is it in vain that he hath made the intermediate air so yielding and elastic that the sight penetrates through it? And is it in vain that he hath made the light, without which all the rest would be useless? Man, be not ungrateful; nor, on the other hand, unmindful of your superior advantages; [4] but for sight and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and the supports of it, as fruits, and wine, and oil, be thankful to God: but remember, that he hath given you another thing, superior to them all; which makes use of them, proves them, estimates the value of each.[5] For what is it that pronounces upon the value of each of these faculties? Is it the faculty itself? Did you ever perceive the faculty of sight or hearing to say anything concerning itself? Or wheat, or barley, or horses, or dogs? No. These things are appointed as instruments and servants, to obey that which is capable of using the appearances of things. If you inquire the value of anything, of what do you inquire? What is it that answers you? [6] How, then, can any faculty be superior to this, which both uses all the rest as instruments and tries and pronounces concerning each of them? For which of

them knows what itself is, and what is its own value? Which of them knows when it is to be used, and when not? Which is it that opens and shuts the eyes, and turns them away from improper objects? Is it the faculty of sight? No; but that of choice. Which is it that opens and shuts the ears? What is it by which they are made curious and inquisitive; or, on the contrary, deaf, and unaffected by what is said? Is it the faculty of hearing? No; but that of choice. Will this, then, perceiving itself to exist in [man amidst] the other faculties, which are all blind and deaf, and unable to discern anything but those offices in which they are appointed to minister and be subservient to it; and that itself alone sees clearly, and distinguishes the value of each of the rest; will this, I say, inform us that anything is supreme but itself? What doth the eye, when it is opened, do more, than see? But whether we ought to look upon the wife of any one, and in what manner, what is it that tells us? The faculty of choice. Whether we ought to believe, or to disbelieve, what is said; or whether, if we do believe, we ought to be moved by it or not; what is it that tells us? Is it not the faculty of choice? Again, the very faculty of elocution, and that which ornaments discourse, if there be any such peculiar faculty, what doth it more than merely ornament and arrange expressions, as curlers do the hair? But whether it be better to speak or to be silent; or better to speak in this or in that manner; whether this be decent or indecent; and the season and use of each; what is it that tells us, but the faculty of choice? What then, would you have it appear and bear testimony against itself? What means this? If the case be thus, that which serves may be superior to that to which it is subservient; the horse to the rider; the dog to the hunter; the instrument to the musician; or servants to the king. What is it that makes use of all the rest? Choice. What takes care of all? Choice. What destroys the whole man, at one time by hunger; at another by a rope or a precipice? Choice. Hath man, then, anything stronger than this? And how is it possible, that what is liable to restraint should be stronger than what is not? What hath a natural power of hindering the faculty of sight? Both choice, and what depends on choice. And it is the same of the faculties of hearing and speech. And what hath a natural power of hindering choice? Nothing independent on itself, only its own perversion. Therefore choice alone is vice; choice alone is virtue.

§ 2. Since, then, choice is such a faculty, and placed in

authority over all the rest, let it come forth and say to us that the body is, of all things, the most excellent. If even the body itself pronounced itself to be the most excellent, it could not be borne. But now, what is it, Epicurus, that pronounces all this? What was it that composed volumes concerning The End of Being, The Nature of Things, The Rule [of Reasoning];[7] that assumed a philosophic beard; that, as it was dying, wrote that it was then spending its last and happiest day?[8] Was this body, or was it the faculty of choice? And can you, then, without madness, confess anything superior to this? Are you in reality so deaf and blind? What then, doth any one dishonour the other faculties? Heaven forbid! Doth any one deny that the faculty of sight[9] is useful and preferable to the want of it? Heaven forbid! It would be stupid, impious, and ungrateful to God. But we render to each its due. There is some use of an ass, though not so much as of an ox; and of a dog, though not so much as of a servant; and of a servant, though not so much as of the citizens; and of the citizens, though not so much as of the magistrates. And, though some are more excellent than others, those uses which the last afford are not to be despised. The faculty of elocution hath its value, though not equal to that of choice. When, therefore, I talk thus, let not any one suppose that I would have you neglect elocution, any more than your eyes or ears or hands or feet or clothes or shoes. But if you ask me what is the most excellent of things, what shall I say? I cannot say elocution, but a right choice; for it is that which makes use of this and all the other faculties, whether great or small. If this be set right, a bad man becomes good; if it be wrong, a good man becomes wicked. By this we are unfortunate, fortunate; we disapprove or approve each other. In a word, it is this which, neglected, forms unhappiness, and, well cultivated, happiness.

§ 3. But to take away the faculty of elocution, and to say that it is in reality nothing, is not only ungrateful to those who gave it, but cowardly too. For such a person seems to me to be afraid that, if there be any such faculty, we may not on occasion be able to treat it with contempt. Such are they, too, who deny any difference between beauty and deformity. Was it possible, then, to be affected in the same manner by seeing Thersites as Achilles, or Helen as any[10] other woman? There also are the foolish and clownish notions of those who are ignorant of the nature of things, and afraid that whoever perceives a difference must presently be carried away and overcome. But the great

point is to leave to each thing its own proper faculty, and then to see what the value of that faculty is, and to learn what is the principal thing; and upon every occasion, to follow that and to make it the chief object of our attention; to consider other things as trifling in comparison of this; and yet, as far as we are able, not to neglect even these. We ought, for instance, to take eare of our eyes; but not as of the principal thing, but only on account of the principal; because that will no otherwise preserve its own nature, than by making a due estimation of the rest, and preferring some to others. What is the usual practice, then? That of a traveller, who, returning into his own country, and meeting on the road with a good inn, being pleased with the inn, should remain at the inn. Have you forgot your intention, man? You were not travelling to this place, but only through it. "But this is a fine place." And how many other fine inns are there, and how many pleasant fields? But only to be passed through in your way. The business is, to return to your country, to relieve the anxieties of your family, to perform the duties of a citizen, to marry, have children, and go through the public offices. For you did not set out to choose the finest places, but to return to live in that where you were born, and of which you are appointed a citizen.

§ 4. Such is the present case. Because by speech and verbal precepts we are to arrive at perfection, and purify our own choice, and rectify that faculty of which the office is the use of the appearances of things; and because for the delivery of theorems a certain manner of expression, and some variety and subtilty of discourse, becomes necessary; many, captivated by these very things—one by expression, another by syllogisms, a third by convertible propositions, just as our traveller was by the good inn—go no further, but sit down and waste their lives shamefully there, as if amongst the sirens. Your business, man, was to prepare yourself for such an use of the appearances of things as nature demands: not to be frustrated of your desires, or incur your aversions; never to be disappointed or unfortunate, but free, unrestrained, uncompelled; conformed to the administration of Jupiter, obedient to that, finding fault with nothing, but able to say from your whole soul the verses which begin,

"Conduct me, Jove; and thou, O Destiny."

While you have such a business before you, will you be so pleased with a pretty form of expression, or a few theorems,

as to choose to stay and live with them, forgetful of your home, and say, "They are fine things!" Why, who says they are not fine things? But only as a passage; as an inn. For, could you speak like Demosthenes, what hinders but that you might be a disappointed wretch? Could you resolve syllogisms like Chrysippus, what hinders but that you might be miserable, sorrowful, envious, in short, disturbed, unhappy? Nothing. You see, then, that these are mere inns of small value; and that your point in view is quite another thing. When I talk thus to some, they suppose that I am overthrowing all care about speaking, and about theorems: but I do not overthrow that; only the resting in these things without end, and placing our hopes there. If any one, by maintaining this, hurts an audience, place me amongst those hurtful people; for I cannot, when I see one thing to be the principal and most excellent, call another so, to gain your favour.

CHAPTER XXIV

CONCERNING A PERSON WHOM HE TREATED WITH DISREGARD

§ 1. When a certain person said to him, "I have often come to you with a desire of hearing you, and you have never given me any answer; but now, if possible, I entreat you to say something to me": Do you think, replied Epictetus, that, as in other things, so in speaking, there is an art by which he who understands it speaks skilfully, and he who doth not, unskilfully?

I do think so.

He, then, who by speaking both benefits himself and is able to benefit others, must speak skilfully; but he who rather hurts, and is hurt, must be unskilful in this art of speaking. For you may find some speakers hurt, and others benefited. And are all hearers benefited by what they hear? Or will you find some benefited, and some hurt? [1]

Both.

Then those who hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully, hurt.

Granted.

Is there an art of hearing, then, as well as of speaking?

It seems so.

If you please, consider it thus too. To whom do you think the practice of music belongs?

To a musician.

To whom the proper formation of a statue?

To a statuary.

And do not you imagine some art necessary to view a statue skilfully?

I do.

If, therefore, to speak properly belongs to one who is skilful, do not you see, that to hear with benefit belongs likewise to one who is skilful? For the present, however, if you please, let us say no more of doing things perfectly, and with benefit, since we are both far enough from anything of that kind; but this seems to be universally confessed, that he who would hear philosophers needs some kind of exercise in hearing. Is it not so? Tell me, then, on what I shall speak to you? On what subject are you able to hear me? [2]

On good and evil.

The good and evil of what? Of a horse?

No.

Of an ox?

No.

What then, of a man?

Yes.

Do we know, then, what man is? What is his nature; what our idea of him is; and how far our ears are open in respect to this matter? [3] Nay, do you understand what nature is; or are you able, and in what degree, to comprehend me, when I come to say, "But I must use demonstration to you"? How should you? Do you comprehend what demonstration is; or how a thing is demonstrated, or by what methods; or what resembles a demonstration, and yet is not a demonstration? Do you know what true or false is? What is consequent to a thing, and what contradictory? Or unsuitable, or dissonant? But I must excite you to philosophy. How shall I show you that contradiction among the generality of mankind, by which they differ concerning good and evil, profitable and unprofitable, when you know not what contradiction means? Show me, then, what I shall gain by discoursing with you? Excite an inclination in me, as a proper pasture excites an inclination to eating in a sheep: for if you offer him a stone, or a piece of bread, he will not be excited. Thus we too have certain natural

inclinations to speaking, when the hearer appears to be somebody; when he gives us encouragement: but if he sits by, like a stone or a tuft of grass, how can he excite any desire in a man? Doth a vine say to an husbandman, "Take care of me"? No; but invites him to take care of it, by showing him that if he doth, it will reward him for his care. Who is there whom engaging sprightly children do not invite to play, and creep, and prattle with them? But who was ever taken with an inclination to divert himself, or bray, with an ass? For, be the creature ever so little, it is still a little ass.

§ 2. Why do you say nothing to me, then?

I have only this to say to you: That whoever is ignorant what he is, and wherefore he was born, and in what kind of a world, and in what society; what things are good, and what evil; what fair, and what base: who understands neither discourse nor demonstration; nor what is true nor what is false; nor is able to distinguish between them: such a one will neither exert his desires, nor aversions, nor pursuits, conformably to nature: he will neither intend, nor assent, nor deny, nor suspend his judgment conformably to nature: but will wander up and down entirely deaf and blind, supposing himself to be somebody,[4] while he is in reality nobody. Is there anything new in all this? Is not this ignorance the cause of all the errors that have happened from the very original of mankind? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles differ? Was it not for want of knowing what is advantageous, what disadvantageous? Doth not one of them say, It is advantageous to restore Chryseïs to her father; the other, that it is not? Doth not one say, that he ought to take away the prize of the other; the other, that he ought not? Did they not, by these means, forget who they were, and for what purpose they had come there? Why, what did you come for, man; to gain a mistress or to fight?—"To fight." With whom? With the Trojans or Greeks?—"With the Trojans." Leaving Hector, then, do you draw your sword upon your own king? And do you, good sir, forgetting the duties of a king,

Intrusted with a nation, and its cares,

go to squabbling about a girl with the bravest of your allies, whom you ought by every method to conciliate and preserve? And will you be inferior to a subtle priest, who pays his court with the utmost care to you fine gladiators?—You see the effects which ignorance of what is advantageous produces. "But I

am rich [you may say], as well as other people."—What, richer than Agamemnon? "But I am handsome too."—What, handsomer than Achilles? "But I have fine hair too."—Had not Achilles finer and brighter? Yet he neither combed it nicely, nor curled it. "But I am strong too."—Can you lift such a stone, then, as Hector or Ajax? "But I am of a noble family too."—Is your mother a goddess, or your father descended from Jupiter? And what good did all this do Achilles, when he sat crying for a girl? "But I am an orator."—And was not he? Do not you see how he treated the most eloquent of the Greeks, Phœnix and Ulysses? How he struck them dumb? This is all I have to say to you; and even this against my inclination.

Why so?

Because you have given me no encouragement. For what can I see in you to encourage me as spirited horses do their riders? Your person? That you disfigure. Your dress? That is effeminate. Your behaviour? Your look? Absolutely nothing. When you would hear a philosopher, do not say to him, "You tell me nothing"; but only show yourself worthy, or fit to hear; and you will find how you move him to speak.

CHAPTER XXV

THAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY

When one of the company said to him, "Convince me that logic is necessary": Would you have me demonstrate it to you? says he.—"Yes." Then I must use a demonstrative form of argument.—"Granted." And how will you know then whether I argue sophistically? On this, the man being silent: You see, says he, that even by your own confession, logic is necessary; since, without its assistance, you cannot learn so much as whether it be necessary or not.

CHAPTER XXVI

WHAT IS THE PROPERTY OF ERRORS IN LIFE

§ 1. EVERY error in life implies a contradiction: for, since he who errs doth not mean to err, but to be in the right, it is evident that he acts contrary to his meaning. What doth a thief mean? His own interest. If, then, thieving be against his interest, he acts contrary to his own meaning. Now every rational soul is naturally averse to self-contradiction: but so long as any one is ignorant that it is a contradiction, nothing restrains him from acting contradictorily: but, whenever he discovers it, he must as necessarily renounce and avoid it, as any one must dissent from a falsehood whenever he perceives it to be a falsehood: but while this doth not appear, he assents to it as to a truth.

§ 2. He, then, is an able speaker, and excels at once in exhortation and conviction, who can discover to each man the contradiction by which he errs, and prove clearly to him, that what he would, he doth not; and what he would not do, that he doth.[1] For if that be shown, he will depart from it of his own accord: but till you have shown it, be not surprised that he remains where he is: for he doth it on the appearance that he acts rightly.[2] Hence Socrates, relying on this faculty, used to say, "It is not my custom to cite any other witness of my assertions; but I am always contented with my opponent. I call and summon him for my witness; and his single evidence is instead of all others."[3] For he knew that if a rational soul be moved by anything, the scale must turn whether it will or no."[4] Show the governing faculty of reason a contradiction, and it will renounce it: but, till you have shown it, rather blame yourself than him who is unconvinced.

END OF THE SECOND BOOK

BOOK III

CHAPTER I

OF FINERY IN DRESS

§ 1. A CERTAIN young rhetorician coming to him with his hair too curiously ornamented, and his dress very fine, Tell me, says Epictetus, whether you do not think some horses and dogs beautiful, and so of all other animals?

I do.

Are some men then likewise beautiful, and others deformed?

Certainly.

Do we call each of these beautiful then in its kind, on the same account, or on some account peculiar to itself? You will judge of it by this: since we see a dog naturally formed for one thing, a horse for another, and a nightingale, for instance, for another, in general, it will not be absurd to pronounce each of them beautiful, so far as it is in the condition most suitable to its own nature; but, since the nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so?

Agreed.

Then, what makes a dog beautiful, makes a horse deformed; and what makes a horse beautiful, a dog deformed, if their natures are different.

So it seems probable.

For, I suppose, what makes a good pancratiast[1] makes no good wrestler, and a very ridiculous racer; and the very same person who appears beautiful as a pentathlete[1] would appear very deformed in wrestling.

Very true.

What then makes a man beautiful? Is it the same, in general, that makes a dog or a horse so?

The same.

What is it then that makes a dog beautiful?

That excellency which belongs to a dog.

What a horse?

The excellency of a horse.

What a man? Must it not be the excellency belonging to a man? If then you would appear beautiful, young man, strive for human excellency.

What is that?

Consider, when you praise without partial affection, whom you praise: is it the honest, or the dishonest?

The honest.

The sober or the dissolute?

The sober.

The temperate or the intemperate?

The temperate.

Then, if you make yourself such a character, you know that you will make yourself beautiful; but, while you neglect these things, though you use every contrivance to appear beautiful, you must necessarily be deformed.

§ 2. I know not how to say anything further to you; for if I speak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away and return no more. And if I do not speak, consider how I shall act: if you come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you; and you come to me as to a philosopher, and I do not speak like a philosopher.[2] Besides, how could it be consistent with my duty towards yourself, to overlook and leave you uncorrected? If hereafter you should come to have sense, you will accuse me, with reason: "What did Epictetus observe in me, that when he saw me come to him in such a shameful condition, he overlooked it, and never said so much as a word of it? Did he so absolutely despair of me? Was not I young? Was not I able to hear reason? How many young men at that age are guilty of many such errors? I am told of one Polemo, who from a most dissolute youth became totally changed.[3] Suppose he did not think I should become a Polemo, he might however have set my locks to right; he might have stripped off my bracelets and rings, he might have prevented my picking off the hairs from my person. But when he saw me dressed like a—what shall I say?—he was silent." I do not say like what; when you come to your senses, you will say it yourself, and will know what it is, and who they are who study such a dress.

§ 3. If you should hereafter lay this to my charge, what excuse could I make? Ay, but if I do speak, he will not regard me. Why did Laius regard Apollo? Did not he go and get drunk, and bid farewell to the oracle? What then? Did this hinder Apollo from telling him the truth? Now, I am uncertain

whether you will regard me or not, but Apollo positively knew that Laius would not regard him, and yet he spoke.[4] "And why did he speak?" You may as well ask, Why is he Apollo, why doth he deliver oracles, why hath he placed himself in such a post as a prophet and the fountain of truth, to whom the inhabitants of the world should resort? Why is Know Thyself inscribed on the front of his temple, when no one minds it?

§ 4. Did Socrates prevail on all who came to him, to take care of themselves? Not on the thousandth part; but however, being, as he himself declares, divinely appointed to such a post, he never deserted it. What doth he say even to the judges? "If you would acquit me, on condition that I should no longer act as I do now, I will not accept it, nor desist, but I will accost all I meet, whether young or old, and interrogate them just in the same manner, but particularly you, my fellow-citizens, as you are more nearly related to me." "Are you so curious and officious, Socrates? What is it to you how we act?"—"What do you say? While you are of the same community, and the same kindred with me, shall you be careless of yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the city, a bad kinsman to your kindred, and a bad neighbour to your neighbourhood?" "Why, who are you?"—Here it is a great thing to say, "I am he who ought to take care of mankind"; for it is not every little paltry heifer that dares resist the lion; but if the bull should come up and resist him, say to him, if you think proper, Who are you? What business is it of yours? In every species, man, there is some one part which by nature excels; in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not say to what excels, Who are you? If you do, it will, somehow or other, find a voice to tell you, "I am like the purple thread in a garment.[5] Do not expect me to be like the rest, or find fault with my nature, which hath distinguished me from others."

§ 5. What then, am I such a one? How should I? Indeed, are you such a one as to be able to hear the truth? I wish you were. But, however, since I am condemned to wear a grey beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I despaired of you, but will ask you—Whom is it, young man, whom you would render beautiful? Know first who you are, and then adorn yourself accordingly. You are a man; that is, a mortal animal, capable of a rational use of the appearances of things. And what is this rational use? A perfect conformity to nature. What have you then particularly excellent? Is it the animal part? No.

The mortal? No. That which is capable of the use[6] of the appearances of things? No. The excellence lies in the rational part. Adorn and beautify this, but leave your hair to him who formed it, as he thought good. Well, what other denominations have you? Are you a man, or a woman? A man. Then adorn yourself as a man, not a woman. A woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and, if hairy, is a monster, and shown among the monsters at Rome. It is the same in a man, not to be hairy; and if he is by nature not so, he is a monster. But if he clips and picks off his hairs, what shall we do with him? Where shall we show him, and how shall we advertise him? "A man to be seen, who would rather be a woman." What a scandalous show! Who would not wonder at such an advertisement? I believe, indeed, that these very pickers themselves would, not apprehending that it is the very thing of which they are guilty.

§ 6. Of what have you to accuse your nature, sir? That it hath made you a man? Why, were all to be born women, then? In that case, what would have been the use of your finery? For whom would you have made yourself fine, if all were women? But the whole affair displeases you. Go to work upon the whole, then. Remove what is the cause of these hairs, and make yourself a woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half man, half woman. To whom would you be agreeable? To the women? Be agreeable to them as a man.

Ay, but they are pleased with smooth, pretty fellows.

Go hang yourself. Suppose they were pleased with pathics, would you become one? Is this your business in life? Were you born to please dissolute women? Shall we make such a one as you, in the Corinthian republic, for instance, governor of the city, master of the youth, commander of the army, or director of the public games? Will you pick your hairs when you are married? For whom, and for what? Will you be the father of children, and introduce them into the State, picked, like yourself? Oh, what a fine citizen, and senator, and orator! For heaven's sake, sir, ought we to pray for a succession of young men, disposed and bred like you!

§ 7. Now, when you have once heard this discourse, go home, and say to yourself: It is not Epictetus who hath told me all these things (for how should he?), but some propitious God, by him:[7] for it would never have entered the head of Epictetus, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well, let us obey

God, then, that we may not incur the divine displeasure. If a crow had signified anything to you by his croaking, it is not the crow that signifies it, but God by him. And if you have anything signified to you by the human voice, doth he not cause the man to tell it you, that you may know the divine efficacy, which declares its significations to different persons, in different manners; and signifies the greatest and principal things by the noblest messengers?[8] What else doth the poet mean when he says,

"Hermes I sent, his purpose to restrain?"

Hermes, descending from heaven, was to warn him, and the gods now likewise send a Hermes to warn you, not to invert the well-appointed order of things, nor be curiously trifling, but suffer a man to be a man, and a woman a woman; a beautiful man, to be beautiful as a man; a deformed man, to be deformed as a man; for you do not consist of flesh and hair, but of the faculty of choice. If you take care to have this beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear anything than this. But consider what Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of all men, Alcibiades: "Endeavour to make yourself beautiful." What doth he mean to say to him? "Curl your locks, and pick the hairs from your legs"? Heaven forbid! But ornament your choice; throw away your wrong principles.

What is to be done with the poor body, then?

Leave it to nature. Another hath taken care of such things. Give them up to him.

What! then must one be a sloven?

By no means, but be neat, conformably to your nature. A man should be neat as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. If not, let us pick out the mane of a lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the comb of a cock, for he ought to be neat too. Yes, but let it be as a cock, and a lion as a lion, and a hound as a hound.

CHAPTER II

IN WHAT A PROFICIENT OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED, AND THAT WE NEGLECT THE PRINCIPAL THINGS

§ 1. THERE are three topics in philosophy, in which he who would be wise and good must be exercised.[1] That of the Desires and Aversions, that he may not be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other. That of the pursuits and Avoidances, and, in general, the duties of life; that he may act with order and consideration, and not carelessly. The third topic belongs to circumspection, and a freedom from deception; and, in general, whatever belongs to the Assent.

§ 2. Of these topics, the principal, and most urgent, is that of the passions; for passion is produced no otherwise than by a disappointment of the desires, and an incurring of the aversions. It is this which introduces perturbations, tumults, misfortunes, and calamities; this is the spring of sorrow, lamentation, and envy; this renders us envious and emulous, and incapable of hearing reason.

§ 3. The next topic regards the duties of life. For I am not to be disturbed by passions, in the same sense as a statue is, but as one who preserves the natural and acquired relations; as a pious person, as a son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen.

§ 4. The third topic belongs to those who are now making a proficiency, and is a security to the other two, that no unexamined appearance may surprise us, either in sleep, or wine, or in the spleen. This, say you, is above us. But our present philosophers, leaving the first and second topics [the affections and moral duties], employ themselves wholly about the third, convertible, definitive, hypothetical propositions [and other logical subtleties]. For they say that we must, by engaging even in these subjects, take care to guard against deception. Who must? A wise and good man. Is this security from deception, then, the thing you want? Have you mastered the other subjects? Are you not liable to be deceived by money? When you see a fine girl, do you oppose the appearance which is raised in your mind? If your neighbour inherits an estate, do you feel no vexation? Do you, at present, want nothing more than perseverance? You learn even these very things, wretch, with trembling, and a solicitous dread of contempt, and

are inquisitive to know what is said of you; and if any one comes and tells you, that in a dispute which was the best of the philosophers, one of the company said that such a one was the only philosopher, that little soul of yours grows to the size of two cubits, instead of an inch; but if another should come and say, "You are mistaken, he is not worth hearing, for what doth he know? He hath the first rudiments, but nothing more," you are thunderstruck; you presently turn pale and cry out, "I will show him what a man, and how great a philosopher, I am." It is evident [what you are] by these very things; why do you aim to show it by others? Do not you know that Diogenes showed some sophist in this manner by extending his middle finger;[2] and, when he was mad with rage, This, says Diogenes, is he; I have showed him to you. For a man is not showed in the same sense as a stone, or a piece of wood, by the finger; but whoever shows his principles, shows him as a man.

§ 5. Let us see your principles too. For is it not evident that you consider your own choice as nothing, but look out for something external and independent on it? As, what such a one will say of you, and what you shall be thought: whether a man of letters, whether to have read Chrysippus or Antipater; for, if Archedemus too, you have everything you wish. Why are you still solicitous, lest you should not show us what you are? Will you let me tell you what you have showed us that you are? A mean, discontented, passionate, cowardly fellow; complaining of everything; accusing everybody; perpetually restless; good for nothing. This you have showed us. Go now and read Archedemus, and then, if you hear but the noise of a mouse, you are a dead man; for you will die some such kind of death as—who was it? Crinis,[3] who valued himself extremely too, that he understood Archedemus.

§ 6. Wretch, why do not you let alone things that do not belong to you? These things become such as are able to learn them without perturbation; who can say, "I am not subject to anger, or grief, or envy. I am not restrained; I am not compelled. What remains for me to do? I am at leisure; I am at ease. Let us see how convertible propositions are to be treated; let us consider, when an hypothesis is laid down, how we may avoid a contradiction." To such persons do these things belong. They who are safe may light a fire, go to dinner if they please, and sing and dance; but you come and hoist a flag when your vessel is just sinking.

CHAPTER III

WHAT IS THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF A GOOD MAN; AND IN WHAT WE CHIEFLY OUGHT TO BE PRACTITIONERS

§ 1. The subject-matter of a wise and good man is, his own governing faculty. The body is the subject-matter of a physician, and of a master of exercise; and a field, of the husbandman. The business of a wise and good man is, an use of the appearances of things conformable to nature. Now, every soul, as it is naturally formed for an assent to truth, a dissent from falsehood, and a suspense with regard to uncertainty, so it is moved by a desire of good, an aversion from evil, and an indifference to what is neither good nor evil. For, as a money-changer, or a gardener, is not at liberty to reject Cæsar's coin, but when once it is shown is obliged, whether he will or not, to deliver what is sold for it, so is it in the soul. Apparent good at first sight attracts, and evil repels. Nor will the soul any more reject an evident appearance of good than they will Cæsar's coin.

§ 2. Hence depends every movement both of God and man; and hence good is preferred to every obligation, however near. My connection is not with my father, but with good.—Are you so hard-hearted?—Such is my nature, and such is the coin which God hath given me. If, therefore, good is made to be anything but fair and just, away go father, and brother, and country, and everything. What! Shall I overlook my own good and give it up to you? For what? "I am your father." But not my good. "I am your brother." But not my good. But, if we place it in a right choice, good will consist in an observance of the several relations of life; and then, he who gives up some externals acquires good. Your father deprives you of your money, but he doth not hurt you. Your brother will possess as much larger a portion of land than you as he pleases; but will he possess more honour, more fidelity, more fraternal affection? Who can throw you out of this possession? Not even Jupiter, for, indeed, it is not his will; but he hath put this good into my own power, and given it me like his own, uncompelled, unrestrained, and unhindered. But when any one hath a coin different from this, for his coin whoever shows it to him may have whatever is sold for it in return. A thievish proconsul comes into the province: what coin doth he use? Silver.

Show it him, and carry off what you please. An adulterer comes: what coin doth he use? Women. Take the coin, says one, and give me this trifle. "Give it me, and it is yours." Another is addicted to boys: give him the coin, and take what you please. Another is fond of hunting: give him a fine nag or a puppy; and, though with sighs and groans, he will sell you for it what you will, for he is inwardly compelled by another who hath constituted this coin.

§ 3. In this manner ought every one chiefly to exercise himself. When you go out in a morning, examine whomsoever you see or hear; answer, as to a question. What have you seen? A handsome person? Apply the rule. Is this dependent, or independent, on choice? Independent. Throw it away. What have you seen? One grieving for the decease of a child? Apply the rule. Death is independent on choice. Throw it by. Hath a consul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is the consular office? Dependent, or independent, on choice? Independent. Throw aside this too. It is not proof. Cast it away. It is nothing to you.

§ 4. If we acted thus, and practised in this manner from morning till night, by heaven, something would be done. Whereas now, on the contrary, we are caught by every appearance half asleep; and, if we ever do awake, it is only a little in the school; but, as soon as we go out, if we meet any one grieving, we say, "He is undone." If a consul, "How happy is he!" If an exile, "How miserable!" If a poor man, "How wretched; he hath nothing to eat!"

§ 5. These vicious principles then are to be lopped off; and here is our whole strength to be applied. For what is weeping and groaning? Principle. What is misfortune? Principle. What is sedition, discord, complaint, accusation, impiety, trifling? All these are principles, and nothing more; and principles concerning things independent on choice, as if they were either good or evil. Let any one transfer these principles to things dependent on choice, and I will engage that he will preserve his constancy, whatever be the state of things about him.

§ 6. The soul resembles a vessel filled with water; the appearances of things resemble a ray falling upon its surface. If the water is moved, the ray will seem to be moved likewise, though it is in reality without motion. Whenever, therefore, any one is seized with a swimming in his head, it is not the arts and virtues that are confounded, but the mind in which they are; and, if this recover its composure, so will they likewise.

CHAPTER IV

CONCERNING ONE WHO EXERTED HIMSELF, WITH INDECENT EAGERNESS, IN THE THEATRE

§ 1. When the Governor of Epirus had exerted himself indecently in favour of a comedian, and was, upon that account, publicly railed at; and, when he came to hear it, was highly displeased with those who railed at him: Why, what harm, says Epictetus, have these people done? They have favoured a player, which is just what you did.

Is this a proper manner, then, of expressing their favour?

Seeing you, their governor, and the friend and vicegerent of Cæsar, express it thus, was it not to be expected that they would express it thus too? For if it is not right to express favour in this manner to a player, be not guilty of it yourself; and, if it is, why are you angry at them for imitating you? For whom have the many to imitate, but you, their superiors? From whom are they to take example when they come into the theatre, but from you? "Do but look how Cæsar's vicegerent sees the play. Hath he cried out? I will cry out too. Hath he leaped up from his seat? I, too, will leap up from mine. Do his slaves sit in different parts of the house, making an uproar? I, indeed, have no slaves; but I will make as much uproar as I can myself, instead of ever so many."

§ 2. You ought to consider, then, that when you appear in the theatre, you appear as a rule and example to others, how they ought to see the play. Why is it that they have railed at you? Because every man hates what hinders him. They would have one actor crowned, you another. They hindered you; and you, them. You proved the stronger. They have done what they could; they have railed at the person who hindered them. What would you have, then? Would you do as you please, and not have them even talk as they please? Where is the wonder of all this? Doth not the husbandman rail at Jupiter when he is hindered by him? Doth not the sailor? Do men ever cease railing at Cæsar? What then, is Jupiter ignorant of this? Are not the things that are said reported to Cæsar? How then doth he act? He knows that if he was to punish all railers, he would have nobody left to command.

§ 3. When you enter the theatre, then, ought you to say, "Come, let Sophron[1] be crowned"? No. But, "Come, let me preserve my choice, in a manner conformable to nature, upon this occasion. No one is dearer to me than myself. It is ridiculous, then, that because another man gains the victory as a player, I should be hurt. Whom do I wish to gain the victory? Him who doth gain it; and thus he will always be victorious, whom I wish to be so." But I would have Sophron crowned.—Why, celebrate as many games as you will at your own house; Nemean, Pythian, Isthmian, Olympic, and proclaim him victor in all; but, in public, do not arrogate more than your due, nor seize to yourself what lies in common: otherwise, bear to be railed at; for, if you act like the mob, you reduce yourself to an equality with them.

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THOSE WHO PRETEND SICKNESS AS AN EXCUSE TO RETURN HOME[1]

§ 1. I AM sick here, said one of the scholars. I will return home. Were you never sick at home, then? Consider, whether you are doing anything here conducive to the regulation of your choice; for, if you make no improvement, it was to no purpose that you came. Go home. Take care of your domestic affairs. For, if your ruling faculty cannot be brought to a conformity to nature, your land may. You may increase your money, support the old age of your father, mix in the public assemblies, and make a bad governor as you are a bad man, and do other things of that sort. But if you are conscious to yourself that you are casting off some of your wrong principles, and taking up different ones in their room; and that you have transferred your scheme of life from things not dependent on choice to those which are; and that, if you do sometimes cry Alas, it is not upon the account of your father or your brother, but yourself; why do you any longer plead sickness?[2] Do not you know that both sickness and death must overtake us? At what employment? The husbandman at his plough; the sailor on his voyage. At what employment would you be taken? For, indeed, at what em-

ployment ought you to be taken? If there is any better employment at which you can be taken, follow that. For my own part, I would be taken engaged in nothing, but in the care of my own faculty of choice; how to render it undisturbed, unrestrained, uncompelled, free. I would be found studying this, that I may be able to say to God, "Have I transgressed thy commands? Have I perverted the powers, the senses, the preconceptions which thou hast given me? Have I ever accused thee, or censured thy dispensations? I have been sick, because it was thy pleasure; and so have others, but I willingly. I have been poor, it being thy will, but with joy. I have not been in power, because it was not thy will; and power I have never desired. Hast thou ever seen me out of humour upon this account? Have I not always approached thee with a cheerful countenance, prepared to execute thy commands and the significations of thy will? Is it thy pleasure that I should depart from this assembly? I depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast thought me worthy to have a share in it with thee; to behold thy works, and to join with thee in comprehending thy administration." Let death overtake me while I am thinking, while I am writing, while I am reading such things as these.

§ 2. But I shall not have my mother to hold my head when I am sick.

Get home then to your mother, for you are fit to have your head held when you are sick.

But I used at home to lie on a fine couch.

Get to this couch of yours, for you are fit to lie upon such a one, even in health; so do not lose the doing what you are qualified for. But what says Socrates? "As one man rejoices in the improvement of his estate, another of his horse, so do I daily rejoice in apprehending myself to grow better."

In what? In pretty speeches?

Good words, I entreat you.

In trifling theorems? In what doth he employ himself? For, indeed, I do not see that the philosophers are employed in anything else.

Do you think it nothing, never to accuse or censure any one, either God or man? Always to carry abroad and bring home the same countenance? These were the things which Socrates knew; and yet he never professed to know or to teach anything; but if any one wanted pretty speeches or little theorems, he brought him to Protagoras, to Hippias; just as if any one had come for pot-herbs he would have taken him to a gardener.

Who of you then hath such an [earnest] intention as this? If you had, you would bear sickness, and hunger, and death, with cheerfulness. If any of you hath been in love, he knows that I speak truth.

CHAPTER VI

MISCELLANEOUS

§ 1. When he was asked, how[1] it came to pass that, though the art of reasoning is more studied now, yet the improvements were greater formerly? In what instance, answered he, is it more studied now, and in what were the improvements greater then? For in what is studied at present, in that will be found likewise the improvements at present. The present study is the solution of syllogisms; and in this improvements are made. But formerly, the study was to preserve the governing faculty conformable to nature; and improvement was made in that. Therefore, do not confound things, nor when you study one expect improvement in another; but see whether any of us, who applies himself to think and act conformably to nature, ever fails of improvement. Depend upon it, you will not find one.

§ 2. A good man is invincible; for he doth not contend where he is not superior. If you would have his land, take it; take his servants, take his public post, take his body. But you will never frustrate his desire, nor make him incur his aversion. He engages in no combat but what concerns the objects of his own choice. How can he fail then to be invincible?

§ 3. Being asked what common sense was, he answered: As that may be called a common ear which distinguishes only sounds, but that which distinguishes notes an artificial one; so there are some things which men not totally perverted discern by their common natural powers; and such a disposition is called common sense.

§ 4. It is not easy to gain the attention of effeminate young men, for you cannot take custard by a hook; but the ingenuous, even if you discourage them, are the more eager for learning. Hence Rufus, for the most part, did discourage them, and made use of that as a criterion of the ingenuous and disingenuous.

For he used to say, As a stone, even if you throw it up, will by its own propensity be carried downward; so an ingenuous mind, the more it is forced from its natural bent, the more strongly will it incline towards it.

CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING A GOVERNOR OF THE FREE STATES, WHO WAS AN EPICUREAN

§ 1. When the governor, who was an Epicurean, came to him, It is fit, says he, that we ignorant people should inquire of you philosophers what is the most valuable thing in the world; as those who come into a strange city do of the citizens, and such as are acquainted with it; that, after this inquiry, we may go and take a view of it, as they do in cities. Now, scarcely any one denies but that there are three things belonging to man: soul, body, and externals. It remains for you to answer which is the best. What shall we tell mankind? Is it flesh?

And was it for this that Maximus took a voyage in winter as far as Cassiope to accompany his son? Was it to gratify the flesh?

No, surely.

Is it not fit, then, to employ our chief study on what is best?

Yes, beyond all other things.

What have we, then, better than flesh?

The soul.

Are we to prefer the good of the better, or of the worse?

Of the better.

Doth the good of the soul consist in what is dependent, or independent, on choice?

In what is dependent on it.

Doth the pleasure of the soul, then, depend on choice?

It doth.

And whence doth this pleasure arise? From itself? This is unintelligible. For there must subsist some principal essence of good, in the attainment of which we shall enjoy this pleasure of the soul.

This too is granted.

In what, then, consists this pleasure of the soul? For if it

be in mental objects, the essence of good is found.[1] For it is impossible that we should be reasonably elated with pleasure unless by good; or that, if the leading cause is not good, the effect should be good. For to make the effect reasonable, the cause must be good. But this, if you are in your senses, you will not allow; for it would be to contradict both Epicurus and the rest of your principles. It remains, then, that the pleasures of the soul must consist in bodily objects; and that there must be the leading cause and the essence of good. Maximus therefore did foolishly, if he took a voyage for the sake of anything but body; that is, for the sake of what is best. He doth foolishly, too, if he refrains from what is another's, when he is a judge, and able to take it. But let us consider only this, if you please, how it may be done secretly and safely, and so that no one may know it. For Epicurus himself doth not pronounce stealing to be evil, only the being found out in it, and says, "Do not steal," for no other reason but because it is impossible to insure ourselves against a discovery. But I say to you, that if it be done dexterously and cautiously, we shall not be discovered. Besides, we have powerful friends of both sexes at Rome, and the Greeks are weak, and nobody will dare to go up to Rome on such an affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper good? It is madness; it is folly. But if you were to tell me that you do refrain, I would not believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to an apparent falsehood, or to deny an apparent truth, so it is impossible to abstain from an apparent good. Now, riches are a good; and, indeed, the chief instrument of pleasures. Why do not you acquire them? And why do not we corrupt the wife of our neighbour, if it can be done secretly? And, if the husband should happen to be impertinent, why not cut his throat too? if you have a mind to be such a philosopher as you ought to be, a complete one, to be consistent with your own principles. Otherwise you will not differ from us, who are called Stoics. For we too say one thing and do another; we talk well and act ill; but you will be perverse in a contrary way; teach bad principles, and act well.

§ 2. For heaven's sake, represent to yourself a city of Epicureans.[2] "I do not marry." "Nor I. For we were not to marry, nor have children, nor to engage in public affairs." What will be the consequence of this? Whence are the citizens to come? Who will educate them? Who will be the governor of the youth? Who the master of their exercises? What, then, will he teach them? Will it be what used to be taught at

Athens or Lacedemon? Take a young man; bring him up according to your principles. These principles are wicked; subversive of a state; pernicious to families; nor becoming, even to women. Give them up, sir. You live in a capital city. You are to govern and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one's wife or child, or silver or gold plate, is to have any charms for you, but your own. Provide yourself with principles consonant to these truths; and, setting out from thence, you will with pleasure refrain from things so persuasive to mislead, and get the better. But, if to their own persuasive force we add such a philosophy as hurries us upon them and confirms us in them, what will be the consequence?

§ 3. In a sculptured vase, which is the best: the silver or the workmanship? In the hand, the substance is flesh, but its operations are the principal thing. Accordingly, the duties relative to it are likewise threefold; some have respect to mere existence, others to the manner of existence, and a third sort are the leading operations themselves. Thus, likewise, do not set a value on the materials of man, mere paltry flesh, but on the principal operations belonging to him.

What are these?

Engaging in public business; marrying; the production of children; the worship of God; the care of our parents; and, in general, the having our desires and aversions, our pursuits and avoidances, such as each of them ought to be, conformable to our nature.

What is our nature?

To be free, noble-spirited, modest. (For what other animal blushes? What other hath the idea of shame?) But pleasure must be subjected to these, as an attendant and handmaid, to call forth our activity and to keep us constant in natural operations.

But I am rich and want nothing.

Then why do you pretend to philosophise? Your gold and silver plate is enough for you. What need have you of principles?

Besides, I am judge of the Greeks.

Do you know how to judge? Who hath imparted this knowledge to you?

Cæsar hath given me a commission.

Let him give you a commission to judge of music; and what good will it do you? But how were you made a judge? Whose hand have you kissed? That of Symphorus, or Numenius? [3]

Before whose bed-chamber have you slept? To whom have you sent presents? After all, do you perceive that the office of judge is of the same value as Numenius?

But I can throw whom I please into prison.

As you may a stone.

But I can beat whom I will too.

As you may an ass. This is not a government over men. Govern us like reasonable creatures. Show us what is for our interest, and we will pursue it; show us what is against our interest, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates, make us imitators of yourself. He was properly a governor of men, who subjected their desires and aversions, their pursuits, their avoidances, to himself. "Do this; do not do that, or I will throw you into prison." Going thus far only is not governing men like reasonable creatures. But—"Do as Jupiter hath commanded, or you will be punished. You will be a loser."

What shall I lose?

Nothing more than the not doing what you ought. You will lose your fidelity, honour, decency. Look for no greater losses than these.

CHAPTER VIII

HOW WE ARE TO EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST THE APPEARANCES OF THINGS

§ 1. In the same manner as we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions, we should exercise ourselves likewise in relation to such appearances as every day occur, for these too offer questions to us. Such a one's son is dead. What do you think of it? Answer: it is independent on choice, it is not an evil.—Such a one is disinherited by his father. What do you think of it? It is independent on choice, it is not an evil.—Cæsar hath condemned him.—This is independent on choice, it is not an evil.—He hath been afflicted by it.—This is dependent on choice, it is an evil.—He hath supported it bravely.—This is dependent on choice, it is a good.

§ 2. If we accustom ourselves in this manner we shall make an improvement, for we shall never assent to anything but what the appearance itself comprehends. A son is dead.—What hath happened?—A son is dead.—Nothing more?—Nothing.

—A ship is lost.—What hath happened?—A ship is lost.—He is carried to prison.—What hath happened?—He is carried to prison. That he is unhappy is an addition that every one makes of his own.—"But Jupiter doth not order these things right."—Why so? Because he hath made you patient? Because he hath made you brave? Because he hath made them to be no evils? Because it is permitted you, while you suffer them, to be happy? Because he hath opened you the door, whenever they do not suit you? Go out, man, and do not complain.

§ 3. If you would know how the Romans treat philosophers, hear. Italicus, esteemed one of the greatest philosophers among them, being in a passion with his own people, as if he had suffered some intolerable evil, said once when I was by, "I cannot bear it; you are the ruin of me, you will make me just like him," pointing to me.

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING A CERTAIN ORATOR WHO WAS GOING TO ROME ON A LAW-SUIT

§ 1. When a person came to him who was going to Rome on a law-suit in which his dignity was concerned, and, after telling him the occasion of his journey, asked him what he thought of the affair? If you ask me, says Epictetus, what will happen to you at Rome, and whether you shall gain or lose your cause, I have no theorem for this. But if you ask me how you shall fare, I can answer, If you have right principles, well; if wrong ones, ill. For principle is to every one the cause of action. For what is the reason that you so earnestly desired to be voted Governor of the Gnossians? Principle. What is the reason that you are now going to Rome? Principle. And in winter, too, and with danger and expense? Why, because it is necessary. What tells you so? Principle. If, then, principles are the causes of all our actions, wherever any one hath bad principles, the effect will be answerable to the cause. Well, then, are all our principles sound? Are both yours and your antagonist's? How, then, do you differ? Or are yours better than his? Why? You think so; and so doth he, that his are better;

and so do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show me that you have made some examination and taken some care of your principles. As you now take a voyage to Rome for the government of the Gnossians, and are not contented to stay at home with the honours you before enjoyed, but desire something greater and more illustrious; did you ever take such a voyage in order to examine your own principles, and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened to have any? Did you ever apply to any one upon this account? What time did you ever set yourself? What age? Run over your years. If you are ashamed of me, do it to yourself. Did you examine your principles when you were a child? Did you not then do everything just as you do everything now? When you were a youth, and frequented the schools of the orators and made declamations yourself, did you ever imagine that you were deficient in anything? And when you became a man, and entered upon public business, pleaded causes, and acquired credit, who, any longer, appeared to be equal to you? How would you have borne that any one should examine whether your principles were bad? What, then, would you have me say to you?

Assist me in this affair.

I have no theorem for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that account you came, as to a philosopher, but as you would come to an herb-seller or a shoemaker.

To what purposes, then, have the philosophers theorems?

For preserving and conducting the ruling faculty conformably to nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a small thing?

No, but the greatest.

Well, and doth it require but a short time? And may it be taken as you pass by? If you can, take it then; and so you will say, "I have visited Epictetus." Ay; just as you would a stone, or a statue. For you have seen me and nothing more. But he visits a man, as a man, who learns his principles, and in return shows his own. Learn my principles. Show me yours. Then say you have visited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any bad principle, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is visiting a philosopher. No. But "It lies in our way; and, while we were about hiring a ship, we may call on Epictetus. Let us see what it is he says." And then, when you are gone, you say, "Epictetus is nothing. His language was inaccurate, was barbarous." For what else did you come to judge of? "Well, but if I employ[1] myself in these

things, I shall be without an estate, like you; without plate, without equipage, like you."—Nothing, perhaps, is necessary to be said to this, but that I do not want them. But, if you possess many things, you still want others; so that, whether you will or not, you are poorer than I.

§ 2. What, then, do I want?

What you have not: constancy, a mind conformable to nature, and a freedom from perturbation. Patron or no patron, what care I? But you do. I am richer than you. I am not anxious what Cæsar will think of me. I flatter no one on that account. This I have, instead of silver and gold plate. You have your vessels of gold; but your discourse, your principles, your assents, your pursuits, your desires, of mere earthenware. When I have all these conformable to nature, why should not I bestow some study upon my reasoning too? I am at leisure. My mind is under no distraction. In this freedom from distraction, what shall I do? Have I anything more becoming a man than this? You, when you have nothing to do, are restless; you go to the theatre, or perhaps to bathe.[2] Why should not the philosopher polish his reasoning? You have fine [3] crystal and myrrhine vases; I have acute forms of reasoning. To you, all you have appears little; to me, all I have great. Your appetite is unsatiable; mine is satisfied. When children thrust their head into a narrow jar of nuts and figs, if they fill it they cannot get it out again; then they fall a-crying. Drop a few of them and you will get out the rest. And do you too drop your desire; do not covet many things, and you will get some.

CHAPTER X

IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS

§ 1. We should have all our principles ready, to make use of on every occasion. At dinner, such as relate to dinner; in the bath, such as relate to the bath; and in the bed, such as relate to the bed.

> "Let not the stealing god of sleep surprise
> Nor creep in slumbers on thy weary eyes,
> Ere every action of the former day
> Strictly thou dost and righteously survey:
> What have I done? In what have I transgressed?

What good or ill has this day's life expressed?
Where have I failed, in what I ought to do?
If evil were thy deeds, repent and mourn,
If good, rejoice . . ."

ROWE'S *Pythagoras*.

We should retain these verses, so as to apply them to our use; not merely to repeat them aloud, as we do the verses in honour of Apollo [without minding what we are about].[1]

§ 2. Again, in a fever, we should have such principles ready as relate to a fever; and not, as soon as we are taken ill, to lose and forget all. Provided I do but act like a philosopher, let what will happen. Some way or other, depart I must from this frail body, whether a fever comes or not.[2] What is it to be a philosopher? Is it not to be prepared against events? Do not you comprehend that you say, in effect, If I am but prepared to bear all events with calmness, let what will happen; otherwise, you are like a pancratiast, who after receiving a blow should quit the combat. In that case, indeed, you may allowably leave off, and not [run the hazard] of being whipped.[3] But what shall we get by leaving off philosophy? What, then, ought each of us to say upon every difficult occasion? "It was for this that I exercised, it was for this that I prepared myself." God says to you, Give me a proof if you have gone through the preparatory combats, according to rule;[4] if you have followed a proper diet, a proper exercise; if you have obeyed your master; and after this, do you faint at the very time of action? Now is the proper time for a fever. Bear it well; for thirst, bear it well; for hunger, bear it well. Is it not in your power? Who shall restrain you? A physician may restrain you from drinking, but he cannot restrain you from bearing your thirst well. He may restrain you from eating, but he cannot restrain you from bearing hunger well.—But I cannot follow my studies.—And for what end do you follow them, wretch? Is it not that you may be prosperous? That you may be constant? That you may think and act conformably to nature? What restrains you, but that in a fever you may preserve your ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the proof of the matter. Here is the trial of the philosopher; for a fever is a part of life, just as a walk, a voyage, or a journey. Do you read when you are walking? No, nor in a fever. But when you walk well, you have everything belonging to a walker; so if you bear a fever well, you have everything belonging to one in a fever. What is it to bear a fever well? Not to blame either God or man, not to be afflicted at what

happens; to expect death in a right and becoming manner, and to do what is to be done. When the physician enters, not to dread what he may say; nor, if he should tell you that you are in a fair way, to be too much rejoiced; for what good hath he told you? When you were in health, what good did it do you? Not to be dejected when he tells you that you are very ill; for what is it to be very ill? To be near the separation of soul and body. What harm is there in this, then? If you are not near it now, will you not be near it hereafter? What, will the world be quite overset when you die? Why, then, do you flatter your physician? Why do you say, "If you please, sir, I shall do well"?[5] Why do you furnish an occasion to his pride? Why do not you treat a physician, with regard to an insignificant body, which is not yours, but by nature mortal, as you do a shoemaker about your feet, or a carpenter about a house? These are the things necessary to one in a fever. If he fulfils these, he hath what belongs to him. For it is not the business of a philosopher to take care of these mere externals, of his wine, his oil, or his body; but his ruling faculty. And how with regard to externals? So as not to behave inconsiderately about them. What occasion, then, is there for fear? What occasion for anger,[6] about what belongs to others, and what is of no value? For two rules we should always have ready: That nothing is good or evil, but choice; and, That we are not to lead events, but to follow them. "My brother ought not to have treated me so." Very true, but he must see to that. However he treats me, I am to act right with regard to him, for the one is my own concern, the other is not; the one cannot be restrained, the other may.

CHAPTER XI

MISCELLANEOUS

§ 1. THERE are some punishments appointed, as by a law, for such as disobey the divine administration. Whoever shall esteem anything good, except what depends on choice, let him envy, let him covet, let him flatter, let him be full of perturbation. Whoever esteems anything else to be evil, let him grieve, let him mourn, let him lament, let him be wretched. And yet, though thus severely punished, we cannot desist.

Remember what the poet says of a stranger:

> "A worse than thou might enter here secure;
> No rude affront shall drive him from my door;
> For strangers come from Jove . . ."—Homer.

§ 2. This, too, you should be prepared to say, with regard to a father: It is not lawful for me to affront you, father, even if a worse than you should have come; for all are from paternal Jove. And so of a brother; for all are from kindred Jove. And thus we shall find Jove to be the inspector of all the other relations.

CHAPTER XII

OF ASCETIC EXERCISE

§ 1. We are not to carry our exercises beyond nature, nor merely to attract admiration; for thus we, who call ourselves philosophers, shall not differ from jugglers. For it is difficult, too, to walk upon a rope, and not only difficult, but dangerous. Ought we too, for that reason, to make it our study to walk upon a rope, or set up a palm-tree,[1] or grasp a statue?[2] By no means. It is not everything difficult or dangerous that is a proper exercise, but such things as are conducive to what lies before us to do.

And what is it that lies before us to do?

To have our desires and aversions free from restraint.

How is that?

Not to be disappointed of our desire, nor incur our aversion. To this ought our exercise to be turned. For, without strong and constant exercise, it is not possible to preserve our desire undisappointed, and our aversion unincurred; and therefore, if we suffer it to be externally employed on things independent on choice, be assured that your desire will neither gain its object, nor your aversion avoid it.

§ 2. And, because habit hath a powerful influence, and we are habituated to apply our desire and aversion to externals only, we must oppose one habit to another, and where the appearances are most slippery, there oppose exercise. I am inclinable to pleasure. I will bend[3] myself beyond a due proportion to the other side for the sake of exercise. I am averse to pain. I will break and exercise the appearances [which strike my

mind], that I may withdraw my aversion from every such object. For who is the practitioner in exercise? He who endeavours totally to restrain desire, and to apply aversion only to things dependent on choice, and endeavours it most in the most difficult cases. Hence different persons are to be exercised in different ways. What signifies it to this purpose to set up a palm-tree, or carry about a tent [4] of skins or a pestle and mortar? [4] If you are hasty, man, let it be your exercise to bear ill language patiently; and when you are affronted, not to be angry. Thus, at length, you may arrive at such a proficiency as, when any one strikes you, to say to yourself, "Let me suppose this to be grasping a statue." Next, exercise yourself to make a decent use of wine; not to drink a great deal, for even in this there are some so foolish as to exercise themselves; but at first to abstain from it; and to abstain from a girl, and from delicacies in eating. Afterwards you will venture into the lists at some proper season, by way of trial, if at all, to see whether appearances get the better of you as much as they used to do. But at first, fly from what is stronger than you. The contest of a fine girl with a young man just initiated into philosophy is unequal. The brass pot and the earthen pitcher, as the fable says, are an unsuitable match.

§ 3. Next to the Desires and Aversions is the second class, of the Pursuits and Avoidances; that they may be obedient to reason; that nothing may be done improperly in point of time or place, or in any other respect.

§ 4. The third class relates to Assent, and what is plausible and persuasive. As Socrates said that we are not to lead an unexamined life, so neither are we to admit an unexamined appearance, but to say, "Stop, let me see what you are, and whence you come." (As the watch say, Show me the ticket.) "Have you that signal from nature which is necessary to the admission of every appearance?"

§ 5. In short, whatever things are applied to the body by those who exercise it, if they any way affect desire or aversion, they may be used in ascetic exercise. But if this be done for mere ostentation, it belongs to one who looks out and hunts for something external, and seeks for spectators to exclaim, "What a great man!" Hence Apollonius said well: "If you have a mind to exercise yourself for your own benefit, when you are choking with heat, take a little cold water in your mouth and spirt it out again, and tell nobody."

CHAPTER XIII

WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT A SOLITARY PERSON

§ 1. SOLITUDE is the state of a helpless person. For not he who is alone is therefore solitary, any more than one in a crowd the contrary. When, therefore, we lose a son, or a brother, or a friend on whom we have been used to repose, we often say we are left solitary even in the midst of Rome, where such a crowd is continually meeting us; where we live among so many, and when we have, perhaps, a numerous train of servants. For he is understood to be solitary who is helpless and exposed to such as would injure him. Hence, in a journey especially, we call ourselves solitary when we fall among thieves; for it is not the sight of a man that removes our solitude, but of an honest man, a man of honour and a helpful companion. If merely being alone is sufficient for solitude, Jupiter may be said to be solitary at the conflagration, and bewail himself that he hath neither Juno, nor Pallas, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descendant, nor relation. This some indeed say he doth, when he is alone at the conflagration.[1] Such as these, moved by some natural principle, some natural desire of society and mutual love, and by the pleasure of conversation, do not rightly consider the state of a person who is alone. We ought, however, to be prepared in some manner for this also, to be self-sufficient and able to bear our own company. For as Jupiter converses with himself, acquiesces in himself, and contemplates his own administration, and is employed in thoughts worthy of himself: so should we too be able to talk with ourselves, and not to need the conversation of others, nor be at a loss for employment; to attend to the divine administration; to consider our relation to other beings; how we have formerly been affected by events, how we are affected now; what are the things that still press upon us, how these too may be cured, how removed; if anything wants completing, to complete it according to reason. You see that Cæsar hath procured us a profound peace; there are neither wars nor battles, nor great robberies nor piracies, but we may travel at all hours, and sail from east to west. But can Cæsar procure us peace from a fever too? From a shipwreck? From a fire? From an earthquake? From a thunderstorm? Nay, even from love? He cannot. From grief? From envy?

No, not from any one of these. But the doctrine of philosophers promises to procure us peace from these too. And what doth it say? "If you will attend to me, O mortals, wherever you are, and whatever you are doing, you shall neither grieve nor be angry, nor be compelled nor restrained; but you shall live impassive, and free from all." Shall not he who enjoys this peace, proclaimed, not by Cæsar (for how should he have it to proclaim?) but by God, through reason, be contented, when he is alone reflecting and considering: "To me there can now no ill happen; there is no thief, no earthquake. All is full of peace, all full of tranquillity; every road, every city, every assembly. My neighbour, my companion, unable to hurt me." Another, whose care it is, provides you with food, with clothes, with senses, with preconceptions. Whenever he doth not provide what is necessary, he sounds a retreat; he opens the door, and says to you, "Come." Whither? To nothing dreadful, but to that whence you were made; to what is friendly and congenial to the elements. What in you was fire, goes away to fire; what was earth, to earth; what air, to air; what water, to water. There is no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyriphlegethon; but all is full of gods and dæmons. He who can have such thoughts, and can look upon the sun, moon, and stars, and enjoy the earth and sea, is no more solitary than he is helpless.—Well, but suppose any one should come and murder me, when I am alone.—Fool, not you, but that insignificant body of yours.

§ 2. What solitude is there then left? What destitution? Why do we make ourselves worse than children? What do they do when they are left alone? They take up shells and dust; they build houses, then pull them down, then build something else, and thus never want amusement. Suppose you were all to sail away, am I to sit and cry because I am left alone and solitary? Am I so unprovided with shells and dust? But children do this from folly; and we are wretched from wisdom.

§ 3. Every great faculty is dangerous to a beginner.[2] Study first how to live like a person in sickness, that in time you may know how to live like one in health. Abstain from food. Drink water. Totally repress your desire, for some time, that you may at length use it according to reason; and, if according to reason [as you may], when you come to have some good in you, you will use it well. No, but we would live immediately as men already wise, and be of service to mankind.—Of what service? What are you doing? Why, have you been of service

to yourself? But you would exhort them. You exhort! Would you be of service to them, show them, by your own example, what kind of men philosophy makes, and be not impertinent. When you eat, be of service to those who eat with you; when you drink, to those who drink with you. Be of service to them, by giving way to all, yielding to them, bearing with them; and not by throwing out your own ill humour upon them.

CHAPTER XIV

MISCELLANEOUS

§ 1. As bad performers cannot sing alone but in a chorus, so some persons cannot walk alone. If you are anything, walk alone, talk by yourself, and do not skulk in the chorus. Think a little at last; look about you, sift yourself, that you may know what you are.

§ 2. If a person drinks water, or doth anything else for the sake of exercise, upon every occasion he tells all he meets, "I drink water." Why, do you drink water merely for the sake of drinking it? If it doth you any good to drink it, drink it; if not, you act ridiculously. But, if it is for your advantage, and you drink it, say nothing about it before those who are apt to take offence. What then? These are the very people you wish to please.

§ 3. Of actions some are performed on their own account; others occasioned by circumstances; some proceed from motives of prudence; some from complaisance to others; and some are done in pursuance of a manner of life which we have taken up.

§ 4. Two things must be rooted out of men: conceit and diffidence. Conceit lies in thinking you want nothing; and diffidence in supposing it impossible that, under such adverse circumstances, you should ever succeed. Now, conceit is removed by confutation; and of this Socrates was the author. And [in order to see] that the undertaking is not impracticable, consider and inquire. The inquiry itself will do you no harm; and it is almost being a philosopher to inquire how it is possible to make use of our desire and aversion without hindrance.

§ 5. I am better than you, for my father hath been consul. I

have been a tribune, says another, and not you. If we were horses, would you say, My father was swifter than yours? I have abundance of oats and hay, and fine trappings? What now, if, while you were saying this, I should answer, "Be it so. Let us run a race, then." Is there nothing in man analogous to a race in horses, by which it may be known which is better or worse? Is there not honour, fidelity, justice? Show yourself the better in these, that you may be the better, as a man. But if you tell me you can kick violently, I will tell you again that you value yourself on the property of an ass.

CHAPTER XV[1]

THAT EVERYTHING IS TO BE UNDERTAKEN WITH CIRCUMSPECTION

§ 1. In every affair consider what precedes and follows, and then undertake it. Otherwise you will begin with spirit; but not having thought of the consequences, when some of them appear you will shamefully desist. "I would conquer at the Olympic games." But consider what precedes and follows, and then, if it be for your advantage, engage in the affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties; exercise your body, whether you choose it or not, at a stated hour, in heat and cold; you must drink no cold water, nor sometimes even wine.[2] In a word, you must give yourself up to your master, as to a physician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate your arm, turn your ankle, swallow abundance of dust, be whipped,[3] and, after all, lose the victory. When you have reckoned up all this, if your inclination still holds, set about the combat. Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children, who sometimes play wrestlers, sometimes gladiators, sometimes blow a trumpet, and sometimes act a tragedy, when they happen to have seen and admired these shows. Thus you too will be at one time a wrestler, at another a gladiator, now a philosopher, then an orator; but with your whole soul, nothing at all. Like an ape, you mimic all you see, and one thing after another is sure to please you, but is out of favour as soon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon anything considerately, nor after

having viewed the whole matter on all sides, or made any scrutiny into it, but rashly, and with a cold inclination. Thus some, when they have seen a philosopher and heard a man speaking like Euphrates [4] (though, indeed, who can speak like him?), have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider your shoulders, your back, your thighs; for different persons are made for different things. Do you think that you can act as you do, and be a philosopher? That you can eat [5] and drink, and be angry and discontented as you are now? You must watch, you must labour, you must get the better of certain appetites, must quit your acquaintance, be despised by your servant, be laughed at by those you meet; come off worse than others in everything, in magistracies, in honours, in courts of judicature. When you have considered all these things round, approach, if you please; if, by parting with them, you have a mind to purchase apathy, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, do not come hither; do not, like children, be one while a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Cæsar's officers. These things are not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must cultivate either your own ruling faculty or externals, and apply yourself either to things within or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the vulgar.[6]

CHAPTER XVI

THAT CAUTION IS NECESSARY IN CONDESCENSION AND COMPLAISANCE

§ 1. He who frequently converses with others, either in discourse or entertainments, or in any familiar way of living, must necessarily either become like his companions, or bring them over to his own way. For, if a dead coal be applied to a live one, either the first will quench the last, or the last kindle the first. Since, then, the danger is so great, caution must be used in entering into these familiarities with the vulgar; remembering that it is impossible to touch a chimney-sweeper without being partaker of his soot. For what will you do, if you are to talk of gladiators, of horses, of wrestlers, and, what is worse, of

men? "Such a one is good, another bad; this was well, that ill done." Besides, what if any one should sneer or ridicule, or be ill-natured? Is any of you prepared like a harper, who, when he takes his harp and tries the strings, finds out which notes are discordant, and knows how to put the instrument in tune? Hath any of you such a faculty as Socrates had, who, in every conversation, could bring his companions to his own purpose? Whence should you have it? You must therefore be carried along by the vulgar. And why are they more powerful than you? Because they utter their corrupt discourses from principle, and you your good ones only from your lips. Hence they are without strength or life; and it would turn one's stomach to hear your exhortations and poor miserable virtue celebrated up hill and down. Thus it is that the vulgar get the better of you; for principle is always strong, always invincible. Therefore, before these good opinions are fixed in you, and you have acquired some faculty for your security, I advise you to be cautious in your familiarity with the vulgar; otherwise, if you have any impressions made on you in the schools, they will melt away daily, like wax before the sun. Get away, then, far from the sun, while you have these waxen opinions.

§ 2. It is for this reason that the philosophers advise us to leave our country; because inveterate manners draw the mind aside, and prevent the beginning of a new habit. We cannot bear those who meet us to say, "Hey-day! such a one is turned philosopher, who was so-and-so." Thus physicians send patients with lingering distempers to another place, and another air; and they do right. Do you too import other manners, instead of those you carry out. Fix your opinions, and exercise yourselves in them. No, but from hence to the theatre, to the gladiators, to the walks, to the circus; then hither again, then back again, just the same persons all the while. No good habit, no attention, no animadversion upon ourselves. No observation what use we make of the appearances presented to our minds, whether it be conformable or contrary to nature; whether we answer them right or wrong;[1] whether we say to things independent on choice, "You are nothing to me." If this be not[2] yet your case, fly from your former habits; fly from the vulgar, if you would ever begin to be anything.

CHAPTER XVII

OF PROVIDENCE

§ 1. WHENEVER you lay anything to the charge of Providence, do but reflect, and you will find that it hath happened agreeably to reason.

Well, but a dishonest man hath the advantage.

In what?

In money.

Why, he is better qualified for it[1] than you; because he flatters, he throws away shame, he keeps awake; and where is the wonder? But look whether he hath the advantage of you in fidelity or in honour. You will find he hath not; but that wherever it is best for you to have the advantage of him, there you have it. I once said to one who was full of indignation at the good fortune of Philostorgus, "Why, would you be willing to sleep with Sura?"[2] Heaven forbid, said he, that day should ever come! Why, then, are you angry, that he is paid for what he sells; or how can you call him happy, in possessions acquired by means which you detest? Or what harm doth providence do, in giving the best things to the best men? Is it not better to have a sense of honour, than to be rich?—Granted. Why, then, are you angry, man, if you have what is best? Always remember, then, and have it ready, that a better man hath the advantage of a worse in that instance in which he is better, and you will never have any indignation.

But my wife treats me ill.

Well, if you are asked what is the matter, answer, "My wife treats me ill."

Nothing more?

Nothing.

My father gives me nothing.—What is the matter?—My father gives me nothing. To denominate this an evil, some external and false addition must be made. We are not therefore to get rid of Poverty; but of our principle concerning it, and we shall do well.

When Galba was killed, somebody said to Rufus, "Now, indeed, the world is governed by Providence." I never thought, answered Rufus, of bringing the slightest proof that the world was governed by Providence, from Galba.

CHAPTER XVIII

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ALARMED BY ANY NEWS THAT IS BROUGHT US

§ 1. When any alarming news is brought you, always have it at hand that no news can be brought you concerning what is in your own choice. Can any one bring you news that your opinions or desires are ill conducted? By no means; but that somebody is dead. What is that to you, then? That somebody speaks ill of you. And what is that to you, then? That your father is forming some contrivance or other. Against what? Against your choice? How can he? Well, but against your body, against your estate? You are very safe; this is not against you. But the judge hath pronounced you guilty of impiety. And did not the judges pronounce the same of Socrates? Is his pronouncing a sentence any business of yours? No. Then why do you any longer trouble yourself about it? There is a duty incumbent on your father, which, unless he performs, he loses the character of a father, of natural affection, of tenderness. Do not want him to lose anything else by this, for no person is ever guilty in one instance, and a sufferer in another. Your duty, on the other hand, is to make your defence with constancy, modesty, and mildness; otherwise you lose the character of filial piety, of modesty, and generosity of mind. Well, and is your judge free from danger? No. He runs an equal hazard. Why, then, are you still afraid of his decision? What have you to do with the evil of another? Making a bad defence would be your own evil. Let it be your only care to avoid that; but whether sentence is passed on you or not, as it is the business, so it is the evil, of another. "Such a one threatens you."—Me? No. "He censures you."—Let him look to it, how he doth his own business. "He will give an unjust sentence against you."—Poor wretch!

CHAPTER XIX

WHAT IS THE CONDITION OF THE VULGAR, AND WHAT OF A PHILOSOPHER

§ 1. The first difference between one of the vulgar and a philosopher is this: the one says, I am undone on the account of my child, my brother, my father; but the other, if ever he be obliged to say, I am undone! reflects, and adds, On account of myself. For choice cannot be restrained or hurt by anything to which choice doth not extend, but only by itself. If, therefore, we always would incline this way, and, whenever we are unsuccessful, would lay the fault on ourselves, and remember that there is no cause of perturbation and inconstancy but principle, I engage we should make some proficiency. But we set out in a very different way, from the very beginning. In infancy, for example, if we happen to stumble, our nurse doth not chide us, but beats the stone. Why, what harm hath the stone done? Was it to move out of its place for the folly of your child? Again, if we do not find something to eat when we come out of the bath, our governor doth not try to moderate our appetite, but beats the cook. Why, did we appoint you governor of the cook, man? No, but of our child. It is he whom you are to correct and improve. By these means, even when we are grown up, we appear children. For an unmusical person is a child in music; an illiterate person, a child in learning; and an untaught one, a child in life.

CHAPTER XX

THAT SOME ADVANTAGE MAY BE GAINED FROM EVERY EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCE

§ 1. In appearances that are merely objects of contemplation, almost all persons have allowed good and evil to be in ourselves, and not in externals. No one says, It is good to be day, evil to be night, and the greatest evil that three should be four; but what? That knowledge is good, and error evil. So that, concerning falsehood itself, there exists one good thing,[1] the

knowledge that it is falsehood. Thus then should it be in life also. Health is a good, sickness an evil. No, sir. But what? A right use of health is a good, a wrong one an evil. So that, in truth, it is possible to be a gainer even by sickness. And is it not possible by death too? By mutilation? Do you think Menœceus [2] an inconsiderable gainer by death? — "May whoever talks thus be such a gainer as he was!"—Why, pray, sir, did not he preserve his patriotism, his magnanimity, his fidelity, his gallant spirit? And, if he had lived on, would he not have lost all these? Would not cowardice, mean-spiritedness, and hatred of his country, and a wretched love of life, have been his portion? Well, now, do not you think him a considerable gainer by dying? No; but, I warrant you, the father of Admetus [3] was a great gainer, by living on in so mean-spirited and wretched a way as he did! Why, did not he die at last? For heaven's sake, cease to be thus struck by the mere materials [of action]. Cease to make yourselves slaves, first of things, and then upon their account, of the men who have the power either to bestow or take them away. Is there any advantage then to be gained from these men? From all, even from a reviler. What advantage doth a wrestler gain from him with whom he exercises himself, before the combat? The greatest. Why, just in the same manner I exercise myself with this man. [4] He exercises me in patience, in gentleness, in meekness. No; but I suppose I gain an advantage from him who manages my neck, and sets my back and shoulders in order; and the best thing a master of exercise can say is, "Lift him up with both hands," and the heavier he is, the greater is my advantage; and yet, it is no advantage to me when I am exercised in gentleness of temper! This is not knowing how to gain an advantage from men. Is my neighbour a bad one? He is so to himself; but a good one to me. He exercises my good temper, my moderation. Is my father bad? To himself, but not to me. "This is the rod of Hermes. Touch with it whatever you please, and it will become gold." No; but bring whatever you please, and I will turn it into good. Bring sickness, death, want, reproach, capital trial. All these, by the rod of Hermes, shall turn to advantage. "What will you make of death?" —Why, what but an ornament to you; what but a means of your showing, by action,[5] what the man is who knows and follows the will of nature. "What will you make of sickness?" —I will show its nature. I will make a good figure in it; I will be composed and happy. I will not flatter my physician.

I will not wish to die. What need you ask further? Whatever you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, respectable, and eligible. No.—"But, take care not to be sick." Just as if one should say, "Take care that the appearance of three being four doth not present itself to you." "It is an evil." How an evil, man? If I think as I ought about it, what hurt will it any longer do me? Will it not rather be even an advantage to me? If then, I think as I ought of poverty, of sickness, of being out of power, is not that enough for me? Why, then, must I any longer seek good or evil in externals? But what is the state of the case? These things are allowed here, but nobody carries them home, but immediately every one is in a state of war with his servant, his neighbours, with those who sneer and ridicule him. Well fare Lesbius,[6] for proving every day that I know nothing.

CHAPTER XXI

CONCERNING THOSE WHO READILY SET UP FOR SOPHISTS

§ 1. [1] THEY who have received bare propositions are presently inclined to throw them up, as a sick stomach doth its food. First concoct it, and then you will not throw it up; otherwise it will be crude and impure and unfit for nourishment. But show us, from what you have digested, some change in your ruling faculty; as wrestlers do in their shoulders, from their exercise and their diet; as artificers in their skill, from what they have learnt. A carpenter doth not come and say, "Hear me discourse on the art of building"; but he hires a house and fits it up and shows himself master of his trade. Let it be your business likewise to do something like this: eat like a man; drink, dress, marry, have children, perform the duty of a citizen; bear reproach; bear with an unreasonable brother; bear with a father; bear with a son, a neighbour, a companion, as becomes a man. Show us these things that we may see that you have really learnt somewhat from the philosophers. No; "But come and hear me repeat commentaries." Get you gone, and seek somebody else to throw them out upon. "Nay, but I will explain the doctrines of Chrysippus to you, so as no other person can; I will elucidate his diction in the clearest manner." And is it for this, then, that young men leave their country and

their own parents, that they may come and hear you explain words? Ought they not to return patient, active, free from passion, free from perturbation; furnished with such a provision for life that, setting out with it, they will be able to bear all events well, and derive ornament from them? But how should you impart what you have not? For have you yourself done anything else from the beginning but spent your time in solving syllogisms and convertible propositions and interrogatory arguments? "But such a one hath a school, and why should not I have one?"—Wretch, these things are not effected in a careless and fortuitous manner. But there must be age and a method of life and a guiding God. Is it not so? No one quits the port or sets sail till he hath sacrificed to the gods, and implored their assistance; nor do men sow without first invoking Ceres. And shall any one who hath undertaken so great a work undertake it safely without the gods? And shall they, who apply to such a one, apply to him with success? What are you doing else, man, but divulging the mysteries? And you say, "There is a temple at Eleusis, and here is one too. There is a priest,[2] and I will make a priest here; there is a herald, and I will appoint a herald too; there is a torch-bearer, and I will have a torch-bearer; there are torches, and so shall there be here. The words said, the things done are the same. Where is the difference betwixt one and the other?" Most impious man! is there no difference? Are these things of use out of place, and out of time? A man should come with sacrifices and prayers, previously purified, and his mind affected with a sense that he is approaching to sacred and ancient rites. Thus the mysteries become useful; thus we come to have an idea that all these things were appointed by the ancients for the instruction and correction of life. But you divulge and publish them, without regard to time and place, without sacrifices, without purity; you have not the garment that is necessary for a priest, nor the hair or the girdle[3] that is necessary; nor the voice, nor the age; nor have you purified yourself like him. But, when you have got the words by heart, you say, "The words are sacred of themselves." These things are to be approached in another manner. It is a great, it is a mystical affair; not given by chance, or to everyone indifferently. Nay, mere wisdom, perhaps, is not a sufficient qualification for the care of youth. There ought to be likewise a certain readiness and aptitude for this, and, indeed, a particular constitution of body; and, above all, a counsel from God to undertake this

office, as he counselled Socrates to undertake the office of confutation; Diogenes, that of authoritative reproof; Zeno, that of dogmatical instruction. But you set up for a physician, provided with nothing but medicines, and without knowing, or having studied, where or how they are to be applied. "Why, such a one had medicines for the eyes, and I have the same." Have you, then, a faculty too of making use of them? Do you at all know when and how and to whom they will be of service? Why, then, do you act at hazard? Why are you careless in things of the greatest importance? Why do you attempt a matter unsuitable to you? Leave it to those who can perform it, and do it honour. Do not you, too, bring a scandal upon philosophy by your means, nor be one of those who cause the thing itself to be culumniated. But, if theorems delight you, sit quiet, and turn them every way by yourself; but never call yourself a philosopher, nor suffer another to call you so; but say, "He is mistaken; for my desires are not different from what they were; nor my pursuits directed to other objects; nor my assent otherwise given; nor have I at all made any change in the use of the appearances, from my former condition." Think and speak thus of yourself, if you would think as you ought; if not, act at all hazards, and do as you do, for it becomes you.

CHAPTER XXII

OF THE CYNIC PHILOSOPHY [1]

§ 1. When one of his scholars, who seemed inclined to the Cynic philosophy, asked him what a Cynic must be, and what was the general plan of that sect? Let us examine it, says he, at our leisure. But thus much I can tell you now, that he who attempts so great an affair without God,[2] is an object of divine wrath, and would only bring public dishonour upon himself. For, in a well-regulated house, no one comes and says to himself, "I ought to be the manager here." If he doth, and the master [3] returns and sees him insolently giving orders, he drags him out and hath him whipped. Such is the case likewise in this great city [of the world]. For here, too, is a master of the family, who orders everything. "You are the sun: you can, by making a circuit, form the year and the seasons, and increase and

nourish the fruits; raise and calm the winds, and give a moderate warmth to the bodies of men. Go; make your circuit, and thus intimately move everything from the greatest to the least. You are a calf; when the lion appears, do your part,[4] or you will suffer for it. You are a bull; come and fight, for that is incumbent on you, and becomes you, and you can do it. You can lead an army to Troy; be you Agamemnon. You can engage in single combat with Hector; be you Achilles." But, if Thersites had come and claimed the command, either he would not have obtained it, or, if he had, he would have disgraced himself before the more witnesses.

§ 2. Do you, too, carefully deliberate upon this matter; it is not what you think it. "I wear an old cloak now, and I shall have one then. I sleep upon the hard ground now, and I shall sleep so then. I will moreover take a wallet and a staff and go about, and will beg of those I meet, and begin by abusing[5] them; and, if I see any one using means to take off the hair from his face or body, or setting his curls, or walking in purple, I will rebuke him." If you imagine this to be the thing, avaunt; come not near it; it doth not belong to you. But, if you imagine it to be what it really is, and do not think yourself unworthy of it, consider how great a thing you undertake. First, with regard to yourself: you must no longer, in any instance, appear like what you do now. You must accuse neither God nor man. You must totally suppress desire, and must transfer aversion to such things only as are dependent on choice. You must have neither anger, nor resentment, nor envy, nor pity. Neither boy, nor girl, nor fame, nor delicacies in eating must have charms for you. For you must know that other men indeed fence themselves with walls and houses and darkness when they do anything of this kind, and have many concealments; a man shuts the door, places somebody before the apartment; "Say, He is gone out; say, He is not at leisure." But the Cynic, instead of all this, must fence himself with virtuous shame; otherwise he will act indecently, naked, and in the open air. This is his house; this his door; this his porter; this his darkness. He must not wish to conceal anything relating to himself; for, if he doth, he is gone; he hath lost the Cynic, the open, the free character; he hath begun to fear something external; he hath begun to need a concealment, nor can he get it when he will. For where shall he conceal himself, or how? For if this tutor, this pedagogue of the public, should happen to slip, what must he suffer? Can he, then, who dreads these

things be thoroughly bold within and prescribe to other men? Impracticable, impossible.

§ 3. In the first place, then, you must purify your own ruling faculty, conformably [6] to this method of life. Now, the subject-matter for me to work upon is my own mind, as wood is for a carpenter or leather for a shoemaker; and my business is, a right use of the appearances of things. But body is nothing to me; its parts nothing to me. Let death come when it will, either of the whole or of a part. "Go into exile." And whither? Can any one turn me out of the world? He cannot. But wherever I go, there is the sun, the moon, the stars, dreams, auguries, communication with God. And even this preparation is by no means sufficient for a true Cynic. But it must further be known that he is a messenger sent from Jupiter to men concerning good and evil; to show them that they are mistaken, and seek the essence of good and evil where it is not, but do not observe it where it is; that he is a spy, like Diogenes, when he was brought to Philip after the battle of Chæronea.[7] For, in effect, a Cynic is a spy to discover what things are friendly, what hostile, to man; and he must, after making an accurate observation, come and tell them the truth; not be struck with terror, so as to point out to them enemies where there are none; nor, in any other instance, disconcerted or confounded by appearances.

§ 4. He must then, if it should so happen, be able to lift up his voice, come upon the stage, and say, like Socrates, "O mortals, whither are you hurrying? What are you about? Why do you tumble up and down, wretches, like blind men? You are going a wrong way, and have forsaken the right. You seek prosperity and happiness [8] in a wrong place, where it is not; nor do you give credit to another who shows you where it is. Why do you seek it without? It is not in body: if you do not believe me, look upon Myro,[9] look upon Ofellius. It is not in wealth: if you do not believe me, look upon Crœsus, look upon the rich of the present age, how full of lamentation their life is. It is not in power; for, otherwise, they who have been twice and thrice consuls must be happy, but they are not. To whom shall we give credit in this affair? To you who look only upon the externals of their condition, and are dazzled by appearances, or to themselves? What do they say? Hear them when they groan, when they sigh, when they think themselves more wretched and in more danger from these very consulships, this glory and splendour. It is not in empire; otherwise

Nero and Sardanapalus had been happy. But not even Agamemnon was happy, though a better man than Sardanapalus or Nero. But, when others are snoring, what is he doing?"

"He rends his hairs . . ."

And what doth he say himself?

"Scarce can my knees these trembling limbs sustain,
And scarce my heart support its load of pain."—POPE.

Why, which of your affairs goes ill, poor wretch? Your possessions? No. Your body? No. But you have gold and brass in abundance. What, then, goes ill? That part of you, whatever it be called, is neglected and corrupted by which we desire and are averse, by which we pursue and avoid.—How neglected?—It is ignorant of that for which it was naturally formed, of the essence of good, and of the essence of evil. It is ignorant what is its own, and what another's. And, when anything belonging to others goes ill, it says, "I am undone, the Greeks are in danger!" (Poor ruling faculty! which alone is neglected and hath no care taken of it.) "They will die by the sword of the Trojans!"—And, if the Trojans should not kill them, will they not die?—"Yes, but not all at once."—Why, where is the difference? For, if it be an evil to die, whether it be all at once or singly, it is equally an evil. Will anything more happen than the separation of soul and body?[10]—"Nothing."—And, when the Greeks perish, is the door shut against you? Is it not in your own power to die?—"It is."—Why, then, do you lament while you are a king and hold the sceptre of Jove? A king is no more to be made unfortunate than a god. What are you, then? You are a shepherd,[11] truly so called; for you weep, just as shepherds do when the wolf seizes any of their sheep, and they who are governed by you are mere sheep. But why did you come hither? Was your desire in any danger? Your aversion? Your pursuits? Your avoidances? "No," says he, "but my brother's wife hath been stolen."—Is it not great good luck then to be rid of a sorry adulterous wife?—"But must we be held in contempt by the Trojans?" What are they? Wise men or fools? If wise, why do you go to war with them? If fools, why do you mind them?

§ 5. Where, then, doth our good lie, since it doth not lie in these things? Tell us, sir, you who are our messenger and spy.—Where you do not think, nor are willing to seek it. For, if

you were willing, you would find it in yourselves; nor would you wander abroad, nor seek what belongs to others, as your own. Turn your thoughts into yourselves. Consider the preconceptions which you have. What do you imagine good to be? —What is prosperous, happy, unhindered.—Well, and do not you naturally imagine it great? Do not you imagine it valuable? Do not you imagine it incapable of being hurt? In what materials, then, must you seek prosperity and exemption from hindrance? In that which is enslaved, or free?—In the free.—Is your body, then, enslaved or free?—We do not know. —Do not you know that it is the slave of fever, gout, defluxion, dysentery; of a tyrant; of fire, steel; of everything stronger than itself?—Yes, it is a slave.—How, then, can anything belonging to the body be unhindered? And how can that be great, or valuable, which is by nature lifeless, earth, clay? What then, have you nothing free?—Possibly nothing.—Why, who can compel you to assent to what appears false?—No one.—Or who, not to assent to what appears true?—No one.—Here, then, you see that there is something in you, by nature, free. But who of you can desire or be averse, or use his active powers of pursuit or avoidance, or concert, or purpose, unless he hath been impressed by an appearance of its being for his advantage or his duty?—No one.—You have, then, in these too, something unrestrained and free. Cultivate this, wretches; take care of this, seek for good here.—" But how is it possible that a man worth nothing, naked, without house or home, squalid, unattended, who belongs to no country, can lead a prosperous life?" —See, God hath sent us one to show, in fact, that it is possible.[12] " Take notice of me, that I am without a country, without a house, without an estate, without a servant; I lie on the ground; no wife, no children, no coat,[13] but only earth and heaven and one sorry cloak. And what do I want? Am not I without sorrow, without fear? Am not I free? Did any of you ever see me disappointed of my desires, or incurring my aversion? Did I ever blame God or man? Did I ever accuse any one? Hath any of you seen me look discontented? How do I treat those whom you fear, and of whom you are struck with awe? Is it not like sorry slaves? What that sees me doth not think that he sees his own king and master?" This is the language, this the character, this the undertaking, of a Cynic. No, I warrant you, but the wallet and the staff and the great jaws; swallowing or treasuring up whatever is given you, abusing unseasonably those you meet, or showing a brawny arm. Do

you consider how you shall attempt so important an affair? First take a mirror. View your shoulders, examine your back, your thighs. You are going to be enrolled a combatant at the Olympic games, man; not in a poor, slight contest. In the Olympic games, a champion is not allowed merely to be conquered and depart, but must first be disgraced in the view of the whole world, not only of the Athenians or Spartans or Nicopolitans; and then he who hath rashly departed must be whipped too, and, before that, must suffer thirst and heat, and swallow an abundance of dust.

§ 6. Consider carefully, know yourself, consult the divinity, attempt nothing without God; for, if he counsels you, be assured that it is his will that you should be a great man, or [which comes to the same thing] suffer many a blow. For there is this very fine circumstance connected with the character of a Cynic, that he must be beat like an ass, and, when he is beat, must love those who beat him, as the father, as the brother of all.[14] No, to be sure; but, if anybody beats you, stand publicly and roar out, "O Cæsar, am I to suffer such things in breach of your peace? Let us go before the proconsul."—But what is Cæsar to a Cynic, or what is the proconsul, or any one else, but Jupiter? who hath deputed him, and whom he serves. Doth he invoke any other but him? And is he not persuaded, that whatever he suffers of this sort, it is Jupiter who doth it to exercise him? Now, Hercules, when he was exercised by Eurystheus, did not think himself miserable, but executed with alacrity all that was to be done. And shall he who is appointed to the combat, and exercised by Jupiter, cry out and take offence at things? A worthy person, truly, to bear the sceptre of Diogenes! Hear what he, in a fever, said to those who were passing by.[15] "Sorry wretches, why do not you stay? Do you take such a journey to Olympia, to see the destruction or combat of the champions; and have you no inclination to see the combat between a man and a fever?" Such a one, who took a pride in difficult circumstances, and thought himself worthy to be a spectacle to those who passed by, was a likely person, indeed, to accuse God, who had deputed him, as treating him unworthily! For what subject of accusation shall he find? That he preserves a decency of behaviour? With what doth he find fault? That he sets his own virtue in a clearer light?—Well, and what doth he say of poverty? of death? of pain? How did he compare his happiness with that of the Persian king; or, rather, thought it beyond comparison? For,

amidst perturbations and griefs and fears, and disappointed desires and incurred aversions, how can there be any entrance for happiness? And, where there are corrupt principles, there must all these things necessarily be.

§ 7. The same young man inquiring whether, if a friend should be willing to come to him and take care of him when he is sick, he should comply? And where, says Epictetus, will you find me the friend of a Cynic? For to be worthy of being numbered among his friends, a person ought to be such another as himself; he ought to be a partner of the sceptre and the kingdom, and a worthy minister, if he would be honoured with his friendship, as Diogenes was the friend of Antisthenes, as Crates of Diogenes. Do you think that he who only comes to him and salutes him is his friend, and that he will think him worthy of being entertained as such? If such a thought comes into your head, rather look round you for some clever dunghill, to shelter you in your fever from the north wind, that you may not perish by taking cold. But you seem to me to want only to get into somebody's house, and to be well fed there a while. What business have you, then, even to attempt so important an affair as this?

§ 8. But (said the young man) will a Cynic engage himself in marriage, and the production of children, as a principal point?[16]

If you will allow me a republic of sages, no one there, perhaps, will readily apply himself to the Cynic philosophy. For on whose account should he embrace that method of life? However, suppose he doth, there will be nothing to restrain him from marrying and having children. For his wife will be such another as himself, his father-in-law such another as himself, and his children will be brought up in the same manner. But as the state of things now is like that of an army prepared for battle, is it not necessary that a Cynic should be without distraction;[17] entirely attentive to the service of God; at liberty to walk about among mankind; not tied down to vulgar duties, nor entangled in relations which, if he transgresses, he will no longer keep the character of a wise and good man; and which, if he observes, there is an end of him as the messenger and spy and herald of the gods? For, consider, there are some offices due to his father-in-law, some to the other relations of his wife, some to his wife herself; besides, after this, he is confined[18] to the care of his family when sick, and making provision for their support. Not to speak of other things, he must have a vessel to warm water in, to bathe his child. There must be

wool, oil, a bed, a cup for his wife, after her delivery; and thus the furniture increases: more business, more distraction. Where for the future is this king, whose time is devoted to the public good?

"To whom its safety a whole people owes."

Who ought to oversee others, married men, fathers of children; to observe who treats his wife well, who ill; who quarrels; which family is well regulated, which not: like a physician, who goes about and feels the pulse of his patients; "You have a fever, you the headache, you the gout. Do you abstain from food,[19] do you eat, do you omit bathing, you must have an incision made, you be cauterised." Where shall he have leisure for this, who is tied down to vulgar duties? Must not he provide clothes for his children, and send them with pens and ink and paper to a schoolmaster? Must not he provide a bed for them? (For they cannot be Cynics from their very birth.) Otherwise, it would have been better to expose them as soon as they were born than to kill them thus. Do you see to what we bring down our Cynic? How we deprive him of his kingdom?—"Well, but Crates[20] was married." The cause of which you speak was a particular one, arising from love, and the woman another Crates. But we are inquiring about ordinary and common[21] marriages, and in this inquiry we do not find the affair mightily suited to the condition of a Cynic.

§ 9. How, then, shall he keep up society?

For heaven's sake, do they confer a greater benefit upon the world who leave two or three snivelling children in their stead, than those who as far as possible oversee all mankind; what they do, how they live, what they attend to, what they neglect, contrary to their duty? Did all they who left children to the Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas who died childless? And did Priam, who was the father of fifty profligates, or Danaus,[22] or Æolus, conduce more to the advantage of society than Homer? Shall a military command or any other post, then, exempt a man from marrying and becoming a father, so that he shall be thought to have made sufficient amends for the want of children; and shall not the kingdom of a Cynic be a proper compensation for it? Perhaps we do not understand his grandeur, nor duly represent to ourselves the character of Diogenes; but consider Cynics as they are now, who stand like dogs watching at tables, and who imitate the

others in nothing, unless perhaps in breaking wind, but absolutely in nothing besides, else this [which you have objected] would not move us, nor should we be astonished that a Cynic will not marry nor have children. Consider, sir, that he is the father of humankind, that all men are his sons, and all women his daughters. Thus he attends, thus takes care of all. What! do you think it is from impertinence that he rebukes those he meets? He doth it as a father, as a brother, as a minister of the common parent, Jove.

§ 10. Ask me if you please, too, whether a Cynic will engage in the administration of the commonwealth. What commonwealth do you inquire after, blockhead, greater than what he administers? Whether he will harangue among the Athenians about revenues and taxes, whose business it is to debate with all mankind; with the Athenians, Corinthians, and Romans equally, not about taxes and revenues, or peace and war, but about happiness and misery, prosperity and adversity, slavery and freedom. Do you ask me whether a man engages in the administration of the commonwealth who administers such a commonwealth as this? Ask me, too, whether he will accept any command? I will answer you again, what command, fool, greater than that which he now exercises?

§ 11. A Cynic, however, hath need of a constitution duly qualified; for, if he should appear consumptive, thin, and pale, his testimony hath no longer the same authority. For he must not only give a proof to the vulgar, by the constancy of his mind, that it is possible to be a man of figure and merit without those things that strike them with admiration; but he must show too, by his body, that a simple and slender diet under the open air doth no injury to the constitution. "See, I and my body are a witness of this." As Diogenes did; for he went about fresh and plump, and gained the attention of the many by the very appearance of a healthy body. But a pitiable Cynic seems a mere beggar; all avoid him, all are offended at him; for he ought not to appear slovenly, so as to drive people from him; but even his rough negligence should be neat and engaging.

§ 12. Much natural agreeableness and acuteness are likewise necessary in a Cynic (otherwise he becomes a mere driveller, and nothing else), that he may be able to give an answer readily and pertinently upon every occasion. Like Diogenes to one who asked him: "Are you that Diogenes who do not believe there are any gods?" "How so," replied he, "when I think

you odious to them?" Again, when Alexander surprised him sleeping, and repeated,

> "To waste long nights in indolent repose
> Ill fits a chief, who mighty nations guides,"

before he was quite awake he answered,

> "Directs in council, and in war presides."
> POPE'S *Homer*. B. ii. v. 27.

§ 13. But above all, the ruling faculty of a Cynic must be purer than the sun, otherwise he must necessarily be a common cheat, and a rascal, if, while he is guilty of some vice himself, he reproves others. For, consider how the case stands. Arms and guards give a power to common kings and tyrants of reproving and of punishing delinquents, though they are wicked themselves; but to a Cynic, instead of arms and guards, conscience gives this power, when he knows that he hath watched and laboured for mankind; that he hath slept pure, and waked still purer; and that he hath regulated all his thoughts as the friend, as the minister of the gods, as a partner of the empire of Jupiter; that he is ready to say upon all occasions,

> "Conduct me, Jove; and thou, O Destiny."

And, "If it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be." Why should he not dare to speak boldly to his own brethren, to his children; in a word, to his kindred? Hence he who is thus qualified is neither impertinent nor a busybody, for he is not busied about the affairs of others, but his own, when he oversees the transactions of men. Otherwise say that a general is a busybody when he oversees, examines, and watches his soldiers, and punishes the disorderly. But if you reprove others at the very time that you have a cake under your own arm, I will ask you: Had you not better, sir, go into a corner and eat up what you have stolen? But what have you to do with the concerns of others? For what are you? Are you the bull in the herd, or the queen of the bees? Show me such ensigns of empire as she hath from nature. But, if you are a drone, and arrogate to yourself the kingdom of the bees, do not you think that your fellow-citizens will drive you out, just as the bees do the drones?

§ 14. A Cynic must besides have so much patience as to seem insensible and a stone to the vulgar. No one reviles, no one beats, no one affronts him; but he hath surrendered his body to be treated at pleasure by any one who will. For he remembers that the inferior, in whatever instance it is the inferior, must be

conquered by the superior, and the body is inferior to the multitude, the weaker to the stronger. He never therefore enters into a combat where he can be conquered, but immediately gives up what belongs to others; he doth not claim what is slavish and dependent; but, where choice and the use of the Appearances are concerned, you will see that he hath so many eyes, you would say Argos was blind to him. Is his assent ever precipitate? His pursuits ever rash? His desire ever disappointed? His aversion ever incurred? His intention ever fruitless? Is he ever querulous, ever dejected, ever envious? Here lies all his attention and application. With regard to other things, he snores supine. All is peace. There is no robber, no tyrant of the choice.—But of the body?—Yes. The estate?—Yes. Magistracies and honours?—Yes. And what doth he care for these? When any one therefore would frighten him with them, he says, "Go, look for children, vizards are frightful to them; but I know they are only shell, and have nothing within side."

§ 15. Such is the affair about which you are deliberating; therefore, if you please, for heaven's sake defer it; and first consider how you are prepared for it. Mind what Hector says to Andromache:

> "No more—but hasten to thy tasks at home,
> There guide the spindle, and direct the loom.
> Me, glory summons to the martial scene,
> The field of combat is the sphere for men."
>
> POPE'S *Homer*.

Thus conscious he was of his own qualifications and of her weakness.

CHAPTER XXIII

CONCERNING SUCH AS READ AND DISPUTE OSTENTATIOUSLY

§ 1. FIRST say to yourself what you would be, and then do what you have to do. For in almost everything else we see this to be the practice. Olympic champions first determine what they would be, and then act accordingly. To a racer in a longer course there must be one kind of diet, walking, anointing, and exercise; to one in a shorter all these must be different, and to a pentathlete [1] still more different. You will find the case the

same in the manual arts. If a carpenter, you must have such and such things; if a smith, such other. For, if we do not refer each of our actions to some end we shall act at random; if to an improper one we shall miss our aim. Further, there is a general and a particular end. First, to act as a man. What is comprehended in this? Not to be, though gentle, like a sheep; nor mischievous like a wild beast. But the particular end relates to the study and choice of each individual. A harper is to act as a harper; a carpenter, as a carpenter; a philosopher, as a philosopher; an orator, as an orator. When therefore you say, "Come and hear me read," observe first, not to do this at random; and, in the next place, after you have found to what end you refer it, consider whether it be a proper one. Would you be useful, or be praised? You presently hear him say, "What, do I value the praise of the multitude?" And he says well, for this is nothing to a musician or a geometrician, as such. You would be useful, then. In what? Tell us, that we too may run to make part of your audience. Now, is it possible for any one to benefit others who hath received no benefit himself? No; for neither can he who is not a carpenter or a shoemaker benefit any in respect to those arts. Would you know, then, whether you have received benefit? Produce your principles, philosopher; what is the aim and promise of desire? Not to be disappointed. What of aversion? Not to be incurred. Come, do we fulfil this promise? Tell me the truth; but, if you falsify, I will tell it you. The other day, when your audience came but coldly together, and did not receive what you said with acclamations of applause, you went away dejected. Again, the other day, when you were praised, you went about asking everybody, "What did you think of me?"—"Upon my life, sir, it was prodigious."—"But how did I express myself upon that subject?"—"Which?"—"Where I gave a description of Pan and the nymphs." [2]—"Most excellently."—And do you tell me, after this, that you regulate your desires and aversions conformably to nature? Get you gone. Persuade somebody else. Did not you the other day praise a man contrary to your own opinion? Did not you flatter a certain senator? Would you wish your own children to be like him?—"Heaven forbid!"—"Why, then, did you praise and cajole him?"—"He is an ingenious young man, and attentive to discourses."—"How so?"—"He admires me."—Now, indeed, you have produced your proof. After all, what do you think? Do not these very people secretly despise you?

When therefore a man, conscious of no good action or intention, finds some philosopher saying, "You are a great genius, and of a frank and candid disposition," what do you think he says but, "This man hath some need of me"? Pray tell me what action of a great genius he hath shown. You see, he hath long conversed with you, hath heard your discourses, hath heard your lectures. Hath he turned his attention to himself? Hath he perceived his own faults? Hath he thrown off his conceit? Doth he seek an instructor?—Yes, he doth. An instructor how to live?—No, fool, but how to talk; for it is upon this account that he admires you. Hear what he says. "This man writes with very great art, and much more finely than Dion." [3] That is quite another thing. Doth he say, This is a modest, faithful, calm person? But, if he said this too, I would ask him, since he is faithful, What is it to be faithful? [4] And, if he could not tell, I would add, First learn the meaning of what you say, and then speak. While you are in this bad disposition, then, and gaping after applauders, and counting your hearers, would you be of benefit to others? "To-day I had many more hearers."—"Yes, many; we think there were five hundred."—You say nothing; make them a thousand.—"Dion never had so great an audience."—"How should he?"—"And they have a fine taste for discourses."—"What is excellent, sir, will move even a stone." Here is the language of a philosopher! Here is the disposition of one who is to be beneficial to mankind! Here is the man attentive to discourses! who hath read the works of the Socratic philosophers, as such; not as if they were the writings of orators, like Lysias and Isocrates. "I have often wondered by what arguments," [5] etc. No; "by what argument"; that is the more perfectly accurate expression. Is this to have read them any otherwise than as you read little pieces of poetry? If you read them as you ought, you would not dwell on such trifles, but would rather consider such a passage as this: "Anytus and Melitus may kill, but they cannot hurt me." And, "I am always so disposed as to regard none of my friends, but that reason which, after examination, appears to me to be the best." Hence, who ever heard Socrates say, "I know, or teach, anything"? But he sent different people to different instructors; so they came to him, desiring to be recommended to the philosophers; and he took and recommended them. No; but I warrant you, as he accompanied them, he used to give them such advice as this: "Hear me discourse to-day at the house of Quadratus." [6]—Why should I hear you? Have you

a mind to show me how finely you put words together, sir? And what good doth that do you? "But praise me."—What do you mean by praising you?—"Say, incomparable! prodigious!"—Well, I do say it. But, if praise be that which the philosophers call by the appellation of good, what have I to praise you for? If it be a good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you.—"What, then, ought these things to be heard without pleasure?"—By no means. I do not hear even a harper without pleasure; but am I therefore to stand playing upon the harp? Hear what Socrates says to his judges: "It would not be decent for me to appear before you, at this age, composing speeches like a boy." Like a boy, says he. For it is, without doubt, a pretty knack to choose out words and place them together, and then to read or speak them gracefully in public; and, in the midst of the discourse, to observe that "He vows by all that is good, there are but few capable of these things." But doth a philosopher apply to people to hear him? Doth not he attract those who are fitted to receive benefit from him, in the same manner as the sun or their necessary food doth? What physician applies to anybody to be cured by him? (Though now, indeed, I hear that the physicians at Rome apply for patients; but in my time they were applied to.) "I apply to you to come and hear that you are in a bad way; and that you take care of everything but what you ought; that you know not what is good or evil, and are unfortunate and unhappy." A fine application! And yet, unless the discourse of a philosopher hath this effect, both that and the speaker are void of life.[7] Rufus used to say, If you are at leisure to praise me, I speak to no purpose. And indeed he used to speak in such a manner that each of us who heard him supposed that some person had accused us to him; he so hit upon what was done by us, and placed the faults of every one before his eyes.

§ 2. The school of a philosopher is a surgery. You are not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain: for you come there not in health; but one of you hath a dislocated shoulder, another an abscess, a third a fistula, a fourth the headache. And am I, then, to sit uttering pretty trifling thoughts and little exclamations that, when you have praised me, you may each of you go away with the same dislocated shoulder, the same aching head, the same fistula, and the same abscess that you brought? And is it for this that young men are to travel? And do they leave their parents, their friends, their relations and their estates that they may praise you while you are uttering little exclama-

tions? Was this the practice of Socrates? Of Zeno? Of Cleanthes? "What then! is there not in speaking a style and manner of exhortation?"—Who denies it? Just as there is a manner of confutation and of instruction. But who ever, therefore, added that of ostentation for a fourth? For in what doth the exhortatory manner consist? In being able to show to one and all the contradictions in which they are involved, and that they care for everything rather than what they mean to care for; for they mean the things conducive to happiness, but they seek them where they are not to be found. To effect this must a thousand seats be placed, and an audience invited, and you, in a fine robe, or cloak, ascend the rostrum and describe the death of Achilles? Forbear, for heaven's sake, to bring, as far as you are able, good words and practices into disgrace. Nothing, to be sure, gives more force to exhortation than when the speaker shows that he hath need of the hearers! But tell me, who, when he hears you reading or speaking, is solicitous about himself? Or turns his attention upon himself? Or says, when he is gone away, "The philosopher hit me well"? Instead of this, even though you are in high vogue, is not all that one man says, "He spoke finely about Xerxes"?—"No," says another; "but on the battle of Thermopylæ." Is this the audience of a philosopher?

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE AFFECTED BY THINGS NOT IN OUR OWN POWER

§ 1. Let not what is contrary to nature in another be an evil to you; for you were not born to be depressed and unhappy along with others, but to be happy along with them. And if any one is unhappy, remember that he is so for himself; for God made all men to enjoy felicity and a settled good condition. He hath furnished all with means for this purpose, having given them some things for their own; others, not for their own. Whatever is subject to restraint, compulsion, or deprivation, not their own; whatever is not subject to restraint, their own. And the essence of good and evil he hath placed in things which

are our own, as it became him who provides for and protects us with paternal care.

But I have parted with such a one, and he is in grief.

And why did he esteem what belonged to another his own? Why did he not consider, while he was pleased with seeing you, that you are mortal, that you are subject to change your abode? Therefore he bears the punishment of his own folly. But to what purpose or for what cause do you too break [1] your spirits? Have not you, neither, studied these things? But, like trifling, silly women, considered the things you delighted in; the places, the persons, the conversations, as if they were to last for ever; and now sit crying because you do not see the same people, nor live in the same place? Indeed, you deserve to be so affected, and thus to become more wretched than ravens or crows; which, without groaning or longing for their former state, can fly where they will, build their nests in another place, and cross the seas.

Ay; but this happens from their want of reason.

Was reason then given us by the gods for the purpose of unhappiness and misery, to make us live wretched and lamenting? O, by all means, let every one be immortal! Let nobody go from home! Let us never go from home ourselves, but remain rooted to a spot like plants! And, if any of our acquaintance should quit his abode, let us sit and cry; and when he comes back, let us dance and clap our hands like children. Shall we never wean ourselves, and remember what we have heard from the philosophers (unless we have heard them only as juggling enchanters): that the world is one great city, and the substance one out of which it is formed; that there must necessarily be a certain rotation of things; that some must give way to others; some be dissolved, and others rise in their stead; some remain in the same situation, and others be moved; but that all is full of friendship, first of the gods, and then of men, by nature endeared to each other; that some must be separated, others live together, rejoicing in the present, and not grieving for the absent; and that man, besides a natural greatness of mind and contempt of things independent on choice, is likewise formed not to be rooted to the earth, but to go at different times to different places, sometimes on urgent occasions, and sometimes merely for the sake of observation. Such was the case of Ulysses, who

> "Wandering from clime to clime observant strayed,
> Their manners noted, and their states surveyed."
>
> POPE'S *Odyssey*, I.

And yet, before him, of Hercules, to travel over the world,

> "Just and unjust recording in his mind,
> And, with sure eyes, inspecting all mankind."
> POPE'S *Odyssey*, XVII. 580.

To expel and clear away the one, and, in its stead, to introduce the other. Yet how many friends do you think he must have at Thebes? How many at Argos? How many at Athens? And how many did he acquire in his travels? He married too when he thought it a proper time, and became a father, and then quitted his children; not lamenting and longing for them, nor as if he had left them orphans; for he knew that no human creature is an orphan, but that there is a father who always, and without intermission, takes care of all. For he had not merely heard it, as matter of talk, that Jupiter was the father of mankind; but he esteemed and called him his own father, and performed all that he did with a view to him. Hence, he was in every place able to live happy. But it is never possible to make happiness consistent with a desire of what is not present. For what is happy must have all it wishes for;[2] must resemble a person satisfied with food; there must be no thirst, no hunger.

But Ulysses longed for his wife, and sat crying on a rock.

Why, do you mind Homer and his fables in everything? Or, if Ulysses really did cry, what was he but a wretched man? But what wise and good man is wretched? The universe is surely but ill governed, unless Jupiter takes care that his subjects may be happy like himself. But these are unlawful and profane thoughts; and Ulysses, if he did indeed cry and bewail himself, was not a good man. For who can be a good man who doth not know what he is? And who knows this and forgets that all things made are perishable, and that it is not possible for man and man always to live together? What then? To desire impossibilities is base and foolish: it is the behaviour of a stranger[3] [to the world]; of one who fights against God the only way he can—by his principles.

But my mother grieves when she doth not see me.

And why hath not she learnt these doctrines? I do not say that care ought not to be taken that she may not lament; but that we are not to wish absolutely what is not in our own power. Now, the grief of another is not in our power; but my own grief is. I will, therefore, absolutely suppress my own, for that is in my power; and I will endeavour to suppress another's grief as far as I am able: but I will not endeavour it absolutely,

otherwise I shall fight against God; I shall resist Jupiter, and oppose him in the administration of the universe. And not only my children's children [4] will bear the punishment of this disobedience and fighting against God, but I myself too; starting, and full of perturbation, both in the day-time and in my dreams by night; trembling at every message, and having my enjoyment [5] dependent on the intelligence of others. "Somebody is come from Rome." "No harm, I hope." Why, what harm can happen to you where you are not?—"From Greece." "No harm, I hope." Why, at this rate, every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate where you are, but it must be beyond sea, too, and by letters? Such is the security of your condition!

But what if my friends there should be dead?

What, indeed, but that those are dead who were born to die. Do you at once wish to live to be old, and yet not to see the death of any one you love? Do not you know that, in a long course of time, many and various events must necessarily happen? That a fever must get the better of one, a highwayman of another, a tyrant of a third? For such is the world we live in; such they who live in it with us. Heats and colds, improper diets, journeys, voyages, winds, and various accidents destroy some, banish others; destine one to an embassy, another to a camp. And now, pray, sit in a flutter about all these things, lamenting, disappointed, wretched, dependent on another; and that not one or two, but ten thousand times ten thousand.

§ 2. Is this what you have heard from the philosophers? This what you have learnt? Do not you know [6] what sort of a thing a warfare is? One must keep guard, another go out for a spy, another to battle too. It is neither possible that all should be in the same place, nor, indeed, better: but you, neglecting to perform the orders of your general, complain whenever anything a little hard is commanded, and do not consider what you make the army become as far as lies in your power. For, if all should imitate you, nobody will dig a trench, or throw up a rampart, or watch, or expose himself to danger; but every one will appear useless to the expedition. Again, if you were a sailor in a voyage, fix upon one place, and there remain. If it should be necessary to climb the mast, refuse to do it; if to run to the head of the ship, refuse to do it. And what captain will bear you? Would not he throw you overboard as a useless piece of goods and mere luggage, and a bad example to the other sailors? Thus, also, in the present case, every

one's life is a warfare,[7] and that long and various. You must observe the duty of a soldier, and perform everything at the nod of your general; and even, if possible, divine what he would have done. For there is no comparison between the above-mentioned general and this, either in power or excellence of character. You are placed in an extensive command, and not in a mean post; but you are a senator.[8] Do not you know that such a one must spend but little time on his affairs at home; but be much abroad, either commanding or obeying; attending on the duties either of a magistrate, a soldier, or a judge. And now, pray, would you be fixed and rooted to the same spot, like a plant?

Why, it is pleasant.

Who denies it? And so is a ragout pleasant; and a fine woman is pleasant. Is not this just what they say who make pleasure their end? Do not you perceive whose language you have spoken? That of Epicureans and catamites. And while you follow their practices and hold their principles, do you talk to us of the doctrines of Zeno and Socrates? Why do not you throw away, to as great a distance as possible, those ornaments which belong to others, and which you have nothing to do with? What else do the Epicureans desire than to sleep without hindrance and rise[9] without compulsion; and, when they are got up, to yawn at their leisure, and wash their face; then write and read what they please; then prate about some trifle or other, and be applauded by their friends, whatever they say; then go out for a walk; and, after they have taken a turn, bathe; and then eat; and then to bed: in what manner they spend their time there, why should one say? For it is easily guessed. Come, now, do you also tell me what course of life you desire to lead, who are a zealot for truth and Diogenes and Socrates. What would you do at Athens? These very same things? Why, then, do you call yourself a Stoic? They who falsely pretend to the Roman citizenship are punished severely; and must those be dismissed with impunity who falsely claim so great a thing and so venerable a title as you do? Or is this impossible, and is there not a divine and powerful and inevitable law which exacts the greatest punishments from those who are guilty of the greatest offences? For what says this law? Let him who claims what doth not belong to him be arrogant, be vain-glorious, be base, be a slave; let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity; and, in a word, let him be unhappy, let him lament.

§ 3. [10] What then! would you have me pay my court to such a one? Would you have me frequent his door?

If reason requires it, for your country, for your relations, for mankind, why should you not go? You are not ashamed to go to the door of a shoemaker when you want shoes, nor of a gardener when you want lettuce. Why, then, of the rich when you have some similar want?

Ay; but I am not struck with awe of a shoemaker.

Nor of a rich man neither.

I need not flatter a gardener.

Nor a rich man neither.

How then shall I get what I want?

Why, do I bid you go in expectation of getting it? No; only that you may do what becomes yourself.

Why then, after all, should I go?

That you may have gone; that you may have discharged the duties of a citizen, of a brother, of a friend. And, after all, remember that you are going to a shoemaker, to a gardener, who hath not the power of anything great or respectable, though he should sell it ever so dear. You are going to buy lettuces. They are sold for a penny, not for a talent. So here, too, the matter is worth going to his door about. Well, I will go. It is worth talking with him about.[11] Well, I will talk with him.

Ay, but one must kiss his hand, too, and cajole him with praise.

Away with you. That is worth a talent. It is not expedient for myself, nor my country, nor my fellow-citizens, nor my friends, to destroy the good citizen and the friend [in my own character].

But one shall appear not to have set heartily about the business if one fails.

What, have you forgot again why you went? Do not you know that a wise and good man doth nothing for appearance, but for the sake of having acted well?

What advantage then is it to him to have acted well?

What advantage is it to one who writes the name of Dion as he ought? The having writ it.

Is there no reward, then?

Why, do you seek any greater reward for a good man than the doing what is fair and just? And yet at Olympia you desire nothing else, but think it enough to be crowned victor. Doth it appear to you so small and worthless a thing to be fair, good, and happy? Besides, being introduced by God into this

great city [the world], and bound to discharge at this time the duties of a man, do you still want nurses and a mamma; and are you [12] moved and effeminated by the tears of poor foolish women? Are you thus determined never to cease being an infant? Do not you know, that he who acts like a child, the older he is, so much is he the more ridiculous?

§ 4. [13] Did you never visit any one at Athens, at his own house?

Yes; whomsoever I pleased.

Why, now you are here, be willing to visit this person, and you will still see whom you please; only let it be without meanness, without desire or aversion, and your affairs will go well; but their going well or not doth not consist in going to the house and standing at the door, or not, but lies within, in your own principles; when you have acquired a contempt of things independent on choice, and esteem none of them your own, but that what belongs to you is only to judge, to think, to exert your pursuits, your desires and aversions, right. What further room is there after this for flattery, for meanness? Why do you still long for the quiet you enjoyed there,[14] for places familiar to you? Stay a little and these will become familiar to you in their turn; and then, if you are so mean-spirited, weep and lament again at leaving these.

How, then, am I to preserve an affectionate temper?

As becomes a noble-spirited and happy person. For reason will never tell you to be dejected and broken-hearted, or to depend on another, or to reproach either god or man. Be affectionate in such a manner as to observe all this. But if from affection, as you call it, you are to be a slave and a wretch, it is not worth your while to be affectionate. And what restrains you from loving any one as a mortal, as a person who may be obliged to quit you? Pray, did not Socrates love his own children? But it was as became one who was free, and mindful that his first duty was to gain the love of the gods. Hence he violated no part of the character of a good man, either in his defence, or in fixing a penalty on himself.[15] Nor yet before, when he was a senator or a soldier. But we make use of every pretence to be mean-spirited; some on the account of a child, some of a mother, and some of a brother. But it is not fit to be unhappy on the account of any one, but happy on the account of all; and chiefly of God, who hath constituted us for this purpose. What! did Diogenes love nobody, who was so gentle and benevolent as cheerfully to undergo so many pains

and miseries of body for the common good of mankind? Yes, he did love them; but how? As became a minister of Jove; at once taking care of men and obedient to God. Hence the whole earth, not any particular place, was his country. And, when he was taken captive, he did not long for Athens and his friends and acquaintance there, but made himself acquainted with the pirates, and endeavoured to reform them; and, when he was at last sold, he lived at Corinth just as before at Athens: and, if he had gone to the Perrhœbeans,[16] he would have been exactly the same. Thus is freedom acquired. Hence he used to say, "Ever since Antisthenes made me free,[17] I have ceased to be a slave." How did he make him free? Hear what he says. "He taught me what was my own, and what not. An estate is not my own. Kindred, domestics, friends, reputation, familiar places, manner of life, all belong to another." "What is your own, then?" "The use of the appearances of things. He showed me that I have this, not subject to restraint or compulsion; no one can hinder or force me to use them any otherwise than I please. Who, then, after this, hath any power over me? Philip, or Alexander, or Perdiccas, or the Persian king? Whence should they have it? For he that is to be subdued by man must, long before, be subdued by things. He, therefore, of whom neither pleasure nor pain, nor fame nor riches, can get the better, and who is able, whenever he thinks fit, to throw away his whole body with contempt, and depart, whose slave can he ever be? To whom is he subject?" But if Diogenes had taken pleasure in living at Athens, and had been subdued by that manner of life, his affairs would have been at every one's disposal; and whoever was stronger would have had the power of grieving him. How would he have flattered the pirates, think you, to make them sell him to some Athenian, that he might see again the fine Piræus, the long walls, and the citadel? How would you see them, you wretch? As a dispirited slave. And what good would that do you?—"No; but free."—Show in what manner free. See, somebody lays hold on you; whoever takes you away from your usual manner of life and says, "You are my slave; for it is in my power to restrain you from living as you like. It is in my power to afflict[18] and humble you. Whenever I please, you may be cheerful again, and set out elated for Athens." What do you say to him who thus enslaves you? What method will you find of getting free? Or dare yon uot so much as look up at him; but, without making many

words, supplicate to be dismissed? You ought to go to prison, man, with alacrity, with speed, and to precede your conductors. Instead of this, do you regret living at Rome, and long for Greece? And, when you must die, will you then too come crying to us that you shall no more see Athens, nor walk in the Lycæum? Have you travelled for this? Is it for this that you have been seeking for somebody to do you good? What good? That you may the more easily solve syllogisms, and manage hypothetical arguments? And is it for this reason you left your brother, your country, your friends, your family, that you might carry back such improvements as these? So that you did not travel for constancy, nor for tranquillity; nor that, secured from harm, you might complain of no one, accuse no one: that no one might injure you; and that thus you might preserve your relative duties without impediment. You have made a fine traffic of it, to carry home hypothetical arguments and convertible propositions! If you please, too, sit in the market and cry them for sale as mountebanks do their medicines. Why will you not rather deny that you know even what you have learned, for fear of bringing a scandal upon theorems as useless? What harm hath philosophy done you? In what hath Chrysippus injured you, that you should give a proof, by your actions, that philosophy is of no value? Had you not evils enough at home? How many causes for grief and lamentation had you there, even if you had not travelled? But you have added more; and, if you ever get any new acquaintance and friends, you will find fresh causes for groaning; and, in like manner, if you attach yourself to any other country. To what purpose therefore do you live? To heap sorrow upon sorrow to make you wretched? And then you tell me this is affection. What affection, man? If it be good, it is not the cause of any ill; if ill, I will have nothing to do with it. I was born for my own good, not ill.

§ 5. What, then, is the proper exercise in this case?

First, the highest, and principal, and obvious, as it were at your door, is, that when you attach yourself to anything, it may not be as to what cannot be taken away.

But as to what?

As to something of the same kind with an earthen pot, or a glass cup; that, when it happens to be broken, you may remember not to be troubled.[19] So here, too: when you kiss your child, or your brother, or your friend, never entirely give way to the appearance, nor suffer the pleasure to diffuse itself

as far as it will; but curb it, restrain it, like those who stand behind triumphant victors, and remind them that they are men. Do you likewise remind yourself that you love what is mortal, that you love what is not your own. It is allowed you for the present, not irrevocably, nor for ever, but as a fig or a bunch of grapes in the appointed season. If you long for these in winter, you are a fool. So, if you long for your son or your friend when he is not allowed you, know, you wish for figs in winter. For as winter is to a fig, so is every accident in the universe to those things which are taken away by it. In the next place, represent to yourself appearances contrary to [20] whatever objects give you pleasure. What harm is there while you are kissing your child to say softly, "To-morrow you will die"; and so to your friend, "To-morrow either you or I shall go away, and we shall see each other no more"?

But these sayings are ominous.

And so are some incantations, but, because they are useful, I do not mind it; only let them be useful. But do you call anything ominous, except what is the signification of some ill? Cowardice is ominous; mean-spiritedness is ominous; lamentation, grief, want of shame. These are words of bad omen; and yet we ought not to be scrupulous of using them, as a guard against the things they mean. But do you tell me that a word is ominous which is significant of anything natural? Say, too, that it is ominous for ears of corn to be reaped, for this signifies the destruction of the corn, but not of the world. Say, too, that the fall of the leaf is ominous; and that a candied mass should be produced from figs, and raisins from grapes. For all these are changes from a former into another state; not a destruction, but a certain appointed economy and administration. Such is absence, a small change; such is death, a greater change: not from what now is nothing, but to what now is not.

[21] What, then, shall I be no more?

You will be; but [you will be] something else, of which, at present, the world hath no need: for even you were not produced when you pleased, but when the world had need [of you]. Hence a wise and good man, mindful who he is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only how he may fill his post regularly and dutifully to God. "Is it thy pleasure I should any longer continue in being? I will continue free, spirited, agreeably to thy pleasure; for thou hast made me incapable of restraint in what is my own. But hast thou no

further use for me? Fare thou well! I have stayed thus long for thy sake alone, and no other, and now I depart in obedience to thee." — "How do you depart?"—"Again, agreeably to thy pleasure; as free, as thy servant, as one sensible of thy commands and thy prohibitions. But while I am employed in thy service, what wouldst thou have me be? A prince or a private man, a senator or a plebeian, a soldier or a general, a preceptor or the master of a family? Whatever post or rank thou shalt assign me, like Socrates, I will die a thousand times rather than desert it. Where wouldst thou have me be? At Rome or at Athens, at Thebes or at Gyaros? Only remember me there. If thou shalt send me where men cannot live conformably to nature, I do not depart from thence in disobedience [22] to thy will, but as receiving my signal of retreat from thee. I do not desert thee; heaven forbid! but I perceive thou hast no use for me. If a life conformable to nature be granted, I will seek no other place but that in which I am, nor any other company but those with whom I am.

§ 6. Let these things be ready at hand night and day. These things write; these things read; of these things talk both to yourself and others. Ask them, "Have you any assistance to give me for this purpose?" And again, go and ask another and another. Then, if any of those things should happen that are said to be against our will, immediately this will be a relief to you: in the first place, that it was not unexpected. For it is a great matter upon all occasions to be able to say,[23] "I knew that I begot one born to die." Thus do you say too, "I knew that I was liable to die, to remove, to be exiled, to be imprisoned." If afterwards you turn to yourself and seek from what quarter the event proceeds, you will presently recollect: "It is from things independent on choice, not from what is my own. What, then, is it to me?" Then, further (which is the chief): Who sent it? The commander, the general, the city, the law of the city? Give it me, then, for I must always obey the law in all things. Further yet: when any appearance molests you (for that is not in your power), strive against it, and by reason conquer it. Do not suffer it to gain strength, nor to lead you on to consequences, and represent what and how it pleases. If you are at Gyaros, do not represent to yourself the manner of living at Rome; how many pleasures you used to find there, and how many would attend your return; but be intent on this point, how he who lives at Gyaros may live with spirit and comfort at Gyaros. And if you are at Rome, do not represent

to yourself the manner of living at Athens, but consider only how you ought to live where you are. Lastly, to all other pleasures oppose that of being conscious that you are obeying God, and performing, not in word, but in deed, the duty of a wise and good man. How great a thing is it to be able to say to yourself, " What others are now solemnly arguing in the schools, and seem to carry beyond probability, this I am actually performing. They are sitting and expatiating upon my virtues, and disputing about me and celebrating me. Jupiter hath been pleased to let me receive a demonstration of this from myself, and, indeed, that he may know whether he hath a soldier, a citizen, such as he should be, and to produce me as a witness to other men, concerning things independent on choice. See that your fears were vain, your appetites vain. Seek not good from without; seek it in yourselves, or you will never find it. For this reason he now brings me hither, now sends me thither; shows me to mankind, poor, without authority, sick; sends me to Gyaros, leads me to prison: not that he hates me; heaven forbid! For who hates the best of his servants? Nor that he neglects me, for he doth not neglect any one of the smallest [24] things; but to exercise me, and make use of me as a witness to others. Appointed to such a service, do I still care where I am, or with whom, or what is said of me, instead of being wholly attentive to God, and to his orders and commands? "

§ 7. Having these things always at hand, and practising them by yourself, and making them ready for use, you will never want any one to comfort and strengthen you. For shame doth not consist in not having anything to eat, but in not having reason enough to exempt you from fear and sorrow. But, if you once acquire that exemption, will a tyrant, or his guards or courtiers, be anything to you? Will any destination of offices, or they who offer sacrifices in the capitol on being admitted into the Emperor's train, give you uneasiness, who have received so great a command from Jupiter? Only, do not make a parade of it, nor grow insolent upon it. But show it by your actions; and, though no one should perceive it, be content that you are well and happy.

CHAPTER XXV

CONCERNING THOSE WHO DESIST FROM THEIR PURPOSE

§ 1. Consider which of the things which you at first proposed to yourself you have retained, which not, and how; which give you pleasure, which pain in the reflection; and, if possible, recover yourself where you have failed. For the champions, in this greatest of combats, must not grow weary, but are even contentedly to bear whipping. For this is no combat of wrestling or boxing; where both he who succeeds, and he who doth not succeed, may possibly be of very great worth, or of little—indeed, may be very fortunate or very miserable; but the combat is for good fortune and happiness itself. What is the case, then? Here, even if we have renounced the contest, no one restrains us from renewing it, nor need we wait for another four years for the return of another Olympiad; but recollecting, and recovering yourself, and returning with the same zeal, you may renew it immediately; and even if you should again yield, you may again begin, and, if you once get the victory, you become like one who hath never yielded. Only, do not begin from a habit of this to do it with pleasure, and then, like quails that have fled the pit,[1] go about as if you were a brave champion, though you have been conquered all the games round.[2] "The appearance of a pretty girl conquers me." What then? "Have not I been conquered before? I have a mind to rail at somebody. Well, have not I railed before?"—You talk to us just as if you had come off unhurt. Like one that should say to his physician, who had forbidden him to bathe, "Why, did not I bathe before?" Suppose the physician should answer him, "Well, and what was the consequence of your bathing? Were not you feverish? Had not you the headache?" So, when you before railed at somebody, did not you act like an ill-natured person, like an impertinent one? Have not you fed this habit of yours by actions familiar to it? When you were conquered by a pretty girl, did you come off with impunity? Why, then, do you talk of what you have done before? You ought to remember it, I think, as slaves do whipping, so as to refrain from the same faults.—"But the case is unlike, for there it is pain that causes the remembrance; but what is the pain,

what the punishment, of my committing faults? For when was I ever habituated [by any suffering] to avoid acting ill?"—Therefore the pains of experience, whether we will or not, have their use.

CHAPTER XXVI

CONCERNING THOSE WHO ARE IN DREAD OF WANT

§ 1. [1] Are not you ashamed to be more fearful and mean-spirited than fugitive slaves? To what estates, to what servants do they trust, when they run away and leave their masters? Do not they, after carrying off a little with them for the first days, travel over land and sea, contriving first one, then another method of getting food? And what fugitive ever died with hunger? But you tremble, and lie awake by night, for fear you should want necessaries. Wretch! are you so blind? Do not you see the way where the want of necessaries leads?

Why, where doth it lead?

Where a fever, where even a stone falling on you, leads—to death. Have not you yourself, then, often said this to your companions? Have not you read, have not you written, many things of this kind? And how often have you arrogantly boasted that you are easy with regard to death?

Ay, but my family too will starve with hunger.

What then? Doth their hunger lead any other way than yours? Is there not the same descent? The same state below? Will you not, then, in every want and necessity, look with confidence there, where even the most rich and powerful, and kings and tyrants themselves, must descend? You, indeed, hungry perhaps; and they, burst with indigestion and drunkenness? What beggar have you almost ever seen who did not live to old age, nay, to extreme old age? Chilled with cold day and night, lying on the ground, and eating only what is barely necessary, they come nearly to an impossibility of dying.—Cannot you write? Cannot you keep a school? Cannot you be a watchman at somebody's door?

But it is shameful to come to this necessity.

First, therefore, learn what things are shameful, and then tell us you are a philosopher; but at present, do not bear that even

any one else should call you so. Is that shameful to you which is not your own act? Of which you are not the cause? Which hath happened to you by accident, like a fever, or the headache? If your parents were poor, or left others their heirs, or, though they are living, do not assist you, are these things shameful for you? Is this what you have learned from the philosophers? Have you never heard, that what is shameful is blamable; and what is blamable deserves to be blamed? Whom do you blame for an action not his own, which he hath not done himself? Did you then make your father such a one as he is? Or is it in your power to mend him? Is that permitted you? What then, must you desire what is not permitted; and, when you fail of it, be ashamed? Are you thus habituated, even when you are studying philosophy, to depend upon others, and to hope nothing from yourself? Sigh, then, and groan, and eat in fear that you shall have no victuals tomorrow. Tremble, lest your servants should rob you, or run away from you, or die. Thus live on without ceasing, whoever you are, who have applied to philosophy in name only, and, as much as in you lies, have disgraced its theorems, by showing that they are unprofitable and useless to those who take up the profession of them. You have never made constancy, tranquillity, and apathy the object of your desires; have attended on no one upon this account, but on many for the sake of syllogisms, nor have ever by yourself examined any one of these appearances. "Can I bear this, or can I not bear it? What remains for me to do?" But, as if all your affairs went safe and well, you have dwelt upon the third class,[2] that of security from failure, that you may never fail—of what?—Fear, mean-spiritedness, admiration of riches, an unaccomplished desire, and unsuccessful aversion. These are the things which you have been labouring to secure. Ought you not first to have acquired something by the use of reason, and then to have provided security for that? Whom did you ever see building a round of battlements without placing them upon a wall? And what porter is ever set where there is no door? But you study. Can you show me what you study?

Not to be shaken by sophistry.

Shaken from what? Show me first what you have in your custody; what you measure, or what you weigh; and then accordingly show me the balance, or the bushel. What signifies it to go on ever so long measuring dust? Ought you not to show what makes men happy, what makes their affairs proceed

as they wish? How we may blame no one, accuse no one; how acquiesce in the administration of the universe? Show me these things. "See, I do show them," say you? "I will solve syllogisms to you."—This is the measure, wretch, and not the thing measured. Hence you now pay the penalty due for neglecting philosophy. You tremble, you lie awake, you advise with everybody; and if what you are advised to doth not please everybody, you think that you have been ill advised. Then you dread hunger, as you fancy; but it is not hunger that you dread, but you are afraid that you shall not have a cook, that you shall not have another person for a butler, another to pull off your shoes, a fourth to dress you, others to rub you, others to follow you; that when you have undressed yourself in the bathing room, and stretched yourself out like those who are crucified, you may be rubbed here and there; and the person who presides over these operations may stand by, and say, "Come this way; give your side; take hold on his head; turn your shoulder"; and that, when you are returned home from the bath, you may bawl out, "Doth nobody bring anything to eat?" And then, "Take away, wipe the table." This is your dread, that you shall not be able to lead the life of a sick man. But learn the life of those in health; how slaves live, how labourers, how those who are genuine philosophers, how Socrates lived, even with a wife and children; how Diogenes, how Cleanthes,[3] at once studying and drawing water. If these are the things you would have, you will have them everywhere, and with a fearless confidence.

In what?

In the only thing that can be confided in; what is sure, incapable of being restrained, or taken away—your own choice.

§ 2. But why have you contrived to make yourself so useless and good for nothing, that nobody will receive you into their house, nobody take care of you; but though, if any sound useful vessel was thrown out of doors, whoever finds it will take it up, and esteem it as a gain, yet nobody will take up you, but everybody esteem you a loss? What, cannot you so much as perform the office of a dog, or a cock? Why, then, do you wish to live any longer, if you are so worthless? Doth any good man fear that food should fail him? It doth not fail the blind, it doth not fail the lame. Shall it fail a good man? A paymaster is not wanting to a soldier, or to a labourer, or to a shoemaker, and shall one be wanting to a good man? Is God so negligent of his own institutions, of his servants, of his witnesses,

whom alone he makes use of as examples to the uninstructed, both that he is, and that he administers the universe rightly, and doth not neglect human affairs, and that no evil happens to a good man, either living or dead? What, then, is the case when he doth not bestow food? What else than that, like a good general, he hath made me a signal of retreat? I obey, I follow; speaking well of my leader, praising his works. For I came when it seemed good to him, and again, when it seems good to him, I depart; and in life it was my business to praise God, both by myself, to each particular person, and to the world. Doth he not grant me many things? Doth he not grant me affluence? It is not his pleasure that I should live luxuriously, for he did not grant that even to Hercules, his own son, but another [4] reigned over Argos and Mycenæ, while he lived subject to command, laboured, and was exercised. And Eurystheus was just what he was; neither king of Argos nor Mycenæ, not being indeed king of himself. But Hercules was ruler and governor of the whole earth and seas; the expeller of lawlessness and injustice; the introducer of justice and sanctity. And this he effected naked and alone. Again, when Ulysses was shipwrecked and cast away, did his helpless condition at all deject him? Did it break his spirit? No. But how did he go to Nausicaa and her attendants, to ask those necessaries which it seems most shameful to beg from another?

> "As the fierce lion, on the mountain bred,
> Confiding in his strength . . ."

Confiding in what? Not in glory, nor in riches, nor in dominion, but in his own strength; that is, in his principles concerning what things are in our own power, what not. For these alone are what render us free, render us incapable of restraint; raise the head of the dejected, and make them look with unaverted eyes full in the face of the rich, and of the tyrants; and this was the gift of the philosopher.[5] But you will not set out with confidence; but trembling about such trifles as clothes and plate. Wretch! have you thus wasted your time till now?

But what if I should be sick?
You will be sick as you ought.
Who will take care of me?
God; your friends.
I shall lie in a hard bed.
But like a man.
I shall not have a convenient room.

You will be sick in an inconvenient one, then.

Who will provide victual for me?

They who provide for others too; you will be sick like Manes.[6]

But, besides, what will be the conclusion of my sickness? Any other than death?

Why, do you not know, then, that the origin of all human evils and of the mean-spiritedness and cowardice is not death, but rather the fear of death? Fortify yourself, therefore, against this. Hither let all your discourses, readings, exercises, tend. And then you will know that thus alone are men made free.

END OF THE THIRD BOOK

BOOK IV

CHAPTER I

OF FREEDOM

§ 1. He is free who lives as he likes; who is not subject either to compulsion, to restraint, or to violence; whose pursuits are unhindered, his desires successful, his aversions unincurred. Who, then, would wish to lead a wrong course of life?—"No one." Who would live deceived, prone to mistake, unjust, dissolute, discontented, dejected?—"No one." No wicked man, then, lives as he likes; therefore neither is he free. And who would live in sorrow, fear, envy, pity; with disappointed desires, and incurred aversions?—"No one." Do we then find any of the wicked exempt from sorrow, fear, disappointed desires, incurred aversions?—"Not one." Consequently, then, not free.[1]

§ 2. If a person who hath been twice consul should hear this, provided you add, "But you are a wise man; this is nothing to you," he will forgive you. But if you tell him the truth—that in point of slavery he doth not differ from those who have been thrice sold,—what must you expect but to be beaten? "For how," says he, "am I a slave? My father was free, my mother free.[2] Besides, I am a senator, too, and the friend of Cæsar, and have been twice consul, and have myself many slaves." In the first place, most worthy sir, perhaps your father too was a slave of the same kind, and your mother, and your grandfather, and all your ancestors successively. But even if they were ever so free, what is that to you? For what if they were of a generous, you of a mean spirit; they brave, and you a coward; they sober, and you dissolute?

§ 3. And, "What," says he, "is this towards being a slave?"[3] —Do you think it nothing towards being a slave, to act against your will? Compelled and lamenting?—"Be it so. But who can compel me but the master of all, Cæsar?"—By your own confession, then, you have one master; and let not his being,

as you say, master of all give you any comfort, but know that you are a slave in a great family. Thus the Nicopolitans, too, frequently cry out, "By the life of Cæsar we are free!"

§ 4. For the present, however, if you please, we will let Cæsar alone. But tell me this. Have you never been in love with any one, either of a servile or liberal condition?—"Why, what is that to the being either a slave or free?" Was you never commanded anything by your mistress that you did not choose? Have you never flattered your slave? Have you never kissed her feet? And yet, if you were commanded to kiss Cæsar's feet, you would think it an outrage, and an excess of tyranny. Have you never gone out by night where you did not choose? Have you never spent more than you chose? Have not you sometimes uttered your words with sighs and groans? Borne to be reviled, and shut out of doors? But, if you are ashamed to confess your own follies, see what Thrasonides [4] says and doth, who, after having fought more battles perhaps than you, went out by night when Geta [5] would not dare to go; nay, had he been compelled to it by him, would have gone roaring and lamenting his bitter servitude. And what doth [this master of his] say afterwards? "A sorry girl hath enslaved me, whom no enemy ever enslaved."—(Wretch! to be the slave of a girl, and a sorry girl too! Why, then, do you still call yourself free? Why do you boast your military expeditions?)—Then he calls for a sword, and is angry with the person who out of kindness denies it; and sends presents to her who hates him; and begs, and weeps, and then again is elated on every little success. But how is he elated even then? Is it so as neither passionately to desire or fear?

§ 5. Consider in animals what is our idea of freedom. Some keep tame lions, and feed and even carry them about with them; and who will say that any such lion is free? Nay, doth he not live the more slavishly the more he lives at ease? And who, that had sense and reason, would wish to be one of those lions? Again, how much do birds, which are taken and kept in a cage, suffer by trying to fly away? Nay, some of them starve with hunger rather than undergo such a life; then, as many of them as are saved, it is scarcely and with difficulty and in a pining condition, and the moment they find any hole, out they hop. Such a desire have they of natural freedom, and to be at their own disposal and unrestrained.—"And what harm [6] doth this confinement do you?"—"What say you? I was born to fly where I please, to live in the open air, to sing when I please.

You deprive me of all this, and say, What harm doth it do you?"

§ 6. Hence we will allow those only to be free who do not endure captivity; but, as soon as they are taken, die, and escape. Thus Diogenes somewhere says, that the only way to freedom is to die with ease. And he writes to the Persian king, "You can no more enslave the Athenians than you can fish."—"How? What, shall not I take them?"—"If you do take them," says he, "they will leave you, and be gone like fish. For take a fish, and it dies. And, if the Athenians too die as soon as you have taken them, of what use are your war-like preparations?" This is the voice of a free man, who had examined the matter in earnest, and, as it might be expected, found it out. But, if you seek it where it is not, what wonder if you never find it?

§ 7. A slave wishes to be immediately set free. Think you it is because he is desirous to pay his fine to the officer?[7] No; but because he fancies that, for want of acquiring his freedom, he hath hitherto lived under restraint and unprosperously. "If I am once set free," says he, "it is all prosperity; I care for no one, I speak to all as their equal, and on a level with them. I go where I will, I come when[8] and how I will." He is at last made free; and presently, having nowhere to eat, he seeks whom he may flatter, with whom he may sup. He then either submits to the basest and most infamous prostitution, and, if he can obtain admission to some great man's table, falls into a slavery much worse than the former; or, if the creature, void of sense and right taste, happens to acquire an affluent fortune, he doats upon some girl, laments, and is unhappy, and wishes for slavery again. "For what harm did it do me? Another clothed me, another shod me, another fed me, another took care of me when I was sick. It was but in a few things, by way of return, I used to serve him. But now, miserable wretch! what do I suffer in being a slave to many instead of one! Yet, if I can obtain the equestrian rings,[9] I shall live with the utmost prosperity and happiness." In order to obtain them he first suffers what he deserves, and, as soon as he hath obtained them, it is all the same again. "But, then," says he, "if I do but get a military command, I shall be delivered from all my troubles." He gets a military command. He suffers as much as the vilest rogue of a slave; and, nevertheless, he asks for a second command, and a third; and, when he hath put the finishing hand and is made a senator, then he is a slave indeed.

When he comes into the assembly, it is then that he undergoes his finest and most splendid slavery.

§ 8. . . .[10] Not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, the nature of things; and not to adapt pre-conceptions rashly to particular subjects. For the cause of all human evils is, the not being able to adapt general pre-conceptions to particular cases. But different people have different opinions. One thinks the cause of his evils to be that he is sick. By no means; but that he doth not adapt his pre-conceptions right. Another, that he is poor; another, that he hath a harsh father and mother; another, that he is not in the good graces of Cæsar. This is nothing else but not understanding how to adapt our pre-conceptions. For, who hath not a pre-conception of evil, that it is hurtful? That it is to be avoided? That it is by all means to be prudently guarded against? One pre-conception doth not contradict another, except when it comes to be adapted. What, then, is this evil thus hurtful, and to be avoided? "Not to be the friend of Cæsar," saith one. He is gone, he fails in the adapting, he is embarrassed, he seeks what is nothing to the purpose. For, if he gets to be Cæsar's friend, he is nevertheless distant from what he sought. For what is it that every man seeks? To be secure, to be happy, to do what he pleases without restraint and without compulsion. When he becomes the friend of Cæsar, then, doth he cease to be restrained? To be compelled? Is he secure? Is he happy? Whom shall we ask? Whom can we better credit than this very man, who hath been his friend? Come forth and tell us whether you sleep more quietly now, or before you were the friend of Cæsar? You presently hear him cry, "Leave off, for heaven's sake, and do not insult me. You know not the miseries I suffer; there is no sleep for me; but one comes, and saith that Cæsar is already awake; another, that he is just going out. Then follow perturbations, then cares." Well, and when did you use to sup more pleasantly, formerly, or now? Hear what he says about this too. When he is not invited, he is distracted; and if he is, he sups like a slave with his master, solicitous all the while not to say or do anything foolish. And what think you? Is he afraid of being whipped like a slave? How can he hope to escape so well? No; but as becomes so great a man, Cæsar's friend, of losing his head.—And when did you bathe more quietly; when did you perform your exercises more at your leisure; in short, which life would you rather wish to live, your present, or the former? I could swear, there is no one so

stupid and insensible [11] as not to deplore his miseries, in proportion as he is more the friend of Cæsar.

§ 9. Since, then, neither they who are called kings,[12] nor the friends of kings, live as they like, who, after all, are free? Seek, and you will find; for you are furnished by nature with means for discovering the truth. But, if you are not able by these alone to find the consequence, hear them who have sought it. What do they say? Do you think freedom a good?—"The greatest." Can any one then who attains the greatest good be unhappy or unsuccessful in his affairs?—"No." As many, therefore, as you see unhappy, lamenting, unprosperous, confidently pronounce them not free.—"I do." Henceforth then we have done with buying and selling, and suchlike stated conditions of becoming slaves. For, if you have made these concessions properly, whether a great or a little king, a consular, or one twice a consul, be unhappy, he is not free.—"Agreed."

§ 10. Further, then, answer me this: Do you think freedom to be something great and noble and valuable?—"How should I not?" Is it possible, then, that he who acquires anything so great and valuable and noble should be of an abject spirit?—"It is not." Whenever, then, you see any one subject to another, and flattering him, contrary to his own opinion, confidently say that he too is not free; and not only if he doth it for a supper, but even if it be for a government, nay, a consulship; but call those indeed little slaves who act thus for the sake of little things, and the others, as they deserve, great slaves.—"Be this, too, agreed." Well, do you think freedom to be something independent and self-determined?—"How can it be otherwise?" Him, then, whom it is in the power of another to restrain or to compel, affirm confidently to be not free. And do not mind his grandfathers, or great-grandfathers, or inquire whether he hath been bought or sold; but if you hear him say from his heart, and with emotion, My master, though twelve lictors should march before him, call him a slave. And if you should hear him say, Wretch that I am, what do I suffer! call him a slave. In short, if you see him wailing, complaining, unprosperous, call him a slave in purple. "Suppose, then, he doth nothing of all this?"—Do not yet say he is free, but learn whether his principles are liable to compulsion, to restraint, or disappointment, and, if you find this to be the case, call him a slave keeping holiday during the Saturnalia.[13] Say that his master is abroad: he will come presently, and you will know what he suffers. "Who will come?"—Whoever hath the power

either of bestowing or taking away any of the things he wishes for. "Have we so many masters, then?"—We have. For, prior to all such, we have the things themselves for our masters; now they are many, and it is through these that it becomes necessary that such as have the disposal of them should be our masters too. For no one fears Cæsar himself, but death, banishment, loss of goods, prison, disgrace. Nor doth any one love Cæsar, unless he be a person of great worth; but we love riches, the tribunate, the prætorship, the consulship. When we love and hate and fear these things, they who have the disposal of them must necessarily be our masters. Hence we even worship them as gods. For we consider that whoever hath the disposal of the greatest advantages is a deity; and then we subjoin falsely, But such a one hath the power of the greatest advantages; therefore he is a deity. For, if we subjoin falsely, the inference arising from thence must be false likewise.

§ 11. "What is it, then, that makes a man free and independent? For neither riches, nor consulship, nor command of provinces, or kingdoms, make him so; but something else must be found." What is it that preserves any one from being hindered and restrained in writing?—"The science of writing." In music?—"The science of music." Therefore, in life, too, the science of living. As you have heard it in general, then, consider it likewise in particulars. Is it possible for him to be unrestrained who desires any of those things that are in the power of others?—"No." Can he avoid being hindered?—"No." Therefore neither can he be free. Consider, then, whether we have nothing, or all, in our own power alone; or whether some things are in our own power, and some in that of others.—"What do you mean?" When you would have your body perfect, is it in your own power, or is it not?—"It is not." When you would be healthy?—"Nor this." When you would be handsome?—"Nor this." Live, or die?—"Nor this." Body, then, is not our own, but subject to everything stronger than itself.—"Agreed." Well, is it in your own power to have an estate when you please, and as long as you please, and such a one as you please?—"No." Slaves?—"No." Clothes?—"No." A house?—"No." Horses?—"Indeed none of these." Well, if you would ever so fain have your children live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in your own power?—"No, nor this." Will you say, then, that there is nothing independent which is in your own power alone, and unalienable? See, then, if you have anything of this sort.—"I

do not know." But, consider it thus: Can any one make you assent to a falsehood?—"No one." In the topic of assent, then, you are unrestrained and unhindered.—"Agreed." Well, and can any one compel you to exert your pursuits towards what you do not like?—"He can. For when he threatens me with death, or fetters, he compels me to exert them." If, then, you were to despise dying, or being fettered, would you any longer regard him?—"No." Is despising death, then, an action in our power, or is it not?—"It is." Is it, therefore, in your power also to exert your pursuits towards anything, or is it not?—"Agreed that it is. But in whose power is my avoiding anything?" This, too, is in your own.—"What then, if, when I am exerting myself to walk, any one should restrain me?" What part of you can he restrain? Can he restrain your assent?—"No, but my body." Ay, as he may a stone.—"Be it so. But still I walk no more." And who told you that walking was an action of your own that cannot be restrained? For I only said that your exerting yourself towards it could not be restrained. But where there is need of body and its assistance, you have already heard that nothing is in your power.—"Be this, too, agreed." And can any one compel you to desire against your will?—"No one." Or to propose or intend, or, in short, not to make use of the appearances which present themselves to you?—"Nor this. But when I desire anything, he will restrain me from obtaining what I desire." If you desire anything that is your own, and that cannot be restrained, how can he restrain you?—"By no means." And pray who tells you that he who desires what depends on another cannot be restrained?—"May not I desire health, then?" By no means, nor anything else that depends on another; for what is not in your own power, either to procure or to preserve when you will, that belongs to another. Keep off not only your hands from it, but, far prior to these, your desires. Otherwise you have given yourself up a slave, you have put your neck under the yoke, if you admire any of the things not your own, but subject and mortal, to whichsoever of them you are attached.—"Is not my hand my own?" It is a part of you, but it is by nature clay, liable to restraint, to compulsion, a slave to everything stronger than itself. And why do I say your hand? You ought to possess your whole body as a paltry ass with a pack-saddle on, as long as may be, as long as it is allowed you. But if there should come a press [14] and a soldier should lay hold on it, let it go. Do not resist or murmur, otherwise you will be

first beat, and lose the ass after all. And, since you are to consider the body itself in this manner, think what remains to do concerning those things which are provided for the sake of the body. If that be an ass, the rest are bridles, pack-saddles, shoes, oats, hay, for the ass. Let these go too. Quit them more easily and expeditiously than the ass. And when you are thus prepared and thus exercised to distinguish what belongs to others from your own; what is liable to restraint from what is not; to esteem your own property, the other not; to keep your desire, to keep your aversion carefully turned to this point; whom have you any longer to fear?—"No one." For about what should you be afraid? About what is your own, in which consists the essence of good and evil? And who hath any power over this? Who can take it away? Who can hinder you? No more than God [can be hindered]. But are you afraid for body, for possessions, for what belongs to others, for what is nothing to you? And what have you been studying all this while, but to distinguish between your own and not your own; what is in your power and what is not in your power; what is liable to restraint and what is not? And for what purpose have you applied to the philosophers? That you might be nevertheless disappointed and unfortunate? No doubt you will be exempt from fear and perturbation! And what is grief to you? For nothing but what we fear when expected, affects us with grief when present. And what will you any longer passionately wish for? For you have a temperate and steady desire of things dependent on choice, as they are good, and present; and you have no desire of things independent on choice, so as to leave room for that irrational and impetuous and immoderately hasty passion.

§ 12. Since, then, you are thus affected with regard to things, what man can any longer be formidable to you? What hath man formidable to man, either in appearance or speech or mutual intercourse? No more than horse to horse, or dog to dog, or bee to bee. But things are formidable to every one; and whenever any person can either confer or take away these from another, he becomes formidable too. "How,[15] then, is the citadel" [the seat of tyranny] "to be destroyed?"—Not by sword or fire, but by principle. For if we should demolish that which is in the town, shall we have demolished also that of a fever, of pretty girls, in short, the citadel within ourselves; and turned out the tyrants, to whom we are subject upon all occasions every day, sometimes the same, sometimes others?

From hence we must begin, from hence demolish the citadel, turn out the tyrants; give up body, its parts, riches, power, fame, magistracies, honours, children, brothers, friends; esteem all these as belonging to others. And, if the tyrants be turned out from hence, why should I besides demolish the [external] citadel; at least, on my own account? For what doth it do to me by standing? Why should I turn out the guards? For in what point do they affect me? It is against others they direct their fasces, their staves, and their swords. Have I ever been restrained from what I willed? Or compelled against my will? Indeed, how is this possible? I have ranged my pursuits under the direction of God. Is it his will that I should have a fever? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should pursue anything? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should desire? It is my will too. Is it his will that I should obtain anything? It is mine too. Is it not his will? It is not mine. Is it his will that I should be tortured? [16] Then it is my will to be tortured. Is it his will that I should die? Then it is my will to die. Who can any longer restrain or compel me contrary to my own opinion? No more than Jupiter [can be restrained]. It is thus that cautious travellers act. Doth any one hear that the road is beset by robbers? He doth not set out alone, but waits for the retinue of an ambassador, or questor, or a pro-consul; and, when he hath joined himself to their company, goes along in safety. Thus doth the prudent man act in the world. There are many robberies, tyrants, storms, distresses, losses of things the most dear. Where is there any refuge? How can he go along unattacked? What retinue can he wait for to go safely through his journey? To what company join himself? To some rich man? To some consular senator? And what good will that do me? He is stripped himself; groans and laments. And what if my fellow-traveller himself should turn against me, and rob me? What shall I do? I will be the friend of Cæsar. While I am his companion, no one will injure me. Yet, before I can become illustrious enough for this, what must I bear and suffer! How often, and by how many, must I be robbed! And then, if I do become the friend of Cæsar, he too is mortal; and, if by any accident he should become my enemy, where can I best retreat? To a desert? Well, and doth not a fever come there? What can be done, then? Is it not possible to find a fellow-traveller, safe, faithful, brave, incapable of being surprised? A person who reasons thus understands and considers that, if he joins

himself to God, he shall go safely through his journey.—"How do you mean, join himself?" That whatever is the will of God may be his will too; whatever is not the will of God may not be his. "How, then, can this be done?"—Why, how otherwise than by considering the exertions of God's power, and his administration? What hath he given me, my own, and independent? What hath he reserved to himself? He hath given me whatever depends upon choice. The things in my power he hath made incapable of hindrance or restraint. But how could he make a body of clay [17] incapable of hindrance? Therefore he hath subjected [that, and] possessions, furniture, house, children, wife, to the revolution of the universe. Why, then, do I fight against God? Why do I will to retain what depends not on will? What is not granted absolutely; but how? In such a manner and for such a time as was thought proper. But he who gave, takes away.[18] Why, then, do I resist? Not to say that I shall be a fool in contending with a stronger than myself; what is a prior consideration, I shall be unjust. For whence had I these things when I came into the world? My father gave them to me. And who gave them to him? And who made the sun? Who the fruits? Who the seasons? Who their connection and relation to each other? And, after you have received all, and even your very self, from another, are you angry with the giver, and complain if he takes anything away from you? Who are you, and for what purpose did you come? Was it not he who brought you here? Was it not he who showed you the light? Hath not he given you assistants? Hath not he given you senses? Hath not he given you reason? And as whom did he bring you here? Was it not as a mortal? Was it not as one to live, with a little portion of flesh, upon earth, and to see his administration; to behold the spectacle with him, and partake of the festival for a short time? After having beheld the spectacle, and the solemnity, then, as long as it is permitted you, will you not depart when he leads you out, adoring and thankful for what you have heard and seen?—"No, but I would enjoy the feast still longer." So would the initiated, too, be longer in their initiation; so perhaps would the spectators at Olympia see more combatants. But the solemnity is over. Go away. Depart like a grateful and modest person; make room for others. Others too must be born, as you were, and when they are born must have a place and habitations and necessaries. But if the first do not give way, what room is there left? Why are you insatiable? Why are you un-

conscionable? Why do you crowd the world?—"Ay, but I would have my wife and children with me too." Why, are they yours? Are they not the giver's? Are they not his who made you also? Will you not quit what belongs to another, then? Will you not yield to your superior?—"Why, then, did he bring me into the world upon these conditions?" Well, if it is not worth your while, depart. He hath no need of a discontented spectator. He wants such as may share the festival, make part of the chorus, who may rather extol, applaud, celebrate the solemnity; he will not be displeased to see the wretched and fearful dismissed from it. For when they were present, they did not behave as at a festival, nor fill a proper place, but lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; insensible both of their advantage and their powers, which they received for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, nobleness of spirit, fortitude, and the subject of present inquiry, freedom.—"For what purpose then have I received these things?"—To use them. "How long?"—As long as he who lent them pleases. If, then, they are not necessary, do not attach yourself to them, and they will not be so; do not tell yourself that they are necessary, and they are not.

§ 13. This should be our study from morning till night, beginning from the least and frailest things, from an earthen vessel, from a glass. Afterwards, proceed to a suit of clothes, a dog, a horse, an estate; from thence to your self, body, parts of the body, children, wife, brothers. Look everywhere around you, and throw them from yourself. Correct your principles. See that nothing cleave to you which is not your own; nothing grow [19] to you that may give you pain when it is torn away. And say, when you are daily exercising yourself as you do here, not that you act the philosopher (admit this to be an insolent title), but that you are asserting your freedom. For this is true freedom. This is the freedom that Diogenes gained from Antisthenes, and declared it was impossible that he should ever after be a slave to any one. Hence, when he was taken prisoner, how did he treat the pirates? Did he call any of them master? (I do not mean the name, for I am not afraid of a word, but the disposition from whence the word proceeds.) How did he reprove them for feeding their prisoners ill? How was he sold? Did he seek a master? [20] No, but a slave. And when he was sold, how did he converse with his lord? He immediately disputed with him that he ought not to be dressed nor shaved in the manner he was; how he ought to bring up his children.

And where is the wonder? For if the same master had bought an instructor for his children in the exercises of the Palæstra, would he in those exercises have treated him as a servant, or as a master? And so if he had bought a physician or an architect? In every subject the skilful must necessarily be superior to the unskilful. What else, then, can he be but master, who possesses the universal knowledge of life? For who is master in a ship? The pilot. Why? Because whoever disobeys him is a loser.—"But a master can put me in chains." Can he do it then without being a loser?—"So I, among others, used to think." But, because he must be a loser, for that very reason it is not in his power; for no one acts unjustly without being a loser.—"And what loss doth he suffer who puts his own slave in chains?" What think you? The very putting him in chains. This you yourself must grant, if you would preserve the doctrine that man is not a wild but a gentle animal. For when is it that a vine is in a bad condition?—"When is it in a condition contrary to its nature." When a cock?—"The same." Therefore a man too. What, then, is his nature? To bite and kick and throw into prison and cut off heads? No; but to do good, to assist, to indulge the wishes of others. Whether you will or not, then, he is in a bad condition whenever he acts unreasonably.—"And so was not Socrates in a bad condition?" No; but his judges and accusers.—"Nor Helvidius at Rome?" No; but his murderer. "How do you talk?" [21] Why, just as you do. You do not call that cock in a bad condition which is victorious and wounded, but that which is conquered and comes off unhurt. Nor do you call a dog happy which neither hunts nor toils, but when you see him sweating and in pain and panting with the chase. In what do we talk paradoxes? If we say that the evil of everything consists in what is contrary to its nature, is this a paradox? Do not you say it with regard to all other things? Why, therefore, in the case of man alone do you take a different turn? But further, it is no paradox to say that by nature man is gentle and social and faithful.—"This is none neither." [22] How, then, [is it a paradox to say] that when he is whipped or imprisoned or beheaded he is not hurt? If he suffers nobly, doth not he come off even the better, and a gainer? But he is the person hurt who suffers the most miserable and shameful evils; who, instead of a man, becomes a wolf or viper or a hornet.

§ 14. Come, then, let us recapitulate what hath been granted. The man who is unrestrained, who hath all things in his power

as he wills, is free; but he who may be restrained, or compelled, or hindered, or thrown into any condition against his will, is a slave. "And who is unrestrained?"—He that desires none of those things which belongs to others. "And what are those things which belong to others?"—Those which are not in our own power, either to have or not to have, or to have them of such a sort or in such a state. Body, therefore, belongs to another, its parts to another, possessions to another. If, then, you attach yourself to any of these as your own, you will be punished, as he deserves who desires what belongs to others. This is the way that leads to freedom, this the only deliverance from slavery, to be able at length to say from the bottom of one's soul,

> "Conduct me, Jove, and thou, O Destiny,
> Wherever your decrees have fixed my lot."

§ 15. But what say you, philosopher? A tyrant summons you to speak something unbecoming you. Will you say it, or will you not?—"Stay, let me consider." Would you consider now? And what did you use to consider when you were in the schools? Did not you study what things are good and evil and what indifferent?—"I did." Well, and what were the opinions which pleased us?—"That just and fair actions[23] were good, unjust and base ones evil." Is living a good?—"No." Dying an evil?—"No." A prison?—"No." And what did a mean and dishonest speech, the betraying a friend, or the flattering a tyrant appear to us?—"Evils." Why, then, are you still considering, and have not already considered and come to a resolution? For what sort of a consideration is this? Whether I ought, when it is in my power, to procure myself the greatest good instead of procuring myself the greatest evil. A fine and necessary consideration, truly, and deserving mighty deliberation! Why do you trifle with us, man? There never was any such point considered; nor, if you really imagined what was fair and honest to be good, what base and dishonest evil, and all other things indifferent, would you ever be at such a stand as this, or near it; but you would presently be able to distinguish by your understanding, as you do by your sight. For do you ever consider whether black is white, or light heavy? Do not you follow the plain evidence of your senses? Why, then, do you say that you are now considering whether things indifferent are to be avoided rather than evils? The truth is, you have no principles; for neither doth

the one sort of things appear to you indifferent, but the greatest evils; nor the other evils, but matters of no concern to you. For thus you have accustomed yourself from the first. "Where am I? In the school? And is there an audience? I talk as the philosophers do. But am I got out from the school? Away with this stuff that belongs only to scholars and fools. This man is accused by the testimony of a philosopher, his friend; this philosopher turns parasite, that hires himself out for money, a third doth it in the very senate. Who doth not wish what appears [to himself to be right]? His principles exclaim from within." [24]——You are a poor cold lump of opinion, consisting of mere words, on which you hang as by a hair. But preserve yourself firm, and make a due use of the appearances, remembering that you are to be exercised in things. In what manner do you hear, I do not say that your child is dead (for how should you bear that?), but that your oil is spilled, your wine drunk out? That any one, while you are bawling, might only say this, "Philosopher, you talk otherwise in the schools. Why do you deceive us? Why, when you are a worm, do you call yourself a man?" I should be glad to be near one of these philosophers while he is revelling in debauchery, that I might see how he exerts himself, and what sayings he utters, whether he remembers his title, and the discourses which he hears or speaks or reads.

§ 16. "And what is all this to freedom?"—Truly nothing else is, but this, whether you rich people will or not. "And who is your evidence of this?"—Who, but yourselves? Who have a powerful master, and live by his motion and nod, and faint away if he doth but look sternly upon you; who pay your court to old men and old women, and say, "I cannot do this, it is not in my power." Why is it not in your power? Did not you just now contradict me, and say you were free? "But Aprulla [25] hath forbid me."—Speak the truth, then, slave, and do not run away from your masters, nor deny them, nor dare to assert your freedom when you have so many proofs of your slavery. One might indeed find some excuse for a person, compelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion, even when at the same time he sees what is best and yet hath not resolution enough to follow it, since he is withheld by something violent and, in some measure, divine. But who can bear you, who are in love with old men and women; and wipe their noses, and wash them, and bribe them with presents, and wait upon them when they are sick like a slave; at the same time wishing

they may die, and inquiring of the physician whether their distemper be yet mortal? And again, when for these great and venerable magistracies and honours you kiss the hands of the slaves of others, so that you are the slave of those who are not free themselves! And then you walk about in state, a prætor, or a consul. Do not I know how you came to be prætor, whence you received the consulship, who gave it you? For my own part, I would not even live, if I must live by Felicio's means, and bear his pride and slavish insolence. For I know what a slave is, blinded by what he thinks good fortune.

§ 17. Are you free yourself, then? (it will be said). By heaven, I wish and pray for it. But I cannot yet face my masters. I still pay a regard to my body, and set a great value on keeping it whole, though at the same time it is not whole.[26] But I can show you one who was free, that you may no longer seek an example. Diogenes was free.—"How so?" Not because he was of free parents, for he was not; but because he was so himself, because he had cast away all the handles of slavery, nor was there any way of getting at him, nor anywhere to lay hold on him to enslave him. Everything sat loose upon him, everything only just hung on. If you took hold on his possessions, he would rather let them go than follow you for them; if on his leg, he let go his leg; if his body, he let go his body; acquaintance, friends, country, just the same. For he knew whence he had them, and from whom and upon what conditions he received them. But he would never have forsaken his true parents the gods, and his real country, nor have suffered any one to be more dutiful and obedient to them than he; nor would any one have died more readily for his country than he. For he never sought when it would be proper for him to act for the sake of anything else[27] [except his real country the universe]; but he remembered that everything that exists is from thence, and carried on by it and commanded by its ruler. Accordingly, see what he himself says and writes. "Upon this account," says he, "O Diogenes, it is in your power to converse as you will with the Persian monarch, and with Archidamus, king of the Lacedemonians." —Was it because he was born of free parents? Or was it because they were descended from slaves that all the Athenians and all the Lacedemonians and Corinthians could not converse with them as they pleased, but feared and paid court to them? Why, then, is it in your power, Diogenes? "Because I do not esteem this sorry body as my own. Because I want

nothing. Because these [principles] and nothing else are a law to me." These were the things that suffered him to be free.

§ 18. And that you may not think that I show you the example of a man clear of encumbrances, without a wife or children, or country or friends, or relations to bend and draw him aside; take Socrates, and consider him, who had a wife and children, but not as his own; a country, friends, relations, but only as long as it was proper, and in the manner that was proper; and all these he submitted to the law and to the obedience due to it. Hence, when it was proper to fight he was the first to go out, and exposed himself to danger without the least reserve. But when he was sent by the thirty tyrants to apprehend Leo,[28] because he esteemed it a base action he did not deliberate about it, though he knew that, perhaps, he might die for it. But what did that signify to him? For it was something else that he wanted to preserve, not his paltry flesh; but his fidelity, his honour, free from attack or subjection. And afterwards, when he was to make a defence for his life, doth he behave like one who had children? Or a wife? No;[29] but like a single man. And how doth he behave when he was to drink the poison? When he might have escaped, and Crito persuaded him to get out of prison for the sake of his children, what doth he say? Doth he esteem it a fortunate opportunity? How should he? But he considers what is becoming, and neither sees nor regards anything else. "For I am not desirous," says he, "to preserve this pitiful body, but that [part of me] which is improved and preserved by justice, and impaired and destroyed by injustice." Socrates is not to be basely preserved. He who refused to vote for what the Athenians commanded, he who contemned the thirty tyrants, he who held such discourses on virtue and moral beauty: such a man is not to be preserved by a base action; but is preserved by dying, not by running away. For even a good actor is preserved by leaving off when he ought, not by going on to act beyond his time. "What, then, will become of your children?"—"If I had gone away to Thessaly you would have taken care of them; and will there be no one to take care of them when I am departed to Hades?" You see how he ridicules and plays with death. But, if it had been you or I, we should presently have proved, by philosophical arguments, that those who act unjustly are to be repaid in their own way; and should have added, "If I escape, I shall be of use to many; if I die, to none." Nay, if it had been necessary, we should have crept through a mouse-hole to

get away. But how should we have been of use to any? For where must they have dwelt? If we were useful alive, should we not be of still more use to mankind by dying when we ought, and as we ought? And now the remembrance of the death of Socrates is not less, but even more useful to the world than that of the things which he did and said when alive.

§ 19. Study these points, these principles, these discourses, contemplate these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing in proportion to its value. And where is the wonder that you should purchase so great a thing at the price of others, so many, and so great? Some hang themselves, others break their necks, and sometimes even whole cities have been destroyed, for that which is reputed freedom; and will not you, for the sake of the true and secure and inviolable freedom, repay God what he hath given when he demands it? Will you not study, not only as Plato says, to die, but to be tortured and banished and scourged, and, in short, to give up all that belongs to others? If not, you will be a slave among slaves, though you were ten thousand times a consul; and, even though you should rise to the palace, you will be never the less so. And you will feel that though philosophers (as Cleanthes says) do, perhaps, talk contrary to common opinion, yet not contrary to reason. For you will find it true, in fact, that the things that are eagerly followed and admired are of no use to those who have gained them; while they who have not yet gained them imagine that, if they are acquired, every good will come along with them; and then, when they are acquired, there is the same feverishness, the same agitation, the same nauseating, and the same desire of what is absent. For freedom is not procured by a full enjoyment of what is desired, but by proving the desire to be a wrong one. And, in order to know that this is true, take the same pains about these which you have taken about other things. Lie awake to acquire a set of principles that will make you free. Instead of a rich old man, pay your court to a philosopher. Be seen about his doors. You will not get any disgrace by being seen there. You will not return empty, or unprofited, if you go as you ought. However, try at least. The trial is not dishonourable.

CHAPTER II

OF COMPLAISANCE [1]

§ 1. To this point you must attend before all others: not to be so attached to any one of your former acquaintance or friends, as to condescend to the same behaviour with his, otherwise you will undo yourself. But, if it comes into your head, I shall appear odd to him, and he will not treat me as before; remember that there is nothing to be had for nothing; nor is it possible that he who acts in the same manner should not be the same person. Choose, then, whether you will be loved by those you were formerly, and be like your former self, or be better and not meet with the same treatment. For, if this is preferable, immediately incline altogether that way, and let no other kinds of reasoning draw you aside; for no one can improve while he is wavering.[2] If, then, you prefer this to everything, if you would be fixed only on this, and employ all your pains about it, give up everything else. Otherwise this wavering will affect you both ways: you will neither make a due improvement, nor preserve the advantages you had before. For before, by setting your heart entirely on things of no value, you were agreeable to your companions. But you cannot excel in both kinds, but must necessarily lose as much of the one as you partake of the other. If you do not drink with those with whom you used to drink, you cannot appear equally agreeable to them. Choose, then, whether you would be a drunkard and agreeable to them, or sober and disagreeable to them. If you do not sing with those with whom you used to sing, you cannot be equally dear to them. Here too, then, choose which you will. For if it is better to be modest and decent than to have it said of you, What an agreeable fellow! give up the rest; renounce it, withdraw yourself, have nothing to do with it. But, if this doth not please you, incline with your whole force the contrary way. Be one of the catamites, one of the adulterers. Act all that is consequent to such a character, and you will obtain what you would have. Jump up in the theatre, too, and roar out in praise of the dancer. But characters so different are not to be confounded. You cannot act both Thersites and Agamemnon. If you would be Thersites, you must be hump-backed and bald: if Agamemnon, tall and handsome, and a lover of those who are under your care.

CHAPTER III

WHAT THINGS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED FOR OTHERS

§ 1. When you have lost anything external, have this always at hand, what you have got instead of it; and, if that be of more value, do not by any means say, "I am a loser"; whether it be a horse for an ass, an ox for a sheep, a good action for a piece of money, a due composedness of mind for a dull jest, or modesty for indecent discourse. By continually remembering this, you will preserve your character such as it ought to be. Otherwise consider that you are spending your time in vain: and all that you are now applying your mind to, you are going to spill and overset. And there needs but little and a small deviation from reason to destroy and overset all. A pilot doth not need the same apparatus to overset a ship as to save it; but, if he turns it a little to the wind, it is lost: even if he should not do it by design, but only for a moment be thinking of something else, it is lost. Such is the case here too. If you do but nod a little, all that you have hitherto collected is gone. Take heed then to the appearances of things. Keep yourself awake over them. It is no inconsiderable matter you have to guard, but modesty, fidelity, constancy, enjoyment,[1] exemption from grief, fear, perturbation; in short, freedom. For what will you sell these? Consider what the purchase is worth.—"But shall I not get such a thing instead of it?"—Consider, if you do get it,[2] what it is that you obtain for the other. I have decency; another the office of a tribune: I have modesty; he hath the prætorship. But I do not make acclamations where it is unbecoming: I shall not rise [3] up [to do honour to another] in a case where I ought not; for I am free, and the friend of God, so as to obey him willingly; but I must not value anything else, neither body, nor possessions, nor fame; in short, nothing. For it is not his will that I should value them. For if this had been his pleasure, he would have made them my good, which now he hath not done; therefore I cannot transgress his commands.—"In everything preserve your own proper good."—"But what of the rest?"—"Preserve them too according as it is permitted, and so far as to behave agreeably to reason in relation to them, contented with this alone. Otherwise you will be unfortunate, disappointed, restrained, hindered." These are the laws, these

the statutes, transmitted from thence. Of these one ought to be an expositor, and to these obedient, not to those of Masurius [4] and Cassius.

CHAPTER IV

CONCERNING THOSE WHO EARNESTLY DESIRE A LIFE OF REPOSE

§ 1. Remember that it is not only the desire of riches and power that renders us mean and subject to others, but even of quiet and leisure, and learning and travelling. For, in general, valuing any external thing whatever subjects us to another. Where is the difference, then, whether you desire to be a senator or not to be a senator? Where is the difference whether you desire power or to be out of power? Where is the difference whether you say, "I am in a wretched way; I have nothing to do, but am tied down to books as inactive as if I were dead";—or, "I am in a wretched way; I have no leisure to read"? For as levees and power are among things external and independent on choice, so likewise is a book. For what purpose would you read? Tell me. For if you rest merely in being amused and learning something, you are insignificant and miserable. But if you refer it to what you ought, what is that but a prosperous life? And if reading doth not procure you a prosperous life, of what use is it? "But it doth procure a prosperous life (say you); and therefore I am uneasy at being deprived of it."—And what sort of prosperity is that which everything, I do not say Cæsar, or the friend of Cæsar, but a crow, a piper, a fever, ten thousand other things, can hinder? But nothing is so essential to prosperity as the being perpetual and unhindered. I am now called to do something. I now go, therefore, and will be attentive to the bounds and measures which ought to be observed, that I may act modestly, steadily, and without desire or aversion with regard to externals.[1] In the next place, I am attentive to other men, what they say and how they are moved; and that not from ill-nature, nor that I may have an opportunity for censure or ridicule; but I turn to myself and ask, "Am I also guilty of the same faults; and how then shall I leave them off?" [2] Once I too was faulty; but, God be thanked, not now. Well, when you have done thus and been employed in this manner, have not you done as

good a work as if you had read a thousand lines, or written as many? For are you uneasy at not reading while you are eating, or bathing, or exercising? Are not you satisfied with performing these actions conformably to what you have read? Why, then, do you not think uniformly about everything? When you approach Cæsar or any other person, if you preserve yourself unpassionate, unalarmed, sedate; if you are rather an observer of what is done than yourself observed; if you do not envy those who are preferred to you; if the materials of action do not strike you; what do you want? Books? How, or to what end? For is not this a kind of preparation for living, but living itself, made up of things different? Just as if a champion, when he enters the lists, should fall a-crying because he is not exercising without. It was for this that you used to be exercised. For this were the poisers, the dust,[3] the young fellows your antagonists. And do you now seek for these, when it is the time for business? This is just as if, in the topic of assent, when we are presented with appearances, of which some are evidently true, others not, instead of distinguishing them we should want to read dissertations on evidence.

§ 2. What, then, is the cause of this? That we have neither read nor written, in order to treat the appearances that occur to us, conformably to nature, in our behaviour. But we stop at learning what is said, and being able to explain it to others; at solving syllogisms and ranging hypothetical arguments. Hence, where the study is, there too is the hindrance. Do you desire absolutely what is out of your power? Be restrained, then, be hindered, be disappointed. But if we read dissertations about the exertion of the efforts, not merely to see what is said about the efforts, but to exert them well; on desire and aversion, that we may not be disappointed of our desires nor incur our aversions; on the duties of life, that, mindful of our relations, we may do nothing irrationally nor contrary to them: we should not be provoked at being hindered in our reading, but should be contented with the performance of actions suitable to us, and should not compute as we have hitherto been accustomed to compute. "To-day I have read so many lines; I have written so many"; but, "To-day I have used my efforts as the philosophers direct. I have restrained my desires absolutely; I have applied my aversion only to things dependent on choice. I have not been terrified by such a one, nor put out of countenance by such another. I have exercised my patience, my abstinence, my beneficence." And thus we should thank

God for what we ought to thank him. But now we resemble the vulgar in another way also, and do not know it. One is afraid that he shall not be in power; you,[4] that you shall. By no means be afraid of it, man; but as you laugh at him, laugh at yourself. For there is no difference whether you thirst like one in a fever, or dread water like him who is bit by a mad dog. Else how can you say, like Socrates, "If it so pleases God, so let it be"? Do you think that Socrates, if he had fixed his desires on the leisure of the Lyceum, or the Academy, or the conversation of the youth there, day after day, would have made so many campaigns as he did so readily? Would not he have lamented and groaned: "How wretched am I! now must I be miserable here when I might be sunning myself in the Lyceum"? Was that your business in life, then, to sun yourself? Was it not to be prosperous? To be unrestrained? Unhindered? And how could he have been Socrates, if he had lamented thus? How could he, after that, have written pæans in a prison?

§ 3. In short, then, remember this, that whatever external to your own choice you esteem, you destroy that choice. And not only power is external to it, but the being out of power too; not only business, but leisure too.—"Then, must I live in this tumult now?"—What do you call a tumult?—"A multitude of people."—And where is the hardship? Suppose it is the Olympic games. Think it a public assembly. There, too, some bawl out one thing, some do another; some push the rest. The baths are crowded. Yet who of us is not pleased with these assemblies, and doth not grieve to leave them? Do not be hard to please, and squeamish at what happens. "Vinegar is disagreeable (says one), for it is sour. Honey is disagreeable (says a second), for it disorders my constitution. I do not like vegetables, says a third. Thus, too (say others), I do not like retirement; it is a desert: I do not like a crowd; it is a tumult."—Why, if things are so disposed that you are to live alone, or with few, call this condition a repose, and make use of it as you ought. Talk with yourself, exercise the appearances presented to your mind, work up your preconceptions to accuracy. But if you light on a crowd, call it one of the public games, a grand assembly, a festival. Endeavour to share in the festival with the rest of the world. For what sight is more pleasant to a lover of mankind than a great number of men? We see companies of oxen, or horses, with pleasure. We are highly delighted to see a great many ships. Who is sorry to

see a great many men?—"But they stun me with their noise."—Then your hearing is hindered, and what is that to you? Is your faculty of making a right use of the appearances of things hindered too? Or who can restrain you from using your desire and aversion, your powers of pursuit and avoidance, conformable to nature? What tumult is sufficient for this? Do but remember the general rules. What is mine? What not mine? What is allotted me? What is the will of God, that I should do now? What is not his will? A little while ago it was his will that you should be at leisure, should talk with yourself, write about these things, read, hear, prepare yourself. You have had sufficient time for this. At present he says to you, "Come now to the combat. Show us what you have learned, how you have wrestled." How long would you exercise by yourself? It is now the time to show whether you are of the number of those champions who merit victory, or of those who go about the world, conquered in all the games round. Why, then, are you out of humour? There is no combat without a tumult. There must be many preparatory exercises, many acclamations, many masters, many spectators.—"But I would live in quiet."—Why, then, lament and groan, as you deserve. For what greater punishment is there to the uninstructed, and disobedient to the orders of God, than to grieve, to mourn, to envy; in short, to be disappointed and unhappy? Are not you willing to deliver yourself from all this?—"And how shall I deliver myself?"—Have not you heard that you must absolutely withhold desire, and apply aversion to such things only as are dependent on choice? That you must give up all, body, possessions, fame, books, tumults, power, exemption from power? For to whichsoever your propension is, you are a slave, you are under subjection, you are made liable to restraint, to compulsion; you are altogether the property of others. But have that of Cleanthes always ready,

"Conduct me, Jove; and thou, O Destiny."

Is it your will that I should go to Rome? Conduct me to Rome. To Gyaros? To Gyaros. To Athens? To Athens. To prison? To prison. If you once say, "When is one to go to Athens?" you are undone. This desire, if it be unaccomplished, must necessarily render you disappointed; and, if fulfilled, vain on what ought not to elate you: on the contrary, if you are hindered, wretched, by incurring what you do not like. Therefore give up all these things.—"Athens is a fine

place."—But it is a much finer thing to be happy, impassive, tranquil, not to have what concerns you dependent on others. —"Rome is full of tumults and visits."—But prosperity is worth all difficulties. If, then, it be a proper time for these, why do not you withdraw your aversion from them? (What necessity is there for you to be made to carry your burden, by being cudgelled, like an ass?) Otherwise, consider that you must always be a slave to him who hath the power to procure your discharge, to every one who hath the power of hindering you; and must worship him like your evil genius.

§ 4. The only way to real prosperity (let this rule be at hand morning, noon, and night) is a resignation of things independent on choice; to esteem nothing as a property; to deliver up all things to our tutelar genius and to fortune; to make those the governors of them, whom Jupiter hath made so; to be ourselves devoted to that only which is our property, to that which is incapable of restraint; and whatever we read, or write, or hear, to refer all to this.

§ 5. Therefore I cannot call any one industrious if I hear only that he reads or writes; nor even if he adds the whole night to the day do I call him so, unless I know to what he refers it. For not even you would call him industrious who sits up for the sake of a girl, nor therefore in the other case do I. But if he doth it for fame, I call him ambitious; if for money, avaricious; if from the desire of learning, bookish; but not industrious. But if he refers his labour to his ruling faculty, in order to treat and regulate it conformably to nature, then only I call him industrious. For never either praise or blame any person on account of outward actions that are common to all, but on the account of principles. These are the peculiar property of each individual, and the things which make actions good or bad.

§ 6. Mindful of this, be pleased with the present, and contented with whatever it is the season for. If you perceive any of those things which you have learned and studied occurring to you in action, rejoice in them. If you have laid aside ill-nature and reviling; if you have lessened your harshness, indecent language, inconsiderateness, effeminacy; if you are not moved by the same things as formerly, if not in the same manner as formerly, you may keep a perpetual festival: to-day, because you have behaved well in one affair; to-morrow, because in another. How much better a reason for sacrifice is this, than obtaining a consulship or a government? These things you have from yourself and from the gods. Remember this, who it is that

gave them, and to whom, and for what purpose. Habituated once to these reasonings, can you still think there is any difference, in what place you are to please God? Are not the gods everywhere at the same distance? Do not they everywhere equally see what is doing?

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS

§ 1. A WISE and good person neither quarrels with any one himself, nor, as far as possible, suffers another. The life of Socrates affords us an example of this too, as well as of the other virtues, who not only everywhere avoided quarrelling himself, but did not even suffer others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's *Symposium*, how many quarrels he ended; how, again, he bore with Thrasymachus, with Polus, with Callicles; how with his wife; how with his son, who attempted to confute him, and cavilled with him. For he well remembered, that no one is master of the ruling faculty of another, and therefore he desired nothing but what was his own.—"And what is that?"—Not that this or that person[1] should be moved conformably to nature, for that belongs to others; but that while they act in their own way as they please, he should nevertheless be affected, and live conformably to nature, only doing what belongs to himself in order to make them too live conformably to nature. For this is the point that a wise and good person hath in view. To have the command of an army? No; but if it be allotted him, to preserve on this subject of action the right conduct of his own ruling faculty. To marry? No; but if a marriage be allotted him, to preserve himself, on this subject of action, conformable to nature. But if he would have his wife or his child exempt from fault, he would have that his own which belongs to others. And being instructed consists in this very point, to learn what things are our own, and what belongs to others.

§ 2. What room is there, then, for quarrelling to a person thus disposed? For doth he wonder at anything that happens? Doth it appear new to him? Doth not he expect worse and more grievous injuries from bad people than happen to him? Doth he not reckon it so much gained, as they come short of the

last extremities? Such a one hath reviled you.—You are much obliged to him that he hath not struck you.—But he hath struck you too.—You are much obliged to him that he hath not wounded you too.—But he hath wounded you too.—You are much obliged to him that he hath not killed you. For when did he ever learn, or from whom, that he is a gentle, that he is a social animal, that the very injury itself is a great mischief to the injurious? As, then, he hath not learned these things, nor believes them, why should he not follow what appears for his interest? Your neighbour hath thrown stones. What then? Is it any fault of yours? But your goods are broken. What then? Are you a piece of furniture? No, but your essence consists in the faculty of choice. What behaviour, then, is assigned you in return? If you consider yourself as a wolf—to bite again, to throw more stones. But if you ask the question as a man, examine your treasure; see what faculties you have brought into the world with you. Are they dispositions to ferocity? to revenge? When is a horse miserable? When he is deprived of his natural faculties. Not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. And a dog? not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot hunt. Is not a man, then, also unhappy in the same manner? Not he who cannot strangle lions, or grasp statues [2] (for he hath received no faculties for this purpose from nature), but who hath lost his rectitude of mind, his fidelity. Such a one is the person who ought to be publicly lamented for the misfortunes into which he is fallen; not, by heaven, either he who is born [3] or dies, but he whom it hath befallen while he lives to lose what is properly his own, not his paternal possessions, his paltry estate or his house, his lodging or his slaves (for none of these are a man's own, but all belonging to others, servile, dependent, and given at different times, to different persons, by the disposers of them); but his personal qualifications as a man, the impressions which he brought into the world stamped upon his mind; such as we seek in money, and, if we find them, allow it to be good; if not, throw it away. "What impression hath this piece of money?"—"Trajan's." "Give it me."—Nero's." [4] Throw it away. It is false, it is good for nothing. So in the other case. "What impression have his principles?"—"Gentleness, social affection, patience, good-nature." Bring them hither. I receive them. I make such a man a citizen; I receive him for a neighbour, a fellow-traveller. Only, see that he hath not the Neronian impression. Is he passionate? Is he resentful? Is he querulous? Would

he, if he took the fancy, break the head of those who fall in his way? Why, then, do you call him a man? For is everything distinguished by the mere outward form? Then say, just as well, that a piece of wax is an apple, or that it hath the smell and taste too. But the external figure is not enough; nor, consequently, is it sufficient to make a man that he hath a nose and eyes, if he hath not the proper principles of a man. Such a one doth not understand reason, or apprehend when he is confuted. He is an ass. Another is dead to the sense of shame. He is a worthless creature;[6] anything, rather than a man. Another seeks whom he may kick or bite, so that he is neither sheep nor ass. But what then? He is a wild beast.

§ 3. "Well, but would you have me despised, then?"—By whom? By those who know you? And how can they despise you, who know you to be gentle and modest? But, perhaps, by those who do not know you? And what is that to you? For no other artist troubles himself about the ignorant.—"But people will be much the readier to attack me."—Why do you say me? Can any one hurt your choice, or restrain you from treating conformably to nature the appearances that are presented to you? Why, then, are you disturbed, and desirous to make yourself appear formidable? Why do not you make public proclamation that you are at peace with all mankind, however they may act, and that you chiefly laugh at those who suppose they can hurt you? "These wretches neither know who I am, or in what consist my good and evil, or that there is no access for them to what is really mine." Thus the inhabitants of a fortified city laugh at the besiegers. "What trouble now are these people giving themselves for nothing? Our wall is secure, we have provisions for a very long time, and every other preparation." These are what render a city fortified and impregnable, but nothing but its principles render the human soul so. For what wall is so strong, what body so impenetrable, or what possession so unalienable, or what dignity so secured against stratagems? All things else, everywhere else, are mortal, easily reduced; and whoever in any degree fixes his mind upon them, must necessarily be subject to perturbation, despair, terrors, lamentations, disappointed desires, and incurred aversions.

§ 4. And will we not fortify then the only place of security that is granted us, and, withdrawing ourselves from what is mortal and servile, diligently improve what is immortal and by nature free? Do we not remember that no one either hurts or benefits

another; but the principle, which we hold concerning everything, doth it? It is this that hurts us; this that overturns us. Here is the fight, the sedition, the war. It was nothing else that made Eteocles and Polynices enemies but their principle concerning empire and their principle concerning exile; that the one seemed the extremest evil, the other the greatest good. Now, the very nature of every one is to pursue good, to avoid evil, to esteem him as an enemy and betrayer who deprives us of the one, and involves us in the other, though he be a brother, or a son, or father. For nothing is more nearly related to us than good. So that if good and evil consist in externals, there is no affection between father and son, brother and brother; but all is everywhere full of enemies, betrayers, sycophants. But if a right choice be the only good, and a wrong one the only evil, what further room is there for quarrelling, for reviling? About what? About what is nothing to us? Against whom? Against the ignorant, against the unhappy, against those who are deceived in things of the greatest importance?

§ 5. Mindful of this, Socrates lived in his own house, patiently bearing a furious wife, a senseless son. For what were the effects of her fury? The throwing as much water as she pleased on his head, the trampling[6] a cake under her feet. "And what is this to me, if I think such things nothing to me? This very point is my business, and neither a tyrant nor a master shall restrain my will; nor multitudes, though I am a single person; nor one ever so strong, though I am ever so weak. For this is given by God to every one, free from restraint."

§ 6. These principles make friendship in families, concord in cities, peace in nations. They make a person grateful to God, everywhere in good spirits [about externals] as belonging to others, as of no value. But we, alas! are able indeed to write and read these things, and to praise them when they are read; but very far from being convinced by them. Therefore what is said of the Lacedemonians,

"Lions at home, foxes at Ephesus,"

may be applied to us too: lions in the school, but foxes out of it.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING THOSE WHO GRIEVE AT BEING PITIED

§ 1. It vexes me, say you, to be pitied. Is this your affair, then, or theirs who pity you? And further: How is it in your power to prevent it?—"It is, if I show them that I do not need pity." But are you now in such a condition as not to need pity, or are you not?—"I think I am. But these people do not pity me for what, if anything, would deserve pity—my faults; but for poverty and want of power, and sicknesses, and deaths, and other things of that kind." Are you, then, prepared to convince the world that none of these things is in reality an evil; but that it is possible for a person to be happy, even when he is poor and without honours and power? Or are you prepared to appear to them rich and powerful? The last of these is the part of an arrogant, silly, worthless fellow. Observe, too, by what means this fiction must be carried on. You must hire some paltry slaves, and get possessed of a few little pieces of plate and often show them in public, and, though they are the same, endeavour to conceal that they are the same; you must have gay clothes and other finery, and make a show of being honoured by your great people, and endeavour to sup with them, or be thought to sup with them; and use some vile arts with your person, to make it appear handsomer and genteeler than it really is. All this you must contrive, if you would take the second way not to be pitied. And the first is impracticable, as well as tedious, to undertake the very thing that Jupiter himself could not do: to convince all mankind what things are really good and evil. Is this granted you? The only thing granted you is to convince yourself, and you have not yet done that; and do you, notwithstanding, undertake to convince others? Why, who hath lived so long with you as you have with yourself? Who is so likely to have faith in you, in order to be convinced by you, as you in yourself? Who is a better wisher, or a nearer friend to you, than you to yourself? How is it, then, that you have not yet convinced yourself? Should not you [1] now turn these things every way in your thoughts? What you were studying was this: to learn to be exempt from grief, perturbation, and meanness, and to be free. Have not you heard, then, that the only way that leads to this is to give

up what doth not depend on choice: to withdraw from it, and confess that it belongs to others? What kind of thing, then, is another's opinion about you?—"Independent on choice." Is it nothing, then, to you?—"Nothing." While you are still piqued and disturbed about it, then, do you think that you are convinced concerning good and evil?

§ 2. Letting others alone, then, why will you not be your own scholar and teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their advantage to think and act contrary to nature; but no one is nearer to me than myself. What, then, is the meaning of this? I have heard the reasonings of philosophers, and assented to them; yet, in fact, I am never the more relieved. Am I so stupid? And yet in other things that I had an inclination to, I was not found very stupid; but I quickly learned grammar, and the exercises of the Palæstra, and geometry, and the solution of syllogisms. Hath not reason, then, convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other things that I so much approved or liked from the very first. And now I read concerning these subjects, I hear discourses upon them, I write about them, and I have not yet found any reasoning of greater strength than this. What, then, do I want? Is it not that the contrary principles are not removed out of my mind? Is it not that I have not strengthened these opinions by exercise, nor accustomed them to occur in action; but, like arms thrown aside, they are grown rusty and do not fit me? Yet neither in the Palæstra, nor writing, nor reading, nor solving syllogisms, am I contented with mere learning: but I turn the arguments every way which are presented to me, and I compose others; and the same of convertible propositions. But the necessary theorems, by which I might become exempted from fear, grief, passion, unrestrained and free, I neither exercise, nor study, with a proper application. And then I trouble myself what others will say of me; whether I shall appear to them worthy of regard; whether I shall appear happy.—Will you not see, wretch, what you can say of yourself? What sort of person you appear to yourself in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions, in your pursuits, in your preparation, in your intention, in the other proper works of a man? But instead of that do you trouble yourself whether others pity you? "Very true. But I am pitied improperly."—Then are not you pained by this? And is not he who is in pain to be pitied? "Yes."—How, then, are you pitied improperly? For you render yourself worthy of pity by what you suffer upon being pitied.

§ 3. What says Antisthenes, then? Have you never heard? "It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do well, and to be ill spoken of." My head is well, and all around me think it aches. What is that to me? I am free from a fever; and they compassionate me as if I had one. "Poor soul, what a long while have you had this fever!" I say, too, with a dismal countenance, Ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill.—"What can be the consequence, then?" What pleases God. And at the same time I secretly laugh at them who pity me. What forbids, then, but that the same may be done in the other case? I am poor, but I have right principles concerning poverty. What is it to me, then, if people pity me for my poverty? I am not in power, and others are; but I have such opinions as I ought to have concerning power, and the want of power. Let them see to it who pity me. But I am neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold. But, because they are hungry and thirsty, they suppose me to be so too. What can I do for them, then? Am I to go about making proclamation, and saying, Do not deceive yourselves, good people, I am very well: I regard neither poverty, nor want of power, nor anything else, but right principles. These I possess unrestrained. I care for nothing further.—But what trifling is this? How have I right principles when I am not contented to be what I am, but am out of my wits how I shall appear?—But others will get more, and be preferred to me. —Why, what is more reasonable than that they who take pains for anything should get most in that particular in which they take pains? They have taken pains for power; you, for right principles: they, for riches; you, for a proper use of the appearances of things. See whether they have the advantage of you in that for which you have taken pains, and which they neglect; if they assent better concerning the natural bounds and limits of things; if their desires are less disappointed than yours, their aversions less incurred; if they take a better aim in their intention, in their purposes, in their pursuits; whether they preserve a becoming behaviour as men, as sons, as parents, and so on in respect of the other relations of life. But if they are in power, and you not,[2] why will you not speak the truth to yourself—that you do nothing for the sake of power, but that they do everything? And it is very unreasonable, that he who carefully seeks anything should be less successful than he who neglects it.—"No; but, since I take care to have right principles, it is more reasonable that I should have power."—Yes, in respect to what you take care about, your principles. But

give up to others the things in which they have taken more care than you. Else it is just as if, because you have right principles, you should think it fit that when you shoot an arrow you should hit the mark better than an archer, or that you should forge better than a smith. Therefore let alone taking pains about principles, and apply yourself to the things which you wish to possess, and then fall a-crying if you do not succeed; for you deserve to cry. But now you say that you are engaged in other things, intent upon other things; and it is a true saying, that one business doth not suit with another. One man, as soon as he rises and goes out, seeks to whom he may pay his compliments, whom he may flatter, to whom he may send a present; how he may please the dancer [in vogue]; how by doing ill-natured offices to one, he may oblige another. When ever he prays, he prays for things like these; whenever he sacrifices, he sacrifices for things like these. To these he transfers the Pythagorean precept,

"Let not the stealing god of sleep surprise," etc.

[3] Where have I failed in point of flattery? What have I done? Anything like a free, brave-spirited man? If he should find anything of this sort, he rebukes and accuses himself. "What business had you to say that? For could not you have lied? Even the philosophers say there is no objection against telling a lie."

§ 4. But, on the other hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing else but to make a right use of the appearance of things, as soon as you are up in a morning consider, What do I want in order to be free from passion? What, to enjoy tranquillity? What am I? Am I mere worthless body? Am I estate? Am I reputation? None of these. What, then? I am a reasonable creature. What, then, is required of me? Recollect your actions. Where have I failed in any requisite for prosperity? What have I done, either unfriendly or unsociable? What have I omitted that was necessary in these points?

§ 5. Since there is so much difference, then, in your desires, your actions, your wishes, would you yet have an equal share with others in those things about which you have not taken pains and they have? And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of humour, if they pity you? But they are not out of humour if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they are in possession of their proper good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not con-

tented with you own condition, but desire theirs; whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not desire yours. For, if you were really convinced that it is you who are in possession of what is good, and that they are mistaken, you would not so much as think what they say about you.

CHAPTER VII

OF FEARLESSNESS

§ 1. What makes a tyrant formidable? His guards, say you, and their swords; they who belong to the bedchamber, and they who shut out those who would go in. What is the reason, then, that, if you bring a child to him when he is surrounded by his guards, it is not afraid? Is it because the child doth not know what they mean? Suppose, then, that any one doth know what is meant by guards, and that they are armed with swords, and, for that very reason, comes in the tyrant's way, being desirous, on account of some misfortune, to die, and seeking to die easily by the hand of another; doth such a man fear the guards? No; for he wants the very thing that renders them formidable. Well, then, if any one without an absolute desire to live or die, but, as it may happen, comes in the way of a tyrant, what restrains his approaching him without fear? Nothing. If, then, another should think concerning his estate or wife or children as this man doth concerning his body, and, in short, from some madness or folly, should be of such a disposition as not to care whether he hath them or hath them not; but, as children playing with shells make a difference indeed in the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he should pay no regard to the materials [of action], but apply himself to the playing with, and management of, them; what tyrant, what guards, or their swords are any longer formidable to such a man?

§ 2. And is it possible that any one should be thus disposed towards these things from madness,[1] and the Galileans from mere habit; yet that no one should be able to learn, from reason and demonstration, that God made all things in the world, and the whole world itself, unrestrained and perfect, and all its parts for the use of the whole? All other creatures are

indeed excluded from a power of comprehending the administration of the world; but a reasonable being hath abilities for the consideration of all these things, both that itself is a part, and what part, and that it is fit the parts should submit to the whole. Besides, being by nature constituted noble, magnanimous, and free, it sees that, of the things which relate to it, some are restrained and in its own power, some restrained, and in the power of others; the unrestrained, such as depend on choice; the restrained, such as do not depend on it. And, for this reason, if it esteems its good and its interest to consist in things unrestrained, and in its own power, it will be free, prosperous, happy, unhurt, magnanimous, pious, thankful [2] to God for everything, never finding fault with anything, never censuring anything that is brought to pass by him. But, if it esteems its good and its interest to consist in externals, and things independent on choice, it must necessarily be restrained, be hindered, be enslaved to those who have the power over those things which it admires and fears; it must necessarily be impious, as supposing itself injured by God, and inequitable, as claiming more than its share; it must necessarily, too, be abject and mean-spirited.

§ 3. What forbids but that he, who distinguishes these things, may live with an easy and light heart, quietly expecting whatever may happen, and bearing contentedly what hath happened? Would you have poverty [be my lot]? Bring it, and you shall see what poverty is when it hath got one to act it well. Would you have power? Bring toils, too, along with it. Banishment? Wherever I go it will be well with me there, for it was well with me here, not on account of the place, but of the principles which I shall carry away with me, for no one can deprive me of these; on the contrary, they alone are my property, and cannot be taken away, and retaining them suffices me wherever I am or whatever I do. "But it is now time to die."—What is it that you call dying? [3] Do not talk of the thing in a tragedy strain, but say, as the truth is, that it is time for a compound piece of matter to be resolved back into its original. And where is the terror of this? What part of the world is going to be lost? What is going to happen new or prodigious? Is it for this that a tyrant is formidable? Is it on this account that the swords of his guards seem so large and sharp? Try these things upon others. For my part I have examined the whole. No one hath an authority over me. God hath made me free; I know his commands; after this no one can enslave me. I have

a proper assertor of my freedom; proper judges. Is it not of my body that you are the master? What is that to me, then? Of that trifle, my estate? What is that to me, then? Is it not of banishment and chains that you are the master? Why, all these, again, and my whole body I give up to you: whenever you please make a trial of your power, and you will find how far it extends.

§ 4. Whom, then, can I any longer fear? Those who belong to the bedchamber? Lest they should do—what? Shut me out? If they find me desirous to come in, let them. "Why do you come to the door, then?"—Because it is fitting for me that while the play lasts, I should play too. "How, then, are you incapable of being shut out?"—Because if I am not admitted I would not wish to go in, but would much rather that things should be as they are, for I esteem what God wills to be better than what I will.[4] I give myself up, a servant and a follower, to him. I pursue, I desire, in short, I will along with him. Being shut out doth not relate to me, but to those who push to get in. Why, then, do not I push too? Because I know that there is not any good distributed there to those who get in. But when I hear any one congratulated on the favour of Cæsar, I say, What hath he got?—"A province."[5]—Hath he then got such principles, too, as he ought to have?—"A public charge."—Hath he then got with it the knowledge how to use it too? If not, why should I be thrust about any longer to get in? Some one scatters nuts and figs. Children scramble and quarrel for them, but not men, for they think them trifles. But if any one should scatter shells, not even children would scramble for these. Provinces are distributing. Let children look to it. Money. Let children look to it. Military command, a consulship. Let children scramble for them. Let these be shut out, be beat, kiss the hands of the giver, of his slaves. But to me they are but mere figs and nuts. "What, then, is to be done?"—If you miss them, while he is throwing them, do not trouble yourself about it; but if a fig should fall into your lap, take it and eat it, for one may pay so much regard even to a fig. But if I am to stoop and throw down one, or be thrown down by another, and flatter those who are got in, a fig is not worth this, nor any other of the things which are not really good, and which the philosophers have persuaded me not to esteem as good.

§ 5. Show me the swords of the guards.—"See how big and how sharp they are." What, then, do these great and sharp

swords do?—"They kill." And what doth a fever do?—"Nothing else." And a tile?—"Nothing else." Would you have me, then, be struck with an awful admiration of all these, and worship them, and go about a slave to them all? Heaven forbid! But, having once learnt that everything that is born must likewise die (that the world may not be at a stand, or the course of it hindered), I no longer make any difference whether this be effected by a fever, or a tile, or a soldier; but, if any comparison is to be made, I know that the soldier will effect it with less pain and more speedily. Since, then, I neither fear any of those things which he can inflict upon me, nor covet anything which he can bestow, why do I stand any longer in awe of a tyrant? Why am I struck with astonishment? Why do I fear his guards? Why do I rejoice if he speaks kindly to me and receives me graciously, and relate to others in what manner he spoke to me? For is he Socrates or Diogenes that his praise should show what I am? Or have I set my heart on imitating his manners? But, to keep up the play, I go to him and serve him as long as he commands nothing unreasonable or improper. But if he should say to me, "Go to Salamis and bring Leo," [6] I answer him, Seek another, for I play no longer. —"Lead him away." I follow, in sport.—"But your head will be taken off." And will his own always remain on; or yours, who obey him?—"But you will be thrown out unburied." If I am the corpse, I shall be thrown out; but if I am something else than the corpse,[7] speak more handsomely, as the thing is, and do not think to fright me. These things are frightful to children and fools. But if any one who hath once entered into the school of a philosopher doth not know what he himself is, he deserves to be frighted, and to flatter what he lately flattered, if he hath not yet learnt that he is neither flesh nor bones nor nerves, but that which makes use of these, and regulates and comprehends the appearances of things.

§ 6. "Well, but these reasonings make men despise the laws." —And what reasonings, then, render those who use them more obedient to the laws? But the law of fools is no law. And yet, see how these reasonings render us properly disposed, even towards such persons, since they teach us not to claim in opposition to them anything wherein they have it in their power to be superior to us. They teach us to give up body, to give up estate, children, parents, brothers, to yield everything, to let go everything, excepting principles; which even Jupiter hath excepted, and decreed to be every one's own property. What

unreasonableness, what breach of the laws, is there in this? Where you are superior and stronger, there I give way to you. Where, on the contrary, I am superior, do you submit to me; for this hath been my study, and not yours. Your study hath been to walk upon a mosaic floor, to be attended by your servants and clients, to wear fine clothes, to have a great number of hunters, fiddlers, and players. Do I lay any claim to these? But on the other hand, have you, then, studied principles, or even your own rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it consists? How they are connected, what are its articulations, what powers it hath, and of what kind? Why, then, do you take it amiss, if another who hath studied them hath the advantage of you in these things?—"But they are of all things the greatest."—Well, and who restrains you from being conversant with them, and attending to them ever so carefully? Or who is better provided with books, with leisure, with assistants? Only turn your thoughts now and then to these matters; bestow but a little time upon your own ruling faculty. Consider what it is you have, and whence it came, that uses all other things, that examines them all, that chooses, that rejects. But while you employ yourself about externals, you will have those, indeed, such as no one else hath; but your ruling faculty such as you like to have it, sordid and neglected.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING SUCH AS HASTILY RUN INTO THE PHILOSOPHIC DRESS

§ 1. NEVER commend or censure any one for common actions, nor ascribe them either to skilfulness or unskilfulness, and thus you will at once be free both from rashness and ill-nature. Such a one bathes in a mighty little time. Doth he therefore do it ill? Not at all. But what? In a mighty little time.—"Is everything well done, then?"—By no means. But what is done from good principles is well done; what from bad ones, ill. But till you know from what principle any one acts, neither commend nor censure the action. But the principle is not easily judged of from the external appearances. Such a one is a carpenter. Why? He uses an axe. What signifies that?

Such a one is a musician; for he sings. What signifies that? Such a one is a philosopher. Why? Because he wears a cloak and long hair. What, then, do mountebanks wear? And so, when people see any of these acting indecently, they presently say, "See[1] what the philosopher doth." But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to say he is no philosopher. For, if indeed the idea which we have of a philosopher and his profession was to wear a cloak and long hair, they would say right; but, if it be rather to keep himself free from faults, since he doth not fulfil his profession, why do not they deprive him of his title? For this is the way with regard to other arts. When we see any one handle an axe awkwardly, we do not say, "Where is the use of this art? See how ill carpenters perform." But we say the very contrary, "This man is no carpenter, for he handles an axe awkwardly." So, if we hear any one sing badly, we do not say, "Observe how musicians sing," but rather, "This fellow is no musician." It is with regard to philosophy alone that people are thus affected. When they see any one acting contrary to the profession of a philosopher, they do not take away his title; but laying it down that he is a philosopher, and then assuming from the very fact that he behaves indecently, they infer that philosophy is of no use.

§ 2. "What, then, is the reason of this?" Because we pay some regard to the pre-conception which we have of a carpenter and a musician and so of other artists, but not of a philosopher, which being thus vague and confused, we judge of it only from external appearances. And of what other art do we take up our judgment from the dress and the hair? Hath it not theorems too, and materials, and an end [to distinguish it]? What, then, is the subject-matter of a philosopher? Is it a cloak?—No; but reason. What his end? To wear a cloak?—No; but to have his reason correct. What are his theorems? Are they how to get a great beard or long hair?—No; but rather, as Zeno expresses it, to know the elements of reason, what each of them is in particular, and how they are adapted to each other, and what are their consequences.

§ 3. Why, then, will you not first see, whether by acting in an unbecoming manner he answers his profession, and so proceed to blame the study? Whereas, now, when you act soberly yourself, you say, from what he appears to do amiss, "Observe the philosopher!" As if it was decent to call a person who doth such things a philosopher. And again, "This is philosophical!" But you do not say, "Observe the carpenter, or observe the

musician," when you know one of them to be an adulterer, or see him to be a glutton. So, in some small degree, even you perceive what the profession of a philosopher is, but are misled and confounded by your own carelessness. But indeed even they who are called philosophers enter upon their profession by things which are common to them with others. As soon as they have put on a cloak and let their beard grow they cry, "I am a philosopher." Yet no one says, "I am a musician," because he hath bought a fiddle and fiddlestick; nor, "I am a smith," because he is dressed in the Vulcanian cap and apron. But they take their name from their art, not from their habit.

§ 4. For this reason Euphrates was in the right to say, "I long endeavoured to conceal my embracing the philosophic life, and it was of use to me. For, in the first place, I knew that what I did right I did it not for spectators, but for myself. I ate in a proper manner for myself. I had a composed look and walk, all for God and myself. Then, as I fought alone, I was alone in danger. Philosophy was in no danger, on my doing anything shameful or unbecoming; nor did I hurt the rest of the world, which, by offending as a philosopher, I might have done. For this reason, they who were ignorant of my intention used to wonder, that while I conversed and lived entirely with philosophers, I never took up the character. And where was the harm, that I should be discovered to be a philosopher by my actions and not by the usual badges? See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear, how I forbear, how I assist others, how I make use of my desires, how of my aversions, how I preserve the natural and acquired relations, without confusion and without impediment. Judge of me from hence if you can. But, if you are so deaf and blind that you would not suppose Vulcan himself to be a good smith unless you saw the cap upon his head, where is the harm of not being found out by so foolish a judge?"

§ 5. It was thus too that Socrates concealed himself from the generality; and some even came and desired him to recommend them to philosophers. Did he use to be displeased then, like us, and say, What! do not you take me for a philosopher? No; he took and recommended them, contented with only being a philosopher, and rejoicing in not being vexed that he was not thought one. For he remembered his business; and what is the business of a wise and good man? To have many scholars? By no means. Let those see to it who have made this their study. Well, then, is it to be a perfect master of

difficult theorems? Let others see to that too. In what then was he, and did he desire to be, somebody? In what constituted his hurt or advantage. "If," says he, "any one can hurt me, I am doing nothing. If I depend for my advantage upon another, I am nothing. Do I wish for anything, and it doth not come to pass? I am unhappy." To such a combat he invited every one, and in my opinion, yielded to no one. But do you think it was by making proclamation, and saying, "I am such a one"? Far from it; but by being such a one. For this, again, is folly and insolence to say: "I am impassive and undisturbed. Be it known to you, mortals, that while you are fluctuating and bustling about for things of no value, I alone am free from all perturbation."—Are you then so far from being contented with having no pain yourself, that you must needs make proclamation: "Come hither, all you who have the gout, or the headache, or a fever, or are lame, or blind, and see me free from every distemper." This is vain and shocking, unless you could show, like Æsculapius, by what method of cure they may presently become as free from distempers as yourself, and bring your own health as a proof of it.

§ 6. Such is the Cynic, honoured with the sceptre and diadem from Jove; who says, "That you may see, O mankind, that you do not seek happiness and tranquillity where it is, but where it is not, behold, I am sent an example to you from God, who have neither estate nor house,[2] nor wife nor children, nor even a bed, or coat, or furniture. And see how healthy I am. Try me, and, if you see me free from perturbation, hear the remedies, and by what means I was cured." This now is benevolent and noble. But consider whose business it is—Jupiter's, or his whom he judges worthy of this office; that he may never discover anything to the world by which he may invalidate his own testimony, which he gives for virtue, and against externals.

> "No sickly pale his beauteous features wear,
> Nor from his cheek he wipes the languid tear."
>
> HOMER.

And not only this, but he doth not desire or seek for company, or place, or amusement, as boys do the vintage-time, or holidays; always fortified by virtuous shame, as others are by walls, and gates, and sentinels.

§ 7. But now they who have only such an inclination to philosophy as bad stomachs have to some kinds of food, of which they will presently grow sick, immediately run to the sceptre, to the kingdom. They let grow their hair, assume the cloak,[4]

bare the shoulder, wrangle with all they meet; and even, if they see any one in a thick, warm coat, wrangle with him. First harden yourself against all weather, man. Consider your inclination, whether it be not that of a bad stomach, or of a longing woman. First study to conceal what you are; philosophise a little while by yourself. Fruit is produced thus. The seed must first be buried in the ground, lie hid there some time, and grow up by degrees, that it may come to perfection. But, if it produces the ear before the stalk hath its proper joints, it is imperfect, and of the garden of Adonis.[5] Now, you are a poor plant of this kind. You have blossomed too soon, the winter will kill you. See what countrymen say about seeds of any sort, when the warm weather comes too early. They are in great anxiety, for fear the seeds should shoot out too luxuriantly; and then, one frost taking them,[5] shows how prejudicial their forwardness was. Beware you too, man. You have shot out luxuriantly, you have sprung forth towards a trifling fame, before the proper season. You seem to be somebody, as a fool may among fools. You will be taken by the frost; or rather, you are already frozen downwards, at the root; you still blossom indeed a little at the top, and therefore you think you are still alive and flourishing. Let us, at least, ripen naturally. Why do you lay us open? Why do you force us? We cannot yet bear the air. Suffer the root to grow; then the first, then the second, then the third joint of the stalk to spring from it; and thus[6] nature will force out the fruit, whether I will or not. For who that is big with and full of such principles doth not perceive too his own qualifications, and exert his efforts to correspondent operations? Not even a bull is ignorant of his own qualifications, when any wild beast approaches the herd, nor waits for any one to encourage him; nor a dog, when he spies any game. And, if I have the qualifications of a good man, shall I wait for you to qualify me for my own proper operations? But believe me, I have them not yet. Why, then, would you wish me to be withered before my time, as you are?

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING A PERSON WHO WAS GROWN IMMODEST

[1] § 1. When you see another in power, set against it that you have the advantage of not wanting power. When you see another rich, see what you have instead of riches; for, if you have nothing in their stead, you are miserable. But, if you have the advantage of not needing riches, know that you have something more than he hath, and of far greater value. Another possesses a handsome woman; you, the happiness of not desiring a handsome woman. Do you think these are little matters? And what would those very persons, who are rich and powerful and possess handsome women, give that they were able to despise riches and power, and those very women whom they love, and whom they acquire! Do not you know of what nature the thirst of one in a fever is? It hath no resemblance to that of a person in health. He drinks, and is satisfied. But the other, after being delighted a very little while, grows sick, turns the water into choler, throws it up, hath pain in his bowels, and becomes more violently thirsty. Of the same nature is it to have riches, or dominion, or enjoy a fine woman, with fondness of any one of these things. Jealousy takes place, fear of losing the beloved object, indecent discourses, indecent designs, unbecoming actions.

§ 2. "And what, say you, do I lose all the while?"—You were modest, man, and are so no longer. Have you lost nothing? Instead of Chrysippus and Zeno, you read Aristides [2] and Euenus.[3] Have you lost nothing, then? Instead of Socrates and Diogenes, you admire him who can corrupt and entice the most women. You set out your person, and would be handsome when you are not. You love to appear in fine clothes to attract the eyes of the women, and, if you anywhere meet with a good perfumer,[4] you esteem yourself a happy man. But formerly you did not so much as think of any of these things, but only where you might find a decent discourse, a worthy person, a noble design. For this reason, you used to sleep like a man; to appear in public like a man; to wear a manly dress; to hold discourses worthy of a man. And after this, do you tell me you have lost nothing? What, then, do men lose nothing but money? Is not modesty to be lost? Is

not decency to be lost? Or may he who loses these suffer no damage? You, indeed, perhaps no longer think anything of this sort to be a damage. But there was once a time when you accounted this to be the only damage and hurt; when you were anxiously afraid lest any one should shake your regard from these discourses and actions. See, it is not shaken by another, but by yourself. Fight against yourself, recover yourself to decency, to modesty, to freedom. If you had formerly been told any of these things of me, that any one prevailed on me to commit adultery, to wear such a dress as yours, to be perfumed, would not you have gone and laid violent hands on the man who thus abused me? And will you not now then help yourself? For how much easier is that assistance? You need not kill or fetter or affront or go to law with any one, but merely to talk with yourself, who will most readily be persuaded by you, and with whom no one hath greater credit than you. And, in the first place, condemn your actions; but when you have condemned them, do not despair of yourself, nor be like those poor-spirited people who, when they have once given way, abandon themselves entirely, and are carried along as by a torrent. Take example from the wrestling masters. Hath the boy fallen down? Get up again, they say; wrestle again till you have acquired strength. Be you affected in the same manner. For, be assured that there is nothing more tractable than the human mind. You need but will, and it is done, it is set right; as, on the contrary, you need but nod over the work, and it is ruined. For both ruin and recovery are from within.

§ 3. "And, after all, what good will this do me?" [5]—What greater good do you seek? From impudent, you will become modest; from indecent, decent; from dissolute, sober. If you seek any greater things than these, go on as you do. It is no longer in the power of any god to save you.

CHAPTER X

WHAT THINGS WE ARE TO DESPISE, AND ON WHAT TO PLACE A DISTINGUISHED VALUE

§ 1. The doubts and perplexities of all men are concerning externals. What they shall do? How it may be? What will be the event? Whether this thing may happen, or that? All this is the talk of persons engaged in things independent on choice. For who says, How shall I do, not to assent to what is false? How not to dissent from what is true? If any one is of such a good disposition as to be anxious about these things, I will remind him: Why are you anxious? It is in your own power. Be assured. Do not rush upon assent before you have applied the natural rule. Again, if [1] he be anxious, for fear his desire should be ineffectual and disappointed or his aversion incurred, I will first kiss him, because, slighting what others are in a flutter and terrified about, he takes care of what is his own, where his very being is; then I will say to him, If you would not be disappointed of your desires, or incur your aversions, desire nothing that belongs to others; be averse to nothing not in your own power, otherwise your desire must necessarily be disappointed and your aversion incurred. Where is the doubt here? Where the room for, How will it be? What will be the event? And, will this happen, or that? Now, is not the event independent on choice?—"Yes." And doth not the essence of good and evil consist in what depends on choice?—"Yes." It is in your power, then, to treat every event conformably to nature? Can any one restrain you?—"No one." Then do not say to me any more, How will it be? For, however it be, you will set it right, and the event to you will be lucky.

§ 2. Pray, what would Hercules have been if he had said, "What can be done to prevent a great lion or a great boar or savage men from coming in my way?" Why, what is that to you? If a great boar should come in your way, you will fight the greater combat; if wicked men, you will deliver the world from wicked men.—"But, then, if I should die by this means?"—You will die a good man in the performance of a gallant action. For since, at all events, one must die, one must necessarily be found doing something, either tilling, or digging, or trading, or serving a consulship, or sick of an indigestion or a

flux. At what employment, then, would you have death find you? For my part, I would have it be some humane, beneficent, public-spirited, gallant action. But if I cannot be found doing any such great things, yet, at least, I would be doing what I am incapable of being restrained from, what is given me to do, correcting myself, improving that faculty which makes use of the appearances of things, to procure tranquillity, and render to the several relations of life their due; and, if I am so fortunate, advancing to the third topic, a security of judging right. If death overtakes me in such a situation, it is enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God and say, "The opportunities which thou hast given me of comprehending and following [the rules] of thy administration I have not neglected. As far as in me lay, I have not dishonoured thee. See how I have used my perceptions, how my pre-conceptions. Have I at any time found fault with thee? Have I been discontented at thy dispensations, or wished them otherwise? Have I transgressed the relations of life? I thank thee that thou hast brought me into being. I am satisfied with the time that I have enjoyed the things which thou hast given me. Receive them back again, and assign them to whatever place thou wilt; for they were [2] all thine, and thou gavest them to me."

§ 3. Is it not enough to make one's exit in this state of mind? And what life is better and more becoming than that of such a one? Or what conclusion happier? But, in order to attain these advantages, there are no inconsiderable things both to be taken and lost. You cannot wish both for a consulship and these too, nor take pains to get an estate and these too, or be solicitous both about your servants and yourself. But,[3] if you wish anything absolutely of what belongs to others, what is you own is lost. This is the nature of the affair. Nothing is to be had for nothing. And where is the wonder? If you would be consul, you must watch, run about, kiss hands, be wearied down with waiting at the doors of others, must say and do many slavish things, send gifts to many, daily presents to some. And what is the consequence [of success]? Twelve bundles of rods,[4] to sit three or four times on the tribunal, to give the Circensian games, and suppers [5] in baskets to all the world; or let any one show me what there is in it more than this. Will you then be at no expense, no pains to acquire apathy, tranquillity, to sleep sound while you do sleep, to be thoroughly awake while you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious for nothing? But if anything belonging to you be lost or idly

wasted while you are thus engaged, or another gets what you ought to have had, will you immediately begin fretting at what hath happened? Will you not compare the exchange you have made? How much for how much? But you would have such great things for nothing, I suppose. And how can you? One business doth not suit with another; you cannot bestow your care both upon externals and your own ruling faculty.[6] But, if you would have the former, let the latter alone, or you will succeed in neither, while you are drawn different ways towards both. On the other hand, if you would have the latter, let the former alone.—"The oil will be spilled, the furniture will be spoiled";—but still I shall be free from passion.—"There will be a fire when I am not in the way, and the books will be destroyed";—but still I shall treat the appearances of things conformably to nature.—"But I shall have nothing to eat."—If I am so unlucky, dying is a safe harbour. That is the harbour for all, death; that is the refuge, and, for that reason, there is nothing difficult in life. You may go out of doors when you please, and be troubled with smoke no longer.

§ 4. Why, then, are you anxious? Why do you keep yourself waking? Why do not you calculate where your good and evil lies; and say they are both in my own power, neither can any deprive me of the one, or involve me, against my will, in the other? Why, then, do not I lay myself down and snore? What is my own is safe. Let what belongs to others look to itself who carries it off, how it is given away by him that hath the disposal of it. Who am I, to will that it should be so and so? For is the option given to me? Hath any one made me the dispenser of it? What I have in my own disposal is enough for me. I must make the best I can of this. Other things must be as the master of them pleases.

§ 5. Doth any one who hath these things before his eyes lie awake [like Achilles], and shift from side to side? What would he have, or what doth he want? Patroclus, or Antilochus,[7] or Menelaus? Why, did he ever think any one of his friends immortal? Why, when had not he it before his eyes that the morrow or the next day himself or that friend might die?—"Ay, very true," says he; "but I reckoned that he would survive me, and bring up my son."[8]—Because you were a fool, and reckoned upon uncertainties.[9] Why, then, do not you blame yourself, but sit crying like a girl?—"But he used to set my dinner before me."[10]—Because he was alive, fool; but now he cannot. But Automedon will set it before you; and, if he

should die, you will find somebody else. What if the pipkin in which your meat used to be cooked should happen to be broken, must you die with hunger because you have not your old pipkin? Do not you send and buy a new one?

"What greater evil (says he) could afflict my breast?"

Is this your evil, then? And, instead of removing it, do you accuse your mother that she did not foretell it to you, that you might have spent your whole life in grieving from that time forward?

§ 6. Do not you think, now, that Homer composed all this on purpose to show us that the noblest, the strongest, the richest, the handsomest of men may nevertheless be the most unfortunate and wretched, if they have not the principles they ought to have?

CHAPTER XI

OF PURITY AND CLEANLINESS

§ 1. Some doubt whether sociableness be comprehended in the nature of man; and yet these very persons do not seem to me to doubt but that purity is by all means comprehended in it, and that by this, if by anything, it is distinguished from brute animals. When, therefore, we see any animal cleaning itself, we are apt to cry with wonder, It is like a human creature. On the contrary, if an animal is accused [of dirtiness], we are presently apt to say, by way of excuse, that it is not a human creature. Such excellence do we suppose to be in man, which we first received from the gods. For, as they are by nature pure and uncorrupt, in proportion as men approach to them by reason, they are tenacious of purity and incorruption. But, since it is impracticable that their essence, composed of such materials, should be absolutely pure, it is the office of reason to endeavour to render it as pure as possible.

§ 2. The first and highest purity, or impurity, then, is that which is formed in the soul. But you will not find the impurity of the soul and body to be alike. For what else of impurity can you find in the soul than that which renders it filthy with regard to its operations? Now the operations of the soul are its pursuits and avoidances, its desires, aversions, preparations, inten-

tions, assents. What, then, is that which renders it defiled and impure in these operations? Nothing else than its perverse judgments. So that the impurity of the soul consists in wicked principles, and its purification in the forming right principles; and that is pure which hath right principles, for that alone is unmixed and undefiled in its operations.

§ 3. Now we should, as far as possible, endeavour after something like this in the body too. It is impossible but in such a composition as man there must be a defluxion of rheum. For this reason, nature hath made hands, and the nostrils themselves as channels to let out the moisture. If any one therefore snuffs it up again, I say that he performs not the operation of a man. It was impossible but that the feet must be bemired and soiled from what they pass through. Therefore nature hath prepared water and hands. It was impossible but that some filth must cleave to the teeth from eating. Therefore, she says, wash your teeth. Why? That you may be a man, and not a wild beast or a swine. It was impossible but, from perspiration and the pressure of the clothes, something dirty and necessary to be cleaned should remain upon the body. For this there is water, oil, hands, towels, brushes, soap, and other necessary apparatus, for its purification.—No; a smith indeed will get the rust off his iron, and have proper instruments for that purpose, and you yourself will have your plates washed before you eat, unless you are quite dirty and slovenly, but you will not wash nor purify your body.—"Why should I?" (say you). —I tell you again in the first place, that you may be like a man; and in the next, that you may not offend those with whom you converse. * * *[1] Without being sensible of it, you do something like this. Do you think you deserve to stink? Be it so. But do those deserve to suffer by it who sit near you? Who are placed at table with you? Who salute you? Either go into a desert, as you deserve, or live solitary at home, and smell yourself; for it is fit you should enjoy your nastiness alone. But to what sort of character doth it belong to live in a city, and behave as carelessly and inconsiderately? If nature had trusted even a horse to your care, would you have overlooked and neglected him? Now, consider your body as committed to you instead of a horse. Wash[2] it, rub it, take care that it may not be any one's aversion, nor disgust any one. Who is not more disgusted at a stinking, unwholesome-looking sloven, than at a person who hath been rolled in filth? The stench of the one is adventitious from without, but that which arises from

want of care is a kind of inward putrefaction.—"But Socrates bathed but seldom."—But his person looked clean, and was so agreeable and pleasing, that the most beautiful and noble youths were fond of him, and desired rather to sit by him than by those who had the finest persons. He might have omitted both bathing and washing if he had pleased, and yet bathing so seldom had its effect.—"But Aristophanes calls him one of the squalid, slip-shod philosophers."—Why, so he says, too, that he walked in the air, and stole clothes from the Palæstra. Besides, all who have written of Socrates affirm quite the contrary, that he was not only agreeable in his conversation, but in his person too. And, again, they write the same of Diogenes. For we ought not to fright the world from philosophy by the appearance of our person, but to show ourselves cheerful and easy, by the care of our persons,[3] as well as by other marks. "See, all of you, that I have nothing, that I want nothing. Without house, without city, and an exile (if that happens to be the case [4]), and without a home, I live more easily and prosperously than the noble and rich. Look upon my person, too, that it is not injured by coarse fare."—But, if any one should tell me this, with the habit and the visage of a condemned criminal, what god should persuade me to come near philosophy while [5] it renders men such figures? Heaven forbid! I would not do it, even if I was sure to become a wise man for my pains. I declare, for my own part, I would rather that a young man, on his first inclination to philosophy, should come to me finically dressed, than with his hair spoiled and dirty. For there appears in him some idea of beauty, and desire of decency; and where he imagines it to be, there he applies his endeavours. One hath nothing more to do but to point it out to him and say, "You seek beauty, young man, and you do well. Be assured, then, that it springs from the rational part of you. Seek it there, where the pursuits and avoidances, the desires and aversions, are concerned. Herein consists your excellence, but the paltry body is by nature clay. Why do you trouble yourself to no purpose about it? You will be convinced by time, if not otherwise, that it is nothing." But if he should come to me bemired, dirty, with whiskers down to his knees, what can I say to him? By what similitude allure him? For what hath he studied which hath any resemblance to beauty, that I may transfer his attention, and say that beauty is not there, but here? Would you have me tell him that beauty doth not consist in filth, but in reason? For hath he any desire of beauty? Hath

he any appearance of it? Go, and argue with a hog not to roll in the mire.

§ 4. It was in the quality of a young man that loved beauty that Polemo [6] was touched by the discourses of Xenocrates. For he entered with some incentives to the study of beauty, though he sought it in the wrong place. And indeed nature hath not made the very brutes dirty which live with man. Doth a horse wallow in the mire? Or a good dog? But swine, and filthy geese, and worms, and spiders, which are banished to the greatest distance from human society. Will you then, who are a man, choose not to be even one of the animals that are conversant with man, but rather a worm or a spider? Will you not bathe sometimes, be it in whatever manner you please? Will you never use water to wash yourself? Will you not come clean, that they who converse with you may have some pleasure in you? But will you accompany us, a mere lump of nastiness, even to the temples, where it is not lawful for any one so much as to spit, or blow his nose?

§ 5. What, then, would anybody have you dress yourself out to the utmost? By no means, except in those things where our nature requires it; in reason, principles, actions; but, in our persons, only as far as neatness, as far as not to give offence. But if you hear that it is not right to wear purple, you must go, I suppose, and roll your cloak in the mud, or tear it. —"But where should I have a fine cloak?"—You have water, man; wash it. "What an amiable [7] youth is here! How worthy this old man to love and be loved!"—A fit person to be trusted with the instruction of our sons and daughters, and attended by young people, as occasion may require—to read them lectures on a dunghill! Every deviation proceeds from something human, but this approaches very nearly towards being not human.

CHAPTER XII

OF ATTENTION

§ 1. When you let go your attention for a little while, do not fancy you may recover it whenever you please; but remember this, that by means of the fault of to-day your affairs must necessarily be in a worse condition for the future. First, what

is the saddest thing of all, a habit arises of not attending; and then a habit of deferring the attention, and always driving [1] off from time to time, and procrastinating a prosperous life, a propriety of behaviour, and the thinking and acting conformably to nature. Now, if the procrastination of anything is advantageous; but, if it be not advantageous, why do not you preserve a constant attention?—"I would play to-day."—What then? Ought you not to do it, with proper attention to yourself?—"I would sing."—Well, and what forbids but that you may sing, with attention to yourself? For there is no part of life exempted, to which attention doth not extend. For will you do it the worse by attending, and the better by not attending? What else in life is best performed by inattentive people? Doth a smith forge the better by not attending? Doth a pilot steer the safer by not attending? Or is any other, even of the minutest operations, performed the better by inattention? Do not you perceive, that when you have let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power to call it back, either to propriety or modesty or moderation? But you do everything as it happens; you follow your inclinations.

§ 2. To what, then, am I to attend?

Why, in the first place, to those universal maxims which you must always have at hand, and not sleep, or get up, or drink, or eat, or converse without them: that no one is the master of another's choice; and it is in choice alone that good and evil consist. No one, therefore, is the master either to procure me any good or to involve me in any evil; but I alone have the disposal of myself with regard to these things. Since these, then, are secured to me, what need have I to be troubled about externals? What tyrant is formidable? What distemper? What poverty? What offence?—"I have not pleased such a one."—Is he my concern, then? Is he my conscience?—"No."—Why do I trouble myself any further about him, then?—"But he is thought to be of some consequence."—Let him look to that, and they who think him so. But I have one whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey: God, and those [2] who are next him. He hath intrusted me with myself, and made my choice subject to myself alone, having given me rules for the right use of it. If I follow the proper rules in syllogisms, in convertible propositions, I do not regard nor care for any one who says anything contrary to them. Why, then, am I vexed at being censured in matters of greater consequence? What is the reason of this perturbation?

Nothing else but that in this instance I want exercise. For every science despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the sciences, but even the arts. Take any shoemaker, take any smith you will, and he laughs at the rest of the world with regard to his own business.

§ 3. In the first place, then, these are the maxims we must have ready, and do nothing without them; but direct the soul to this mark, to pursue nothing external, nothing that belongs to others, but as he who hath the power hath appointed. Things dependent on choice are to be pursued always, and the rest as it is permitted. Besides this, we must remember who we are, and what name we bear, and endeavour to direct the several offices of life to the rightful demands of its several relations; what is the proper time for singing, what for play, in what company; what will be the consequence of our performance; whether our companions will despise us, or we ourselves; when to employ raillery, and whom to ridicule; upon what occasions to comply, and with whom; and then, in complying, how to preserve our own character.

§ 4. Wherever you deviate from any of these rules the damage is immediate; not from any thing external, but from the very action itself.—"What, then, is it possible by these means to be faultless?" Impracticable; but this is possible, to use a constant endeavour to be faultless. For we shall have cause to be satisfied if, by never remitting this attention, we shall be exempt at least from a few faults. But now, when you say, I will begin to attend to-morrow, be assured it is the same thing as if you say, "I will be shameless, impertinent, base to-day; it shall be in the power of others to grieve me; I will be passionate, I will be envious to-day." See to how many evils you give yourself up.—"But all will be well to-morrow."—How much better to-day? If it be for your interest to-morrow, much more to-day, that it may be in your power to-morrow too, and that you may not defer it again to the third day.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING SUCH AS READILY DISCOVER THEIR OWN AFFAIRS

§ 1. When any one appears to us to discourse frankly of his own affairs, we, too, are some way induced to discover our secrets to him; and we suppose this to be acting with frankness. First, because it seems unfair that, when we have heard the affairs of our neighbour, we should not, in return, communicate ours to him; and, besides, we think that we shall not appear of a frank character in concealing what belongs to ourselves. Indeed it is often said, "I have told you all my affairs; and will you tell me none of yours? Where do people act thus?" Lastly, it is supposed that we may safely trust him who hath already trusted us, for we imagine that he will never discover our affairs for fear we, in our turn, should discover his. It is thus that the inconsiderate are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you, in a common dress, and begins to speak ill of Cæsar. Then you, as if you had received a pledge of his fidelity by his first beginning the abuse, say likewise what you think; and so you are led away in chains to execution.

§ 2. Something like this is the case with us in general. But when one hath safely intrusted his secrets to me, shall I, in imitation of him, trust mine to any one who comes in my way? The case is different. I indeed hold my tongue (supposing me to be of such a disposition), but he goes and discovers them to everybody; and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a desire of revenge I discover his, and asperse, and am aspersed. But, if I remember that one man doth not hurt another, but that every one is hurt and profited by his own actions, I indeed keep to this, not to do anything like him; yet, by my own talkative folly, I suffer what I do suffer.

§ 3. "Ay, but it is unfair, when you have heard the secrets of your neighbour, not to communicate anything to him in return."—"Why, did I ask you to do it, sir? Did you tell me your affairs upon condition that I should tell you mine in return? If you are a blab, and believe all you meet to be friends, would you have me, too, become like you? But what if the case be this: that you did right in trusting your affairs to me, but it is not right that I should trust you? Would you have me run

headlong and fall? This is just as if I had a sound barrel and you a leaky one, and you should come and deposit your wine with me to put it into my barrel, and then should take it ill that in my turn I did not trust you with my wine. No. You have a leaky barrel. How, then, are we any longer upon equal terms? You have deposited your affairs with an honest man, and a man of honour; one who esteems his own actions alone, and nothing external, to be either hurtful or profitable. Would you have me deposit mine with you, a man who have dishonoured your own faculty of choice, and who would get a paltry sum, or a post of power or preferment at court, even if, for the sake of it, you were to kill your own children, like Medea? Where is the equality of this? But show me that you are faithful, a man of honour, steady; show me that you have friendly principles; show me that your vessel is not leaky, and you shall see that I will not stay till you have trusted your affairs to me; but I will come and entreat you to hear an account of mine. For who would not make use of a good vessel? Who despises a benevolent and friendly adviser? Who will not gladly receive one to share the burden, as it were, of his difficulties; and, by sharing, to make it lighter?—"Well, but I trust you, and you do not trust me."—In the first place, you do not really trust me; but you are a blab, and therefore can keep nothing in. For, if the former be the case, trust only me. But now, whomever you see at leisure, you sit down by him and say, "My dear friend, there is not a man in the world that wishes me better, or hath more kindness for me than you; I entreat you to hear my affairs." And this you do to those with whom you have not the least acquaintance. But, if you do really trust me, it is plainly as [thinking me] a man of fidelity and honour, and not because I have told you my affairs. Let me alone, then, till I, too, am of this opinion [with regard to you]. Show me that if a person hath told his affairs to any one it is a proof of his being a man of fidelity and honour. For, if this was the case, I would go about and tell my affairs to the whole world, if, upon that account, I should become a man of fidelity and honour. But that is no such matter, but requires a person to have no ordinary principles.

§ 4. If, then, you see any one taking pains for things that belong to others, and subjecting his choice to them, be assured that this man hath a thousand things to compel and restrain him. He hath no need of burning pitch, or the torturing wheel, to make him tell what he knows; but the nod of a girl, for

instance, will shake his purpose; the goodwill of a courtier, the desire of a public post, of an inheritance; ten thousand other things of that sort. It must therefore be remembered in general, that secret discourses require fidelity and a certain sort of principles. And where, at this time, are these easily to be found? Pray, let any one show me a person of such a disposition as to say, I trouble myself only with those things which are my own, incapable of restraint, by nature free. This I esteem the essence of good. Let the rest be as it may happen. It makes no difference to me.

END OF THE DISCOURSES

THE ENCHIRIDION, OR MANUAL, OF EPICTETUS

I

Of things, some are in our power and others not. In our power are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in one word, whatever are our own actions. Not in our power are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.

Now, the things in our power are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our power, weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you suppose things by nature slavish to be free, and what belongs to others your own, you will be hindered; you will lament; you will be disturbed; you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you suppose that only to be your own which is your own, and what belongs to others such as it really is, no one will ever compel you; no one will restrain you; you will find fault with no one; you will accuse no one; you will do no one thing against your will; no one will hurt you; you will not have an enemy, for you will suffer no harm.

Aiming therefore at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be carried, even with a slight tendency, towards the attainment of the others:[1] but that you must entirely quit some of them and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would both have these and command and riches at once, perhaps you will not gain so much as the latter, because you aim at the former too: but you will absolutely fail of the former, by which alone happiness and freedom are procured.

Study therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are but an appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be." And then examine it by those rules which you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns the things which are in our own power, or those which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our power, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.

II

Remember that desire promises the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion promises the avoiding of that to which you are averse; that he who fails of the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object of his aversion wretched. If, then, you confine your aversion to those objects only which are contrary to the natural use of your faculties, which you have in your own power, you will never incur anything to which you are averse. But if you are averse to sickness, or death, or poverty, you will be wretched. Remove aversion, then, from all things that are not in our power, and transfer it to things contrary to the nature of what is in our power. But, for the present, totally suppress desire: for, if you desire any of the things not in our own power, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are, and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your possession.[2] Use only [the requisite acts] of pursuit and avoidance; and even these lightly, and with gentleness and reservation.

III

With regard to whatever objects either delight the mind, or contribute to use, or are loved with fond affection, remember to tell yourself of what nature they are, beginning from the most trifling things. If you are fond of an earthen cup, that it is an earthen cup of which you are fond; for thus, if it is broken, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, that you kiss a being subject to the accidents of humanity; and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.

IV

When you are going about any action, remind yourself of what nature the action is. If you are going to bathe, represent to yourself the things which usually happen in the bath: some persons dashing the water; some pushing and crowding; others giving abusive language; and others stealing. And thus you will more safely go about this action if you say to yourself, "I will now go bathe, and preserve my own mind in a state con-

formable to nature." And in the same manner with regard to every other action. For thus, if any impediment arises in bathing, you will have it ready to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to preserve my mind in a state conformable to nature; and I shall not preserve it so if I am out of humour at things that happen."

V

Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death that it is terrible. When therefore we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own principles. It is the action of an uninstructed person to lay the fault of his own bad condition upon others; of one entering upon instruction to lay the fault on himself; and of one perfectly instructed, neither on others nor on himself.

VI

Be not elated on any excellence not your own. If a horse should be elated and say, "I am handsome," it would be supportable. But when you are elated, and say, "I have a handsome horse," know that you are elated on what is, in fact, only the good of the horse.[3] What, then, is your own? The use of the appearances of things. So that when you behave conformably to nature in the use of these appearances, you will be elated with reason; for you will be elated on some good of your own.

VII

As in a voyage, when the ship is at anchor, if you go on shore to get water you may amuse yourself with picking up a shellfish, or an onion, in your way, but your thoughts ought to be bent towards the ship, and perpetually attentive lest the captain should call, and then you must leave all these things, that you may not be thrown into the vessel, bound neck and heels like a sheep: thus likewise in life, if, instead of an onion or a shell-

fish, such a thing as a wife or a child be granted you, there is no objection; but if the captain calls, run to the ship, leave all these things, regard none of them. But if you are old, never go far from the ship: lest, when you are called, you should be unable to come in time.

VIII

Require not things to happen as you wish, but wish them to happen as they do happen, and you will go on well.

IX

Sickness is an impediment to the body, but not to the faculty of choice, unless itself pleases. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the faculty of choice: and say this to yourself with regard to everything that happens. For you will find it to be an impediment to something else, but not to yourself.

X

Upon every accident, remember to turn towards yourself and inquire what powers you have for making a proper use of it. If you see a handsome person, you will find continence a power against this: if pain be presented to you, you will find fortitude: if ill language, you will find patience. And thus habituated, the appearances of things will not hurry you away along with them.

XI

Never say of anything, "I have lost it"; but, "I have restored it." Is your child dead? It is restored. Is your wife dead? She is restored. Is your estate taken away? Well, and is not that likewise restored? "But he who took it away is a bad man." What is it to you by whose hands he, who gave it, hath demanded it back again? While he gives you to possess it, take care of it; but as of something not your own, as passengers do of an inn.

XII

If you would improve, lay aside such reasonings as these: "If I neglect my affairs, I shall not have a maintenance; if I do not correct my servant, he will be good for nothing." For it is better to die with hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation; and it is better your servant should be bad, than you unhappy.

Begin therefore from little things. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine stolen? Say to yourself, "This is the purchase paid for apathy, for tranquillity, and nothing is to be had for nothing." And when you call your servant, consider it is possible he may not come to your call; or, if he doth, that he may not do what you would have him do. But he is by no means of such importance[4] that it should be in his power to give you any disturbance.

XIII

[5] If you would improve, be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to externals. Do not wish to be thought to know anything; and though you should appear to be somebody to others, distrust yourself. For, be assured, it is not easy at once to preserve your faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature, and [to secure] externals; but while you are careful about the one, you must of necessity neglect the other.

XIV

If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends to live for ever, you are stupid; for you wish things to be in your power which are not so, and what belongs to others to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your servant to be without fault, you are a fool; for you wish vice not to be vice,[6] but something else. But, if you wish to have your desires undisappointed, this is in your own power. Exercise, therefore, what is in your power. He is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove whatever that person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever, then, would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others else he must necessarily be a slave.

XV

Remember that you must behave [in life] as at an entertainment.[7] Is anything brought round to you? Put out your hand and take your share with moderation. Doth it pass by you? Do not stop it. Is it not yet come? Do not stretch forth your desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. Thus do with regard to children, to a wife, to public posts, to riches, and you will be some time or other a worthy partner of the feasts of the gods. And if you do not so much as take the things which are set before you, but are able even to despise them, then you will not only be a partner of the feasts of the gods, but of their empire also. For, by thus doing, Diogenes and Heraclitus,[8] and others like them, deservedly became, and were called, divine.

XVI

When you see any one weeping for grief, either that his son is gone abroad, or dead, or that he hath suffered in his affairs, take heed that the appearance may not hurry you away with it. But immediately make the distinction within your own mind, and have it ready to say, "It is not the accident that distresses this person, for it doth not distress another man; but the judgment which he forms concerning it." As far as words go, however, do not disdain to condescend to him, and even, if it should so happen, to groan with him. Take heed, however, not to groan inwardly too.

XVII

Remember that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it be his pleasure you should act a poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For this is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is another's.

XVIII

When a raven happens to croak unluckily, let not the appearance hurry you away with it, but immediately make the dis-

tinction to yourself, and say, " None of these things is portended to me; but either to my paltry body, or property, or reputation, or children, or wife. But to me all portents are lucky, if I will. For whichever of these things happens, it is in my power to derive advantage from it."

XIX

You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat in which it is not in your own power to conquer. When, therefore, you see any one eminent in honours, or power, or in high esteem on any other account, take heed not to be hurried away with the appearance, and to pronounce him happy; for, if the essence of good consists in things in our own power, there will be no room for envy or emulation. But, for your part, do not wish to be a general, or a senator, or a consul, but to be free; and the only way to this is a contempt of things not in our own power.

XX

Remember, that not he who gives ill language or a blow affronts, but the principle which represents these things as affronting. When, therefore, any one provokes you, be assured that it is your own opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the first place, not to be hurried away with the appearance. For if you once gain time and respite, you will more easily command yourself.

XXI

Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible be daily before your eyes, but chiefly death, and you will never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly covet anything.

XXII

If you have an earnest desire of attaining to philosophy, prepare yourself from the very first to be laughed at, to be sneered by the multitude, to hear them say, " He is returned to us a philosopher all at once," and " Whence this supercilious

look?" Now, for your part, do not have a supercilious look indeed; but keep steadily to those things which appear best to you as one appointed by God to this station. For remember that, if you adhere to the same point, those very persons who at first ridiculed will afterwards admire you. But if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double ridicule.

XXIII

If you ever happen to turn your attention to externals, so as to wish to please any one, be assured that you have ruined your scheme of life.[9] Be contented, then, in everything with being a philosopher; and, if you wish to be thought so likewise by any one, appear so to yourself, and it will suffice you.

XXIV

Let not such considerations as these distress you. "I shall live in dishonour, and be nobody anywhere." For, if dishonour is an evil, you can no more be involved in any evil by the means of another, than be engaged in anything base. Is it any business of yours, then, to get power, or to be admitted to an entertainment? By no means. How, then, after all, is this a dishonour? And how is it true that you will be nobody anywhere, when you ought to be somebody in those things only which are in your own power, in which you may be of the greatest consequence? "But my friends will be unassisted."—What do you mean by unassisted? They will not have money from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. Who told you, then, that these are among the things in our own power, and not the affair of others? And who can give to another the things which he hath not himself? "Well, but get them, then, that we too may have a share." If I can get them with the preservation of my own honour and fidelity and greatness of mind, show me the way and I will get them; but if you require me to lose my own proper good that you may gain what is no good, consider how unequitable and foolish you are. Besides, which would you rather have, a sum of money, or a friend of fidelity and honour? Rather assist me, then, to gain this character than require me to do those things by which I may lose it. Well, but my country, say you, as far as depends on

me, will be unassisted. Here again, what assistance is this you mean? "It will not have porticoes nor baths of your providing." And what signifies that? Why, neither doth a smith provide it with shoes, or a shoemaker with arms. It is enough if every one fully performs his own proper business. And were you to supply it with another citizen of honour and fidelity, would not[10] he be of use to it? Yes. Therefore neither are you yourself useless to it. "What place, then, say you, shall I hold in the state?" Whatever you can hold with the preservation of your fidelity and honour. But if, by desiring to be useful to that, you lose these, of what use can you be to your country when you are become faithless and void of shame?

XXV

Is any one preferred before you at an entertainment, or in a compliment, or in being admitted to a consultation? If these things are good, you ought to rejoice that he hath got them; and if they are evil, do not be grieved that you have not got them. And remember that you cannot, without using the same means [which others do] to acquire things not in our own power, expect to be thought worthy of an equal share of them. For how can he who doth not frequent the door of any [great] man, doth not attend him, doth not praise him, have an equal share with him who doth? You are unjust, then, and unsatiable, if you are unwilling to pay the price for which these things are sold, and would have them for nothing. For how much are lettuces sold? A halfpenny, for instance. If another, then, paying a halfpenny, takes the lettuces, and you, not paying it, go without them, do not imagine that he hath gained any advantage over you. For as he hath the lettuces, so you have the halfpenny which you did not give. So, in the present case, you have not been invited to such a person's entertainment, because you have not paid him the price for which a supper is sold. It is sold for praise; it is sold for attendance. Give him then the value, if it be for your advantage. But if you would, at the same time, not pay the one and yet receive the other, you are unsatiable, and a blockhead. Have you nothing, then, instead of the supper? Yes, indeed, you have: the not praising him, whom you do not like to praise; the not bearing with his behaviour at coming in.[11]

XXVI

The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from each other. As, when our neighbour's boy hath broken a cup, or the like, we are presently ready to say, "These are things that will happen." Be assured, then, that when your own cup likewise is broken, you ought to be affected just as when another's cup was broken. Transfer this, in like manner, to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? There is no one who would not say, "This is a human accident." But if any one's own child happens to die, it is presently, "Alas! how wretched am I!" But it should be remembered how we are affected in hearing the same thing concerning others.

XXVII

As a mark [12] is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so neither doth the nature of evil exist in the world.

XXVIII

If a person had delivered up your body to any one whom he met in his way, you would certainly be angry. And do you feel no shame in delivering up your own mind to be disconcerted and confounded by any one who happens to give you ill language?

XXIX [13]

[Discourses, III. XV.]

XXX

Duties are universally measured by relations. Is any one a father? In this are implied, as due, taking care of him, submitting to him in all things, patiently receiving his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Is your natural tie then to a good father? No; but to a father. Is a brother

unjust? Well, preserve your own situation towards him. Consider not what he doth, but what you are to do to keep your own faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature. For another will not hurt you unless you please. You will then be hurt when you think you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will find, from the idea of a neighbour, a citizen, a general, the corresponding duties if you accustom yourself to contemplate the several relations.

XXXI

Be assured that the essential property of piety towards the gods is to form right opinions concerning them, as existing [14] and as governing the universe with goodness and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect understanding. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them as neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected any other way [15] than by withdrawing yourself from things not in our own power, and placing good or evil in those only which are. For if you suppose any of the things not in our own power to be either good or evil, when you are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily find fault with and blame the authors. For every animal is naturally formed to fly and abhor things that appear hurtful, and the causes of them; and to pursue and admire those which appear beneficial, and the causes of them. It is impracticable, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt should rejoice in the person who, he thinks, hurts him, just as it is impossible to rejoice in the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by a son, when he doth not impart to him the things which he takes to be good; and the supposing empire to be a good made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies. On this account the husbandman, the sailor, the merchant, on this account those who lose wives and children, revile the gods. For where interest is, there too is piety placed. So that, whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought, is, by the very same means, careful of piety likewise. But it is also incumbent on every one to offer libations and sacrifices and first fruits, conformably to the customs of his country, with purity, and not in a slovenly manner, nor negligently, nor sparingly, nor beyond his ability.

XXXII

When you have recourse to divination, remember that you know not what the event will be, and you come to learn it of the diviner; but of what nature it is you know before you come, at least if you are a philosopher. For if it is among the things not in our own power, it can by no means be either good or evil. Do not, therefore, bring either desire or aversion with you to the diviner (else you will approach him trembling), but first acquire a distinct knowledge that every event is indifferent and nothing to you, of whatever sort it may be, for it will be in your power to make a right use of it, and this no one can hinder; then come with confidence to the gods, as your counsellors, and afterwards, when any counsel is given you, remember what counsellors you have assumed, and whose advice you will neglect if you disobey. Come to divination, as Socrates prescribed, in cases of which the whole consideration relates to the event, and in which no opportunities are afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover the thing proposed to be learned. When, therefore, it is our duty to share the danger of a friend or of our country, we ought not to consult the oracle whether we shall share it with them or not. For, though the diviner should forewarn you that the victims are unfavourable, this means no more than that either death or mutilation or exile is portended. But we have reason within us, and it directs, even with these hazards, to stand by our friend and our country. Attend, therefore, to the greater diviner, the Pythian god, who cast out of the temple the person who gave no assistance to his friend while another was murdering him.

XXXIII

Immediately prescribe some character and form [of behaviour] to yourself, which you may preserve both alone and in company.

Be for the most part silent, or speak merely what is necessary, and in few words. We may, however, enter, though sparingly, into discourse sometimes when occasion calls for it, but not on any of the common subjects, of gladiators, or horse races, or athletic champions, or feasts, the vulgar topics of conversation; but principally not of men, so as either to blame, or praise, or make comparisons. If you are able, then, by your own con-

versation bring over that of your company to proper subjects; but, if you happen to be taken among strangers, be silent.

Let not your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor profuse.[16]

Avoid swearing, if possible, altogether; if not, as far as you are able.

Avoid public and vulgar entertainments; but, if ever an occasion calls you to them, keep your attention upon the stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar manners. For be assured that if a person be ever so sound himself, yet, if his companion be infected, he who converses with him will be infected likewise.

Provide things relating to the body no further than mere use; as meat, drink, clothing, house, family. But strike off and reject everything relating to show and delicacy.

As far as possible, before marriage, preserve yourself pure from familiarities with women, and, if you indulge them, let it be lawfully.[17] But do not therefore be troublesome and full of reproofs to those who use these liberties, nor frequently boast that you yourself do not.

If any one tells you that such a person speaks ill of you, do not make excuses about what is said of you, but answer: "He doth not know my other faults, else he would not have mentioned only these."

It is not necessary for you to appear often at public spectacles; but if ever there is a proper occasion for you to be there, do not appear more solicitous for any one than for yourself; that is, wish things to be only just as they are, and him only to conquer who is the conqueror, for thus you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from acclamations and derision and violent emotions. And when you come away, do not discourse a great deal on what hath passed, and what doth not contribute to your own amendment. For it would appear by such discourse that you were immoderately struck with the show.

Go not [of your own accord] to the rehearsals of any [authors], nor appear [at them] readily. But, if you do appear, preserve your gravity and sedateness, and at the same time avoid being morose.

When you are going to confer with any one, and particularly of those in a superior station, represent to yourself how Socrates or Zeno would behave in such a case, and you will not be at a loss to make a proper use of whatever may occur.

When you are going to any of the people in power, represent

to yourself that you will not find him at home; that you will not be admitted; that the doors will not be opened to you; that he will take no notice of you. If, with all this, it be your duty to go, bear what happens, and never say [to yourself], "It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a man disconcerted by externals.[18]

In parties of conversation, avoid a frequent and excessive mention of your own actions and dangers. For, however agreeable it may be to yourself to mention the risks you have run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your adventures. Avoid, likewise, an endeavour to excite laughter. For this is a slippery point, which may throw you into vulgar manners, and, besides, may be apt to lessen you in the esteem of your acquaintance. Approaches to indecent discourse are likewise dangerous. Whenever, therefore, anything of this sort happens, if there be a proper opportunity, rebuke him who makes advances that way; or, at least, by silence and blushing and a forbidding look, show yourself to be displeased by such talk.

XXXIV

If you are struck by the appearance of any promised pleasure, guard yourself against being hurried away by it; but let the affair wait your leisure, and procure yourself some delay. Then bring to your mind both points of time: that in which you shall enjoy the pleasure, and that in which you will repent and reproach yourself after you have enjoyed it; and set before you, in opposition to these, how you will rejoice and applaud yourself if you abstain. And even though it should appear to you a seasonable gratification, take heed that its enticing, and agreeable and attractive force may not subdue you; but set in opposition to this how much better it is to be conscious of having gained so great a victory.

XXXV

When you do anything from a clear judgment that it ought to be done, never shun the being seen to do it, even though the world should make a wrong supposition about it; for, if you do not act right, shun the action itself; but, if you do, why are you afraid of those who censure you wrongly?

XXXVI

As the proposition, Either it is day or it is night, is extremely proper for a disjunctive argument, but quite improper in a conjunctive one,[19] so, at a feast, to choose the largest share is very suitable to the bodily appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social spirit of an entertainment. When you eat with another, then, remember not only the value of those things which are set before you to the body, but the value of that behaviour which ought to be observed towards the person who gives the entertainment.

XXXVII

If you have assumed any character above your strength, you have both made an ill figure in that and quitted one which you might have supported.

XXXVIII

As, in walking, you take care not to tread upon a nail or turn your foot, so likewise take care not to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And, if we were to guard against this in every action, we should undertake the action with the greater safety.

XXXIX

The body is to every one the measure of the possessions proper for it, as the foot is of the shoe. If, therefore, you stop at this, you will keep the measure; but if you move beyond it, you must necessarily be carried forward, as down a precipice; as in the case of a shoe, if you go beyond its fitness to the foot, it comes first to be gilded, then purple,[20] and then studded with jewels. For to that which once exceeds a due measure, there is no bound.

XL

Women from fourteen years old are flattered with the title of "mistresses" by the men. Therefore, perceiving that they

are regarded only as qualified to give the men pleasure, they begin to adorn themselves, and in that to place all their hopes. It is worth while, therefore, to fix our attention on making them sensible that they are esteemed for nothing else but the appearance of a decent and modest and discreet behaviour.[21]

XLI

It is a mark of want of genius to spend much time in things relating to the body, as to be long in our exercises, in eating and drinking, and in the discharge of other animal functions. These should be done incidentally and slightly, and our whole attention be engaged in the care of the understanding.

XLII

When any person doth ill by you, or speaks ill of you, remember that he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he judges from a wrong appearance, he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived. For if any one should suppose a true proposition to be false, the proposition is not hurt, but he who is deceived about it. Setting out, then, from these principles, you will meekly bear a person who reviles you, for you will say upon every occasion, "It seemed so to him."

XLIII

Everything hath two handles, the one by which it may be borne, the other by which it cannot. If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold on the action by the handle of his injustice, for by that it cannot be borne; but by the opposite, that he is your brother, that he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be borne.

XLIV

These reasonings are unconnected: "I am richer than you, therefore I am better"; "I am more eloquent than you,

therefore I am better." The connection is rather this: "I am richer than you, therefore my property is greater than yours"; "I am more eloquent than you, therefore my style is better than yours." But you, after all, are neither property nor style.

XLV

Doth any one bathe [22] in a mighty little time? Do not say that he doth it ill, but in a mighty little time. Doth any one drink a great quantity of wine? Do not say that he doth ill, but that he drinks a great quantity. For, unless you perfectly understand the principle [from which any one acts], how should you know if he acts ill? Thus you will not run the hazard of assenting to any appearances but such as you fully comprehend.

XLVI

Never call yourself a philosopher, nor talk a great deal among the unlearned about theorems, but act conformably to them. Thus, at an entertainment, do not talk how persons ought to eat, but eat as you ought. For remember that in this manner Socrates also universally avoided all ostentation. And when persons came to him and desired to be recommended by him to philosophers, he took and recommended them, so well did he bear being overlooked. So that if ever any talk should happen among the unlearned concerning philosophic theorems, be you, for the most part, silent. For there is great danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digested. And, if any one tells you that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you may be sure that you have begun your business. For sheep do not throw up the grass to show the shepherds how much they have eaten; but, inwardly digesting their food, they outwardly produce wool and milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewise not show theorems to the unlearned, but the actions produced by them after they have been digested.

XLVII

When you have brought yourself to supply the necessities of your body at a small price, do not pique yourself upon it; nor,

if you drink water, be saying upon every occasion, "I drink water." But first consider how much more sparing and patient of hardship the poor are than we. But if at any time you would inure yourself by exercise to labour, and bearing hard trials, do it for your own sake, and not for the world; do not grasp [23] statues, but, when you are violently thirsty, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spurt it out and tell nobody.

XLVIII

The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person, is, that he never expects either benefit or hurt from himself, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is, that he expects all hurt and benefit from himself. The marks of a proficient are, that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one, says nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing anything: when he is, in any instance, hindered or restrained, he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly laughs at the person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no defence. But he goes about with the caution of infirm people [after sickness or an accident], dreading to move anything that is set right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses [24] all desire in himself; he transfers his aversion to those things only which thwart the proper use of our own faculty of choice; the exertion of his active powers towards anything is very gentle; if he appears stupid or ignorant, he doth not care, and, in a word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in ambush.

XLIX

When any one shows himself vain on being able to understand and interpret the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself, "Unless Chrysippus had written obscurely, this person would have had no subject for his vanity. But what do I desire? To understand nature and follow her. I ask, then, who interprets her, and, finding Chrysippus doth, I have recourse to him. I do not understand his writings. I seek, therefore, one to interpret them." So far there is nothing to value myself upon. And when I find an interpreter, what remains is to make use of his instructions. This alone is the valuable thing. But, if I

admire nothing but merely the interpretation, what do I become more than a grammarian instead of a philosopher? Except, indeed, that instead of Homer I interpret Chrysippus. When any one, therefore, desires me to read Chrysippus to him, I rather blush when I cannot show my actions agreeable and consonant to his discourse.

L

Whatever rules you have deliberately proposed to yourself [for the conduct of life], abide by them as so many laws, and as if you would be guilty of impiety in transgressing any of them; and do not regard what any one says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. How long, then, will you defer to think yourself worthy of the noblest improvements, and in no instance to transgress the distinctions of reason? You have received the philosophic theorems, with which you ought to be conversant, and you have been conversant with them. What other master, then, do you wait for, to throw upon that the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a boy, but a grown man.[25] If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere in being one of the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of living as a man grown up, and a proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best be to you an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, be set before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off; and that, by once being worsted and giving way, proficiency is lost, or [by the contrary] preserved. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything,[26] attending to nothing but reason. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one desirous of becoming a Socrates.

LI

The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that of the use of [practical] theorems, as that, We ought not to lie; the second is that of demonstrations, as, Whence it is that we ought

not to lie; the third, that which gives strength and articulation to the other two, as, Whence this is a demonstration. For what is demonstration? What is consequence? What contradiction? What truth? What falsehood? The third topic, then, is necessary on the account of the second, and the second on the account of the first. But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we act just on the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third topic, and employ all our diligence about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are mighty ready to show how it is demonstrated that lying is not right.

LII

Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand:

> "Conduct me, Jove, and thou, O Destiny,
> Wherever your decrees have fixed my station.
> I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,
> Wicked and wretched, I must follow still." [27]

> "Whoe'er yields properly to Fate, is deemed
> Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven." [28]

And this third:

[29] "O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed, but hurt me they cannot."

THE END OF THE ENCHIRIDION

FRAGMENTS OF EPICTETUS

FROM

STOBÆUS, ANTONIUS, AND MAXIMUS[1]

I

A LIFE entangled with fortune resembles a wintry torrent; for it is turbulent, and muddy, and difficult to pass, and violent, and noisy, and of short continuance.

A soul conversant with virtue resembles a perpetual fountain; for it is clear, and gentle, and potable, and sweet, and communicative, and rich, and harmless, and innocent.

II

If you would be good, first believe that you are bad.

III

It is better to offend seldom (owning it when we do), and act often wisely, than to say we seldom err, and offend frequently

IV

Chastise your passions, that they may not punish you.

V

Be not so much ashamed of what is void of glory, as studious to shun what is void of truth.

VI

If you would be well spoken of, learn to speak well of others. And, when you have learned to speak well of them, endeavour

likewise to do well to them; and thus you will reap the fruit of being well spoken of by them.

VII

Freedom is the name of virtue; and slavery, of vice; and both these are actions of choice. But neither of them belongs to things in which choice hath no share. But fortune [2] is accustomed to dispose at her pleasure of the body, and those things relating to the body in which choice hath no share. For no one is a slave whose choice is free. Fortune is an evil chain to the body, and vice to the soul. For he whose body is unbound, and whose soul is chained, is a slave. On the contrary, he whose body is chained, and his soul unbound, is free. The chain of the body nature unbinds by death, and vice by [3] money; the chain of the soul virtue unbinds by learning, and experience, and philosophic exercise.

VIII

If you would live with tranquillity and content, endeavour to have all who live with you good. And you will have them good by instructing the willing and dismissing the unwilling.[4] For together with the fugitives will wickedness and slavery fly; and with those who remain with you will goodness and liberty be left.

IX

[5] It is scandalous that he who sweetens his drink by the gifts of the bees should by vice embitter reason, the gift of the gods.

X

No one who is a lover of money, a lover of pleasure, or a lover of glory, is likewise a lover of mankind; but only he who is a lover of virtue.

XI

As you would not wish to sail in a large and finely decorated and gilded ship, and sink; so neither is it eligible to inhabit a

grand and sumptuous house, and be in a storm [of passions and cares].

XII

When we are invited to an entertainment, we take what we find; and if any one should bid the master of the house set fish or tarts before him, he would be thought absurd. Yet, in the world, we ask the gods for what they do not give us, and that though they have given us so many things.

XIII

They are pretty fellows indeed, said he, who value themselves on things not in our own power. I am a better man than you, says one, for I have many estates, and you are pining with hunger. I have been consul, says another; I am a governor, a third; and I have a fine head of hair, says a fourth. Yet one horse doth not say to another, "I am better than you, for I have a great deal of hay and a great deal of oats; and I have a gold bridle and embroidered trappings"; but, "I am swifter than you." And every creature is better or worse, from its own good or bad qualities. Is man, then, the only creature which hath no natural good quality? And must we consider hair, and clothes, and ancestors [to judge of him]?

XIV

Patients are displeased with a physician who doth not prescribe to them, and think he gives them over. And why are none so affected towards a philosopher as to conclude he despairs of their recovery to a right way of thinking, if he tells them nothing which may be for their good?

XV

They who have a good constitution of body support heats and colds; and so they who have a right constitution of soul bear [the attacks of] anger, and grief, and immoderate joy, and the other passions.

XVI

Examine yourself, whether you had rather be rich or happy; and, if rich, be assured that this is neither a good, nor altogether in your own power; but, if happy, that this is both a good, and in your own power, since the one is a temporary loan of fortune [6] and the other depends on choice.

XVII

As when you see a viper, or an asp, or a scorpion, in an ivory or gold box, you do not love or think it happy on account of the magnificence of the materials in which it is enclosed, but shun and detest it because it is of a pernicious nature; so likewise, when you see vice lodged in the midst of wealth and the swelling pride of fortune, be not struck by the splendour of the materials with which it is surrounded, but despise the base alloy of its manners.

XVIII

Riches are not among the number of things which are good; prodigality is of the number of those which are evil; rightness of mind, of those which are good. Now, rightness of mind invites to frugality and the acquisition of things that are good; but riches invite to prodigality, and seduce from rightness of mind. It is difficult, therefore, for a rich person to be right-minded, or a right-minded person rich.[7]

XIX

[8] —— Just as if you had been bred and born in a ship, you would not be eager to become the pilot. For neither would the ship have any natural and perpetual connection [9] with you there, nor have riches here, but reason everywhere. That, therefore, which is natural and congenial to you, reason, think likewise to be in a peculiar manner your own, and take care of it.

XX

If you were born in Persia, you would not endeavour to live in Greece, but to be happy in the place where you are. Why, then, if you are born in poverty, do you endeavour to be rich, and not to be happy in the condition where you are?

XXI

As it is better to lie straitened for room upon a little couch in health, than to toss upon a wide bed in sickness, so it is better to contract yourself within the compass of a small fortune and be happy, than to have a great one and be wretched.

XXII

It is not poverty that causes sorrow, but covetous desires; [10] nor do riches deliver from fear, but reasoning. If, therefore, you acquire a habit of reasoning, you will neither desire riches nor complain of poverty.

XXIII

A horse is not elated, and doth not value himself on his fine manger or trappings or saddle-clothes; nor a bird, on the warm materials of its nest: but the former, on the swiftness of his feet; and the latter, of its wings. Do not you, therefore, glory in your eating or dress, or, briefly, in any external advantage, but in good-nature and beneficence.

XXIV

There is a difference between living well and living profusely. The one arises from contentment and order, and decency and frugality; the other from dissoluteness and luxury, and disorder and indecency. In short, to the one belongs true praise, to the other censure. If, therefore, you would live well, do not seek to be praised for profuseness.

XXV

Let the first satisfying of appetite be always the measure to you of eating and drinking, and appetite itself the sauce and the pleasure. Thus you will never take more [food] than is necessary, nor will you want cooks; and you will be contented with whatever drink falls in your way.[11]

XXVI

Be careful not to thrive [12] by the meats in your stomach, but by cheerfulness in the soul. For the former, as you see, are evacuated and carried off together; but the latter, though the soul be separated,[13] remains uncorrupted and sincere.

XXVII

In every feast remember that there are two guests to be entertained, the body and the soul; and that what you give the body you presently lose, but what you give the soul remains for ever.

XXVIII

Do not mix anger with profusion and set them before your guests. Profusion makes its way through the body and is quickly gone; but anger, when it hath penetrated the soul, abides for a long time. Take care not to be transported with anger and affront your guests, at a great expense; but rather delight them at a cheap rate by gentle behaviour.

XXIX

Take care at your meals that the attendants be not more in number than those whom they are to attend. For it is absurd that many persons should wait on a few chairs.

XXX

It would be best if, both while you are personally making your

preparations, and while you are feasting at table, you could give among the servants part of what is before you.[14] But, if such a thing be difficult at that time, remember that you, who are not weary, are attended by those who are; you, who are eating and drinking, by those who are not; you, who are talking, by those who are silent; you, who are at ease, by those who are under constraint;[15] and thus you will never be heated into any unreasonable passion yourself, nor do any mischief by provoking another.

XXXI

Strife and contention are always absurd, but particularly unbecoming at table conversations. For a person warmed with wine will never either teach or be convinced by one who is sober. And wherever sobriety is wanting, the end will show that you have exerted yourself to no purpose.

XXXII

Grasshoppers are musical, but snails are dumb. The one rejoice in being wet, and the others in being warm. Then the dew calls out the one, and for this they come forth; but, on the contrary, the noonday sun awakens the other, and in this they sing. If, therefore, you would be a musical and harmonious person, whenever, in parties of drinking, the soul is bedewed with wine, suffer her not to go forth and defile herself. But when, in parties of conversation, she glows by the beams of reason, then command her to speak from inspiration and utter the oracles of justice.

XXXIII

Consider him with whom you converse in one of these three ways: either as superior to you [in abilities], or inferior, or equal. If superior, you ought to hear him and be convinced; if inferior, to convince[16] him; if equal, to agree with him; and thus you will never be found guilty of litigiousness.

XXXIV

It is better, by yielding to truth, to conquer opinion; than, by yielding to opinion, to be defeated by truth.

XXXV

If you seek truth you will not seek to conquer by all possible means; and when you have found truth, you will have a security against being conquered.

XXXVI

Truth conquers by itself, opinion by foreign aids.

XXXVII

It is better, by living with one free person, to be fearless and free, than to be a slave in company with many.

XXXVIII

What you avoid suffering yourself, attempt not to impose on others. You avoid slavery, for instance; take care not to enslave. For, if you can bear to exact slavery from others, you appear to have been first yourself a slave. For vice hath no communication with virtue, nor freedom with slavery. As a person in health would not wish to be attended by the sick, nor to have those who live with him be in a state of sickness; so neither would a person who is free bear to be served by slaves, or to have those who live with him in a state of slavery.

XXXIX

Whoever you are that would live at a distance from slaves, deliver yourself from slavery. And you will be free if you deliver yourself from [the power of] appetite. For neither was Aristides called just, nor Epaminondas divine, nor Lycurgus a preserver, because they were rich and were served by slaves, but because, being poor, they delivered Greece from slavery.

XL

If you would have your house securely inhabited, imitate the Spartan Lycurgus. And as he did not enclose his city with walls,

but fortified the inhabitants with virtue, and preserved the city always free, so you do likewise; not surround yourself with a great courtyard, nor raise high towers, but strengthen those that live with you by benevolence and fidelity and friendship. And thus nothing hurtful will enter, even if the whole band of wickedness was set in array against it.

XLI

Do not hang your house round with tablets and pictures, but adorn it with sobriety. For those are merely foreign, and a fading [17] deception of the eyes; but this, a congenial and indelible and perpetual ornament to the house.

XLII

Instead of herds of oxen, endeavour to assemble flocks of friends about your house.

XLIII

As a wolf resembles a dog, so doth a flatterer and an adulterer and a parasite resemble a friend. Take heed, therefore, that, instead of guardian dogs, you do not inadvertently admit ravening wolves.

XLIV

He is void of true taste who strives to have his house admired by decorating it with a showish outside; but to adorn our characters by the gentleness of a communicative temper is at once a proof of good taste and good nature.

XLV

If you admire little things, in the first place, you will never [18] be thought to deserve great ones; but, if you despise little things, you will be greatly admired.

XLVI

Nothing is meaner than the love of pleasure, the love of gain, and insolence. Nothing is nobler than magnanimity, meekness, and good-nature.

XLVII

—Producing the sentiments of those intractable philosophers who do not think [the enjoyment of] pleasure to be [in itself] the natural state of man, but merely an adventitious circumstance of those things in which his natural state consists, justice, sobriety, and freedom. For what manner of reason, then, should the soul rejoice, and feel a serenity from the lesser good of the body, as Epicurus says it doth, and not be pleased with its own good, which is the very greatest? And yet nature hath given me likewise a sense of shame; and I am covered with blushes when I think I have uttered any indecent expression. This emotion will not suffer me to lay down pleasure as [in itself] a good, and the end of life.

XLVIII

The ladies at Rome have Plato's *Republic* in their hands, because he allows a community of wives; for they attend merely to the words of the author, and not to his sense. For he doth not first order one man and one woman to marry and live together, and then allow a community of wives, but he abolishes that kind of marriage and introduces one of another kind.[19] And, in general, men are pleased in finding out excuses for their own faults. Yet philosophy says, it is not fit even to move a finger without some reason.

XLIX

The more rarely the objects of pleasure occur, the more delightful they are.

L

Whenever any one exceeds moderation, the most delightful things may become the most undelightful.

LI

Agrippinus was justly entitled to praise on this account, that, though he was a man of the highest worth, he never praised himself; but blushed, even if another praised him. And he was a man of such a character as to write in praise of every harsh event that befell him; if he was feverish, of a fever; if disgraced, of disgrace; if banished, of banishment. And when once, as he was going to dine, a messenger brought him word that Nero ordered him to banishment: Well, then, says Agrippinus, we will dine at Aricia.[20]

LII

Diogenes affirmed no labour to be good, unless the end was a due state and tone of the soul, and not of the body.

LIII

As a true balance is neither set right by a true one, nor judged by a false one,[21] so likewise a just person is neither set right by just persons, nor judged by unjust ones.

LIV

As what is straight hath no need of what is straight, so neither what is just of what is just [to assist or amend it].

LV

Do not give judgment from another tribunal before you have been judged yourself as the tribunal of justice.[22]

LVI

If you would give a just sentence, mind neither parties nor pleaders, but the cause itself.

LVII

You will commit the fewest faults in judging, if you are faultless in your own life.

LVIII

It is better, by giving a just judgment, to be[23] blamed by him who is deservedly condemned, than, by giving an unjust judgment, to be justly censured by nature.

LIX

As the touch-stone which tries gold is not itself tried by the gold, such is he who hath the rule of judging.

LX

It is scandalous for a judge to be judged by others.

LXI

As nothing is straighter than what is straight, so nothing is juster than what is just.[24]

LXII

Who among you do not admire the action of Lycurgus the Lacedemonian? For when he had been deprived of one of his eyes by one of the citizens, and the people had delivered the young man to him to be punished in whatever manner he should think proper, Lycurgus forbore to give him any punishment. But having instructed and rendered him a good man, he brought him into the theatre; and, while the Lacedemonians were struck with admiration, "I received," says he, "this person from you injurious and violent, and I restore him to you gentle, and a good citizen."

LXIII

When Pittacus had been unjustly treated by some person, and had the power of chastising him, he let him go; saying, "Forgiveness is better than punishment; for the one is the proof of a gentle, the other of a savage nature."

LXIV

—But, above all, this is the business of nature, to connect and mutually adapt the exertion of the active powers [25] to the appearance of what is fit and beneficial.

LXV

It is the character of the most mean-spirited and foolish men to suppose they shall be despised by others, unless, by every method, they hurt those who are first their enemies.[26]

LXVI

When you are going to attack any one with vehemence and threatening, remember to say first to yourself that you are [by nature] a gentle animal, and that by doing nothing violent you shall live without repentance, and without need of being set right.

LXVII

We ought to know that it is not easy for a man to form a principle of action, unless he daily speaks and hears the same things, and, at the same time, accommodates them to the use of life.

LXVIII

Nicias was so intent on business that he often asked his domestics whether he had bathed, and whether he had dined.

LXIX

While Archimedes was intent on his Diagrams, his servants drew him away by violence, and anointed [22] him; and, after his body was anointed, he traced his figures upon that.

LXX

When Lampis, the sea commander, was asked how he acquired riches: "A great deal," said he, "without difficulty, but a little with labour."

LXXI

Solon, when he was silent at an entertainment, being asked by Periander whether he was silent for want of words, or from folly: "No fool," answered he, "can be silent at a feast."

LXXII

Consult nothing so much, upon every occasion, as safety. Now it is safer to be silent than to speak; and omit speaking whatever is not accompanied with sense and reason.

LXXIII

As lighthouses in havens, by kindling a great flame from a few fagots, afford a considerable assistance to ships wandering on the sea: so an illustrious person, in a state harassed by storms, while he is contented with little himself, confers great benefits on his fellow-citizens.

LXXIV

—As you would certainly, if you undertook to steer a ship, learn the steersman's art. For it will be in your power, as, in that case, to steer the whole ship, so, in this, the whole state.

LXXV

If you have a mind to adorn your city by consecrated monuments, first consecrate in yourself the most beautiful monument of gentleness and justice and benevolence.

LXXVI

You will confer the greatest benefits on your city, not by raising the roofs, but by exalting the souls [of your fellow-citizens]. For it is better that great souls should live in small habitations than that abject slaves should burrow in great houses.

LXXVII

Do not variegate the structure of your walls with Eubœan and Spartan stone; but adorn both the minds of the citizens and of those who govern them by the Grecian education. For cities are made good habitations by the sentiments of those who live in them, not by wood and stone.

LXXVIII

As, if you were to breed lions, you would not be solicitous about the magnificence of their dens, but the qualities of the animals themselves: so, if you undertake to preside over your fellow-citizens, be not so solicitous about the magnificence of the buildings, as careful of the fortitude of those who inhabit them.

LXXIX

As a skilful manager of horses doth not feed the good colts, and suffer the unruly ones to starve, but feeds them both alike; only whips one more, to make him draw equally with his fellow: so a man of care and skill in the art of civil government endeavours to do good [28] to the well-disposed citizens, but not at once to destroy those that are otherwise. He by no means denies subsistence to either of them; only he disciplines and urges on, with the greater vehemence, him who resists reason and the laws.

LXXX

As neither a goose is alarmed by gaggling, nor a sheep by bleating: so neither be you terrified by the voice of a senseless multitude.

LXXXI

As you do not comply with a multitude when it injudiciously asks of you any part of your own property: so neither be disconcerted by a mob when it endeavours to force you to any unjust compliance.

LXXXII

Pay in, before you are called upon, what is due to the public, and you will never be asked for what is not due.

LXXXIII

As the sun doth not wait for prayers and incantations to be prevailed on to rise, but immediately shines forth, and is received with universal salutation: so, neither do you wait for applauses and shouts and praises, in order to do good; but be a voluntary benefactor, and you will be beloved like the sun.[29]

LXXXIV

A ship ought not to be fixed by one anchor, nor life on a single hope.[30]

LXXXV

We ought not to stretch either our legs or our hopes to a point they cannot reach.

LXXXVI

Thales, being asked what was the most universally enjoyed of all things, answered, "Hope; for they have it who have nothing else."

LXXXVII

It is more necessary for the soul to be cured than the body; for it is better to die than to live ill.

LXXXVIII

Pyrrho used to say, "There is no difference between living and dying." A person asked him, Why, then, do not you die? "Because," answered Pyrrho, "there is no difference."[31]

LXXXIX

Nature is admirable, and, as Xenophon says, fond of life. Hence we love and take care of the body, which is of all things the most unpleasant and squalid. For if we were obliged, only for five days, to take care of our neighbour's body, we could not support it. For only consider what it would be, when we get up in a morning, to wash the teeth of others, and do all requisite offices besides. In reality, it is wonderful we should love a thing which every day demands so much attendance. I stuff this sack, and then I empty it again. What is more troublesome? But I must obey God. Therefore I stay, and bear to wash and feed and clothe this paltry, miserable body. When I was younger, he commanded me something still more, and I bore it. And will you not, when nature, which gave the body, takes it away, bear that? "I love it," say you. Well, this is what I have just been observing; and this very love hath nature given you; but she also says, "Now let it go, and have no further trouble."

XC

When a young man dies, [an old one] accuses the gods that, at the time when he ought to be at rest, he is encumbered with the troubles of life. Yet,[32] nevertheless, when death approaches, he wishes to live, and sends for the physician, and entreats him to omit no care or pains. It is marvellous that men should not be willing either to live or die.

XCI

To a longer and worse life, a shorter and better is by all means to be preferred by every one.

XCII

When we are children, our parents deliver us to the care of a tutor, who is continually to watch over us that we get no hurt. When we are become men, God delivers us to the guardianship of an implanted conscience. We ought by no means, then, to despise this guardian; for it will both displease[33] God, and we shall be enemies to our own conscious principle.

XCIII

Riches ought to be used as the materials of some action, and not upon every occasion alike.

XCIV

All men should rather wish for virtue than wealth, which is dangerous to the foolish; for vice is increased by riches. And in proportion as any one is destitute of understanding, into the more injurious excess he flies out, by having the means of gratifying the rage of his pleasures.

XCV

What ought not to be done, be not even suspected [or, entertain not even a thought] of doing.[34]

XCVI

Deliberate much before you say and do anything; for it will not be in your power to recall what is said or done.

XCVII

Every place is safe to him who lives with justice.

XCVIII

Crows pick out the eyes of the dead when they are no longer of any use. But flatterers destroy the soul of the living, and blind its eyes.

XCIX

The anger of a monkey, and the threats of a flatterer, deserve equal regard.

C

Kindly receive those who are willing to give good advice; but not those who upon every occasion are eager to flatter. For the former truly see what is advantageous; but the latter consider only the opinions of their superiors, and imitate the shadows of bodies by nodding assent to what they say

CI

A monitor ought, in the first place, to have a regard to the delicacy and sense [35] of shame of the person admonished. For they who are hardened against a blush are incorrigible.

CII

It is better to admonish than reproach; for the one is mild and friendly, the other harsh and affronting; and the one corrects the faulty, the other only convicts them.

CIII

[36] Communicate to strangers and persons in need, according to your ability.[37] For he who gives nothing to the needy, shall receive nothing in his own need.

CIV

A person once brought clothes to a pirate, who had been cast ashore and almost killed by the severity of the weather; then carried him to his house and furnished him with other conveniences. Being reproached by some person for doing good to bad people, "I have paid this regard," answered he, "not to the man, but to human nature."

CV

We ought not to choose every pleasure, but that which tends to something good.

CVI

It is the character of a wise man to resist pleasure, and of a fool to be enslaved by it.

CVII

In all vice, pleasure being presented like a bait, draws sensual minds to the hook of perdition.

CVIII

Choose rather to punish your appetites than to be punished by them.

CIX

No one is free who doth not command himself.

CX

The vine bears three clusters. The first of pleasure, the second of intoxication, the third of outrage.[38]

CXI

Do not talk much over wine to show your learning; for your discourse will be loathsome.

CXII

He is a drunkard who takes more than three glasses; and though he be not drunk, he hath exceeded moderation.

CXIII

[39] Let discourse of God be renewed every day, preferably to our food.

CXIV

Think oftener of God than you breathe.

CXV

If you always remember that God stands by, an inspector of whatever you do either in soul or body, you will never err, either in your prayers or actions, and you will have God abiding with you.

CXVI

As it is pleasant to view the sea from the shore, so it is pleasant to one who hath escaped to remember his past labours.

CXVII

The intention of the law is to benefit human life; but it cannot, when men themselves choose to suffer, for it discovers its proper virtue in the obedient.

CXVIII

As physicians are the preservers of the sick, so are the laws of the injured.

CXIX

The justest laws are the truest.

CXX

It is decent to yield to a law, to a governor, and to a wiser man.

CXXI

Things done contrary to law are the same as if they were undone.

CXXII

In prosperity it is very easy to find a friend, in adversity nothing is so difficult.

CXXIII

Time delivers fools from grief; and reason, wise men.

CXXIV

He is a man of sense who doth not grieve for what he hath not, but rejoices in what he hath.

CXXV

Epictetus being asked how a person might grieve his enemy, answered, "By doing as well as possible himself."

CXXVI

Let no wise man estrange himself from the government of the state; for it is both impious to withdraw from being useful to those that need it, and cowardly to give way to the worthless. For it is foolish to choose rather to be governed ill, than to govern well.

CXXVII

Nothing is more [40] becoming a governor, than to despise no one, nor be insolent, but to preside over all impartially.

CXXVIII

Any person may live happy in poverty, but few in wealth and power. So great is the advantage of poverty, that no man observant of the laws [41] of life would change it for disreputable wealth; unless, indeed, Themistocles, the son of Neocles, the most wealthy of the Athenians, in a poverty of virtue was better than Aristides and Socrates. But both himself and his wealth are perished, and without a name. For a bad man loses all in death, but virtue is eternal.

CXXIX

[Remember] that such is, and was, and will be, the nature of the world; nor is it possible that things should be otherwise than they now are, and that not only men and other animals upon earth partake of this change and transformation, but the divinities also. For, indeed, even the four elements are transformed and changed up and down; and earth becomes water, and water air, and this again is transformed into other things. And the same manner of transformation happens from things above to those below. Whoever endeavours to turn his mind towards these points, and persuade himself to receive with willingness what cannot be avoided, he will pass his life with moderation and harmony.

CXXX

He who is discontented with things present, and allotted by Fortune, is unskilful in life. But he who bears them, and the consequences arising from them, nobly and rationally, is worthy to be esteemed a good man.

CXXXI

All things obey, and are subservient to, the world;[42] the earth, the sea, the sun, and other stars, and the plants and animals of the earth. Our body likewise obeys it, in being sick and well, and young and old, and passing through the other changes, whenever that decrees. It is therefore reasonable that what depends on ourselves, that is, our judgment, should not be the only rebel to it. For the world is powerful, and superior, and consults the best for us, by governing us in conjunction with the whole. Further: opposition, besides that it is unreasonable, and produces nothing except a vain struggle, throws us likewise into pain and sorrows.

THE FOLLOWING FRAGMENTS ARE ASCRIBED JOINTLY TO EPICTETUS AND OTHER AUTHORS[1]

I

CONTENTMENT, as it is a short and delightful way, hath much gracefulness and little trouble.

II

Fortify yourself with contentment; for this is an impregnable fortress.

III

Prefer nothing to truth, not even the choice of friendship, lying within the reach of the passions; for by them justice is both confounded and darkened.

IV

Truth is an immortal and eternal thing. It bestows, not a beauty which time will wither, nor a boldness of which the sentence of a judge can deprive[2] us; but [the knowledge of] what is just and lawful, distinguishing from them, and confuting, what is unjust.

V

We should have neither a blunt sword, nor an ineffectual[3] boldness of speech.

VI

Nature has given man one tongue, but two ears, that we may hear twice as much as we speak.

VII

Nothing is in reality either pleasant or unpleasant by nature; but all things are effected by custom.

VIII

Choose the best life; for custom will make it pleasant.

IX

Choose rather to leave your children well instructed than rich. For the hopes of the learned are better than the riches of the ignorant.

X

A daughter is a possession to a father which is not his own.

XI

The same person advised the leaving modesty to children, rather than gold.

XII

The reproach of a father is an agreeable medicine; for the profit is greater than the pain.

XIII

He who succeeds in a son-in-law finds a son; he who fails in one loses likewise a daughter.

XIV

The worth of learning, like that of gold, is esteemed in every place.

XV

He who exercises wisdom exercises the knowledge of God.

XVI

There is no animal so beautiful as a man adorned by learning.

XVII

We ought to fly the friendship of the wicked and the enmity of the good.

XVIII

Necessitous circumstances prove friends and detect enemies.

XIX

We ought to do well by our friends when they are present, and speak well of them when they are absent.

XX

Let not him think he is loved by any who loves none.

XXI

We ought to choose both a physician and a friend, not the most agreeable, but the most useful.

XXII

If you would lead a life without sorrow, consider things which will happen, as if they had already happened.

XXIII

Be exempt from grief, not like irrational creatures, from insensibility; nor from inconsiderateness, like fools; but like a man of virtue, making reason the remedy for grief.

XXIV

They whose minds are the least grieved by calamities, and whose actions struggle the most against them, are the greatest both in public and in private life.

XXV

They who are well instructed, like those who are exercised in the Palæstra, if they happen to fall, quickly and dexterously rise again from misfortunes.

XXVI

We ought to call in reason, like a good physician, to our assistance in misfortunes.

XXVII

A fool intoxicated by a long course of good fortune, as by one of drinking, becomes more senseless.

XXVIII

Envy is the adversary of the fortunate.

XXIX

He who remembers what man is, is discontented at nothing which happens.

XXX

A pilot and a fair wind are necessary to a happy voyage; reason and art, to a happy life.

XXXI

Good fortune, like ripe fruit, ought to be enjoyed while it is present.

XXXII

He is unreasonable who is displeased at events which happen from natural necessity.

THE FOLLOWING FRAGMENTS ARE OMITTED BY MR. UPTON; BUT AS THEY STAND UNDER THE NAME OF ARRIAN, AND SEEM TO BE IN THE SPIRIT OF EPICTETUS, THEY ARE ADDED HERE

I

[1] WHAT does it signify to me, says he, whether the universe is composed of atoms or uncompounded [2] substances, or of fire and earth? Is it not sufficient to know the essence of good and evil, and the proper bounds of the desires and aversions; and, besides those, of the active powers; and by the making use of these as so many certain rules, to order the conduct of life, and bid these things which are above us farewell, which, perhaps, are incomprehensible to human understanding; but if one should suppose them ever so comprehensible, still, what is the benefit of them when comprehended? And must it not be said that he gives himself trouble to no purpose who allots these things as necessary to the character of a philosopher?—"What then, is the Delphic admonition, Know thyself, superfluous?"—"No, surely," says he.—"What, then, doth it mean?" If any one should admonish a performer in a chorus to know himself, would not he attend to it as a direction about his [3] motions? . . .

II

[4] The same person being asked wherein the diligent have the advantage of the slothful? answered, Wherein the pious have the advantage of the impious: in good hopes.

III

[5] Walls give to cities, and cultivation of the understanding to minds, ornament and security.

IV

[6] When a young man was giving himself airs in a public place, and saying that he was grown wise by conversing with many wise men: I have conversed, too, answered somebody, with many rich men, but I am not grown rich.

V

[7] Socrates, being sent for by Archelaus,[8] as designing to make him a rich man, returned him this answer: "Four quarts of meal are sold at Athens for five farthings, and the fountains run with water. If what I have is not sufficient for me, yet I am sufficiently able to make a shift with that; and thus it becomes sufficient for me. Do not you perceive that it makes no difference in the goodness of Polus [the player's] voice, whether he performs the part of Œdipus in his regal state, or when he is a wanderer and a beggar at Colonus? And shall a brave man appear worse than Polus, and not perform well in whatever personage is imposed upon him by the Deity? Shall he not imitate Ulysses, who made no worse figure in rags than in a fine purple robe?"

VI

There are some persons who are calmly of a high spirit, and do all the same things quietly, and as it were without anger, which those do who are hurried with strong passion. We are to guard, therefore, against the faults of such persons, as being much worse than that of violent anger. For people of the latter character are quickly satiated with vengeance, whereas the others extend it to a longer time, like persons in a slow fever.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

[1] Sensibus ipsis judicari voluptates. Cic. *de Fin.* ii. By Pleasure the Epicureans sometimes explained themselves to mean only freedom from uneasiness: but the philosophers of other sects in general, as well as Cicero, insist, producing their own expressions for it, that they meant sensual delights. This, indeed, was more explicitly the doctrine of Aristippus, the father of the Cyrenaics, a sect, however, which sunk into the Epicureans, whose notions plainly led to the dissoluteness so remarkable in the lives of most of them.

[2] The Stoics define these terms: the one, a motion by which we are carried towards some object; the other, a motion by which we strive to shun it. The original words, by a happiness in the Greek language, are properly opposed to each other; which the English will not admit. I have chosen the best I could find, and wish they were better.

[3] It seems strange that the Stoics generally put the Assents last, since both the affections and will should be governed by the understanding, which, therefore, should be rectified in order to do its office well. Epictetus seems to be of this opinion in i. 17. But, perhaps, they thought common sense or natural logic sufficient for this purpose, and artificial logic, which they meant, but did not express clearly by the word Assents, necessary as a guard only against sophistry. Yet their mentioning it as a guard also against being misled when they were in drink, and even in their dreams, leaves but little room for this conjecture.

[4] Καὶ μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος ἀποβλητήν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναποβλήτην· ὁ μέν, ἀποβλητὴν διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν· ὁ δέ, ἀναποβλήτην, διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις. Diog. Laert. in Zeno.

Nam si argumentaberis, sapientem multo vino inebriari, et retinere rectum tenorem, etiamsi temulentus sit: licet colligas, nec veneno poto moriturum, etc. Sen. *Epist.* 83.

[5] The original word is of peculiar signification among the Stoics, and I wish it could have been rendered into English in a manner less ambiguous and more expressive of its meaning. But the Stoic language perished with the Stoic sect, and scarcely any of its technical terms can now be rendered intelligible except by a paraphrase or a definition.

[6] Τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῃ. Diog. Laert. vii. § 45.

[7] ἔστι δὲ ἡ πρόληψις, ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθ' ὅλου. Diog. Laert. vii. § 54.

[8] I am sensible that Prosperity, in common use, relates wholly to external circumstances; but I could find no better word to express the internal good condition of mind which the Stoics meant by *εὐροια*. There is an instance of the like use, 1 John iii. 2.

[9] Quidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitæ mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transilit, et corrumpitur, sensum: nec habet propriæ significationis notam, quod nostris verbis dicitur, atque ad humana negotia compositis.
Arnob. *adv. Gentes.* iii. p. 111. Ed. Lugd. Bat. 1651.

[10] *ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀγέννητος.* Diog. Laer. vii. § 137.

[11] *Θεὸν δ' εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον, λογικόν, τέλειον, ἢ νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ· μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων, ὥσπερ καὶ πατέρα πάντων.* *Ibid.* § 147.

[12] *πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις.* *Ibid.*

[13] *οὐσίαν δὲ Θεοῦ Ζήνων μέν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν.* *Ibid.* § 148.

[14] *ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος πεπερασμένος ἐστίν.* *Ibid.*

[15] *κατὰ χρόνων ποίας περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν.* *Ibid.* § 137.

[16] See Philo Judæus, of the incorruptibility of the world, p. 947, Ed. *Par.*

[17] *Θεός ἐστι πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρωδὲς, οὐκ ἔχον μορφήν, μετάβαλλον δὲ εἰς ἃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσι.* Posidonius.

[18] *πῦρ τεχνικόν.* Plut. *de Placit Philosoph.* i. 7.

[19] *οὗτοι τὸν Θεόν, ἀρχὴν ὄντα, σῶμα νοερόν, καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες, οὐ καθαρόν, οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ ἀσύνθετον, ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἑτέρου, καὶ δι' ἑτέρου ἀποφαίνουσι.* Plut. *de Communibus notitiis adv. Stoicos.*, p. 1085.

[20] *σῶμα δέ ἐστι, κατ' αὐτούς, ἡ οὐσία.* Diog. Laert. vii. § 150.

[21] *Adv. Praxeam.* c. 7. Yet, *De Anima*, c. 7, he says, Omne corporale passibile est, which he certainly did not think God was.

[22] *δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον, τὸν Θεόν.* Diog. Laer. vii. § 134.

[23] Deus ista temperat, quæ circumfusa rectorem sequuntur et ducem. Potentius autem est quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei. Sen. *Epist.* 65.
Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens, aut subjectus deus. Omnem ergo regit ipse naturam. Cic. de *Nat. Deor.* ii. § 30. Ed. Dav.

[24] Non potest artifex mutare materiam. Sen. *de Provid.* c. 8.

[25] I. i.

[26] Non universo hominum generi, solum, sed etiam singulis, etc. Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* iii.

[27] Anus fatidica. *Ibid.* i.

[28] Nec sine ratione, quamvis subita, accidere. Sen. *de Provid.* c.i.

[30] λόγος καθ' ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται. Diog. Laer. vii. § 149.

[30] Chrysippus——Applicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animos [*Animorum.* Dav.] liberatos volunt. Dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabitur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem Fati confirmet invitus. Cic. *de Fato*, § 17. Dav. Chrysippus autem, eum et necessitatem improbaret, etc., § 18.

[31] Sen. *de Beneficiis*, vi. 23.

[32] *Ibid.* iv. 7.

[33] Cic. *de Natura Deorum*, ii. 15.

[34] Epic. i. 14, etc.

[35] ἧς μέρη εἶναι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις. Diog. Laert. vii. § 156.

[36] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν—καὶ σῶμα εἶναι. *Ibid.*

[37] τὴν ψυχὴν μετὰ θάνατον ἐπιμένειν, φθαρτὴν δ' εἶναι. *Ibid.*

[38] Κλεάνθης πάσας ἐπιδιαμένειν φησί, μεχρὶ ἐκπυρώσεως. Χρύσιππος δέ, τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνων. *Ibid.* § 157.

[39] Lactantius, indeed, vii. 7, says: Esse inferos Zenon Stoicus docuit, et sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas: et illos quidem, quietas et delectabiles incolere regiones; hos vero luere pœnas in tenebrosis locis, atque in cæni voraginibus horrendis. But I know not that any other author relates this of him.

[40] See i. 12, p. 29. iii. 7. *Ibid.* c. 24. iv. 9, § 2, 3. *Ibid.* c. 10, § 2, c. 12, § 4.

[41] iii. 13.

[42] *Ibid.* c. 24.

[43] The only passage that I can recollect, in which any intimation seems to be given of a future reward, is in the fifteenth chapter of the *Enchiridion :* and, probably, even there he means only a happiness to be enjoyed in the present life, after due improvement in philosophy; though he expresses it by the very strong figures of partaking the feasts and empire of the gods. For, doubtless, the wise man, like his kindred deities, feasted upon everything that happened; and, by willing as Jupiter did, reigned along with him. Besides, Epictetus says there, of Diogenes, and Heraclitus, or Hercules, not that they are, but that they were divine persons: which must refer to something which had ceased when he wrote; and, consequently, to their felicity before, not after their deaths. At least he doth not intimate anything concerning their second life: and if that was to be short, as it might be (and it could not reach beyond the conflagration), and was not very certain neither, the hope of it would be a very insufficient counterbalance to vehement appetites and passions.

[44] 4. § 21. These expressions, *diffused* and *kindled*, allude to the Stoic doctrine, that souls are portions of the deity, separated for a time, and that his essence is fire.

[45] 12, § 5.

[46] *εἶναί τινας δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐποπτὰς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.* Diog. Laert. vii. § 151.

Scit genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum,
Naturæ deus humanæ, mortalis in unum-
Quodque caput. Hor. ii. *Ep.* ii. 186, etc.

See Epict. i. 14, p. 33.

[47] *εἶναι δ'αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διοικήτου βούλησιν.* Diog. Laert. vii. § 88.

[48] See M. Antoninus, ii. 13, 17. iii. 3, 5. v. 27.

[49] Condonanda tamen sententia, Stoice, vestra est.
Nam si post obitum, neque præmia sint, neque pœnæ,
Heu, quo perventum est! Heu, quid jam denique restat!
Scilicet humanas gerit aut res numen inique,
Aut nil curat iners, aut, si bene temperat orbem,
Nemo bonus miser est, nemo improbus esse beatus
In vita possit, gens ut sibi stoica fingit.
J. Hawkins Browne.

I have a singular pleasure in quoting these lines, from a poem which does honour to our country.

[50] ii. 18, § 3, 4. iii. 21, § 1, iv. 4, § 1. See likewise M. Antoninus, i. § 17. ix. § 4. xii. § 14.

[51] Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedat deum. Ille naturæ beneficio, non suo, sapiens est: ecce res magna, habere imbecillitatem hominis, securitatem dei. Sen. *Epist.* 53.

[52] iv. 1, § 17. iv. 8, *sub. fin.*

[53] i. 15, § 2. iv. 12, § 4.

[54] i. 12, p. 30.

[55] Quis sapiens sit, aut fuerit, nec ipsos Stoicos solere dicere. Cic. *Acad.* iv.

[56] . . . Cito nequitia subrepit: virtus difficilis inventu est, rectorem ducemque desiderat. Etiam sine magistro vitia discuntur. Sen. *Natural. Quæst.* iii. c. 30.

[57] iv. 8, § 6.

[58] Eo libentius Epicuri egregia dicta commemoro, ut istis, qui ad illa confugient, spe mala inducti, qua velamentum se ipsos suorum vitiorum habituros existimant, probem, quocunque ierint, honeste esse vivendum. Sen. *Epist.* 21. It was hard indeed to reconcile this with some of his other doctrines.

[59] Suidas *in Voc.*

[60] Orig. *Contra Cels.* vii. § 53.

[61] Suidas *in Voc.*

[62] Simplic. *Com.* p. 102.

[63] A. Gell, xv. 11.

[64] Simplic. *Com.* p. 102.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Ibid.* p. 272.

[68] A. Gellius, ii. 18.

[69] Ælii Spart. *Adrian*, c. 17.

[70] *Orat. cons. ad Jovian. Imp.*

[71] *In Voc.*

[72] The reign of Nero began A.D. 54; of Adrian, 117; of M. Antoninus, 161.

[73] *Bibl. Gr.* vol. iii. p. 257.

[74] i. § 7.

[75] vii. § 19.

[76] *Noct. Att.* i. c. 2.

[77] *Contra Cels.* vi. § 2.

[78] *Com.* p. 2.

[79] Fabricii *Bibl. Gr.* vol. iii. iv. c. 8, p. 269, etc.

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

[1] See Introduction, § 7.

[2] The sacred writers also mention man as made of clay, Gen. ii. 7; Job x. 9, xxxiii. 6. ἢ σὺ λαβὼν γῆν πηλὸν, ἔπλασας ζῷον, xxxviii. 14.

[3] One would hope, from the context, that Epictetus is here speaking only of a moral, not a natural impossibility; an impossibility arising merely from the present constitution of things. See Introduction, § 17. See likewise Book ii. chap. v. § 5.

[4] See Introduction, § 5.

[5] Plautius Lateranus, a consul elect, was put to death by the command of Nero for being privy to the conspiracy of Piso. His execution was so sudden, that he was not permitted to take leave of his wife and children, but was hurried into a place appropriated to the punishment of slaves, and there killed by the hand of the tribune Statius. He suffered in obstinate silence, and without making any reproach to Statius, who was concerned in the same plot for which he himself was punished. Tacitus, xv. 60.

[6] Epaphroditus was the Master of Requests and freedman of Nero, and the master of Epictetus. He assisted Nero in killing himself, for which he was condemned to death by Domitian. Suetonius *in vitâ Neronis*, c. 49. Domit. c. 14.

[7] See Introduction, § 9.

[8] Thrasea Pætus, a Stoic philosopher, put to death by Nero. He was husband of Arria, so well known by that beautiful epigram in Martial. The expression of Tacitus concerning him is remarkable: "After the murder of so many excellent persons, Nero at last formed a desire of cutting off virtue itself, by the execution of Thrasea Pætus and Barea Soranus." xvi. 21.

[9] Rufus was a Tuscan of the Equestrian order, and a Stoic philosopher. When Vespasian banished the other philosophers, Rufus was alone excepted. Upton.

[10] Agrippinus was banished by Nero, for no other crime than the unfortunate death of his father, who had been causelessly killed by the command of Tiberius: and this had furnished a pretence for accusing him of hereditary disloyalty. Tacitus, xvi. 28, 29.

[11] Aricia, a town about sixteen miles from Rome, which lay in his road to banishment.

CHAPTER II

[1] The Spartans, to make a trial of the fortitude of their children, used to have them publicly whipped at the altar of Diana, and often with so much severity that they expired. The boys supported this exercise with so much constancy as never to cry out, nor even groan. Upton from Cicero, etc.

[2] The supposition made by Epictetus, that it may be reasonable, sometimes, for persons to kill themselves, is a strong and alarming instance of the great necessity of being careful, not only in general to form just and distinct ideas of reasonable and unreasonable, but to apply them properly to particular subjects; since such a man as he failed in so important a case at the very time when he was giving cautions to others.

[3] The translation here gives only the general sense, as a more particular description would be scarcely supportable in our language.

[4] Nero was remarkably fond of theatrical entertainments, and used to introduce upon the stage the descendants of noble families, whom want had rendered venal. Tacitus, xiv. 14.

[5] An allusion to the purple border which distinguished the dress of the Roman nobility.

[6] Helvidius Priscus was no less remarkable for his learning and philosophy, than for the sanctity of his manners and the love of his country. He behaved, however, with too much haughtiness on several occasions to Vespasian, who sentenced him to death with great reluctance, and even forbade the execution when it was too late. Sueton. *in Vesp.* § 15.

[7] *αὐτῷ* in the original refers to *ἰματίῳ*; but the figure would have appeared harsh in the translation.

[8] Bato was a famous master of the Olympic exercises. Upton.

[9] Domitian ordered all the philosophers to be banished. To avoid

this inconvenience, those who had a mind to disguise their profession took off their beards. Upton.

[10] This term [παρασκευή] was used, among the Stoics, to express the natural or acquired powers necessary to the performance of any action.

[11] See Introduction, § 9.

[12] This is a difficult place. The text, as it stands now, is Ἐπίκτητος κρείσσων Σωκράτου οὔκ ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ χείρων; τοῦτό μοι ἱκανόν ἐστιν. Which must be translated, Epictetus is not superior to Socrates: but if not, he is not inferior; and this is enough for me. By a change in the pointing, it might perhaps be translated, But if he is not inferior, this is enough for me. And sometimes the Stoics considered themselves as not inferior to the deity. See lib. i. c. xii. § 2. But neither of these renderings makes a proper connection I have therefore adventured to suppose, that κρείσσων and χείρων have changed places; that οὔκ hath arisen from a casual repetition of the two last letters of Σωκράτου; and that μὴ οὐ is the remainder of some proper name known: perhaps Μελίτου, as he was one of the accusers of Socrates: which cannot now be known. This will give the sense which I have expressed, and it is the only unexceptionable one that I can find.

CHAPTER IV

[1] See *Enchiridion*, c. ii. note [2].

[2] Chrysippus is called by Cicero the most subtle interpreter of the Stoic dreams, and the support of the Portico. He composed 705 volumes; which is not very wonderful, as he was so fond of quotations, that in one of his pieces he transcribed almost an entire play of Euripides. His chief study was logic, which he carried to a trifling degree of subtlety. There is nothing now remaining of his works but some of their titles. He died about 200 years before the Christian era, and was honoured by the Athenians with a statue in the Ceramicus. His death is said to have been occasioned by an immoderate fit of laughing at seeing an ass eat figs. Chrysippus desired the ass might have a glass of wine to wash them down, and was so diverted with his own conceit, that it cost him his life. He is said to have been a very copious and laborious writer, but obscure and immoral; though one would be inclined to think, from the respect with which he is mentioned by Epictetus, that this latter accusation was groundless.

[3] See Introduction, §§ 4, 5, 6.

[4] An allusion to the ancient custom among philosophers, of travelling into foreign countries for improvement.

CHAPTER V

[1] The Academics held that there is nothing to be known; that we have not faculties to distinguish between truth and falsehood; and their custom was neither to affirm nor deny anything.

[2] A Sceptic was held to be an *esprit fort*.

CHAPTER VI

[1] The translation follows *ουδαμως* in Mr. Upton's Addenda.

[2] See Introduction, § 7.

[3] The famous statue of Jupiter Olympius.

[4] The translation follows a conjectural emendation of Mr. Upton's on this passage.

[5] It was one part of the elegance of those times to bathe every day.

[6] Epictetus probably introduces this ridiculous complaint in order to intimate that others commonly made are little less so. See M. Antoninus l. viii. § 50 of Gataker's edition and the Glasgow translation.

CHAPTER VII

[1] It is but fair to warn the reader that little entertainment is to be expected from this chapter, which is wholly logical.

[§ 2. " concluding," *i.e.* of arranging in logical form.]

[2] [§ 3. " from admitting," etc., *τοῦ τὸ ἀνακόλουθον τοῖς αὐτοῖς λόγοις προσδέχεσθαι.* Mrs. C. translates " and admit [rather the contrary, I mean] what," etc. Schenkl marks a lacuna, rejecting the whole sentence; an easy way of getting rid of a difficulty.]

CHAPTER VIII

[1] This is spoken by one of the audience.

[2] Epictetus, whenever he has occasion to mention himself, speaks with remarkable modesty, and in a style very different from that of many of the more ancient philosophers, as appears by the several arrogant speeches recorded of them by Diogenes Laertius, etc.. It is probable he might improve in this humble disposition by the character of Socrates, which he seems particularly to have studied and admired. Yet other philosophers had studied and admired the same character without profiting by it. Perhaps the sober and unassuming temper of Christianity might, from the example of its professors of those days, have produced this, and other good effects, in the minds of many who knew little, if anything, of the gospel itself.

CHAPTER IX

[1] *Δεῖ ἡμᾶς* should probably be *δι' ὑμᾶς*, and is so translated.

[2] This passage has great difficulties, which I know not how to solve, any otherwise than by supposing something after *ἀνθρώπινα* to be lost. [It seems probable that a great deal is wanting; and that *ὅτι ἀνθρώπινα* belongs to one story, and *τί οὖν, ἔφη,* to another.—T.]

[3] The translator follows Mr. Upton's conjecture in this place, and the French version agrees with it.

[P. 23. " you can receive " assumes a reading *δυναμένου*. The text reads the nom., *i.e.* " I can receive."]

CHAPTER X

[P. 24. " old fellows," *γέροντες*, *i.e.* senators, politicians.]

[1] This passage has a striking resemblance to that in Scripture, where the children of this world are said to be wiser in their generation than the children of light.

CHAPTER XI

[1] The Stoics say that wise and good men have the truly natural affection towards their children, and bad persons have it not. Diog. Laert. vii. § 120.

CHAPTER XII

[1] It was the opinion of Socrates, that the gods know all things that are either said or done, or silently thought on: that they are everywhere present, and give significations to mankind concerning all human affairs. Xen. *Mem.* I.

[2] See *Enchiridion*, c. xxvii.

[3] See Introduction, § 20.

[4] One of the Stoic extravagances, arising from the notion that human souls were literally parts of the deity.

CHAPTER XIII

[1] If I did despise the cause of my man-servant, or my maid-servant, when they contended with me: what then shall I do when God riseth up? And when He visiteth, what shall I answer Him? Did not He who made me in the womb, make him? And did not one fashion us in the womb? Job xxxi. 13, 14, 15.

[2] *i.e.* Deceased legislators, who had in view low and worldly considerations.

CHAPTER XIV

[1] There is a beauty in the original, arising from the different terminations in the verbs, which cannot be preserved in our language.

[2] Perhaps the *καὶ* in this line may have been misplaced; and it should read *τουτῳ καὶ τῷ Θεῷ ἕδει ὑμᾶς*; and then the translation will be . . . To this [genius] and to God you ought to swear, etc.

CHAPTER XV

[1] The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom: and is less excusable than the English translators of the Bible, Hab. iii. 17, to whom fig-trees were not so familiar. But the Hebrew word used there signifies rather in general to shoot out, thrive, than in particular to flower.

CHAPTER XVI

[1] Something here seems to be lost.

[2] The ancients imagined swans could sing very melodiously.

[3] Beautiful and affecting examples of such praise and exhortation see in Ps. xxxiv. civ. cxlv., and other parts of the sacred writings.

CHAPTER XVII

[1] The sense here is supplied from a conjecture of Wolfius.

[2] The Stoics were remarkably exact in tracing the etymology of words: a study, certainly, of very great use: but, by too great subtlety and refinement, they were often led by it into much trifling and absurdity.

[3] See the *Enchiridion*, c. xlix.

CHAPTER XVIII

[1] The most ignorant persons often practise what they know to be evil; and they who voluntarily suffer, as many do, their inclinations to blind their judgment, are not justified by following it. The doctrine of Epictetus, therefore, here and elsewhere, on this head, contradicts the voice of reason and conscience; nor is it less pernicious than ill grounded. It destroys all guilt and merit, all punishment and reward, all blame of ourselves or others, all sense of misbehaviour towards our fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such philosophers did not teach repentance towards God. [Epictetus does not imply this. He merely traces evil acts to their source in evil thought or opinion; and recommends a charitable pity for them.]

[2] Several words are wanting in different places of some of the following lines of the Greek; which are conjecturally supplied in the translation from Mr. Upton's version.

[3] See Gal. vi. 1, and many other parts of the New Testament, in which all the humanity and tenderness prescribed by the Stoics are enjoined, and the dangerous notions on which they found them are avoided.

[4] This alludes to a famous quibble among the Stoics. What you have not lost, you have: but you have not lost a pair of horns: therefore you have a pair of horns. Upton. [Rather: you can only feel pain in what you have.]

[8] Mr. Upton observes that Epictetus here applies to the wise man what he had just been saying of the athletic champion; and he proposes a change in one word, by which, instead of the heat, or the rain, the translation will be, in a fever, or in drink. For the Stoics held their wise man to be a perfect master of himself in all these circumstances. The passages which Mr. Upton produces from ii. c. 17, towards the end, and iii. c. 2 towards the beginning, makes the conjecture of οινωμενος for ὑομενος as probable as it is ingenious. But yet the τι ουν αν καυμα η one would imagine to have crept in by a repetition of the transcriber, from the description, a few lines before; as it is scarcely probable that the same word should be used by Epictetus in two different senses, at so small a distance, in the same discourse.

CHAPTER XIX

[1] When temples began to be erected to the emperors, as to gods, the office of priest was purchased by vile flatterers, at a very great expense. Upton from Casaubon.

[2] Which was the ornament of the priests while they were offering sacrifice.

Nicopolis was built by Augustus in memory of the victory at Actium.

CHAPTER XX

[1] Zeno, the founder of the Stoic sect, was born at Citium, a seaport town in the island of Cyprus. He was originally a merchant, and very rich. On a voyage from Tyre, where he had been trading in purple, he was shipwrecked near the Piræum. During his stay at Athens, he happened to meet in a bookseller's shop with the second book of Xenophon's *Memoirs*, with which he was extremely delighted, and asked the bookseller where such kind of persons as the author mentioned were to be found. The bookseller answered, pointing to Crates, the Cynic, who was luckily passing by, Follow him: which Zeno did, and became his disciple. But his disposition was too modest to approve of the Cynic indecency: and, forsaking Crates, he applied himself to the Academics, whom he attended for ten years, and then formed a school of his own. There was a constant severity, or perhaps austerity, in his manners, his dress, and his discourse, except at an entertainment, when he used to appear with cheerfulness and ease. His morals were irreproachable: and he was presented by the Athenians with a golden crown, because his life was a public example of virtue, by its conformity with his words and doctrines. He lived ninety-eight years, and then strangled himself because, in going out of his school, he happened to fall down and break his finger. Diog. Laert. *in Zeno.*

CHAPTER XXII

[1] See Introduction, § 10.

[2] Wars and fightings are ascribed to the same causes by St. James, iv. 1. ["Wherever I find it" should be "from the bath."]

[P. 47. "labours," *i.e.* "is in labour," a metaphor used by Socrates. Plato, *Theæt.* 150.]

CHAPTER XXIII

[1] This passage is obscure, and variously read and explained by the commentators. It is here translated conjecturally. [Perhaps the sense is, whence arise our suspicions, jealousies, and fears concerning our children, if we have no natural affection towards them?—T.]

CHAPTER XXIV

[1] The Greek word signifies a person who used to anoint the body of the combatants, and prepare them by proper exercises for the Olympic games.

[2] Probably, according to Mr. Upton's conjecture, γε should be σε. We send you.

Wolfius imagines this passage to allude to the commotions after the death of Nero, when there were many competitors for the Empire, and every one was eager to take the part of him who appeared to have the greatest probability of success.

[3] Diogenes, passing through the camp of Philip, at the time that he was on his march against the Greeks, was taken and brought before the King, who, not knowing him, asked if he was a spy. Yes, certainly, Philip (answered the philosopher), I am a spy of your inconsiderateness and folly, in risking your kingdom and person, without any necessity, upon the hazard of a single hour. Upton. The story is thus told by Plutarch, but is related something differently by other authors.

[4] The translation follows Mr. Upton's reading.

[5] An allusion to the *Œdipus* of Sophocles.

CHAPTER XXV

[1] An island in the Ægean Sea, to which the Romans used to banish criminals.

[2] The body, which Epictetus here compares to a garment, is, by the sacred writers, represented under the figure of a house, or tabernacle, Job iv. 19; 2 Pet. i. 13, 14. St. Paul, with a sublime rapidity

of expression, joins the two metaphors together, 2 Cor. v. 2-4, as, indeed, the one is but a looser, the other a closer covering. The same apostle hath made use of the figure of clothing, in another place, in a strikingly beautiful manner, 1 Cor. xv. 53, 54.

[8] Anaxagoras is said by some, and Socrates by others, to have made the same speech, on receiving the news of his being condemned to death by the judges of Athens: and from one of them, probably, Demetrius borrowed it. Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher, and is mentioned with high approbation by Seneca.

CHAPTER XXVI

[1] The text is so very corrupt in some parts of this chapter, that the translation must have been wholly conjectural, and therefore is omitted.

[The parts omitted are the following:—

" For there are the grand materials (or opportunities), and what is wealth here seems there but a trifle. This is what makes it difficult there to be master of appearances, when there are great things to give you a fall," *i.e.* prevent a sound judgment. Ἐκεῖ ὄντα is emended to *ἐκσείοντα*.

" Epicurus found fault with the reader of the hypothetical arguments, and he who suggested the reading laughed. Quoth Epicurus: ' You laugh at yourself. You did not train the lad, and never found out whether he could follow these arguments; you make him your reader and nothing more.' "]

CHAPTER XXVII

[1] Pyrrho, the founder of the sect of the Pyrrhonists, was born at Elis, and flourished about the time of Alexander. He held, that there is no difference between just and unjust, good and evil: that all things are equally indifferent, uncertain, and undistinguishable: that neither our senses or understanding give us either a true or a false information; therefore, that we ought to give them no credit: but to remain without opinion; without motion; without inclination: and to say of everything, that it no more is, than it is not; that it is no more one thing than another; and that against one reason there is always an equal reason to be opposed. His life is said to have been conformable to his principles, for that he never avoided anything; and his friends were obliged to follow him, to prevent his running under the wheels of a coach or walking down a precipice. But these stories, perhaps, are nothing but mere invention, formed to expose the absurdities of his system. Once, when he saw his master Anaxarchus fallen into a ditch, he passed by him without offering him any assistance. Anaxarchus was consistent enough with his principles not to suffer Pyrrho to be blamed for this tranquil behaviour, which he justified, as a laudable instance of indifference and want of affection. A fine picture this of Sceptical friendship!

For a more complete account of the system of Pyrrho, see Diog. Laert. in his *Life*. And Lipsius, *Manuduct. ad Stoic. Philosoph.* ii. Disc. 3.

[P. 54. " his father died, his mother died ": should be " were transported with sorrow."]

[P. 55. " upon the spot ": should be " proper to the matter in hand."]

[1] The translation follows Mr. Upton's reading, τὸ φοβείσθαι.

[2] This is spoken in opposition to the Sceptics, who are alluded to in the beginning of the chapter, and who say that no argument hath any force.

[4] This seems to be said by one of the hearers, who wanted to have the absurdities of the Sceptics confuted, and guarded against by regular argument. Epictetus allows this to be right for such as have abilities and leisure; but recommends to others the more necessary task of curing their own moral disorders; and insinuates that the mere common occurrences of life are sufficient to overthrow the notions of the Pyrrhonists.

CHAPTER XXVIII

[1] See note [1], c. xviii. § 1.

[P. 57. Mrs. C. wrongly inserts " right " after each " appeared."]

[2] The order of the following words is disturbed in the original. The translation follows Mr. Upton's correction.

[P. 58. " fancy ": appearance.]

CHAPTER XXIX

[P. 59. " admire ": *i.e.* set value upon.]

[1] [Rather: " that it conquers itself, and is not conquered by another thing ": *i.e.* opinion only has power over opinion.]

[2] Socrates being asked by Crito in what manner he would be buried? answered, As you please; if you can lay hold on me, and I do not escape from you. Then, smiling, and turning to his friends, I cannot, says he, persuade Crito that I, who am now disputing and ranging the parts of my discourse, am Socrates: but he thinks the corpse, which he will soon behold, to be me; and, therefore, asks how he must bury me. Plato, *in Phæd.* § 64. Forster's edition.

[3] The two principal accusers of Socrates.

[4] This is evidently a continuation of the philosopher's answer to those who reproached him, that his principles had done him no good; and therefore is translated in the first person, though it is ὠφέλησαι and ζητεῖς in the Greek.

[The other speaker says: " Then you got no good in this respect? " Epicurus replies: " How could you expect it? "]

[5] The meaning of Epictetus in this passage is not clear. If he is speaking of a voluntary death, which some of his expressions plainly imply, the instance of Socrates seems improperly chosen: for he did not kill himself, but was sentenced by the laws of his country: to which, indeed, he paid so great a reverence, as to refuse all the assistance which was offered by his friends, in order to his escape.

[6] *φαινόλῃ.* Lord Shaftesbury [for *ἐν εἰδώλῳ*, " as a ghost "].

[7] [Rather, " Sir." The word was even then used for " master " or " sir "; in modern Greek it is the regular title " Mr." See note on *Ench.*, p. 269.]

[P. 63. " O the injuries," etc. Perhaps rather: " O the guilt of ' educated ' men! "]

[P. 65. " you will see." Mrs. C. has " he " by a blunder.]

[8] The mercenary professors of philosophy at that time.

BOOK II

CHAPTER I

[1] This was a kind of scarecrow, formed of different coloured feathers, by which the animal was terrified, and so driven into the net, which was the ancient manner of hunting.

[2] *παιδεία*, in Greek, means nearly the same thing as what we now call liberal education. It was that sort of education peculiar to gentlemen—that is, such as were free,—and of which the slaves or lower sort of people were forbid to partake according to the systems of some legislators. Such (as well as I can remember) was the case among the Lacedemonians, and amongst the ancient Persians till the time of Cyrus.

It must be observed that the words *educated*, *free*, *king*, and many others, were taken by the Stoics from common life, and by them applied solely to the character of their wise and perfect man.

[3] " And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." John viii. 32. This is one among many other passages to the same purpose in that perfect law of liberty, the New Testament.

[4] When a slave was to be presented with his freedom, he was brought before the Consul; and his master, taking him by the hand, pronounced a certain form of words, and then turned the slave about, who was thus rendered free. The fine which the master was to pay on this occasion was applied to the public use. Upton.

[5] This seems to be spoken by one of the scholars.

[6] No other ancient author mentions Socrates as having written anything except a hymn to Apollo, and a translation of some fables of Æsop into verse. Many authors of credit affirm that he wrote nothing. Therefore Wolfius doubts whether some other name should not be put here instead of Socrates. Yet the description

most properly belongs to him. And perhaps Epictetus doth not mean to intimate here that Socrates had published anything, but that he wrote, when he had no opportunity of discoursing, for his own improvement. But still, living constantly at Athens, the seat of philosophical disputation, he cannot be supposed often to have had that reason for writing.

[7] The original here seems corrupt, or inaccurate. I hope the translation is not far from the true sense.

[8] The Greek is ἀναφαξία, tranquillity: but it seems to be a false reading for ἀναίδεια. Ἀναίδεια is the very thing which Epictetus had been recommending through the whole chapter, and which makes the subject of the next; and, therefore, cannot be well supposed to be the true reading in a place where it is mentioned with contempt.

[9] For ἀνελεύθερον perhaps the reading should be ἀνελεύθερ', and it is so translated. The person to whom Epictetus speaks was a young man just leaving the philosophical school.

[10] Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, torture, exile and sudden executions can be ranked among the common accidents of life, may be surprised to find Epictetus so frequently endeavouring to prepare his hearers for them. But it must be recollected that he addressed himself to persons who lived under the Roman Emperors, from whose tyranny the very best men were perpetually liable to such kind of dangers.

CHAPTER II

[1] [The various parts of a formal speech.]

[2] This passage is perplexed in the Greek, and the translation conjectural. The meaning seems to be that where our moral conduct is concerned, caution is necessary; and courage is necessary in things not dependent on our own choice, and with which, according to the Stoic principle, truth and nature have nothing to do.

CHAPTER IV

[P. 73. § 2. This appears to have been a doctrine of Zeno, and there may be an allusion to Plato's *Republic*.]

[1] A Stoic philosopher of Tarsus, in Cilicia. Upton.

CHAPTER V

[1] The translation follows Mr. Upton's conjecture.

[2] Socrates professed himself to have a good dæmon, and argues here jocularly from thence that he must believe the existence of a Deity, as he who believes there are mules must believe there are

asses, because that species enters into the composition of the other. But there is a play upon the words in the original which cannot be preserved in the translation. One cannot, I think, help regretting that Plato should relate, and Epictetus approve, a witticism unworthy of the Attic genius; and an instance of levity on so awful a subject, unbecoming the character of the wise and pious Socrates. It may, however, be some excuse that he thought neither his accuser nor his judges deserved, or were likely to be influenced by, a more serious answer.

[1] See I. i. note [1].

CHAPTER VI

[1] In a speech which Cyrus made to his soldiers after the battle with the Assyrians, he mentions Chrysantas, one of his captains, with particular honour for this instance of his obedience. Xenoph. *Cyr.* iv. *init.*

[2] Περισπάσεσι, in Greek, hath a double meaning, which cannot be preserved in a translation. It signifies both in general, circumstances, and in particular, hard circumstances or difficulties.

[3] Epictetus probably means in the way home from Nicopolis to Rome, whence this person had come to hear him.

[4] Socrates writ a hymn to Apollo when he was in prison of which Diogenes Laertius recites the first line. See the behaviour of Paul and Silas on a parallel occasion, Acts xvi. 25.

CHAPTER VII

[1] The Stoics were advocates for divination, though they condemned what they deemed the abuses of it. The thirty-second chapter of the *Enchiridion* is on the same subject.

[2] A lady of high rank at Rome, banished from Italy, among many other noble persons, by Domitian.

[P. 80. "bird" has been emended to "augur, diviner" by a slight change.]

CHAPTER VIII

[1] See Introduction, § 19.

See 1 Cor. vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 16; 2 Tim. i. 14; 1 John iii. 24, iv. 12, 13. [Paul had doubtless read the Stoic writers, and he uses their ideas in his own way.]

[2] An allusion to the combatants in the public exercises, who used to show their shoulders, muscles, and nerves, as a proof of their strength. See I. iv. § 4; II. xviii. § 5; III. xxii. § 5.

[P. 82. The quotation is from Homer, *Iliad*, i. 526.]

CHAPTER IX

[P. 83. A conjunctive proposition contains a number of statement presented all together as true. The other gives alternatives.]

[1] The translation follows Mr. Upton's conjecture.

[Perhaps Jews and Christians are here confused.]

CHAPTER X

[1] [Mrs. C. adds "not" with the note: "The true reading of th Greek is *οὔτ' οὐκ ἔχειν.*" But this requires *μή*. The sense is: th things do not matter, have them or not.]

[1] It hath been suggested to me, that *διατιλθεὶς*, not *διατιθεὶς*, i the true reading; and I have ventured so to translate it. See III i. pp. 352, 353, of Mr. Upton's edition. [But, as *διατίλλω* occur not elsewhere, and reading it here will make an improper repetitio of nearly the same sense, and *διαθεῖναί τινα* signifies to do some thing to another, 4. c. 7, p. 628, edit. Upt., and in Lysias, *Apol. i Sim.* p. 79, *contra Agorat.* p. 235, it will be best to preserve th present reading, and to translate it—What doth he lose who make him such?—T.]

CHAPTER XI

[1] For *τινὰς* in the Greek, the sense seems to require *ἡμᾶς*. [Probably *τινά, i.e.* "one," "mankind in general."

CHAPTER XII

[P. 91. Hesiod, *Theogony*, 587.]

CHAPTER XIII

[P. 93. *Iliad*, xiii. 281.]

[1] Antigonus Gonatas, King of Macedon, had so great an esteem for Zeno that he often took a journey to Athens to visit him, and endeavoured by magnificent promises to allure him to his court, but without success. He gave it as a reason for the distinguished regard which he had paid him, that, though he had made him many and very considerable offers, Zeno never appeared either mean or insolent. [Diog. Laert. *Zeno*, vii.]

[1] This is a Stoic extravagance. The very thing that constitutes the fault of the one in this case is, that he makes the other suffer However, if instead of vainly affecting insensibility, we extend our

view to the future rewards of those who bear ill treatment as they ought, the position is true and useful.

[3] When Diogenes was sailing to Ægina, he was taken by pirates and carried to Crete, and there set to sale. Being asked what he could do, he answered, Govern men: and pointing to a well-dressed Corinthian who was passing by, Sell me (said he) to him! for he wants a master. The Corinthian, whose name was Xeniades, bought him and appointed him the tutor to his children, and Diogenes perfectly well discharged his trust.

CHAPTER XIV

[1] The translation follows Mr. Upton. *παρατυγχάνοντι.*

CHAPTER XV

[1] Instead of *οἰκοδόμημά τι ὄν*, the true reading seems to be *οἰκοδομητέον*, and is so translated.

[2] The world.

[3] The translation here follows Mr. Upton's copy.

[4] This probably is spoken in the person of one who is offered assistance necessary for his support, and refuses it.

CHAPTER XVI

[2] As a bribe for bad purposes.

[2] The order of this passage should be: Sit down now, and pray that your nose may not run. Have you not hands, fool? Hath not God made them for you? etc. But Epictetus probably might speak extempore in this inverted manner; and Arrian proposes to deliver what he said with the greatest exactness.

[3] Sitting, probably some particular sort of it, was anciently (see Judges xx. 26; 1 Chr. xvii. 16) one posture of devotion. Our ancestors in Queen Elizabeth's time called kneeling, sitting on their knees. A mixed posture of sitting and kneeling is now used by some nations in prayer.

[4] See 1. vi. note [4].

[5] The heathen had certain temples in which it was usual for persons to sleep in order to receive oracles by dreams. One of the most celebrated places appropriated to this purpose was the Temple of Amphiaraus. See Philostratus, p. 771. [This translation omits *οὐκ*, "not."]

[6] Mr. Upton conjectures this to be an allusion to some poetical or rhetorical description. [Perhaps the "rock" is the Acropolis, the "bits of stone" statues or decorative marbles.]

[7] Brief summaries of any science, for the use of beginners, are often so called.

[8] Perhaps the true reading should be *φιλοσοφίας*, Philosophy.

[9] The sense of the original phrase, "an ox's belly," is obscure to me. The French translation hath "in your cradle." [Probably here is an allusion to the proverb cited by Wolfius, *ἐπὶ βύρσης καθέζεσθαι*, of which see Suidas.—T. "The most solemn mode of appeal among the Scythians."]

[10] Two famous robbers who infested Attica, and were at last killed by Theseus. Upton.

CHAPTER XVII

[1] See II. xi. § 1.

[2] *i.e.* the topic of the Desires and Aversions.

[3] There are several readings and conjectures. I have followed Wolfius, who reads for *ἀσίτως*, *ἀσείστως*, as agreeing best with the sense.

[4] The Pseudomenos was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks truth; if he speaks truth, he lies. The philosophers composed many books on this difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself to death in studying to answer it. Menage on Diog. Laert. ii. § 108. Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Philos.* vol. i. pp. 613, 614. [Pseudomenos means the Liar.]

[5] This is spoken by Epictetus in the person of one of his scholars, to ridicule their complimenting each other on their writings, while they neglected the more important concern of moral improvements.

[6] *σὲ δει* should be *σὲ ἔδει*.

CHAPTER XVIII

[1] Hardened against proper reflections.

[2] These several facts are here supposed to be recollected at different times.

[3] In this place, and the following lines, the original mentions particular forms of argument which are now little understood, and could not be at all instructive to the English reader.

[P. 109. Plato, *Laws*, ix. p. 854.]

[4] Hercules is said to have been the author of the gymnastic games, and the first victor. Those who afterwards conquered in wrestling, and the Pancratium, were numbered from him. Upton.

[5] Mr. Upton inserts *νικήσεις*, which he conjectures should be *νικήσας*, into the text, from his manuscript; where, probably, it was written merely by an accident of the transcriber's casting his

eye upon that word in the next line. The sense needs not this addition, and perhaps doth better without it. [The translation assumes "boxers," etc., to be vocative. They are the object of *νικήσας*. "The conqueror of all, not of boxers only."]

[6] This pompous title was given to those who had been victors in all the Olympic games.

[P. 109. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 411.]

CHAPTER XIX

[1] The curious reader may see this whole matter explained with the greatest acuteness and accuracy, by the very learned and ingenious Mr. Harris, in Mr. Upton's notes.

[2] This is spoken to Epictetus by one of his hearers.

[3] With Mr. Upton, I read *οὐδέν*, but it seems necessary that *οὐδέ* should likewise stand, and it is so translated.—[The text means: "No, I was not born . . ."]

[4] Some philosophers affected to show their learning at such times, and it is against this idle ostentation that Epictetus points his discourse; for the study of logic itself, under proper regulations, he often strongly recommends.

[5] This I apprehend to be spoken by one of the scholars of Epictetus, who seeing the contempt with which his master treats logical subtleties in the foregoing paragraph, desires him to discourse upon Ethics. [The quotation is from Hom. *Od.* ix. 39.]

[6] Epictetus gives this absurd reply to ridicule the fondness of his scholars for quoting authors, and making a parade of their reading; and insinuates that it is not at all material whether a person, who on such subjects means nothing further than talk, knows what he is talking of, or blunders about it ever so grossly.

[7] Of things into good, evil, and indifferent.

[8] The Peripatetics held other things besides virtue to be good; but not in near so high a degree.

[9] See II. xvi. note [6].

CHAPTER XX

[1] A New Testament word.

[2] When the Athenians found themselves unable to resist the forces of the Persians, they left their city, and having removed their wives and children and their movable effects to Trœzen and Salamis, went on board their ships, and defended the liberty of Greece by their fleet.

[3] What follows is against the Academics, who denied the evidence of the senses.

[4] By these terms the Stoics meant intelligent powers, joining to bring the fruits of the earth to maturity, and to carry on the course of nature.

[5] These seem to be the words of the Academic, desirous of beginning a dispute with Epictetus, to revenge himself, by puzzling him, for the severe things which he had been saying against that sect. But Epictetus refuses to enter into it, and gives his reason.

[6] I have followed Mr. Upton's addition of *αἰσχρόν*; but perhaps, even *καλόν* may be an addition, first arising from writing *ἢ κακόν* twice over.

[7] This resembles what our Saviour saith to the Jewish rulers: "Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you." Matt. xxi. 31.

CHAPTER XXI

[1] Mr. Upton's copy.

[2] We have no expression exactly like that in the Greek. The translation comes the nearest to it of any I could think on.

[3] This seems to be spoken by Epictetus to one of his scholars.

[4] The Greek is pointed at *ἀποδείξω*, but the sense requires the stop at *πως*.

CHAPTER XXII

[1] Admetus, King of Thessaly, being destined to die, Apollo obtained a reversal of his sentence from the Fates, on condition that some person could be found to die in his stead. Admetus tried all his friends, and among the rest his father, Pheres; but no one chose to be his representative but his wife, Alcestis. After her death, Pheres is introduced preparing honours for her funeral, and condoling with his son on her loss. Admetus rejects his presents with great indignation, and makes him the severest reproaches on his cowardice and mean-spiritedness, in not parting with a few remaining years of life to save his son from an untimely death, and in suffering Alcestis to descend to the grave for him in the bloom of youth. The quotation made by Epictetus is part of the answer of Pheres to the reproaches of his son. [Euripides, *Alcestis*, 691.]

[2] The original quotes some verses from Euripides, of a dialogue between Eteocles and Polynices before the walls of Thebes, of which the translation gives the general sense. [*Phœnissæ*, 723.]

[3] See Matt. xii. 50.

[4] By *self* is here meant the proper good, or as Solomon expresses it, Eccl. xii. 13, "the whole of man." The Stoic proves excellently the inconvenience of placing this in anything but a right choice (a right disposition and behaviour); but how it is the interest of each

individual, in every case, to make that choice in preference to present pleasure, and in defiance of present sufferings, appears only from the doctrine of a future recompense.

[6] Perhaps δόσις, in the Greek, should be διάδοσις.

[6] Amphiaraus married Eriphyle, the sister of Adrastus, King of Argos. He was an excellent soothsayer; and, by his skill, foresaw that it would prove fatal to him if he engaged himself in the Theban war. Wherefore, to avoid inevitable destruction, he hid himself, but was discovered by his wife Eriphyle, whom Polynices had corrupted with the present of a golden chain. Statius, *Thebais*, vi.

[7] Mr. Upton's copy. [The Greek means: "so are serpents."]

CHAPTER XXIII

[1] These are the words of Epictetus, to which there are others equivalent afterwards. His meaning probably is, that the value and usefulness of the faculty of elocution ought not to be denied, in opposition to the doctrine of Epicurus, who declared all the liberal arts and sciences to be useless and mischievous. See Diog. Laert. x. § 6, and Menage's notes there.

[2] He proves the timidity at the beginning of § 3.

[3] It was an old notion, that vision was performed by the emission of rays from the eye to the object, not the admission of rays from the object into the eye, and to this Epictetus here refers.

[4] Mr. Upton gives a different sense to κρεισσόνων, but I think that πάλιν, and what afterwards follows, justifies the English translation. [The meaning probably is: "do not forget other things which are superior to these."]

[5] See 1. i.

[6] The hearer is understood in this place to say, The faculty of Choice. It is not improbable, however, that the Greek word προαιρετική may have been omitted in transcribing.

[7] Celebrated treatises on these subjects, composed by Epicurus.

[8] These words are part of a letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying, to one of his friends. See Diog. Laert. x. § 22.

[9] Probably for προαιρετικῆς should be read ὁρατικῆς, which word is used by Epictetus but a little more than a page before. [Others suggest φραστικῆς, "of speech."]

[10] Mr. Upton's reading ἦν ἔτυχε.

CHAPTER XXIV

[1] 2 Cor. ii. 16.

[2] See John viii. 43.

[3] Κατὰ πόσον, περὶ τοῦ, should be κατὰ πόσον περὶ τούτου. There is

no need of altering *τὰ ὦτα τετρημένα*. "Opening the ear" is a phrase of Scripture. Job xxxiii. 16, xxxvi. 10; Isa. xlii. 20; Mark vii. 34, 35. And even digging open the ear, Ps. xl. 6 in the Hebrew.

[4] *Δοκῶν μέν τις εἶναι, ὢν δ' οὐδείς*, is very near to *δοκεῖ εἶναί τι, μηδὲν ὤν*, Gal. vi. 3. There is a similar expression of Plato, at the end of the Apology of Socrates.

[P. 129. The verse is from Homer, *Iliad*, ii. 25.]

CHAPTER XXVI

[1] "For that which I do, I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that I do." Rom. vii. 15.

[2] See I. xviii. note [1].

[3] See xii. § 2.

[4] Something here is lost in the original. The translation hath connected the sense in the best and shortest manner it could.

BOOK III

CHAPTER I

[1] These are the names of combatants in the Olympic games. A Pancratiast was one who united the exercises of wrestling and boxing: a Pentathlete, one who contended in all the five games of leaping, running, throwing the discus, darting, and wrestling.

[2] Epictetus had been before considering the propriety of his own character as a philosopher: but, according to Mr. Upton's very probable conjecture, the translation must be—would it not be cruel, etc.

[3] Polemo was a profligate young rake of Athens, and even distinguished by the dissoluteness of his manners. One day after a riotous entertainment, he came reeling, with a chaplet on his head, into the school of Xenocrates. The audience were greatly offended at his scandalous appearance: but the philosopher went on without any emotion, in a discourse upon temperance and sobriety. Polemo was so struck by his arguments, that he soon threw away his chaplet, and from that time became a disciple of Xenocrates, and profited so well by his instructions that he afterwards succeeded him in the Socratic school.

[4] Laius, King of Thebes, petitioned Apollo for a son. The oracle answered him, that if Laius became a father, he should perish by the hand of his son. The prediction was fulfilled by Œdipus. Upton.

[P. 134. See Plato, *Apology of Socrates*, chapters 1 and 7.]

[5] See Book I. chapter ii. § 3.

[6] The bare use of objects belongs to all animals: a rational use of them is peculiar to man. See Introduction, § 7.

[7] "For it is not ye that speak, but the spirit of your Father which speaketh in you." Matt. x. 20.

[8] This passage hath a remarkable likeness to Heb. i. 1, 2. "God, who at sundry times, and in divers manners, spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son . . ."

[P. 136. From Homer, *Od.* i. 37. Mrs. Carter omits most of the quotation, which runs thus: "We warned him ourselves beforehand, and sent Hermes the Watcher, he who slew Argus, that he slay not the man nor wed his wife."]

CHAPTER II

[P. 137. If προκόψοντα be read in the title, it means: "he who is to improve."]

[1] See Introduction, §§ 3, 4, 5, 6.

[P. 137. After "hypothetical propositions," add "lying."]

[2] Extending the middle finger, with the ancients, was a mark of the greatest contempt.

[3] Crinis was a Stoic philosopher. The circumstances of his death are not now known.

CHAPTER III

[P. 140. "Principle": the word also means "opinion."]

CHAPTER IV

[P. 141. title: rather "one who showed his partisan feeling too strongly."]

[1] The name of a player. Upton.

CHAPTER V

[1] The Greek title to this chapter is defective: νοστόν seems to be the word wanting; or, if διαπλάττω signifies, to pretend, as πλάττω doth, the true reading of the text may be, πρὸς τοὺς νόσον διαπλαττομένους.—[But a much better and almost certain conjecture is to read ἀπαλλαττομένους instead of πλαττομένους; and then the translation will be—Concerning those who return, or were returning, home on account of sickness.—T.]

[P. 142. "be a bad governor": the Greek means ". . . be a governor; being bad, you will do badly," etc.]

[2] ἐμέ. ἔτι, probably should be, ἐμέ. τί ἔτι.

[P. 143. "Socrates": a reference to Xen. *Mem.* 1, 6, 14.]

[P. 144. "in love": the translation omits "with a beautiful girl."]

CHAPTER VI

[1] By changing τῶν into πως, and, as Mr. Upton proposes, πότερον into πρότερον, the whole difficulty of this corrupted passage is removed.

[P. 144. "Rufus": see Book 1. i.]

CHAPTER VII

[1] The translation follows Lord Shaftesbury's correction of ψυχικοῖς for ἀγαθοῖς, which seems absolutely necessary to the sense of the passage.

[2] The translation follows the reading of Wolfius, ἐπινόει.

[3] Of Symphorus and Numenius there is no account, and their names serve only to show that persons once of such power are now totally forgot.

CHAPTER IX

[1] The first ὡς I apprehend should be ὦ, and is so translated.

[2] I can find no sense of ἀναλύετε, which suits this place. Perhaps the reading should be ἦ ἄρα λούεσθε, and it is so translated. Bathing was a common amusement of idle people. See iii. 24, p. 495 of Mr. Upton's edition. [A better emendation is ἀλύετε, "you wander distraught."]

[3] "And how they quaff in gold,
Crystal and myrrhine cups, emboss'd with gems."
Paradise Regained, iv. v. 118.

CHAPTER X

[P. 15. From the Golden Verses of Pgthagoras.]

[1] This place is either corrupt, as Mr. Upton thinks, or alludes to some ancient custom not sufficiently understood now. [The meaning seems to be, a mere formal repetition.]

[2] This is a corrupt passage, and the translation conjectural. Perhaps the true reading might be ποῦ ποτ' ἀπελθόντα τοῦ σωματίου δεῖ ἀπελθεῖν με, and it is so translated. There is a similar turn of expression in the fifth chapter of the second book, which seems to favour this notion. See 1. p. 189 of Mr. Upton's edition.

[3] [The translation should be: "There you may leave off and spare yourself the buffets."]

[4] St. Paul hath made use of this very expression *νομίμως ἀθλεῖν*, 2 Tim. ii. 5.

[5] See Matt. viii. 2, *κύριε, ἐὰν θέλῃς, δύνασαί με καθαρίσαι.* Upton.

[6] *φόβου*, in the Greek, seems to have crept in from the preceding *φοβεῖσθαι*, therefore it is omitted in the translation. [But probably it should be changed into *πόθου*, and the translation be — What occasion for anger, for desire . . . These two Greek words are confounded elsewhere. And the same alteration seems needful in *Porphyr. de Abst.* i. § 2.—T.]

CHAPTER XI

[P. 154. Homer, *Odyssey*, xv. 55.]

CHAPTER XII

[1] A tree remarkable for its being straight and high. I should imagine, therefore, that to set up the palm-tree meant some act of dexterity, not unlike, perhaps, to that of our modern balance-masters, and that the artist not only set up, but ascended to its top, and there exhibited himself in various attitudes. What confirms me in this notion is, that these palm-tree artists are joined with the rope-dancers; their professions being alike formed on the difficulty and danger. In Lucian's treatise *de Syria Dea*, we meet with these men under the name of the *φοινικοβατοῦντες*, who, it seems, were frequent in Arabia and Syria; countries where the palm is known to flourish. [*De Dea Syria*, chap. 29.]

[2] Diogenes used in winter to grasp statues when they were covered with snow, as an exercise, to inure himself to hardship. Diogenes Laertius.

[3] *ἂν ἀτυχήσω* is variously read. Perhaps the right word may be *ἀνατοιχήσω*, derived from *τοῖχος*; which signifies, among other things, the side of a ship or boat. It appears from Julius Pollux and Phrynichus, in Stephens's *Lexicon*, and Scot's Appendix, that *ἀνατοιχειν* is a word used by the vulgar, to signify being sometimes on one side of the vessel, and sometimes on the other, which agrees very well here: I will lean to the opposite side, etc., *i.e.* to keep the vessel even. I am obliged for this note to a friend. [He is sensible, however, that *ἀνατοιχεῖν* is not exactly to throw one's self on one side, and stands condemned by Phrynichus, as a low expression.—T.]

[4] These particulars are not now understood; but show, in general, that the ancient philosophers had their absurd and ostentatious austerities and mortifications, as well as the monks and Indian philosophers since.

[P. 155. " ticket ": *σύνθημα* or *tessera :* see Polybius, vi. 36.]

CHAPTER XIII

[1] The Stoics held successive conflagrations at destined periods, in which all beings were resorbed into the Deity.

[2] The Greek, from *φέρειν οὖν δεῖ* to *φθισικῷ*, is so corrupted and unintelligible that it is totally rejected. Indeed, the connection of this paragraph with what precedes is by no means clear.

CHAPTER XV

[1] This fifteenth chapter makes the twenty-ninth of the *Enchiridion*, but with some varieties of reading. Particularly, for *ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι παρορύσσεσθαι* here, is *εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα παρέρχεσθαι* there.

This chapter hath a great conformity to Luke xiv. 28, etc. But it is to be observed that Epictetus, both here and elsewhere, supposes some persons incapable of being philosophers—that is, virtuous and pious men; but Christianity requires and enables all to be such.

[2] St. Paul hath a similar allusion to the public games. 1 Cor. ix. 25. Both writers have them frequently in view.

[3] Which was the case in any violation of the laws of the games.

[4] The translation doth not follow the pointing of Mr. Upton's edition in this place.

Euphrates was a philosopher of Syria, whose character is described with the highest encomiums by Pliny. See i. Ep. x.

[5] *ταῦτα* in this place should be *ταὐτά*.

[6] What is omitted at the end of this chapter is placed at the end of the seventeenth, to which Lord Shaftesbury thinks it belongs, or to one of the miscellaneous chapters, which is the more probable opinion.

CHAPTER XVI

[1] The translation follows Mr. Upton's conjecture, *δεῖ. εἰ ἐπιλέγω*, etc.

[2] *μήπω*, Mr. Upton's manuscript.

CHAPTER XVII

[1] "But sometimes virtue starves, while vice is fed,"
What then? Is the reward of virtue bread?
That vice may merit, 'tis the price of toil;
The knave deserves it when he tills the soil,
The knave deserves it when he tempts the main.
Essay on Man, iv.

[3] This person is not known. One of his name is mentioned in the *Acts* of Ignatius, as being consul at the time when he suffered martyrdom.

CHAPTER XX

[1] The passage, as it now stands in the Greek, is scarcely intelligible. The difficulty is removed by reading ἀγαθόν for ἀπατήν, and the translation follows this conjecture. [Or we may suppose ἀπατήν to be a gloss or a casual repetition of the same word occurring in the line before; and so translate, there exists the knowledge, etc.—T.]

[2] The son of Creon, who killed himself after he had been informed, by an oracle, that his death would procure a victory to the Thebans. Apollodorus. Upton.

[3] See Book II. xxii. note [1] (p. 324).

[4] οὗτος for οὕτως. Wolfius.

[5] For δείξη σε ἔργῳ, δείξῃς ἔργῳ seems the true reading.

[6] Mr. Upton conjectures this Lesbius to have been some buffoon.

CHAPTER XXI

[1] The translation follows the conjecture of Wolfius, ἀκάθαρτον. There are other difficulties in the text as it now stands. ἐξεμέσῃς, perhaps, should be ἐξεμέσεις; or probably there should be no μὴ before ἐξεμέσῃς; and then the meaning of Epictetus will be, that the persons whom he is speaking of ought first to concoct propositions for their own use, and then throw them up (*i.e.* utter them in discourse) for the use of others. But the figure he makes use of is so dirty, that it is not to be enlarged upon, though taken from the practice of the Greek and Roman physicians.

[2] The priest who presided over the Eleusinian mysteries was called Hierophantes; *i.e.* a revealer of sacred things. He was obliged to devote himself to divine service, and lead a chaste and single life. He was attended by three officers: a torch-bearer, a herald, and one who assisted at the altar. For a fuller account of the Eleusinian mysteries, see Potter's *Grecian Antiquities*, i. 20.

[3] The girdle is mentioned among the holy garments of the Levitical priests. Exod. xxviii. 4, 39, 40, etc.

CHAPTER XXII

[1] The Cynics owed their original to Antisthenes, a disciple of Socrates. They held virtue to be the highest good, and the end of life; and treated riches, honours, and power with great contempt. They were enemies to science and polite literature, and applied

themselves wholly to the study of morality. There was in many respects great conformity between them and the Stoics; but the Stoics selected what seemed laudable in their principles, without imitating the roughness of their address and the detestable indecency of their external behaviour. The Stoics were indeed a reformed branch of the Cynics, and thence, perhaps, spoke of them somewhat more favourably than they might otherwise have done. The Cynics are said to have derived their name from Cynosarges, a gymnasium without the walls of Athens, where Antisthenes taught, and which was so called from the accident of a white dog stealing part of a victim which Diomus was sacrificing to Hercules; and their barking at everybody, and their want of shame, helped to confirm the appellation. In this Cynosarges was a celebrated temple of Hercules, which, very possibly, gave the Cynics the original hint of comparing themselves to that hero, which they so much affected.

[2] "And no man taketh this honour unto himself, but he that is called of God." Heb. v. 4.

[3] This hath a remarkable likeness to Matt. xxiv. 50, 51, especially n the originals.

[4] *i.e.* run away.

[5] For λοιδορεῖν read λοιδορῶν. Upton.

[6] The sense seems to require that καὶ should be κατά, and is so translated.

[7] See Book I. xxiv. note [3].

[8] The translation follows Lord Shaftesbury's conjecture.

[9] Unknown persons, probably of great bodily strength.

[P. 171. Homer, *Iliad*, x. 15. 91.]

[10] Were conquerors deeply to consider how much more happens than the mere separation of soul and body, they would not, for increase of dominion, or a point of false honour, push thousands at once into an unknown eternity.

[11] We find this phrase often used by the inspired writers to describe the office and duty of a king or ruler. And the most tender and affectionate compassion is implied in it, Isaiah xl. 11, where it is said of the King of kings, "He shall feed his flock like a shepherd; he shall gather the lambs with his arm, and carry them in his bosom, and shall gently lead those that are with young." He accordingly applies this distinguishing character to himself in several places of the New Testament, especially John x. 11, 14, 15, 16.

Homer speaks of Agamemnon by this name (which we see was not unusual in the East) to express his authority and care; but Epictetus applies it as a term of reproach, to imply ignorance and meanness of spirit. One cannot help observing, on what is here said of Agamemnon, the selfishness of the Stoic doctrine; which, as it all along forbids pity and compassion, will have even a king to look upon the welfare of his people, and a general on the preservation of his soldiers, as matters quite foreign and indifferent to him.

[13] It is observable that Epictetus seems to think it a necessary qualification in a teacher, sent from God for the instruction of mankind, to be destitute of all external advantages, and a suffering character. Thus doth this excellent man, who had carried human reason to so great a height, bear testimony to the propriety of that method which the divine wisdom hath thought fit to follow in the scheme of the gospel, whose great author had not where to lay his head; and which some, in later ages, have inconsiderately urged as an argument against the Christian religion. The infinite disparity between the proposal of the example of Diogenes in Epictetus, and of our Redeemer in the New Testament, is too obvious to need any enlargement.

[14] The translation follows Mr. Upton's conjecture of *χιτωνάριον* instead of *πραιτωρίδιον*.

[15] Compare this with the Christian precepts of forbearance and love to enemies, Matt. v. 39-44. The reader will observe that Christ specifies higher injuries and provocations than Epictetus doth, and requires of all his followers what Epictetus describes only as the duty of one or two extraordinary persons, as such.

[16] St. Jerome, cited by Mr. Upton, gives the following somewhat different account of this matter. Diogenes, as he was going to the Olympic games, was taken with a fever, and laid himself down in the road; his friends would have put him into some vehicle; but he refused it, and bid them go on to the show. "This night," said he, "I will either conquer, or be conquered. If I conquer the fever, I will come to the games; if it conquers me, I will descend to Hades." [Jerome, *adv. Jovianum* ii.]

[16] The Stoics directed this, and the Epicureans forbade it.

[17] It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word (*ἀπερισπάστως*) with St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same consideration, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from marriage. His observation too, that the state of things was then (*ὡς ἐν παρατάξει*) like that of an army prepared for battle, nearly resembles the apostle's (*ἐνεστῶσα ἀνάγκη*) "present necessity." St. Paul says, 2 Tim. ii. 4. (*οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται*, etc.), no man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life. So Epictetus says here that a Cynic must not be (*ἐμπεπλεγμένον*) entangled in relations, etc. From these and many other passages of Epictetus, one would be inclined to think that he was not unacquainted with St. Paul's Epistles; or that he had heard something of the Christian doctrine. Yet see Introduction, § 40.

[18] *ἐκκλείεται* should be *ἐγκλείεται*, and is so translated.

[P. 175. *Iliad*, ii. 25.]

[19] *ἀσίτησον*. Upton. Wolfius.

[20] Crates was a Theban of birth and fortune, who was so charmed by the appearance of Telephus, in the character of a dirty, ragged beggar, upon the stage, that he gave away all his estate, assumed the wallet and staff, and turned Cynic. Hipparchia, a Thracian lady, was so affected by the discourses and manners of this polite

philosopher, that she fell desperately in love with him; and neither the riches, beauty, or distinction of others who paid their addresses to her were able to rival him in her heart. Her relations vainly endeavoured to oppose her inclination; she was deaf to all their remonstrances; and even threatened to kill herself, unless she was suffered to marry Crates. At the desire of her family, he tried himself to dissuade her from this scheme. He pointed out to her the deformity of his person; and throwing down his wallet and staff before her, told her these were all the riches she was to expect, and that his wife must pursue the same course of life as he did; and desired her to consider of it. But no consideration was able to shake her resolution. She married him, and became as absolute a Cynic as himself, utterly disregarding all external propriety and decency. See Diog. Laertius, in their Lives.

[21] Mr. Upton's reading.

[22] Danaus and Egyptus were the sons of Belus. Danaus had fifty daughters, who, from their grandfather, were called Belides; and Egyptus fifty sons. After a quarrel between the two brothers, a reconciliation was agreed, upon condition of a marriage between their children. But Danaus having learnt from an oracle that he was to be killed by one of his sons-in-law, commanded his daughters to murder their husbands, and furnished them with daggers for that purpose. They all, except one, executed this cruel order. The poets represent them as punished in the infernal regions by an everlasting unavailing attempt to fill a sieve with water.

Æolus was the father of Sisyphus, who, for his infamous robberies, was killed by Theseus, and, after his death, condemned in Tartarus to roll continually a vast stone up a hill.

[P. 175. "Cynics—dogs": the Greek word is the same for both Cynic and dog.]

[Pp. 176-7. Refer to Diogenes Laertius vi. 42; Homer, *Iliad*, ii. 54-5; Epictetus II. xxiii.]

[P. 178. Homer, *Iliad*, vi. 490.]

CHAPTER XXIII

[1] See note [1], p. 326.

[2] Mr. Upton observes that these florid descriptions were the principal study of the Sophists.

[3] Dion was a Greek writer of those times, called for his eloquence Chrysostom, or golden-mouthed; as one of the Fathers of the Church was afterwards.

[4] The sense seems absolutely to require that the latter *οὗτος* should be either expunged or changed into *τοῦτο*. [Or perhaps, rather the former *οὗτος* should be left out.—T.]

[5] These words are the beginning of Xenophon's Memoirs of Socrates, and it was a debate among the minute critics whether

argument or *arguments* was the proper reading. Upton. [*τίσι λόγοις* or *τίνι λόγῳ*]

[8] It might be usual for persons of fashion to lend their houses for sophists and orators to declaim in. Upton. [The passage seems to mean: Socrates did not ask all who consulted him to go and hear him speak, and to praise him. The words "Hear" to "Quadratus" are what some one might have said in Epictetus' days. Quadratus is unknown, and is perhaps any name taken at random.]

[P. 180. "Socrates": Plato, *Apology*, 17, c.]

[7] St. James uses the same word when he saith, "Faith without works is dead."

CHAPTER XXIV

[1] There is no need of Salmasius's change of *ἀντί τινος*, etc. to *ἀντιτείνεις*, etc., if for *ἐπὶ τί κλᾷς* one reads *ἐπικλᾷς*. The *τι* might arise from a mistake in writing *πι* twice over. *ἐπέκλασεν* is used in the same sense in xxvi. 3, p. 527 of Mr. Upton's edition. If *κλάω* hath it, the present reading may stand. ["Why, and for what cause, dost thou weep?"]

[Pp. 183-4. The Greek references are i. 3, xvii. 487.]

[2] *τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονοῦν ἀπέχειν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θέλει, πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ ἐοικέναι.* This bears a strong resemblance to *ἀπέχω δὲ πάντα καὶ περισσεύω, πεπλήρωμαι*, etc. Phil. iv. 18.

[3] The Greek should be pointed, *ξένου, θεομαχοῦντος*.

[4] An allusion to Homer.

[5] The translation here follows a conjecture of Wolfius; who reads for *εὐπείθειαν, εὐπάθειαν*. The same word occurs in iv. 3, p. 582 of Mr. Upton's edition, and is there translated in the same manner.

[6] The translation here follows Mr. Upton's conjecture in his Addenda.

[7] This figure is frequently used both by sacred and profane authors. See Job, vii. 1, Eph. vi. 12, 1 Pet. ii. 11, etc. Vivere militare est: Life is a state of war. Sen. *Epist.* 96, etc.

[8] Instead of *ἀλλ' ἀεὶ βουλευτής*, the true reading, perhaps, is *ἀλλὰ εἰ βουλευτής*, and it is translated accordingly. [Yet possibly the present reading may stand, and be translated, But your life is a perpetual magistracy.—T.]

[9] The conjecture of Wolfius (*ἀναστῆναι*) is a good one, and the translation hath followed it.

[10] What follows hath no connection with what immediately preceded, but belongs to the general subject of the chapter.

[11] The change of the persons in these discourses is often so sudden that it is difficult to discover the speaker; and one can judge only from the general sense. The translator hath endeavoured to give

this passage the turn which seems most agreeable to the context, without adhering very literally to the several words in the Greek. Epictetus in this paragraph personates the scholar, whom he is exhorting to visit a great man.

[12] This refers to a former part of the chapter.

[13] Here what was said before about going to a great man is again resumed.

[14] At Athens.

[15] It was the custom at Athens, in cases where no fixed punishment was appointed by the law, before the judges gave sentence, to ask the criminal himself what penalty he thought he deserved. Socrates refused either to comply with this form himself, or suffer any of his friends to do it for him: alleging that the naming a penalty was a confession of guilt. When the judges, therefore, asked him what penalty he thought he deserved, he answered, "The highest honours and rewards, and to be maintained in the Prytaneum at the public expense." An answer which so extremely irritated his judges, that they immediately condemned him to death. Plato, *Apology*, s. fin.

[16] A people towards the extremity of Greece.

[17] Diogenes was the disciple of Antisthenes. Compare what Diogenes says of Antisthenes making him free, with John viii. 32-36.

[18] Instead of ἀνεῖναι, the sense seems to require ἀνιᾶν, and it is so translated. [Not necessary: the text means "relax, leave unhindered."]

[19] See *Enchiridion*, iii.

[20] The translation here follows Mr. Upton's conjecture. ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷστισι, etc.

[21] The translation follows Mr. Upton's transposition of οὐκ. The meaning of the passage is, that though the personal existence is dissolved and destroyed by death, the substance out of which it was produced remains under some other form, which was the Stoic doctrine. [The text may stand: "You will not (be as you are), but you will be something else, which the world now needs," "now" being at the supposed time of dissolution.]

[23] ἀπειθῶν. Wolfius.

[23] This was said by Xenophon, when news was brought him that his son Gryllus was killed in a battle.

[24] Compare this with the description of the universal care of Providence, Matt. x. 29, 30, and the occasion on which it was introduced.

CHAPTER XXV

[1] It was a sport among the Greeks to put quails in a circular space, like our cockpits, and use various ways of trying their courage. If the quail ran away out of the pit, its master lost.

[1] An allusion to the Pythian, Isthmian, Nemean, and Olympic games. The persons who were victorious in all these were distinguished by a particular name, signifying that they had been conquerors through the whole circle of the games. Upton.

CHAPTER XXVI

[1] Compare this chapter with the beautiful and affecting discourses of our Saviour on the same subject, Matt. vi. 25-34, Luke xii. 22-30.

[2] See Introduction, § 6.

[3] Cleanthes was a Stoic philosopher, the disciple and successor of Zeno. He used to draw water for his livelihood all night, and study all day. He was so poor that for want of proper materials he used to write down what he had heard from his master Zeno on tiles and pieces of bone. The physicians ordered him for a swelling in his gums to abstain two days from food, with which he complied. When he was recovered they gave him leave to return to his usual diet, which he refused; and saying he was now far advanced on his journey, starved himself to death. Diog. Laert.

[4] Eurystheus.

[P. 198. Homer, *Odyssey*, vi. 130.]

[5] The sense would be better if we read *τῆς φιλοσοφίας*, of philosophy. [Or *τοῦ φιλοσόφου* may mean, of the philosophic principle.—T.]

[6] The name of a slave, particularly of a slave who once belonged to Diogenes. [The slave ran away, and Diogenes would not hunt for him. He said, If Manes can live without Diogenes, surely Diogenes can live without Manes. Diog. Laert. Life of Diogenes, § 55.]

BOOK IV

CHAPTER I

[1] "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin." John viii. 34.

[2] "They answered him, We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?" John viii. 33.

[3] Mr. Upton's copy transposes many pages of this chapter to their right place, which in others were joined to the last chapter of the third book.

[4] A character in one of the comedies of Menander, called *The Hated Lover*.

[5] The name of a slave.

[6] Wolfius, very rightly, for καλὸν reads κακόν.

[7] See note [4], Book II. i. (p. 317).

[8] It seems necessary that ὅθεν and ὅπου should be ὅταν and ὅπως, and they are so translated. [Or the latter ὅπου θέλω may be a repetition of the transcriber.—T.]

[9] A gold ring was the peculiar ornament of the Roman knights, by which they were distinguished from the Plebeians. Upton.

[10] Something is here wanting in the original.

[11] ἀνάλγητος for ἀναλήθης. Upton. [ἀναλήθης, "false," may be right.]

[12] The Stoics held the wise man to be the only real king. Upton.

[13] The feast of Saturn, in which the slaves had a liberty of sitting at table with their masters, in memory of the equality of conditions under his reign.

[14] Beasts of burthen and carriages are pressed for the use of armies when need requires.

[15] Epictetus here personates one desirous of recovering the liberty of the city in which he lives. There were citadels erected from time to time in Greek cities to support tyrants, and they and the citadels were destroyed together whenever it could be done.

[16] The translation here is agreeable to Mr. Upton's copy.

[17] See I. ii. § 3.

[18] "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away." Job. i. 21.

[19] Mr. Upton's conjecture.

[20] See note [3], p. 321 (on Book II. xiii.).

[21] The translation here follows a different pointing from Mr. Upton, πῶς λέγεις; ὡς καὶ σύ. ἀλεκτρύονα, etc.

[22] This answer implies a silent concession, that it is no paradox to affirm the evil of everything to consist in what is contrary to its nature.

[23] The translation here follows Mr. Upton's conjecture.

[24] There is much obscurity, and some variety of reading, in several lines of the original in this place, and I am not certain whether the translation hath given the true sense; but it is the best I could make of it. [The contrast is drawn betwixt talk and practice.]

[25] Probably some rich old woman from whom the speaker had expectations.

[P. 214. See Book I. xix.]

[26] Epictetus here alludes to his own lameness. See pp. 153 and 170.

[27] This passage hath great difficulties in the original. I have given it what appeared to me the best sense. But I am still doubtful. [For ὅλων I have taken the reading of Mr. Upton's copy, ἄλλων. For Archidamas read Archidamus.—T.]

[28] Socrates, with four other persons, was commanded by the thirty tyrants of Athens to fetch Leo from the isle of Salamis, in order to be put to death. His companions executed their commission, but Socrates remained at home, and chose rather to expose his life to the fury of the tyrants than be accessory to the death of an innocent person. He would most probably have fallen a sacrifice to their vengeance if the oligarchy had not shortly after been dissolved. See Plato's *Apology*.

[29] Mr. Upton's copy.

[P. 216. " where must they have dwelt? " *i.e.* they would have remained behind.]

CHAPTER II

[1] Compare this chapter with Matt. vi. 24. " No man can serve two masters."

[P. 217. " same behaviour," *i.e.* do a thing just because he does it.]

[2] See James i. 8.

CHAPTER III

[1] See III. xxiv. note [5].

[2] I suspect that τυγχάνων should be οὐ τυγχάνων, and then the translation will be, Consider, on the other hand, if you do not get that, what you obtain instead of it.

[3] Probably Epictetus here alludes to the jumping up in the theatre, in favour of some actor, mentioned in the preceding chapter, and in the fourth chapter of the third book.

[4] Two famous lawyers. This passage is an instance of the manner of speaking less usual among the Greek and Roman than the Eastern writers; where enjoining one thing, and forbidding another, means only that the first should be preferred in case of competition.

CHAPTER IV

[1] The readers, perhaps, may grow tired with being so often told, what they will find it very difficult to believe, that because externals are not in our own power, they are nothing to us. But, in excuse for this frequent repetition, it must be considered that the Stoics had reduced themselves to a necessity of dwelling on this consequence, extravagant as it is, by rejecting stronger aids. One cannot, indeed, avoid highly admiring the very few who attempted to amend and exalt themselves on this foundation. No one, perhaps, ever carried the attempt so far in practice, and no one ever spoke so well in support of the argument, as Epictetus. Yet not-

withstanding his great abilities, and the force of his example, one finds him strongly complaining of the want of success; and one sees from this circumstance, as well as from many others in the Stoic writings, that virtue cannot be maintained in the world without the hope of a future reward.

[2] Τότε perhaps should be ποτέ, and is so translated.

[3] The Olympic champions used to rub themselves with dust and sand, which, as they were anointed, was necessary to give them the better hold on each other. See Mr. Upton's note on III. 15, p. 419, l. 10.

[4] The translation follows the conjecture of Wolfius.

CHAPTER V

[1] Perhaps for κινῇ οὗτός τι should be read κινῆται οὗτος, and the translation follows this conjecture. [The text makes sense: "should commence some action."]

[2] Like Hercules and Diogenes. See III. xii. note [3].

[3] An allusion to a passage in Euripides [*Cresphontes*, frag. 449, Nauck]. The general sense of which is, that we ought to lament the person who is born, from a consideration of the evils into which he is coming, and to rejoice over the dead, who is at rest from his labours. Upton.

There is an account in Herodotus of a people of Thrace, who used to assemble and condole with a family where any one was born, and, on the contrary, express great joy and congratulation wherever there happened a death. v. 4.

[4] Nero being declared an enemy by the senate, his coin was, in consequence of this, prohibited and destroyed.

[P. 226. "wax": τὸ κήρινον, *i.e.* "the wax apple."]

[5] The name of some animal would suit better here than the epithet ἄχρηστος. But χοῖρος, a hog, is a word too unlike, and I can think of no better.

[6] Alcibiades sent a fine great cake as a present to Socrates, which so provoked the jealousy of the meek Xanthippe, that she threw it down and stamped upon it. Socrates only laughed, and said, "Now you will have no share in it yourself." Upton from Ælian. [xi. 12. See for the rest Diog. Laert. *Socrates*.]

[P. 227: "Lions, etc.," a proverb on the Lacedæmonians who fell in Asia.]

CHAPTER VI

[1] The text here is either corrupt or very elliptical and obscure, and the translation conjectural. ἄνω κάτω hath the same sense in the next page but one, which is assigned to it here. The καὶ before

μανθάνειν is omitted, as being probably a corruption of the last syllable of the preceding word, written twice over. Mr. Upton's MS. cuts the difficulty short by leaving out several words; in consequence of which, the translation would be: How is it, then, that you have not yet brought yourself to learn to be exempt, etc. [But this omission was probably owing to the transcribers skipping from μαθεῖν to the like word μανθάνειν. Possibly, instead of leaving out καὶ, we should rather suppose that something before it is left out. And in all likelihood the true translation of νῦν οὐχὶ ἄνω κάτω, instead of, Should not you, etc., is the following: Is not this, *i.e.* undertaking to convince others instead of yourself, inverting the order of things?—T.]

[2] I have translated thus, on the supposition that οὐ in the original ought to be repeated.

[3] See the Pythagorean verses (quoted in III. 10) of which these questions are a parody.

CHAPTER VII

[1] Epictetus probably means, not any remaining disciples of Judas of Galilee, but the Christians, whom Julian afterwards affected to call Galileans. It helps to confirm this opinion that M. Antoninus (ii. § 3) mentions them by their proper name of Christians, as suffering death out of mere obstinacy. It would have been more reasonable and more worthy the character of these great men to have inquired into the principles on which the Christians refused to worship heathen deities, and by which they were enabled to support their sufferings with such amazing constancy, than rashly to pronounce their behaviour the effect of obstinacy and habit. Epictetus and Antoninus were too exact judges of human nature not to know that ignominy, tortures, and death are, not merely on their own account, objects of choice: nor could the records of any time or nation furnish them with an example of multitudes of persons of both sexes, of all ages, ranks, and natural dispositions, in distant countries and successive periods, resigning whatever is most valuable and dear to the heart of man, from a principle of obstinacy, or the mere force of habit; not to say that habit could have no influence on the first sufferers.

[2] This agrees with Eph. v. 20, "Giving thanks always for all things unto God . . ."

[3] The translation here follows Mr. Upton's manuscript and emendation.

[4] "Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt." Matt. xxvi. 39.

[5] The translation of this passage follows the conjecture of Wolfius.

[6] An allusion to the story mentioned in the first chapter of this book, note [28].

[7] See III. xxiv. note [21].

CHAPTER VIII

[1] Perhaps the true reading is ὁ ὁ φιλόσοφος.

[2] See III. xxii. note [12].

[P. 239. *Odyssey*, xi. 528.]

[3] Which were the characteristics of the Cynics.

[4] At the feast of Adonis, there were carried about little earthen pots filled with mould, in which grew several sorts of herbs. These were called gardens, and from thence the gardens of Adonis came to be proverbially applied to things unfruitful or fading; because those herbs were only sowed so long before the festival as to sprout forth and be green at that time, and then were presently cast into the water. See Potter's *Grecian Antiquities*, c. xx. p. 363.

[5] Here is a strong similitude to the seed, in the gospels, that sprang up quickly, and withered.

[6] This passage hath some difficulty in the original, and probably may have been corrupted. The translation hath given what seems to be the sense.

CHAPTER IX

[1] They who are desirous of taking refuge in heathenism from the strictness of the Christian morality will find no great consolation in reading this chapter of Epictetus.

[2] An indecent poet of Miletus.

[3] A writer of amorous verses.

[4] The translation follows Mr. Upton's conjecture of μυροποιοῦ.

[5] Epictetus here asserts that the only benefit of reformation is being reformed; and that they who look for any other are incapable of being reformed, even by God himself, and so may go on and be as bad as they please. Suppose a prince should publish a proclamation that the only advantage of loyalty was being loyal; and if any of his subjects looked for any other, he might be a rebel with impunity: what effect must this have, compared with the declaration, Rev. xxii. 11, 12: "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is filthy, let him be filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still; and behold, I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to give to every man according as his works shall be."

CHAPTER X

[1] I read the text in this place as Wolfius appears by his translation to have done.

[2] "Thine they were, and thou gavest them me." John xvii. 6.

[2] See *Enchiridion*, xiii.

[4] The ensigns of the consular office.

[5] These were distributed by the great men in Rome to their clients, as a reward for their attendance.

[6] "Ye cannot serve God and mammon." Matt. vi. 24.

[7] Antilochus and Menelaus are not mentioned or referred to in the passage of Homer to which Epictetus alludes. [*Iliad* xxiv. 5.]

[9] I hop'd Patroclus might survive, to rear
My tender orphan, with a parent's care.
POPE.

[9] ἄδηλα ᾖον, perhaps, should be ἄδηλα δῆλα ᾖον.

[10] Thou too, Patroclus (thus his heart he vents),
Hast spread the inviting banquet in our tents.
POPE.

CHAPTER XI

[1] Something here seems to be lost. Or perhaps the words "without being sensible of it, you do something like this" ought to be inserted after "neglected him." [Or rather, after the next word; and the translation should be: Yet now, without being sensible of it, you do something like this, even in the present case. Consider your body, etc. But still the separation of οἷον from καὶ νῦν is somewhat unnatural, and takes off from the spirit and quickness of the repartee.—T.]

[3] Here probably should be added "if you do not choose warm water, with cold." These words in the Greek are transferred to a place where they are absolutely unintelligible. They were probably at first omitted by chance, then supplied at the bottom of the page, and then transcribed as if that had been their proper place.

[3] In times of mourning or danger, the ancients expressed their sense of their situation by neglecting their persons.

[Squalid . . . The original word signifies, in general, pale. And, probably, Aristophanes meant the paleness which proceeds from a sedentary, studious life. But Epictetus plainly understood him, of that unwholesome look which want of cleanliness gives.—T.] [See Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 179, 225, etc.]

[4] As it was the case of Diogenes.

[5] For ὥστε, perhaps ἔστε may be the true reading, and it is so translated.

[6] See III. i. note [3].

[7] The youth, probably, means the scholar who neglects neatness; and the old man the tutor, that gives him no precept or example of it.

CHAPTER XII

[1] εἴωθει, perhaps, should be ὠθεῖται. [Or, as Casaubon conjectures, ἀπωθεῖν. Or, perhaps, as Mr. Upton proposes, ὑπερτιθέμενον should be ὑπερτιθέμενος.—T.]

[2] [Is he my conscience . . . κρῖμα signifies, p. 652 l. 6 and p. 66c l. 5 of Mr. Upton's edition, the judgment which any one passes in his own mind.—T.]

[3] The tutelar genius and fortune. Of the former, see I. xiv. § 2. Of both, see IV. iv. § 4. By changing καὶ τοῖς into καί τοι, the translation would be: But, next to him, he hath intrusted me with myself.

THE ENCHIRIDION

[1] The translation follows Mr. Upton's conjecture of ἄλλων for αὐτῶν.

[2] The sense is, that he who is only beginning to philosophise hath yet nothing right within him to desire or set his heart upon; therefore, till he hath, he must not set his heart upon anything. But, in the meantime, he must make use of the pursuits and avoidances, *i.e.* perform the common actions of life; but these outward movements must be cautious and gentle, and the inward movements of desire be quite restrained.

[3] The translation follows Mr. Upton's correction of the text in this chapter [ἵππου for ἵππῳ].

[4] Thus some MSS. Changing in others καλῶς into κακῶς, the translation will be: It is not so well with him, and ill with you.

[5] There is a great likeness to Christian phrases and doctrines in this chapter.

[6] *i.e.* dependent on persons' own choice.

[7] An allusion to the custom in the ancient entertainments, of carrying round the dishes to each of the guests. Upton.

[8] For Heraclitus, I suspect, should be read Hercules. [For nothing appears to support so great an encomium of that philosopher; whereas Hercules and Diogenes were favourites of the Stoics, and particularly of our author; and the latter professed himself an imitator of the former. But then he was never deified.—T.]

[9] "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ." Gal. i. 10.

[10] I have followed the conjecture of a friend, who thinks ὠφελεῖς should be ὠφελεῖ, to preserve an opposition between the person signified by it and the σὺ αὐτός in the next sentence.

[11] Or, according to the reading in Simplicius—the attendants in his antechamber.

[15] Happiness, the effect of virtue, is the mark which God hath set up for us to aim at. Our missing it is no work of his, nor so properly anything real, as a mere negative and failure of our own.

[16] This chapter, except some very trifling differences, is the same with the fifteenth of the Third Book of the *Discourses*, therefore unnecessary to be repeated here.

[17] " He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him." Heb. xi. 6.

[18] ἄλλως τε, perhaps, should be ἄλλως δέ.

[P. 266. " Pythian god ": see Ælian, III. 44.]

[19] See Eccles. ii. 2, vii. 3-6; Ecclus. xix. 30, xxi. 20.

[20] Public prostitutes were allowed by the laws at Rome and in Greece. The mischiefs occasioned by persons of this character, scarcely so much as hinted by the Stoic philosopher, are the subject of many beautiful reflections in the Book of Proverbs.

[21] A late editor of the *Enchiridion* hath proposed to read διαπεπληγμένου instead of διαβεβλημένου. [This reading he hath taken from an edition in 1554, said to be made from a better manuscript than the common editions. He understands it to mean, struck and affected over strongly by externals. διαβεβλημένος means averse from, II. c. 26, in the beginning, and Philostrat. *vit Apollon.* viii. 7, 3. But from the vulgar sense, calumniated, it may mean here, one to whom externals have been misrepresented, who hath a misconception of the world.—T.]

[22] The Stoics were so fond of logic, that we must not wonder if Epictetus took a simile from thence which to others must appear a strange one. [See Book I. xxv.]

[P. 269. " mistresses ": κύριαι, *i.e.* a title like " Madam." So κύριος, " Master, Mr., Sir." See p. 317 note [7].]

[23] Purple was of high honour and price among the ancients.

[24] The original words here, κόσμιαι καὶ αἰδήμονες ἐν σωφροσύνῃ, are almost the same with, ἐν καταστολῇ κοσμίῳ μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης, 1 Tim. ii. 9.

[25] See IV. viii. of the *Discourses*.

[26] See III. xii. of the *Discourses*.

[27] See II., note [8].

[28] The same words, ἀνὴρ τέλειος, in the same sense, are used Eph. iv. 13 (where they are opposed to νηπιοή, v. 14); James iii. 2; and ἄνθρωπος τέλειος, Col. i. 28; and τέλειος, singly, 1 Cor. ii. 6; Phil. iii. 15; Heb. v. 14, where it is opposed to νήπιος, v. 13. Which word is used also, 1 Cor. iii. 1, as μειράκιον is here.

[29] Plato, in his *Crito*, introduces Socrates saying this of himself. Upton.

[30] From a poem of Cleanthes.

[31] From Euripides. [Frag. 965, Nanck.]

[32] From Plato's *Crito* and *Apology*.

FRAGMENTS

[1] According to Fabricius, in his *Bibliotheca Græca*, v. 30, Stobæus was a heathen; at least, he cites only heathen authors. He lived about the beginning of the fifth century. Maximus was a Christian, of the seventh; and Antonius, surnamed Melissa, or the Bee, of the eighth century or later; some say of the twelfth. Their collections are printed together. The editions of Stobæus are extremely incorrect; and in him and Maximus, the names of the authors quoted either were frequently wrong originally, or have been altered since. This may have happened to Antonius also; and, consequently, some of the sayings ascribed to Epictetus may not have been his. Indeed, many of these Fragments have very little the turn of his other Discourses. The two first, particularly, have a much stronger resemblance of the style and manner of M. Antoninus.

[2] The sense absolutely requires that *ψυχή* should be *τύχη*, and it is so translated.

[3] Perhaps by bribing a judge or a jailor. However, the sense is not clear. [Perhaps for *ἡ κακία* should be read *εὐτυχιά*, a turn of good fortune.—T.]

[4] The translation omits *ἔπειτα κεχειρωμένους*, which is in Antonius and Maximus but not in Stobæus.

[5] This sentence is ascribed to Pythagoras, by Antonius and Maximus, *de Rationali ; Serm.* 27, p. 75.

[6] *τῆς εὐδαιμονίας* seems to be merely an interpolation, and is omitted in the translation.

[7] " How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God! " Mark x. 23.

[8] The former part of the sentence seems to be wanting; in which, probably, the author had said, that they who have hereditary wealth should not think the management of it their chief concern; just as, etc.

[9] *σύνεσται* should, perhaps, be *συνῆπται*.

[10] The Latin translator supposes that *εὐθυμία* should be *ἐπιθυμία*, which the sense requires.

[11] I have not translated the Fragment which follows this in Mr. Upton, because I do not understand it.

[12] There are various readings of this Fragment, but none which makes the sense very clear.

[13] It is doubtful whether the meaning be, that the effect of a cheerful behaviour will remain after the person is dead, or after he is separated from the company.

[14] Gesner, for *κυβερνᾷς*, reads *κοινωνεῖς*, which seems the best sense, and is followed in the translation.

[15] There is something strikingly beautiful and humane in this consideration about servants.

[16] *ἀπειθεῖν*, probably, should be *πείθειν*, and is so translated. The *α* seems to have been added from the preceding word.

[17] In Stobæus the word is *ἐπίκουρος*. Gesner, whom Mr. Upton follows, guessed it should be *ἔπιληρος*. *ἔπικηρος*, which the translation supposes, is a less alteration, and makes a proper opposition to what follows.

[18] *πρῶτον μεγάλων ἀξιωθήσῃ* is the text of Stobæus. Mr. Upton puts in *οὐκ*, which the translation follows. *ἀπαξιωθήσῃ* is a smaller change, and the same sense.

[19] This and other shocking things in Plato's *Republic* show how apt even wise men are to err, without a guide.

[20] See *Discourses* I. i.

[21] Compare this and the next Fragment with 1 Cor. ii. 15.

[22] See Rom. xiv. 10.

[23] The antithesis seems to require that *ἀξίως* should be *ἀδίκως*, and the translation—unjustly blamed by him, who is condemned.

[24] The Stoics held all virtues and all faults to be equal, and this Fragment is one of their illustrations of that paradox.

[25] The text has *τῆς φαντασίας*, but the true reading seems evidently to be *τῇ φαντασίᾳ*, and this the translation follows.

[26] *τὸ δὲ οἴεσθαι εὐκαταφρονήτους τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔσεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τοὺς πρώτους ἐχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ βλάψωμεν, σφόδρα ἀγεννῶν καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων. φαμὲν γὰρ τὸν εὐκαταφρόνητον νοεῖσθαι μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι βλάψαι. ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον νοεῖται κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι ὠφελεῖν.*

This is the whole of the Fragment; of which only the first part, which was too good to be omitted, is translated. The rest I do not understand. [By reading *αὐτὸν* for *τὸν*, and disregarding or transposing *μέν*, we have: "For so we say he is held contemptible in proportion as he can (or cannot) hurt. Much rather the standard is, can he (or cannot he) help."]

[27] The Ancients anointed the body every day.

[28] The Latin version supposes that *ποιεῖ* should be *εὐποιεῖ*. This the sense seems to require, and it is so translated.

[29] This simile is peculiarly beautiful; and hath the force of an argument in the discourse of a Stoic, who held the sun to be animated and intelligent.

[30] This Fragment, in Stobæus, is ascribed to Socrates.

[31] See *Discourses*, I. xxvii. note [1].

[32] *ἧττον* is dropped out of the text, probably by reason of the similitude of the next word *ὅταν*.

[33] *ἀπάρεστον*, perhaps should be *ἀπάρεστοι*.

[34] This Fragment is ascribed to Pythagoras. Stobæus, *Serm.* I.

[35] *φήμης* in Antonius and Maximus is *αἰσχύνης*. And it is sc translated here.

[36] This and the following Fragment are from Antonius and Maximus, and in the margin stand there, Democriti, Isocratis, and Epicteti; so, probably, they ought to be put in the second class.

[37] The expression in the original is the same with Luke xi. 41.

[38] This saying is likewise ascribed to Pythagoras.

[39] See Deut. vi. 7; Psalm lxxi. 15, 24; cv. 2.

[40] *ἄλλο* seems a false reading for *μᾶλλον*.

[41] If any one thinks this sense of *νόμιμος* harsh or unsuitable, he may read *φρόνιμος*, prudent.

[42] The Stoics often confound the idea of God with that of the world.

[1] I have followed Mr. Upton's division; but many Fragments in the foregoing class properly belong to this.

[2] *ἀφαίρει τήν* probably should be *ἀφαιρέτην*, and is so translated.

[3] This saying is ascribed by Stobæus to Socrates. *ἄτακτον*, disorderly, is there *ἄπρακτον*, ineffectual, which I have preferred.

[P. 301. Other Fragments have been identified since this book was first published, and may be seen in the later texts. Some are translated by George Long.]

[1] Stob. *de Diis et Physiol.; Serm.* 211, p. 714. Ed. Francof. 1581.

[2] I have translated *ἀμερων* as it stands in the text; but, possibly, it might originally be no more than a marginal interpretation of *ἀτόμων*, changing the full point into a comma; or, according to Gesner's translation, a corruption of *ὁμοιομεριῶν*.

[3] The sentence seems imperfect.

[4] Maximus, *περὶ φιλοπονίας*; *Serm.* 118, p. 374.

[5] Ant. and Max. *de Disciplinâ*; *Serm.* 210, p. 704.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Stobæus, *Compar. Paupertatis et Divitiarum*; *Serm.* 237, p. 778.

[8] Archelaus, the philosopher, was the master of Socrates: but the person here mentioned was king of Macedon, who vainly endeavoured to get Socrates to his court. The envy of Aristophanes upon this occasion is said to have produced that infamous piece of scurrility and buffoonery, his *Comedy of the Clouds*. See Bayle, in the article "Archelaus."

[9] Stobæus, *Quod Eventus*, etc., pp. 324, 329.

GLOSSARY

Acheron, the River of Woe, in Hades.

Achilles, the great hero of the Greeks in the Trojan War.

Admetus, son of Pheres, King of Thessaly, was doomed to die unless a substitute could be found. He tried all his friends, including his father, and they all refused; but Alcestis his wife consented.

Æolus, King of Thessaly, a mythical Greek hero; he had many sons. God of the winds.

Æsculapius, god of healing and leechcraft. Alexander burnt a temple of Æsculapius when his friend Hephæstion died.

Agamemnon, King of Mycenæ, brother of Menelaus, whose wife Helen was cause of the Trojan War, caused the "wrath of Achilles" by taking away from him Briseïs, a captive maiden.

Antisthenes, of Athens, founder of the Cynic sect. He was pupil of Gorgias and of Socrates.

Alcibiades, a statesman and captain of Athens about B.C. 450-404. He was famous for his beauty, his success, his genius, and his profligacy. He was a friend of Socrates, who was very fond of him.

Antipater, of Ascalon, a philosopher and friend of Cicero (1st century B.C.).

Anytus, one of the accusers of Socrates.

Apollo, god of wisdom and prophecy, later also of the sun. He had a famous oracle at Delphi. On the front of the temple was graven the motto, Know thyself.

Archedemus, of Tarsus, a Stoic philosopher.

Archimedes, of Syracuse, the greatest mathematician of antiquity, B.C. 287-212.

Argus, a monster who was spotted all over with eyes.

Argos, a city and district N.E. of the Peloponnese.

Aricia, a town near Rome on the Appian Way.

Aristides, an Athenian statesman, of the 15th century B.C. He was called the Just.

Aristophanes, the greatest comic poet of antiquity, about B.C. 444-380.

Automedon, charioteer of Achilles.

billet, letter.

Capitol, one of the seven hills of Rome, on which stood the citadel and the temple of Jupiter.

Cassiope, in Corcyra (Corfu).

Cassius Longinus, C., a Roman jurist in the early empire, from Tiberius to Vespasian.

Castor and *Pollux*, sons of Zeus and Leda, invoked by sailors.

Catamite, vicious person.

celebrate, thank, praise.

Ceres, Gr. Demeter, goddess of corn and agriculture.

Chæronea, in Bœotia, where Philip conquered the Bœotians, B.C. 338.

choler, bile.

Chryseis, a captive damsel whom Agamemnon was forced to restore to her father. He then took away another damsel, Briseïs, from Achilles, and caused the quarrel which is the subject of Homer's *Iliad*.

Chrysippus, of Cilicia, born B.C. 280, one of the chief philosophers of the Stoic school, died 207.

Circensian Games, gladiatorial contests or wild-beast fights in the Circus Maximus at Rome. The Ædiles were expected to give them.

Cithæron, a mountain between Bœotia and Attica, where Ædipus was exposed as a babe to die. His cry was for sorrow that he had not died (Œd. Tyr. 1390).

Cleanthes, a Stoic, born about B.C. 300, succeeded Zeno as head of the school.

Cocytus, the River of Wailing, in Hades.

composition, system, combination.

concoct, digest.

Consent, general (p. 55), the received opinion about the knowledge and certainty of things, which the sceptics would not admit.
Crates, of Thebes, a Cynic, flourished about B.C. 320.
Cræsus, King of Lydia in the sixth century B.C., famous for his wealth (B.C. 560-546).
Crito, a friend of Socrates, who tried to persuade him to escape from prison.
Cybele, an Asiatic goddess, worshipped with wild and abominable rites by her priesthood.
Cynics, see Book III. chap. xxii. note 1.

Danaus, see note 22 to III. xxii.
dæmon, spirit, an unseen supernatural power.
diesis, quarter-tone in music.
Diogenes, (1) the Cynic of the fourth century B.C.; (2) a later philosopher; (3) Laertius, wrote lives of the philosophers.
Dion of Prusa in Bithynia, the golden-mouth, a sophist and rhetorician.
Dirce, a stream of pure water in Bœotia.
discover, show.
distraction, madness.
Domitian, eleventh Emperor of Rome, reigned A.D. 81-96; a cruel tyrant.

Ecbatana, a summer residence of the Persian kings.
economy, government.
Eleusis, a city near Athens, scene of the mysteries of Demeter (Ceres) and Koré or Persephone (Proserpine). The rites were kept secret and revealed only to the initiate.
euthymema, a logical term.
Epaminondas, a Theban statesman and general, who delivered Thebes from the Spartans, B.C. 379; defeated them at Leuctra, 371; was killed, 362, at Mantinea.
Epaphroditus, once the master of Epictetus.
Epicurus, of Samos, B.C. 342-270, founder of a philosophy which cultivated "life according to nature." The followers of this school soon degenerated into sensualists.
Epirus, a district in N.W. Greece.
Eteocles, son of Œdipus, fought a duel with his brother for Thebes, and they slew each the other.
Euphrates, a Syrian philosopher, a Stoic, friend of the younger Pliny.
Eurystheus, King of Argos, to whom by divine ordinance was given the right to command Hercules.

Felicio, a slave of Epaphroditus, the master of Epictetus.

gaggle, cackle.
Galba, sixth Roman Emperor, reigned A.D. 68-69. He was murdered.
Gnossians, they of Gnossus in Crete.
Gyaros, Gyara, a small island used by the Romans as a penal settlement.

Hades, the underworld, the abode of the dead.
Hector, son of Priam, King of Troy, chief hero on the Trojan side in the War.
Helvidius Priscus, son-in-law of Thrasea Pætus, banished and then put to death for his boldness and freedom of speech, by Vespasian.
Helen, wife of Menelaus, carried off by Paris.
hellebore, a drug used for madness.
Hercules, national hero of Greece. His labours were undertaken at the bidding of Eurystheus. They were: (1) Nemean lion; (2) Lernean hydra; (3) Arcadian stag; (4) Erymanthian boar; (5) cleansing of the stables of Augeas; (6) Stymphalian birds; (7) Cretan bull; (8) mares of Diomedes; (9) Queen of Amazon's girdle; (10) oxen of Geryones; (11) golden apples of the Hesperides; (12) Cerberus brought up from Hades. After death he was deified.
Hermes, Lat. Mercury, messenger of the gods, guide of the souls to Hades, and god of windfalls and good luck. He carried a rod called in Latin caduceus.
Hippias, a Greek rhetorician.
Hippocrates, of Cos, greatest physician of antiquity about B.C. 460-357.

Ilium, Troy.
indifferent, neither good nor bad in itself (a Stoic term).
Isocrates, an Attic orator, B.C. 436-338.
Isthmian Games, celebrated every two years on the Isthmus of Corinth, in honour of Poseidon (Neptune).

Juno, Gr. Hera, queen of the gods.
Jupiter, Gr. Zeus, chief of the Roman gods.

Lycurgus, the great lawgiver of Sparta, 9th century B.C.
Lysias, an Attic orator, B.C. 458-378.

Marcian Water, the aqueduct in Rome of that name.
Maximus, a general who lived under the Emperor Trojan.
Maximus Sabinus, a Roman jurist under Augustus and Tiberius.
Medea, of Colchis, wife of Jason; when Jason tired of her, he murdered her two children in revenge. Euripides wrote a play so called.
Meletus, one of the accusers of Socrates.
Menelaus, King of Sparta, brother of Agamemnon, and husband of Helen.
monster, monstrosity, curiosity, freak.
Mycenæ, an ancient city near Argos.

Nausicaa, a princess who helped Ulysses when he was shipwrecked.
Nemean Games, celebrated every two years at Nemea in the Peloponnese, for the honour of Zeus (Jupiter).
Nero, fifth Roman emperor, reigned A.D. 54-68, proverbial for cruelty and vice.
Nicias, an Athenian commander.
Nymphs, were supposed to dwell in trees, streams, and hills.

Œdipus, son of Laius, King of Thebes, who by ordinance of fate slew his father, and wedded his mother unawares; then, in the height of his glory and power was shown the truth.
Olympia, in Elis, scene of the great games.
Olympiad, period of four years between the Olympic Games.
Olympic Games, celebrated every four years at Olympia in Elis, for the honour of Zeus (Jupiter); those were the greatest games of all Greece.
Orestes slew his mother Clytemnæstra for murder of his father Agamemnon; he fled to Delphi pursued by the Furies, or Avengers of his mother's spirit.
original, origin, elements.

pæan, hymn of praise.
palæstra, wrestling school.
Pallas, a title of Athena, goddess of skill and handicrafts.
Pan, god of the wild woodland, patron of shepherds.
pathics, vicious persons.
Patroclus, the bosom friend of Achilles, borrowed his armour, and was slain in it.
pedagogue, a slave in charge of children to take them to school.
Perdiccas, a warlike Macedonian chieftain.
Periander, tyrant of Corinth in the 6th century B.C., and one of the Seven Sages.
Phidias, the greatest sculptor of the world (B.C. 490-432). His most famous work was the statue of Zeus (Jupiter) at Olympia. He also made a great statue of Athena (Minerva) holding Victory in her hand, for the Parthenon. Both these were of gold and ivory over a wooden frame.
Philip of Macedon, reigned B.C. 359-336, when he was murdered.
Piræus, the harbour of Athens, joined to it by long parallel walls.
Pittacus, about B.C. 652-569, of Mytilene, one of the Seven Sages.
Plato, a philosopher of Athens, B.C. 429-347, disciple of Socrates, and founder of the School of the Academy.
Pluto, ruler of the underworld, who carried off Proserpine to be his wife.
polsers, clubs or dumb-bells.
Polus, a Sicilian sophist, brought into Plato's dialogue *Gorgias*.
Polynices, son of Œdipus: *see* Eteocles.
Priam, King of Troy, had fifty sons,

one of whom, Paris, carried off Helen, and so caused the Trojan War; he was killed at the sack of Troy by the Greeks.

Proserpine, daughter of Ceres.

prudent, prudence, prudent, wise, etc.

Protagoras, a Greek rhetorician.

Pyriphlegethon, the River of Fire, in Hades.

Pyrrho, 4th century B.C., founder of the school called Sceptics, who held that knowledge was unattainable.

Pythian Games, celebrated every four years at Delphi, in honour of Apollo Pythius.

Pythian Priestess, she who served the oracle of Apollo at Delphi.

Rhodes, an island off the coast of Caria.

Rufus, C. Musonius, a Stoic philosopher of the first century A.D.

Sardanapalus, last King of Assyria, noted for wealth, luxury, and debauchery.

Sarpedon, a Lycian prince, fought for the Trojans in the War, slain by Patroclus.

Saturn, an old Roman deity, under whom was the Golden Age.

Saturnalia, a winter festival at Rome, a time of merry-making and licence.

several, separate.

Sirens, witches who charmed mariners to their death by singing.

Socrates, the celebrated dialectician and philosopher, an Athenian, B.C. 469-399.

Solon of Athens, 6th century B.C., one of the Seven Sages.

straiten, press, inconvenience.

Strike, affect with strong feeling, desire, admiration, etc.

Susa, winter residence of the Persian kings.

Thales, about B.C. 636-546, of Miletus, one of the Seven Sages.

Thebes, capital of Bœotia.

Themistocles, an Athenian statesman and commander, 5th century B.C.

Theopompus of Chios, a historian, about B.C. 378-305.

theorem, speculation, rule.

theory, contemplation of things.

Thermopylæ, a pass between Thessaly and Locris, where Leonidas and his Spartans opposed the army of Xerxes and perished "obedient to their country's laws," B.C. 480.

Thersites, a foul-mouthed hunchback in the Greek host before Troy.

Theseus, national hero of Attica; famous for his conflicts with robbers and monsters: Periphates the club-bearer, Sinis the pine-bender, Sciron and his bowl, Procrustes and his bed, the sow of Crommyon, the bull of Marathon, the minotaur of Crete.

Thrasymachus, a sophist of Chalcedon, one of the characters in Plato's *Republic*.

topic, heading, section of a subject.

Triptolemus, a fabled culture-hero, associated with origin of agriculture.

Ulysses, Grecian hero, famed for his cunning; a fugitive from Troy, wandered for ten years, then returned home to his faithful wife Penelope.

unsociable, contrary to the principle of human society.

Vespasian, ninth Emperor of Rome, A.D. 69-79, founder of the Flacian dynasty.

vizard, mask.

Vulcan, Roman god of smithcraft.

Xenophon, a soldier and writer of Athens, led the Ten Thousand home after the battle of Cunaxa, and wrote the story of the march; he also wrote of Socrates; he was still alive in B.C. 357.

Xerxes, King of Persia, invaded Greece B.C. 480, and was defeated at Salamis and Platæa.

Zeno, of Citium, founder of the Stoic school, died about B.C. 260, aged 98.

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
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
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